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1 Introduction 
 
Abstract  
This study examines whether domestic political institutions moderate the influence of economic and political glob-
alisation on climate commitment and climate performance. It makes four contributions to the literature. First, there 
has been no systematic research to date on the extent to which domestic political institutions moderate globalisation 
effects in comparative climate policy research. Instead, three research strands have addressed the joint effect of 
international integration and domestic political institutions within the broader globalisation literature. The veto-
player approach assumes that both ideological heterogeneity among veto players and institutional constraints mod-
erate the effect of globalisation. The political-corruption approach argues that corrupt political decision-makers 
and public officials affect the environmental consequences of international integration. The regime-type approach 
suggests that globalisation affects democracies and autocracies in different ways. The present study applies these 
perspectives to the analysis of climate commitment, as measured by UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification, 
and performance captured by CO2 emissions. Its findings show that the veto-player approach cannot explain the 
relationship between globalisation, climate commitment, and performance. However, it does find support for the 
political-corruption and regime-type approaches. Second, this book contributes to the literature on the joint impact 
of globalisation and domestic political institutions on the environment. Previous research has focused on domestic 
pollution, arguing that governments formulating climate policy tend to react in similar ways to the pressures of 
international competition. The present analysis considers multiple dimensions of globalisation: economic open-
ness, economic interdependence, and international political integration, captured by state involvement in interna-
tional government organisations (IGOs). While countries may respond in similar ways to international economic 
pressures in order to stay competitive, domestic political institutions may moderate the scale effects of economic 
openness and the incentives derived from international political integration. The present findings indicate that the 
impact of economic interdependence on climate performance in developed countries is independent of veto players 
and political corruption. In addition, the regime-type and political-corruption approaches improve our understand-
ing of the effect of economic openness on climate performance in developing countries. Aspects of regime type 
also moderate the effect of international political integration on climate commitment. Third, this study shows that 
a disaggregated analysis of the moderation effects of institutional explanatory factors can contribute to a better 
understanding of the climate consequences of globalisation. In addition to earlier research, which suggested that 
political corruption worsened the negative effects of economic openness, this analysis shows that the interaction 
effect is independent of the form of political corruption. While political globalisation affects UNFCCC ratification 
in different ways in democracies and autocracies, civil rights (in particular) strengthen the positive effect of state 
IGO involvement on Kyoto Protocol ratification. In relation to climate performance, civil rights also moderate the 
effects of trade and capital openness on developing countries. Finally, this study adds to the literature on treaty 
design and international cooperation. The interaction effects of regime type and IGO involvement on climate com-
mitment vary in accordance with treaty design.  
The consequences of climate change can already be observed (IPCC, 2015, p. 6) in melting polar ice and glaciers, 
sea-level rise, and intense heat waves (NASA, 2019, no page number). Climate scientists agree that global warming 
is taking place (IPCC, 2015, p. 5). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has concluded that it 
is ‘extremely likely’ that global environmental change is being caused mainly by anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions (IPCC, 2015, p. 5, emphasis in original),1 which stem from combustion processes and deforestation. 
Most commentators agree that global warming is a challenge for society and the environment. Reducing global air 
pollution would change considerably our personal lives and the economy (Dauvergne, 2017, p. 409). Although 
climate change is a global environmental problem with global causes and consequences (Gleditsch & Sverdrup, 
2002, p. 56), the international political system lacks a world government. For this reason, efforts to address the 
climate change problem rely on international cooperation (Dolšak, 2001, p. 415f.; Frankel & Rose, 2005, p. 89; 
Holzinger et al., 2008, p. 553f.). 
However, several characteristics of the climate crisis make international cooperation difficult (see also Tubi et al., 
2012, p. 472; Underdal, 2010). First, from the perspective of public goods theory, climate change can be regarded 
as a worldwide ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968), i.e. a consequence of our overconsumption of the global 
 
1 More recent studies that support this conclusion include Haustein et al. (2019). 
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atmosphere (e.g., Bättig & Bernauer, 2009, p. 283; Dolšak, 2009, p. 554; Dolšak & Ostrom, 2003, p. 7; Harrison 
& Sundstrom, 2007, p. 1). Although the implications are spread unevenly, climate change mitigation is clearly in 
the long-term interest of all individuals and countries. However, to achieve and sustain their short-term interest in 
economic growth, citizens and governments must accept increases in greenhouse gas emissions (Dolšak, 2009, p. 
51; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010, p. 1; Vogler, 2008, p. 358). Moreover, sectors of the domestic economy that are 
harmed by reductions in global air pollution will mobilise against ambitious climate-protection policies (Dolšak, 
2013, p. 384; Dolšak, 2009). The public good character of the global atmosphere implies that the use of this natural 
resource cannot be restricted. This enables governments to free-ride on the climate-protection efforts of other 
countries (Dolšak, 2013, p. 384; Dolšak, 2009, p. 551, 553; Dolšak, 2001, p. 415; Giddens, 2015, p. 158). Under 
the conditions of global economic competition, states have no interest in climate change mitigation (Bechtel et al., 
2017, p. 1333). Second, the consequences of climate change are long term and will mainly affect future genera-
tions. This makes it less likely that political decision-makers will risk considerable short-term economic and po-
litical costs by forcing or implementing climate policies (Chayes & Chayes, 1991, p. 289; Held & Hervey, 2011, 
p. 102). Third, the costs and benefits of climate change mitigation vary among countries (Chayes & Chayes, 1991, 
p. 289; Dolšak, 2009, p. 552; Held & Hervey, 2011, p. 102). While developed countries face high costs, as they 
produce the largest share of greenhouse gas emissions, developing countries are more vulnerable to the conse-
quences of global environmental change (Dolšak, 2009, p. 552). From a historical perspective, poor economies 
have contributed very little to global warming. Their governments therefore have little interest in implementing 
climate policies that will harm their economic development (Held & Hervey, 2011, p. 102). In sum, public good 
theory suggests that countries are unwilling to commit to climate cooperation or to implement measures to tackle 
global environmental change (Dolšak, 2009, p. 551; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007, p. 1). 
However, state responses to the climate crisis vary considerably among countries (Bättig & Bernauer, 2009, p. 
283; Bernauer, 2013, pp. 433f.; Dolšak, 2001, p. 415; Holzinger et al., 2008, p. 554). Some countries, as well as 
regions and cities, are willing to accept ambitious greenhouse gas emissions targets and to take the lead on imple-
menting climate policies (Brennan, 2009, p. 312). By contrast, other states decline to make binding commitments 
at the international level (here: climate commitment) and avoid adopting or implementing domestic climate change 
mitigation policies (here: climate performance). Public good theory alone cannot explain differences in the climate 
commitment and performance of different countries (Bättig & Bernauer, 2009, p. 283; Tubi et al., 2012, p. 472). 
The following question thus arises: what variables explain country differences in state participation in international 
efforts to tackle global warming? (Bättig & Bernauer, 2009, p. 283f.; Dolšak, 2013, p. 384; Dolšak, 2009, p. 552; 
Garmann, 2014, p. 1; Holzinger et al. 2008, pp. 553f.; Stadelmann-Steffen, 2011, p. 485). Comparative and global 
environmental policy researchers agree that both domestic and international explanatory factors influence climate 
commitment and performance (e.g., Jahn, 2016, p. 225).  
In answer to the political recognition of global environmental change and the competitive pressures imposed by 
the world economy on governments and firms that encourage them to lower their environmental standards, social 
scientists, policymakers, and the public are currently debating the environmental consequences of globalisation2 
(Clapp & Dauvergne, 2011, pp. 19–46; Esty, 2011, p. 156). Is globalisation good or bad for our global environ-
ment? As greenhouse gas emissions result mainly from major economic activities (including transportation, pro-
duction, resource extraction, agriculture, and deforestation) (Dauvergne, 2017, p. 409), the public debate focuses 
on the relationship between economic globalisation and climate change. Social science also examines the im-
portance of international political integration in climate cooperation. Quantitative studies have reached ambiguous 
conclusions on the effects of economic and political globalisation on climate commitment and performance (see 
Chapter 3). Most studies have analysed the additive effects of globalisation, relative to domestic explanatory fac-
tors. The present study explores whether domestic political institutions moderate the effects of international eco-
nomic and political integration on state participation in climate cooperation. As will be explained below, this study 
applies a broad understanding of domestic political institutions, considering both institutional constraints (e.g., 
veto points) and institutional quality (e.g., democracy quality aspects and forms of political corruption). 
As Chapter 3 will discuss, most theoretical approaches in the globalisation/environment literature assume that 
domestic politics, including domestic political institutions, moderates the impact of international integration on 
(foreign) policy outputs (Chaudoin et al., 2015, p. 276; Wenzelburger & Neumann, 2015, 260f.; Zohlnhöfer, 2005). 
First, governments moderate state responses to international integration. Economic and political globalisation in-
fluence climate commitment and performance, acting as incentives and pressures on government behaviour. The 
ratification of climate treaties depends on the domestic political decision-making process, which is shaped by 
domestic political institutions (Congleton, 2002, p. 241; Dolšak, 2009, p. 556; Schulze, 2014, p. 116; Vogler, 2008, 
p. 353). State efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions also occur at country level. The same policy measures 
are used to reduce domestic and global pollution (Povitkina, 2018, p. 413). National governments are central po-
litical actors in the domestic adoption and implementation of climate-related and other policies that affect our 
 
2 This book treats the terms ‘globalisation’ and ‘international integration’ as synonyms. 
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global atmosphere (Barkdull & Harris, 2002, p. 64; Duit, 2014, p. 3; Gleditsch & Sverdrup, 2002, p. 57; Held & 
Hervey, 2011, p. 105; Holzinger et al., 2008, p. 554; McBeath & Rosenberg, 2006, p. 7). Second, domestic political 
institutions involved in implementing climate policies moderate the effect of globalisation on climate performance. 
Third, the government system, alongside domestic political institutions outside the government system, strength-
ens or weakens the impact of international incentives and pressures on climate commitment and performance. In 
this way, domestic political institutions influence a government’s exposure to international influences. 
 ‘Decisions […] are in the end domestic political decisions, taken in the context of home-grown electoral 
interests, national discourses, and domestic political institutions’ (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007, p. 2). 
Finally, domestic political institutions moderate (as context conditions of international trade and investment) the 
effect of economic openness on climate performance via economic growth. It is therefore important to ask whether 
they make a difference to the relationship between globalisation and state participation in climate cooperation. 
Race-to-the-bottom theory suggests that the effects of international integration are independent of domestic polit-
ical institutions. Governments reduce their environmental standards to stay competitive. For this reason, Cao and 
Prakash (2012) have focused on domestic pollutants. While, to stay competitive, countries may react in similar 
ways to pressures related to economic globalisation, this study argues that institutional explanatory factors may 
still moderate the growth effects of economic openness, as well as the incentives derived from international polit-
ical integration, on state participation in climate cooperation. Moreover, there may be differences between climate 
commitment and performance. Despite the pressure of economic competition, states may ratify climate treaties in 
response to positive incentives related to domestic politics and international political integration, without intending 
to actually implement them. Few quantitative studies have considered the possible interaction effects between 
domestic and international explanatory factors in climate performance (e.g., Chang, 2015; Perkins & Neumayer, 
2012; Ruoff, 2009; Spilker, 2013). Interaction effects between globalisation and domestic politics, in relation to 
state participation in climate cooperation, have never been systematically analysed (Bernauer, 2013, p. 436; Pur-
don, 2015, p. 15; see also Cao & Prakash, 2012, p. 67 on environmental policy in general).  
 ‘While research into climate change politics increasingly engages the classic repertoires of comparative 
politics and public policy, it remains necessary to (re)think how international and domestic politics in-
teract’ (Purdon, 2015, p. 15). 
The broader literature on the policy consequences of globalisation has shown that domestic political institutions 
make a difference in the relationship between international integration and public policy (e.g., Garrett 1998; Ha, 
2008; Rudra, 2002; Rudra & Haggard, 2005). The present study intends to fill this research gap. This chapter 
specifies the research question (1.1), explains its relevance (1.2), and summarises this book, chapter by chapter 
(1.3). 
1.1 Specification of the research question 
Do the effects of globalisation on state participation in international climate cooperation depend on domestic po-
litical institutions? The following section explores this research question. State participation in international cli-
mate-protection efforts is here defined as a commitment to the central goals and principles of the UN climate 
change regime (climate commitment) and the adoption and implementation of measures to mitigate climate change 
(climate performance) (see Chapter 2). In considering state participation in international climate cooperation, this 
study restricts the dependent variable to one aspect of a country’s overall climate policy. As explained above, 
collective action by a large number of countries is needed to tackle global warming (Brennan, 2009, p. 310; 
Gleditsch & Sverdrup, 2002, p. 56). It is therefore essential to study country differences in climate cooperation. 
Furthermore, as global warming is a ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968), which cannot be solved without 
considerable costs, it constitutes a hard test for the hypothesis that globalisation and domestic political institutions 
jointly influence environmental protection efforts (Bättig & Bernauer, 2009, p. 292). The present study specifies 
the dependent variable as state participation within the United Nations (UN) climate change regime (UNFCCC, 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), as it is the only global approach to coordinate state 
behaviour to tackle global warming3.  
Both dimensions of climate cooperation are examined. As Chapter 2 will explain, commitment to the central goals 
and principles of climate cooperation is captured through the ratification of UN climate treaties. The focus of this 
study on UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification reflects the availability of data.4 Climate performance is con-
ceptualised using climate policy outcomes5 and measured by carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Previous studies of 
 
3 Giddens (2015, pp. 159f.) argues in favour of regional and bilateral cooperation with countries such as Brazil, China, and 
India, as the climate crisis cannot be solved without them. He argues that the UN is too weak to enforce climate change miti-
gation. 
4 Data for all relevant independent variables are available up to 2006. 
5 This book treats the terms ‘climate policy outcome’ and ‘climate outcome’ as synonyms. 
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the joint effect of globalisation and domestic political institutions have focused on climate performance (e.g., 
Spilker, 2013). To date, no similar publication has investigated climate commitment. However, the definition of 
climate cooperation requires states to agree on common goals and principles and implement policy measures to 
enact them. For this reason, it is relevant to study how globalisation affects both dimensions of climate cooperation. 
This book investigates climate commitment and performance separately. As previously mentioned, the ratification 
of climate treaties does not necessarily imply that governments also reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. States 
have different motivations for joining climate treaties and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, in con-
trast to the ratification of international agreements, climate policy outcomes are influenced by factors beyond 
government behaviour. The literature shows that the relative importance of explanatory factors varies between 
climate commitment and performance (e.g., Bättig & Bernauer, 2009). It is therefore important to investigate 
whether globalisation affects climate commitment and performance in different ways. For example, states may be 
more likely to ratify climate treaties in response to incentives derived from IGO involvement than to reduce climate 
change. Simultaneously, competition concerns may have more impact on climate performance than on climate 
commitment. It is also relevant to explore whether domestic political institutions influence globalisation effects in 
both climate-cooperation dimensions. Researchers must compare domestic and international explanatory factors 
in both dimensions of state participation in climate cooperation. Domestic political institutions may have more 
influence on climate commitment than on climate performance. It is easier for countries to ratify climate treaties 
in response to ENGO influence and incentives derived from international political integration, than to mitigate 
climate change. The costs are lower and the issue visibility of ratification behaviour is higher. It is harder for 
citizens and ENGOs to monitor the impact of economic globalisation on climate policy outcomes. 
In relation to economic and political globalisation, the research question focuses on international factors that help 
to explain climate commitment and performance. Two categories of possible international determinants can be 
distinguished: the impact of state linkages with the international system (e.g., the distribution of power within the 
international system) (Cohen, 2002, p. 432; Oatley, 2011, p. 312; Waltz, 1959, pp. 159f.) and linkages between 
countries (Cao & Prakash, 2012, p. 68; Oatley, 2011, p. 313). In the case of globalisation, this study focuses on 
the latter. Following previous comparative climate policy research, it examines international economic and polit-
ical integration. Two conceptualisations of the former are considered: economic openness (trade and capital open-
ness) and economic interdependence, conceptualised as policy diffusion via important trading partners. This study 
argues that the moderation effects of domestic political institutions should vary between economic openness and 
policy diffusion. Irrespective of institutional differences, countries may react in similar ways to competition pres-
sures. Domestic political institutions may, however, influence the growth effects associated with economic open-
ness. In line with previous research, international political integration is here conceptualised as state involvement 
in international government organisations (IGOs) (see Chapter 3).6 
Domestic influences on policy outputs and outcomes result from processes within the country (Waltz, 1959, p. 
81). This study investigates the importance of domestic political institutions, exploring the extent to which domes-
tic politics influence the effect of globalisation. Focusing on institutional variables makes it possible to examine 
countries worldwide. The availability of data on the policy preferences of political decision-makers outside the 
developed world is limited. Three research strands within the literature address the joint effect of globalisation and 
domestic political institutions on (environmental) policy. The veto-player approach argues that ideological heter-
ogeneity among veto players and institutional constraints (veto points) moderate the effect of international inte-
gration. The political-corruption approach assumes that levels of corruption among political decision-makers and 
public officials impact the consequences of international integration. Finally, the regime-type approach assumes 
that effect of globalisation differs between democracies and autocracies. The underlying understandings of domes-
tic political institutions vary among these explanatory approaches. While the veto-player approach focuses on 
institutional constraints, the political-corruption and regime-type approaches consider aspects of institutional qual-
ity. Accordingly, this study applies a broad understanding of domestic political institutions, considering institu-
tional constraints and quality. Chapters 4 and 5 will detail the domestic political institutional variables of the three 
explanatory factors. To answer the research question, this study applies these perspectives to an analysis of climate 
commitment and performance, asking the following question: Are the effects of international economic and polit-
ical integration on climate commitment and performance dependent on the policy preferences of veto players, veto 
points, political corruption and/or regime type?7 As far as possible, the study examines the rules in use in relation 
to domestic political institutions.8 The veto-player approach makes it possible to consider the policy preferences 
of veto players. The database limits the analysis of these factors in countries outside the developed world.  
 
6 Moreover, data availability restricts the focus on state involvement in IGOs (see Chapter 3). The final chapter discusses 
additional dimensions of globalisation, which should be considered in future research. 
7 The regime type is only applied in the pooled analysis and in the separate analysis of developing countries. 
8 Data availability partly restricts this analysis of the veto-player approach to rules of law. 
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Finally, this study examines both developing and developed countries9. While this classification is too simplistic 
to account for the development level of countries worldwide10 (Farias, 2019; Tezanos Vázquez & Sumner, 2013), 
it is relevant to analysing climate cooperation. First, there are legal differences between these two country groups. 
The UN climate change regime regards rich countries as historically responsible for global warming. By contrast, 
poor economies were expected to focus on their own development during the research period (1992-2006). Gov-
ernments also use the developing/developed classification system to shape foreign policy identity (e.g., Farias, 
2019). Some countries retain developing-country status in the climate change regime because it gives them an 
advantage (e.g., Turkey). Second, greenhouse gas emissions are higher in high-income countries, where the indus-
trialisation process began earlier. The climate performance of these two groups should therefore be studied sepa-
rately. This book examines both developed and developing countries. From a historical perspective, global warm-
ing has been caused by industrialised countries. However, it is relevant to study the participation of developing 
countries in climate cooperation as well. From a social-science perspective, the level of economic development 
alone cannot explain country differences in environmental policies (Spilker, 2013, p. 1). From a policy perspective, 
poor economies must be included to solve the climate change problem (Lederer, 2017, pp. 1107f.). In fact, most 
CO2 emissions now come from the developing world (CGDEV, 2015, no page number). For instance, Brazil and 
China have higher per-capita emissions than some developed countries (Lederer, 2014, p. 327). For the reasons 
detailed above, this book studies developed and developing countries separately, whenever possible. Globalisation 
can be assumed to affect climate commitment and performance in different ways in the two groups; in addition, 
climate treaties define different obligations for countries in the two groups. The industrialisation process began 
earlier in rich countries than in poor ones. Rich countries, therefore, have historically higher levels of global air 
pollution. 
To conclude, this book investigates whether effects of economic and political globalisation on climate commitment 
and performance depend on the policy preferences of veto players, veto points, political corruption, and/or regime 
type. It develops explanatory models of climate commitment and performance for the veto player, political cor-
ruption, and regime-type approaches, using these to formulate hypotheses for an empirical analysis. It conducts 
survival and OLS regression analyses to examine climate commitment and performance. Given the lack of varia-
tion in the ratification behaviour of developed countries, the analysis of climate commitment explores the pooled 
sample of all countries, as well as separately investigating developing countries. Climate performance is analysed 
separately for developed and developing countries. As the developed-country sample consists only of democracies, 
hypotheses related to climate performance are tested only on the developing-country sample with the regime-type 
approach. 
1.2  Contributions to the literature 
The analysis of possible interaction effects between domestic political institutions and globalisation is relevant 
from a scientific as well as a policy perspective. Former UN general secretary, Ban Ki Moon, called global warm-
ing the greatest challenge facing humankind (Hance, 2009, no page number). More recently, Michelle Bachelet, 
the UN rights chief, described climate change as a ‘never seen threat to human rights’ (see AFP, 2019, no page 
number). From a policy perspective, it is important to understand country differences in the willingness and ability 
of governments to tackle climate change (Bernauer, 2013, p. 434; Cao et al., 2014, p. 293). It particularly important 
to establish the extent to which domestic factors moderate the globalisation/global warming relationship. Policy-
makers and interest groups argue that the state is powerless under conditions of economic globalisation (Jänicke, 
1998, p. 343). According to Frankel and Rose (2005, p. 85), when international trade contributes to environmental 
degradation, independent of other factors, there is little public demand to reduce globalisation to protect the envi-
ronment.  
This study makes four contributions to the academic literature. To date, there has been no systematic research on 
this research question in the comparative climate-policy literature. Early International Relations scholars focused 
on international factors to explain climate commitment (e.g., Young, 1997) (Paarlberg, 1997, p. 149; Sussman, 
2004, p. 351). Quantitative studies in the field of comparative environmental policy research focused on domestic 
determinants (e.g., Scruggs, 2003). In accordance on the assumption made in comparative policy and comparative 
foreign-policy theory – that policy outputs are determined by international and domestic variables (Bernauer et al., 
2010, p. 509; Chaudoin et al., 2015, p. 275; Dolšak, 2001, p. 416; Jahn, 2016, p. 225; Zohlnhöfer, 2016, p. 225) – 
recent comparative climate policy research has considered both (Jahn, 2016, p. 225). This study is the first to 
 
9 The terms ‘developed’, ‘industrialised’, ‘rich’ and ‘high-income countries/economies’ are used as synonyms in this book. The 
same applies to ‘developing’ and ‘poor countries/economies’. 
10 First, there are considerable differences within developed and developing countries (Farias, 2019). Second, there are poor 
countries that perform with regard to at least some aspects of socio-economic development better than high-income countries 
and a decline in economic equality in the developed world can be observed (Farias, 2019). 
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contribute to comparative climate policy research by studying the possible interaction effects of domestic and 
international explanatory factors. This analysis of the moderation effects of globalisation and domestic political 
institutions could contribute to a better understanding of climate commitment and performance (Beeson, 2018, p. 
35; Cao & Prakash, 2012; Graham et al., 2012, p. 696). 
‘It is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations, or the reverse. 
‘Both sometimes.’ The more interesting questions are ‘When?’ and ‘How?’’ (Putnam, 1988, p. 427). 
Accordingly, Bernauer (2013, p. 434), Cao and Prakash (2012, p. 67), and Purdon (2015, p. 15) argue that com-
parative climate policy research should consider the moderation effects of domestic variables on international 
influences. Few studies have examined the interaction effects of international integration and domestic political 
institutions on climate performance. Spilker (2013) has shown that regime type does not moderate the effect of 
trade openness on CO2 emissions in developing countries. In another study, Ruoff (2009) found no interaction 
between international political integration and democracy quality in relation to climate performance in the devel-
oping world. Chang (2015) has demonstrated that trade openness is associated with an increase in CO2 emissions 
in corrupt countries. Existent research on the present research question has focused on climate performance. By 
contrast, this study examines climate commitment and performance. The literature suggests that domestic and 
international explanatory factors affect climate commitment and performance in different ways (see Chapters 3 & 
4). This book argues that the same is true of their joint effect. With regard to the regime-type approach, this study 
argues that, as climate change mitigation is associated with considerable costs, international political integration 
is unlikely to contribute to climate performance in either democracies or autocracies. By contrast, regime-type 
differences (which increase countries’ openness to incentives derived from international political integration) are 
likely to impact its influence on climate commitment. Finally, in contrast to previous research, this study examines 
simultaneously the veto player, political corruption, and regime-type approaches to the joint effect of globalisation. 
Similar research has focused on specific institutional variables. The present study shows that the veto-player ap-
proach cannot explain the relationship between globalisation, climate commitment, and performance. The policy 
preferences of veto players in the left/right dimensions are unlikely to influence the effect of globalisation on 
climate commitment or performance. Left- and right-wing parties both want their domestic economies to be com-
petitive. However, the political-corruption and regime-type approaches improve our understanding of the effects 
of economic openness and political integration on climate commitment and performance. 
Second, this study complements the broader literature on the joint effects of globalisation and domestic political 
institutions on the environment. It considers multiple dimensions of globalisation: economic openness and inter-
dependence and international political integration. Jahn and Stephan (2015, p. 18), as well as Franzese and Hays 
(2008, p. 752), emphasise that the non-inclusion or inadequate conceptualisation of international integration will 
result in omitted-variable bias. The following analysis assumes that the moderation effects of domestic political 
institutions and globalisation can vary between economic and political globalisation. Previous research (e.g., Cao 
& Prakash, 2012) has focused on analysing the joint effects of domestic political institutions and economic inter-
dependence on domestic environmental problems, based on the assumption that climate change has no immediate 
impact on citizens, leading governments to react in similar ways to international pressures to stay internationally 
competitive. The present study argues that, while countries respond in similar ways to international economic 
pressures to stay competitive (economic interdependence), domestic political institutions have more influence on 
international political integration and the economic-growth effects of economic openness. Accordingly, the effect 
of policy diffusion among trading partners is independent of political institutions. By contrast, regime type mod-
erates the effect of international political integration on climate commitment. The regime-type and political-cor-
ruption approaches improve our understanding of the effect of economic openness on climate performance in 
developing countries. 
Third, this study contributes to research on the joint effects of globalisation and domestic political institutions by 
examining the possible moderation effects of veto points, forms of political corruption, and regime type at a dis-
aggregated level. The academic literature suggests that specific veto points, political-corruption dimensions, and 
democracy-quality dimensions cannot be expected to have uniform effects on climate commitment and perfor-
mance. The present study argues that this is also relevant to their joint effect with globalisation on climate com-
mitment and performance. From a theoretical perspective, the potential moderation effects of specific veto points, 
such as a presidential veto player, bicameralism, or government fragmentation, are ambiguous and must therefore 
be examined separately. The political-corruption/environment literature distinguishes between forms of political 
corruption. From a theoretical perspective, it is unclear whether general political corruption or specific forms of 
political corruption (e.g., executive, legislative, or public sector corruption) moderate the effect of international 
integration. In line with the results of Spilker (2013), there may be no general difference between democracies and 
autocracies in the effect of trade openness on climate commitment and performance. However, specific democratic 
qualities, such as political and civil rights, may strengthen positive incentives derived from political globalisation 
to encourage the ratification of climate treaties. Such democratic freedoms also make a country attractive for do-
mestic and foreign investment. They can therefore be expected to undermine climate performance via economic 
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growth. The present findings show that a disaggregated analysis of regime type, in particular, contributes to a 
better understanding of the interaction effects between globalisation and domestic political institutions. 
Finally, this study adds to the literature on treaty design and climate cooperation. The literature suggests that treaty 
design matters for the ratification of climate agreements (e.g., Bernauer et al., 2013; Spilker, 2013). It should 
likewise affect the interrelationship between globalisation and domestic political institutions. Few costs are asso-
ciated with ratifying the UNFCCC. The Kyoto Protocol encompasses legally binding emissions reduction targets 
for developed countries; it has been contested among developing countries as well. Democracies and autocracies 
can be assumed to differ systemically, when it comes to the relationship between international political integration 
and ratifying the UNFCCC. It is an empirical question whether the positive effect of political globalisation is 
stronger in democracies or autocracies. Democracies are more open to international influences. Autocracies may 
join IGOs and ratify climate treaties to improve their international reputations. With regard to the Kyoto Protocol, 
there is no general difference between democracies and autocracies. Yet, as previously mentioned, the positive 
effect of international political integration on Kyoto Protocol ratification may be stronger in countries with above-
average levels of political and civil rights. These democratic qualities enable ENGOs to pressure the government, 
reflecting a country’s acceptance of the rule of law. The findings of this study confirm that IGO involvement 
contributes in autocracies and to Kyoto Protocol ratification in countries with above-average levels of civil rights. 
1.3  Chapter by chapter summary 
In response to research question, Chapter 2 explains the conceptualisation and measurement of the dependent 
variable. First, the joint influence of globalisation and domestic political institutions must be studied separately in 
relation to different environmental problems. Political decision makers have fewer incentives to tackle global 
warming than local environmental problems (such as local air pollutants, including nitrogen oxides, NOx; sulphur 
dioxide, SO2). However, it is an empirical question whether domestic political institutions matter to the relationship 
between globalisation and climate protection. As a solution to the climate crisis depends on international coordi-
nation, this study focuses on state participation in climate cooperation. The dependent variable is defined as com-
mitment to the central goals and principles of the UN climate change regime (climate commitment) and imple-
menting measures that contribute to its central goal: the stabilisation of greenhouse gas emissions (climate perfor-
mance). Climate commitment is measured through ratification of the two treaties that fall into the 1992–2006 
research period: the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Climate performance is captured, based on the concept of 
environmental performance, through CO2 emissions. Second, it is important to examine climate commitment and 
performance separately, as previous studies have shown that explanatory factors vary. In contrast to reductions in 
CO2 emissions, climate treaties can be ratified at little cost. This should be an important factor in the interrelation-
ship of domestic and international variables as well. Third, the literature on treaty design and international coop-
eration suggests that the relative importance of domestic and international factors that explain climate commitment 
vary in accordance with treaty design. This study contributes to the literature by examining the joint effects of 
domestic political institutions and globalisation separately for UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification. The latter 
treaty is more challenging for developed countries because it incurs higher costs (e.g., legally binding greenhouse 
gas emissions reduction targets) than the former. Finally, differences between developed and developing countries 
should be considered when analysing the possible moderation effects of domestic political institutions. The two 
climate treaties define different obligations for developed and developing countries. Moreover, the industrialisa-
tion process began earlier in rich countries than in poor ones. The former therefore have higher levels of global air 
pollution. 
To formulate hypotheses on interaction effects, it is necessary to specify the causal order of domestic and interna-
tional explanatory factors of climate commitment and performance. Chapter 3 begins by examining the relation-
ship between international integration, climate commitment, and performance. Is globalisation good or bad for 
climate commitment and performance? How does globalisation affect state participation in climate cooperation? 
The theoretical and empirical literature suggests that economic openness undermines climate performance in poor 
economies through the scale and composition effects of economic growth, and that international political integra-
tion contributes via positive incentives to climate commitment and performance. In the developed world, economic 
globalisation has a particular influence on climate outcomes via policy diffusion among trading partners.  
Second, Chapter 3 explains this study’s contribution to the academic literature. Are the effects of economic and 
political globalisation dependent on domestic political institutions? Most theories underpinning arguments that 
link international integration to climate commitment and performance assume that domestic political institutions 
moderate the effect of international integration. The central argument of this chapter is that it must be determined 
empirically whether the effect of globalisation on climate commitment and performance is independent of domes-
tic factors. While domestic political institutions may not impact competition pressures, the interaction effects be-
tween international integration and domestic political institutions may vary among globalisation dimensions. 
Moreover, institutional constraints and institutional quality do not simply influence government responses to 
16 
 
 
globalisation, they also moderate the indirect effects of economic openness via economic growth. Previous empir-
ical explanatory models of climate commitment and performance have assumed additive effects of international 
integration. Based on the broader globalisation literature, this chapter distinguishes between three research tradi-
tions involving the joint effect of globalisation and domestic political institutions: veto player theory, the joint 
influence of globalisation and political corruption, and the joint influence of the globalisation and regime type. 
They share the assumption that institutional constraints and quality matter to the relationship between globalisation 
and policy output and outcome. To contribute to the globalisation/environment literature, this study examines 
whether these perspectives apply to climate commitment and performance. 
To identify the role played by domestic institutional factors in the causal process discussed in Chapter 5, Chapter 
4 examines the literature on veto players, political corruption, regime type, and climate commitment and perfor-
mance. This chapter argues that it is important to analyse the effect of veto players, political corruption, and regime 
type on climate commitment and performance at a disaggregated level. As the following chapter explains, this is 
also important for analysing the joint influence of globalisation and domestic political institutions. The veto-player 
approach discusses the importance of ideological heterogeneity among veto players and government ideology, as 
well as veto points for climate commitment and performance. There is no agreement on whether specific veto 
points have uniform effects (government fragmentation, presidentialism, and bicameralism/federalism). While the 
literature assumes that the political corruption of political decision-makers and public officials undermines the 
ratification of climate treaties and efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, their relative importance is unclear. 
Finally, while democracies and autocracies are likely to differ systemically in their ratification of soft international 
treaties, such as the UNFCCC, no uniform effect of democratic quality dimensions (vertical and horizontal ac-
countability, political and civil rights) on Kyoto Protocol ratification and climate performance can be assumed. 
To specify the causal order of domestic and international explanatory factors, based on the conclusions of the 
previous two chapters, Chapter 5 first partly reformulates Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer’s (2015) explanatory 
model, transferring it to climate commitment and performance. The following sections specify the basis for ex-
planatory models of the joint influence of globalisation and veto players/political corruption/regime type and for-
mulate hypotheses for the empirical analysis.  
With regard to climate commitment, regime type is assumed to matter to the relationship between international 
political integration and UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification. However, there may be differences between 
the two treaties. Democracies and autocracies are likely to differ systemically with regard to the effect of interna-
tional political integration on UNFCCC ratification. Ratifying the UNFCCC involves few costs. It is an empirical 
question whether democracies or autocracies ratify soft climate treaties faster. There is unlikely to be a systemic 
difference between democracies and autocracies in the effect of international political integration on the ratification 
of the harder Kyoto Protocol. However, political and civil rights, together with international political integration, 
may contribute to Kyoto Protocol ratification.  
This study assumes that ideological heterogeneity among left- and right-wing veto players makes little difference 
in the relationship between economic globalisation and climate performance. Left- and right-wing parties care 
about the competitiveness of the domestic economy. There is little reason to expect domestic political institutions 
to moderate the effects of economic interdependence on climate outcomes in the developed world. Independent 
from institutional difference, governments should consider competition concerns. It is an empirical question 
whether specific veto points moderate the effect of economic globalisation. By contrast, in developing countries, 
political corruption, as well as political and civil rights, is likely to moderate the scale effects of economic openness 
on climate performance. It is unclear, from a theoretical perspective, whether the negative effects of economic 
openness are stronger or weaker in countries with high levels of political corruption and political and/or civil 
rights. On the one hand, political and civil rights should weaken the negative effects of international trade and 
investment. Political rights enable citizens and ENGOs to pressure the government and business actors to consider 
environmental protection. Civil rights allow them to use courts to demand that environmental regulations be im-
plemented. On the other hand, political and civil rights may undermine climate performance via economic growth 
because they make a country more attractive for trade and investment. The interrelationship between political 
corruption and economic openness is also theoretically ambiguous. Corrupt political authorities and public offi-
cials may strengthen the negative effects of economic openness because it hinders the adoption and implementation 
of environmental policies. Simultaneously, it undermines a country’s attractiveness for trade and investment. 
The research design is explained in Chapter 6. As this study is interested in explaining cross-national variations 
in climate commitment and performance, it adopts a macro-comparative approach. The first section explains the 
research period and case selection. The second section describes the measurement of the main independent varia-
bles. To ascertain the relative importance of the interrelationship between international integration and domestic 
politics, statistical analyses control additional economic, natural, political, and social variables that have been 
applied in similar studies. This chapter therefore formulates control hypotheses based on the academic literature. 
The criteria used to measure the independent variables were data availability and data comparability, in addition 
to validity and reliability. The final section summarises the treatment of missing values. 
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Is globalisation good or bad for climate commitment and performance? Is its effect independent of domestic po-
litical institutions? Chapters 7 and 8 carry out a survival analysis and OLS regression analysis respectively to 
examine climate commitment and performance. In accordance with the theoretical expectations, globalisation and 
its interplay with domestic political institutions affects climate commitment and performance in various ways. 
While international economic integration has no effect on the ratification of climate treaties, IGO involvement 
contributes to climate commitment. As expected, the statistical analysis offers no support for the veto-player or 
political-corruption approaches. However, regime type does moderate the effect of international political integra-
tion on climate commitment. In accordance with the hypotheses, the joint effect of regime type and state involve-
ment in IGOs varies between UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. IGO involvement contributes only in autocracies 
to UNFCCC ratification. This finding confirms previous research on the ratification of soft human-rights treaties. 
Autocracies join IGOs and soft international agreements to improve their reputations at the international level. As 
expected, there is no systemic difference between democracies and autocracies when it comes to the relationship 
between international political integration and Kyoto Protocol ratification. However, civil rights strengthen the 
positive effect of state involvement in IGOs on Kyoto Protocol ratification. Countries that accept the rule of law 
at the domestic level ratify the Kyoto Protocol faster. The statistical analysis finds no support for the hypothesis 
that political rights matter to the relationship between international political integration and Kyoto Protocol ratifi-
cation. These results illustrate the importance of considering aspects of regime type when analysing international 
political integration and climate commitment. Moreover, they contribute to the literature on treaty design and 
international cooperation. The joint effects of domestic and international explanatory factors vary in accordance 
with treaty design.  
Confirming theoretical expectations, the findings suggest that climate performance in developed countries depends 
on the climate outcomes of important trading partners. As expected, this effect is independent of veto players and 
forms of political corruption. However, international political integration contributes to climate performance in 
bicameral developed countries. A short case study of the United States investigates this relationship in more detail. 
Among globalisation dimensions, only trade and capital openness are associated with the climate performance of 
developing countries. As expected, among globalisation dimensions, economic openness is crucial for climate 
outcomes in developing countries. As earlier research has shown, political corruption worsens the negative effect 
of international trade on climate performance. This study makes the point that this effect is independent of the 
form of political corruption. In accordance with theoretical expectations, civil rights moderate the effect of eco-
nomic openness on climate outcomes. Civil rights weaken the negative consequences of international trade. Sim-
ultaneously, capital openness contributes to climate performance in countries with below-average civil-rights val-
ues but undermines climate performance in countries that perform relatively well in these democratic-quality di-
mensions. This supports the hypothesis that civil liberties increase via the attractiveness to foreign investment 
scale effects of international trade on CO2 emissions. The paradoxical finding of this study – that these freedom-
related rights strengthen the positive effects of international political integration on climate commitment and 
strengthen the negative effects of economic openness on climate performance – is explained using Bolivia as a 
case study.  
Overall, this book shows that political globalisation contributes to climate commitment and supports climate per-
formance in the developed world. Economic globalisation influences climate outcomes in developed countries via 
economic interdependence, and in developing countries via economic openness. Apart from the relationship be-
tween economic interdependence and climate outcomes in rich countries, the effects of globalisation are moderated 
by domestic political institutions. However, interaction effects vary among globalisation dimensions, between cli-
mate commitment and performance, in relation to treaty design, and between developed and developing countries. 
The results support hypotheses based on political-corruption and regime-type approaches. By contrast, there is 
little support for the veto-player approach. A disaggregated analysis of institutional variables improves our under-
standing of the moderation effects of regime type. The final chapter (Chapter 9) compares findings related to 
climate commitment and performance, explains their contributions to the literature, and discusses the study limi-
tations, policy implications, and opportunities for future research. 
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2 Conceptualisation and measurement of climate commitment 
and performance 
Abstract 
The joint influence of globalisation and domestic political institutions should be studied separately in relation to 
different environmental problems. Political decision-makers have fewer incentives to tackle the negative conse-
quences of international integration on climate change than to address local and regional environmental problems. 
As the solution to global warming depends on international coordination, this study examines variations in state 
participation in the UN climate change regime. This chapter defines the dependent variable as a commitment to 
the central goals and principles of the UN climate change regime (climate commitment) and the implementation 
of measures that contribute to its central goal: climate change mitigation (climate performance). In accordance 
with previous research, both dimensions of climate cooperation are studied separately, as explanatory factors and 
their interactions may vary between climate commitment and performance. Climate commitment is measured by 
ratification of the two treaties that fall within the research period (1992–2006), the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. As determinants and their interactions may vary in accordance with treaty design, the ratification of each 
climate agreement is investigated separately. To conceptualise the second dimension, this chapter explains how 
the climate performance concept is used, based on climate policy outcomes (CO2 emissions), in comparison to 
other concepts. Finally, as the UN climate change regime defines different obligations for developed and develop-
ing countries, this study distinguishes between developed and developing countries in its analysis of the potential 
moderation effects of domestic political institutions. 
This study analyses the joint effect of globalisation and domestic political institutions on cross-national variations 
in climate commitment and performance. To this end, the first section (2.1) of this chapter explains the focus on 
state participation in the UN climate change regime and specifies the dependent variable as a commitment to its 
common goals (climate commitment) and implementing policy measures that contribute to climate change miti-
gation (climate performance). Moreover, it argues that, for theoretical and empirical reasons, the factors that ex-
plain climate commitment and performance should be studied separately. In academic research, different concep-
tualisations and measures have been applied to both dimensions of climate cooperation. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 spec-
ify these and explain the measurements. The moderation effects of domestic political institutions on the influence 
of globalisation on climate commitment and performance may vary between developed and developing countries. 
For this reason, the empirical analysis considers differences between developed and developing countries. The 
final section summarises the conclusions. 
2.1  State participation in international climate cooperation 
Broad and narrow definitions of environmental policy can be distinguished in environmental policy research. 
Broad definitions refer to political decisions on the relationship between a society and its environment (Saretzki, 
2005, p. 1049; Tuschhoff, 2015, p. 209). Narrow understandings specify environmental policy as a set of political 
decisions to protect and ameliorate natural resources (Tosun, 2015, p. 641; Tosun, 2012, p. 437). In accordance 
with the literature on the environmental consequences of globalisation, this study adopts a narrow definition. En-
vironmental policy is a multidimensional concept, differentiated in relation to specific environmental problems 
that need to be tackled (Tosun, 2015, p. 642). Climate policy refers to state efforts to protect our global atmosphere. 
This study limits the dependent variable to a country’s participation in climate cooperation. The following section 
explains this specification in relation to the research question.  
For theoretical and empirical reasons, it is important to study specific environmental problems separately when 
exploring the potential moderation effects of domestic political institutions on the influence of globalisation. The 
existing literature suggests that state responses to environmental challenges and the relative importance of political 
explanatory factors depend on the type of environmental problem (e.g., Spilker, 2013). In this respect, the combi-
nation of several characteristics distinguishes the climate crisis from other environmental problems. First, climate 
change is a global environmental problem. It has worldwide causes and consequences. Moreover, the effects of 
global warming are unequally spread across the world. Political authorities have fewer incentives to adopt and 
implement climate-protection policies than measures to solve local and regional environmental problems. The 
issue visibility of domestic environmental problems is higher (see also Cao & Prakash, 2012, p. 67). If they aim 
to stay in power, political authorities are presumably more interested in solving domestic environmental problems 
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than in ensuring global environmental change. They may even shift the responsibility for climate protection to the 
international level. In addition, various social groups support global and domestic environmental protection (Farzin 
& Bond, 2006, p. 232). Most environmental non-government organisations (ENGOs) focus on local and regional 
environmental problems. Second, the diffuse consequences of climate change are felt only in the long term. As 
with global pollution, citizens and political decision-makers are presumably more concerned about environmental 
problems with immediate consequences (Lederer, 2017, p. 1104; Neumayer, 2002a, p. 159). The link between 
human behaviour and environmental problems is also more obvious in this case.11 Finally, solving the climate 
change problem depends on making fundamental changes to our daily lives and economic system. It is associated 
with considerable short-term economic costs for societies and individuals. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
will change energy production, production processes, transport systems, and consumption patterns. It is therefore 
easier for politicians and interest groups to mobilise domestic and international support for environmental policies 
that are not associated with considerable short-term costs. In sum, domestic political factors that help to explain 
domestic and global pollution should be studied separately. Previous empirical research supports this conclusion. 
Spilker (2013, p. 102) has found that states are less likely to ratify international agreements that deal with global 
environmental problems than to address local environmental problems.  
This study argues that the joint effects of globalisation and domestic political institutions should be studied sepa-
rately for different environmental problems. Climate change is a global collective action problem (see Chapter 1). 
As major economic activities are associated with greenhouse gas emissions, political decision-makers have, for 
competitive reasons, an incentive to free-ride on the climate change mitigation efforts of other countries. This 
implies that they are less motivated to tackle global air pollution through international integration. Thus, govern-
ments are likely to react in different ways to domestic and global pollutants caused by international economic 
integration. Setting aside differences in political institutions and policy preferences, governments are likely to 
respond in similar ways to climate-related externalities of globalisation. Domestic political factors may be of little 
importance in shaping the impact of economic globalisation on climate protection. For this reason, Cao and Pra-
kash (2012, p. 72, footnote) have focused on analysing the joint effect of veto players and international economic 
integration on domestic pollution. Empirical studies have shown that the interaction effects of globalisation and 
domestic political institutions vary across environmental problems. While Spilker (2013) has found that trade 
openness has a less negative effect on local air pollution (SO2 emissions) in democratic countries, the relationship 
between trade openness and global air pollution (CO2 emissions) does not differ between democracies and autoc-
racies. Cao and Prakash (2012) have observed that veto players reduce the effect of trade competition more on 
local air pollution (SO2 emissions) than on water pollution. They argue that issue visibility varies between the two 
types of pollution and that different social groups support air and water protection. This pattern also applies to 
local and global environmental problems. Their findings suggests that domestic political factors are unlikely to 
significantly influence the impact of international integration on global pollutants. As the following chapter will 
show, the globalisation/environment literature partly assumes that domestic politics do not contribute to the influ-
ence of globalisation on climate commitment and performance (e.g. race-to-the-bottom theory). Nonetheless, it is 
important to study possible interaction effects between domestic political and international factors that can help to 
explain climate commitment and performance. First, it is an empirical question whether domestic politics influence 
the effect of globalisation on climate protection. Second, while governments may react in similar ways to compe-
tition pressures caused by international economic integration, country differences in domestic political institutions 
may moderate incentives derived from political globalisation and (as context conditions of international trade and 
investment) affect the relationship between economic openness and climate performance (see Chapter 5). Finally, 
there may be differences between types of domestic political institutions (see Chapter 5).  
Climate policy is a multilevel policy. State actors and non-state actors on the local, domestic, international, and 
supranational level are involved in policies that affect the global atmosphere (Brühl, 2007, p. 710). To analyse 
causal pathways, it is necessary to restrict the analysis to specific aspects of climate policy. This study therefore 
focuses on state participation in climate cooperation within the UNFCCC framework. This is the only climate 
change regime that is open to worldwide participation. Most countries are member states. Most political-science 
studies (e.g., Milner, 1997, p. 7; Milner, 1992, p. 467) define international cooperation in accordance with Keohane 
(2005 [1984]). This conceptualisation is equally relevant to the analysis of state participation in climate coopera-
tion. Keohane (2005 [1984]) asks how international cooperation is possible under conditions of anarchy and inter-
dependence, context conditions that characterise the climate change problem. There is no world government to 
take responsibility for climate protection, a problem that can only be solved through international efforts. Accord-
ing to Keohane (2005 [1984], pp. 51f., emphasis in original)  
‘intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are 
regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of 
policy coordination’. 
 
11 This enables political decision-makers to question human-caused global warming. 
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Two implications follow from this definition. First, international cooperation implies goal-directed behaviour 
among countries (Milner, 1997, p. 7; Milner, 1992, p. 468). International cooperation takes place when states 
deliberately coordinate and adjust their policies to solve a mutual policy problem or to realise mutual gains (Milner, 
1992, p. 468). It is therefore necessary for states to agree on common goals (Bättig et al., 2008, p. 479).12 Second, 
international cooperation only takes place when countries implement measures to realise their common goals, in 
anticipation of other states doing the same (Bättig et al., 2008, p. 479; Milner, 1997, pp. 7f.; Milner, 1992, p. 468). 
In this way, they contribute to mutual gains or help to reduce the negative consequences of their policies on other 
states (policy coordination) (Milner, 1997, pp. 7f.; Milner, 1992, p. 468). Based on this definition, the degree of 
state participation in climate cooperation refers to a country’s commitment to the common goals of the climate 
change regime and the policy adjustments it makes to realise them. The following subsections specify the two 
dimensions of state participation in international climate policy and explain how they are measured. 
Keohane (2005 [1987]) regards both dimensions as necessary conditions of international cooperation. Following 
previous research (e.g., Bättig & Bernauer, 2009), this study measures and examines them separately, given that 
explanatory factors vary between climate commitment and performance. It is easier for states to ratify climate 
treaties than to adopt national policies to mitigate global warming (Kneuer, 2012, p. 873). Additionally, the ratifi-
cation of international agreements is more transparent; it is therefore easier for citizens and interest groups to 
pressure the government to enter into a climate treaty than to make it adopt and implement climate change mitiga-
tion policies. Chapter 5 will argue that the interaction effects between domestic political institutions and globali-
sation vary between climate commitment and performance as well. Given state participation in multilateral climate 
cooperation, this study focuses on national climate policies, i.e. political measures adopted at the national level. 
Only national governments are able to ratify international agreements; they are the most important actors in the 
adoption and implementation of domestic climate policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (see Chapter 1; 
Scruggs, 2003, p. 22). 
In sum, this study focuses, for both theoretical and empirical reasons, on state participation in climate cooperation. 
The relative importance of explanatory factors of climate commitment and performance, as well as interaction 
effects between them, may vary among environmental and climate policies. This study defines the dependent 
variable as state commitment to the common goals of the UN climate change regime and the implementation of 
policy measures that contribute to these goals. The present study examines both dimensions – climate commitment 
and performance – separately, as explanatory factors may vary between the two dimensions. 
2.2 Climate commitment 
The following section discusses climate commitment (2.2.1). The second section uses this discussion and that of 
previous measurement approaches to explain how climate commitment is measured by UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol ratification delay in the following empirical analysis (2.2.2). 
2.2.1 Conceptualisation of climate commitment 
During the research period (1992–2006) (see Chapter 6), two important international climate agreements within 
the UNFCCC came into force. The UNFCCC itself was adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and De-
velopment (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and became active in 1994 (Gupta, 2010, p. 639). The Kyoto 
Protocol did not introduce any new goals or principles (Gupta, 2010, p. 643). The central aim of the UNFCCC is 
the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’ (UN, 1992, Art. 2). By adopting this goal, the two climate 
treaties have focused on climate change mitigation, i.e. the reduction of the velocity and consequences of global 
warming (Kyiar, 2013, no page number).13 
Climate commitment has been defined as state commitment to the common goals. It is important to consider the 
main principles of climate cooperation as well. Countries that have not ratified climate treaties within the UNFCCC 
framework (and those that have withdrawn their ratification) have questioned these principles. Article 3 of the 
UNFCCC defines its principles as follows: (1) Countries have the right and are expected to pursue sustainable 
development (UN, 1992, Article 3). Economic development is regarded as important condition for climate change 
mitigation. Measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions should, therefore, consider a country’s economic devel-
opment. (2) The precautionary principle expects countries ‘to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate 
change and mitigate its adverse effects’ (UN, 1992, Art. 3). (3) The UNFCCC maintains that the situation of 
 
12 State interests in participating in international cooperation can still vary among actors (Milner, 1997, p. 77; Milner, 1992, 
p. 468). 
13 The UNFCCC regarded climate change adaptation, i.e. the ‘adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects’ (IPCC, 
2015, p. 118; emphasis in original) as a local problem (Gupta, 2010, p. 642). Over time a shift to climate change adaptation has 
been observed (McLuhan, 2011, p. 401). 
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developing countries must be taken into account (e.g., their vulnerability to global warming). (4) The cost-effec-
tiveness of climate change mitigation policies should be considered. Countries are expected to cooperate and help 
each other (esp. developing countries) to achieve sustainable development (5). The most important and controver-
sial principle of the UNFCCC is the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (6). Developed coun-
tries are expected to take the lead in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. They are regarded as historically respon-
sible for global warming. Moreover, developed economies have the financial and technological capability to tackle 
global warming. There are disagreements between and within the two groups of countries, regarding the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibilities (Brühl, 2012, p. 726). The controversy has led to negotiation blocs 
among rich countries. On the one hand, member states of the European Union (EU) supported the principle of 
common but differentiated principles (Brühl, 2012, p. 726; Christoff & Eckersley, 2011, p. 439). On the other 
hand, the so-called Umbrella group (Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, the 
Ukraine, and the USA) refused to accept legally binding greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets (Brühl, 2012, 
p. 726; Christoff & Eckersley, 2011, p. 439). Brühl (2012, p. 726) identifies groups of developing countries by 
their positions on international climate policy: (1) Countries with low greenhouse gas emissions but a perceived 
vulnerability to the impacts of climate change; (2) states with high global air-pollution levels that accept climate-
policy measures only under the condition of financial and technical support (e.g. China, Brazil, India); and (3) oil-
exporting economies that were not willing to accept measures that could affect their revenues. These differences 
within both groups of countries affect their ratification behaviour (Christoff & Eckersley, 2011, p. 439). The pre-
sent study therefore argues that climate commitment implies agreement with the goals and main principles of the 
UN climate change regime. Countries may agree with the goal of greenhouse gas emissions stabilisation but disa-
gree with the negotiated principles proposed to realise these goals. For instance, the US did not accept the argument 
that developed countries should take the lead in climate change mitigation and did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  
The UNFCCC defines developed countries as Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
member states in 1992 and economies in transition in Eastern Europe and the Russian Federation (UNFCCC, no 
year). These countries are called Annex I parties and they are obliged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 
levels until 2000 (Kyiar, 2013). They are further divided into Annex II and economies in transition. Within the 
Kyoto Protocol, the former are obliged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels, provide financial re-
sources to developing countries and to promote the transfer of environmentally friendly technologies (Gupta, 2010, 
pp. 638ff.; UNFCCC, no year). Economies in transition are allowed more flexibility to reach their greenhouse gas 
emissions targets (Gupta, 2011, pp. 639f.; UN, 1992, Art. 4). Non-Annex I, i.e. developing countries have the right 
to focus on their socio-economic development. The UNFCCC only requires them to support the spread of envi-
ronmentally friendly technologies and practices (Fredriksson & Gaston, 2000, p. 346).  
It is important to study domestic political explanatory factors of climate commitment and their interplay separately, 
in relation to developed and developing countries. First, participation within the UNFCCC framework implies 
different obligations for developed and developing countries (also Fredriksson et al., 2007, p. 232). Second, posi-
tive incentives in climate treaties, such as climate change mitigation support, make developing countries more 
likely to ratify them (Iwińska et al., 2019, p. 2; Susskind, 1994, p. 44). Second, because of their reliance on the 
agricultural sector, poor countries are more vulnerable to the consequences of climate change (e.g., extreme 
weather) (Lederer, 2014, p. 324, footnote; McLuhan, 2011, p. 405). Third, political authorities in the developing 
world have fewer resources to mitigate global warming and adapt to climate change (McLuhan, 2011, p. 405). In 
sum, we can assume that rich and poor countries differ systemically in their motivations for joining international 
climate cooperation. 
Climate commitment is defined as the degree of acceptance of the central goal of UNFCCC (climate change mit-
igation) and its central principles. This section has shown that differences can be expected in the domestic political 
factors that account for climate commitment among developed and developing countries. 
2.2.2 Measurement of climate commitment 
This section describes the measurement of climate commitment by UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol ratification 
delay. It begins by comparing the reliability and validity of approaches to measuring climate commitment in the 
measurement and aggregation phase of index construction. Based on this discussion, the chapter outlines the meas-
urement of the dependent variable. Environmental commitment has been measured using data on the existence, 
type, width and/or depth of environmental regulations, as well as their monitoring and enforcement (Tosun, 2015, 
p. 646; Tosun, 2012, p. 442). The data are based on observable state behaviour, statistical data and/or expert eval-
uations.14 The measures either focus on specific indicators or summarise multiple indicators.  
 
14 The stringency of environmental law can also be measured by data on the perception of the stringency of environmental law 
by citizens or business representatives (Tosun, 2012, p. 441). However, it does not measure actual state behaviour (Tosun, 
2012, p. 441). 
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Measurement approaches based on expert evaluations 
Climate policy is a cross-cutting policy that can encompass many different policy measures from multiple policy 
fields (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010, p. 7; Steves & Teytelboyn 2013, p. 3). Expert evaluations can capture this 
complexity. The climate-policy component of the Germanwatch Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) gives 
equal weight to a country’s domestic and international climate policy, drawing on evaluations provided by national 
climate change experts (Burck et al., 2016, p. 14). The international climate-policy component evaluates a coun-
try’s intended climate change mitigation efforts and what has been done in this regard (Burck et al., 2016, p. 14). 
The measure thus combines climate commitment and performance. The same applies to the Climate Laws, Insti-
tutions, and Measures Index (CLIMI) from Steves and Teytelboyn (2013), which measures the stringency of cli-
mate change mitigation policies. Moreover, CCPI (2010–2017) and CLIMI (a cross-sectional measure, based on 
the period 2005–2010) are only available for more recent years. Important independent variables for this study are 
not available for these years. In addition, CCPI data are not comparable over time (Burck et al., 2016, p. 15), as 
indicator measurement rules and the number and composition of coders have changed over time. Finally, the 
CLIMI is based on annual national communications to the UNFCCC. Their comparability is questionable. 
Measurement approaches based on statistical data 
The Kyoto Protocol defines, for developed countries, legally binding emissions targets within the commitment 
period. The more ambitious the negotiated reduction of a country’s greenhouse gas emissions, the higher its climate 
commitment. They vary considerably among countries. Greenhouse gas emissions targets under the Kyoto Proto-
col are a reliable and available indicator of climate commitment. It is important to use the relative reduction to the 
business-as-usual development of greenhouse gas emissions (Compston & Bailey, 2016, p. 145; Harrison & 
Sundstrom, 2007, p. 4). For instance, it was easy for Russia to accept its target, as a stabilisation of its greenhouse 
gas emissions was expected after the end of the Soviet Union (Harrison & Sundstorm, 2007, p. 4). In contrast to 
EU member states, Australia and the US would have had to reduce a considerable part of their greenhouse gas 
emissions to fulfil their commitments (Harrison & Sundstorm, 2007, p. 4). Greenhouse gas emissions targets can 
help to understand climate commitment of developed countries. As Non-Annex I countries are not obliged to 
mitigate climate change, greenhouse gas emissions targets cannot be used as a dependent variable in a worldwide 
analysis.  
Climate commitment can also be measured via a country’s climate-expenditure data. The more a country invests 
in climate protection, the more important it considers this policy goal to be (List & Sturm, 2006, p. 1261; Tosun, 
2015, p. 646). Higher expenditure levels enable national environment agencies to implement environmental pro-
tection policies via skilled staff, providing more opportunities to control the environmental behaviour of citizens 
and firms (Tosun, 2015, p. 646; Tosun, 2012, p. 442). State-expenditure data provide a reliable indicator of climate 
commitment, which can also be attributed to political authorities (Tosun, 2015, pp. 645f.). However, they cannot 
capture the stringency of environmental regulations (content validity) (Tosun, 2015, p. 646). Moreover, compara-
ble data on state expenditure on climate change mitigation are not available for worldwide analyses. Climate 
change mitigation and adaptation support, provided by developed countries, can be used as an indicator of each 
country’s acceptance of the principle of helping developing countries. In accordance with the UNFCCC, Annex II 
parties are expected to provide financial assistance to developing countries to mitigate and help them adapt to 
global environmental change (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009, p. 11; UN, 1992, Article 4). These data cannot be applied 
in a worldwide analysis of climate commitment. 
Measures based on observable state behaviour 
Given data availability, most studies rely on codings of observable state behaviour. In addition to the ratifica-
tion/non-ratification of climate agreements, researchers have coded the reporting behaviour of states and financial 
contributions to the international climate regime (e.g., Bättig et al., 2008; Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2013a). The mon-
itoring of state behaviour is an important instrument of international cooperation. The UNFCCC requires countries 
regularly to submit reports on their efforts to implement international climate commitments. The reporting behav-
iour of countries is easily observable on the UNFCCC homepage. The data are reliable and comparable. Non-
Annex I parties do not have to report as regularly as developed countries. This questions its use as time-series 
cross-sectional indicator (e.g., Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2013a). In addition, it only applies to countries that are parties 
of the climate change regime. Its validity is also limited. Reporting is often delegated to civil servants. Bernauer 
and Böhmelt (2013a) consider whether a country has regularly paid its annual financial contributions to the UN-
FCCC Secretariat in a timely fashion as an indicator of climate commitment. These contributions are important to 
the functioning of the UNFCCC Secretariat (Bättig et al., 2008, p. 481). They also tell us something about a coun-
try’s climate commitment. For instance, President Trump threatened to cut US financial contributions to the UN-
FCCC Secretariat. This measure is reliable and comparable, but it does not apply to non-members of the climate 
change regime. With regard to validity, it is a low-cost option for most countries. 
Most quantitative studies of climate commitment have examined the ratification of specific climate treaties (espe-
cially the UNFCCC and/or the Kyoto Protocol). The assumption is that a country that ratifies an international 
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treaty accepts its goals and principles. Few scholars have examined the signing of climate treaties15. Only ratified 
international agreements are domestically binding (Barrett, 2003, pp. 147; Schulze, 2014, p. 116). Two measure-
ment approaches can be distinguished (Neumayer, 2002b, pp. 818f.): (1) measurement by a dichotomous variable 
(ratification vs. non-ratification) (e.g., Fredriksson & Ujhelyi, 2006; Neumayer, 2002b; Zahran et al., 2007) which 
is examined using logit/probit analysis; and (2) measurement by a continuous variable that captures a country’s 
ratification duration (e.g., Fredriksson & Gaston, 2000; Fredriksson et al., 2007; Neumayer, 2002b; von Stein, 
2008; Zahran et al., 2007), examined via a survival analysis. Given the lack of variation, the first approach is not 
applicable to international agreements with nearly universal membership (i.e. worldwide membership) (e.g., UN-
FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol) (Neumayer, 2002b, p. 818). The second measurement approach refers to ratifica-
tion duration or delay, i.e. the time period between the official launch of the ratification process and the day of 
ratification (Fredriksson & Gaston, 2000, p. 347; Neumayer, 2002b, p. 818). Fast ratification is considered an 
indicator of climate commitment (e.g., Fredriksson & Gaston, 2000, p. 347; Fredriksson et al., 2007, p. 235; von 
Stein, 2008, p. 262). Climate treaties enter into force when a minimum number of countries become parties to the 
agreements. For this reason, ratification delay affects the implementation and effectiveness of international agree-
ments (Fredriksson & Gaston, 2000, p. 347f.; Fredriksson & Ujhelyi, 2006, p. 1; Sand, 1991, p. 240). Second, 
ratification signals support of the treaty to other countries (Bättig et al., 2008, p. 480), thus hastening the entry into 
force of an agreement (Fredriksson & Gaston, 2000, p. 348). Ratification delay prolongs the ratification phase for 
all (von Stein, 2008, p. 262) and affects the behaviour of non-parties as well as parties to the agreement (Fredrik-
sson & Gaston 2000, p. 348). Countries are expected to delay ratification to avoid that other countries free-ride on 
their participation (Fredriksson & Gaston 2000, p. 348). 
Ratification or ratification delay is a reliable indicator of commitment (Böhmelt et al., 2015, p. 103). Information 
on the ratification status and time point of ratification is available online for all countries and comparable across 
countries16 and over time. The validity of ratification duration of international climate agreements as an indicator 
of climate commitment has been questioned. (1) First, many environment agreements imply none or only weak 
efforts for environmental protection (Böhmelt et al., 2015, p. 103; Neumayer, 2002b, pp. 818f.). This means that 
all countries can afford to ratify them (Neumayer, 2002b, pp. 818f.). The ratification of climate treaties may, 
therefore, not necessarily mean that countries are committed to their goals and principles. The UNFCCC implies 
little binding commitments for developed and developing countries. It does not formulate binding greenhouse gas 
emissions targets. The same applies to the Kyoto Protocol, in the case of developing countries. From this perspec-
tive, only the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol can tell us anything about the climate commitment of Annex I 
countries. For instance, Australia has withdrawn from its ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the US has never 
ratified it. (2) A related argument is that international environmental agreements often lack compliance mecha-
nisms to ensure their implementation. Accordingly, the ratification of environmental agreements may not reflect 
a real commitment to their goals, as countries can join ‘without being able or willing to fully implement the com-
mitments set forth therein’ (Böhmelt et al., 2015, p. 103). Nonetheless, there are reasons to use the ratification of 
international climate agreements as an indicator of climate commitment within the UNFCCC. (1) As described 
above, climate agreements often imply only weak efforts to tackle global environmental change. It must be taken 
into account that international climate agreements are the result of a consensus during an international negotiation 
process. The unanimity rule implies that countries agree to the environmental regulations accepted by the least 
environmentally friendly country that signs the agreement (Fredriksson & Gaston, 2000, p. 347; Sand, 1991, p. 
240). Ratification of an international climate agreement, therefore, implies a country’s ‘willingness to accept an 
international consensus’ (Meadowcroft, 2014, p. 43). For instance, the US announced that it would leave the Paris 
Agreement, even though it stipulates only on voluntary state contribution to climate protection. Second, ratification 
reflects a government’s climate commitment because it implies that the government accepts climate-protection 
goals that are more ambitious than those in previous international agreements (Böhmelt et al., 2015, p. 103). 
Leinaweaver (2012, p. 15, footnote) maintains that a country’s ratification of environmental treaties may be re-
garded by domestic non-state actors as a stronger signal of its willingness to reduce pollution than domestic policy 
pledges. Von Stein (2008, p. 262) notes that ‘[t]he nonratifiers will be those whose behaviour deviates most notably 
from what the treaty prescribes or proscribes.’ (3) Finally, as explained above, the ratification of an international 
climate agreement within the UNFCCC framework is of central importance for the effectiveness of climate coop-
eration. Thus, Fredriksson et al. (2007, p. 231) note that ‘[t]he ratifications stage of an international environmental 
agreement [...] is a crucial part of cooperation on global pollution problems.’ Regarding validity, it must be noted 
that ratification delay can be caused by other variables (Neumayer, 2002b, pp. 818f.). For instance, a large number 
of domestic veto players may delay the domestic ratification process. This is considered in the multivariate models 
in Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
15 For instance, Neumayer (2002b). 
16 As I will explain below, the Annex I status of parties to the treaties must be controlled, since their obligations vary. 
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In sum, this study regards ratification delay as a valid and reliable indicator of state acceptance of the goals and 
principles of international climate agreements. It is interpreted as the acceptance of the international consensus on 
climate protection. The ratification of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol by an Annex I country is not comparable 
to the ratification of these climate treaties by a Non-Annex I member state. To account for this, Annex I member-
ship is included in this analysis and developing Non-Annex I countries are also explored separately. Developed 
Annex I countries cannot be studied separately because there is little variation. The EU negotiates in climate 
agreements for its member states (Kyiar, 2013, no page number). EU member states agreed to share burdens under 
the Kyoto Protocol and enter it together. Their ratification behaviour cannot, therefore, be seen as independent 
state behaviour (von Stein, 2008, p. 256). Therefore, in this analysis of the Kyoto Protocol, EU-member states are 
treated as a single state.  
The importance of treaty design 
Previous quantitative research on the factors that explain climate commitment can be further distinguished by 
whether it analyses a single indicator or uses a summary measure (e.g., Bättig et al., 2008; Bättig & Bernauer, 
2009; Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2013a,b). While composite measurements are better able to handle complexity and 
reduce measurement error, single indicators make it possible to test causal processes more effectively (Jahn & 
Wälti, 2007, p. 266). Most quantitative studies of environmental commitment use, as their indicator, the number 
of international environmental agreements a country has ratified (additive index). The underlying assumption is 
that the more international agreements a country ratifies, the more committed it is to environmental cooperation. 
In comparative climate policy research, two summary measures are based on observable state-behaviour data: 
Bättig et al.’s (2008) Climate Cooperation Index and Bernauer and Böhmelt’s (2013a) Climate Change Coopera-
tion Index (C3-I). The former summarises cross-sectional indicators of commitment and performance. The C3-I is 
based on the Climate Cooperation Index. It provides panel data, separate measures of commitment and perfor-
mance, and a summary measure. Climate commitment is measured using UNFCCC and Kyoto protocol ratifica-
tion, financial contributions to the UNFCCC Secretariat, and national communications.  
It is important to study the moderation effects of domestic political institutions on the influence of globalisation 
separately for UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification. The International Relations literature has shown that 
treaty design affects ratification behaviour (e.g., Bernauer et al., 2013; Spilker, 2013; von Stein, 2008). Abbott and 
Snidal (2000) distinguish international agreements on a continuum from soft to hard international law, based on 
three criteria: obligation, precision, and delegation (see also Yamagata et al., 2013). ‘Hard’ law refers to ‘binding 
obligations that are precise (or can be made precise through adjudication or the issuance of detailed regulations) 
and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law’ (Abbott & Snidal, 2000, p. 421). Soft law 
refers to international agreements that are weaker, with regard to the extent and precision of obligations and/or the 
delegation of authority (Abbott & Snidal, 2000, p. 422). Spilker (2013, pp. 93f., 97) evaluates the hardness or 
softness of international environmental treaties by examining the specification and existence of precise obligations 
for treaty parties, and mechanisms to monitor state behaviour and enforce state commitments. Most scholars clas-
sify the UNFCCC as a soft agreement for all countries and the Kyoto Protocol as a hard or harder international 
agreement for Annex I countries (e.g., Karlsson-Vikhuyzen & Vihma, 2009, p. 404; Spilker, 2013, p. 97f.; von 
Stein, 2008, p. 246; Yamagata et al., 2013, p. 255). The UNFCCC requires its member states to develop national 
plans to control their emissions (von Stein, 2008, p. 246). Annex I states are expected to reduce their greenhouse 
gas emissions to 1990 levels. These obligations are not legally binding (von Stein, 2008, p. 246f.). The climate-
change-mitigation goal is interpreted as a ‘declaration of intent for climate protection’ (Bättig et al., 2008, p. 480; 
see also McLuhan, 2011, p. 247; von Stein, 2008, p. 247). The UNFCCC goal is imprecise, as it does not define 
specific greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets for member countries (Karlsson-Vikhuyzen & Vihma, 2009, 
p. 404; von Stein, 2008, p. 247). Following von Stein (2008, p. 248), the UNFCCC is moderately characterised by 
the delegation of authority to third parties. The Conference of Parties consists of representatives of the member 
states; it makes decisions unambiguously and monitors national communications and emission inventories. While 
it encompasses a dispute-settlement mechanism, it does not define either specific state obligations or monitoring 
and enforcement procedures (Spilker, 2013, p. 97). The Kyoto Protocol includes legally binding greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction targets for Annex I countries. These targets are precisely formulated and quantified; Annex I 
countries were expected to reach them between 2008 and 2012 (Karlsson-Vikhuyzen & Vihma, 2009, p. 404; von 
Stein, 2008, p. 247). The Kyoto Protocol also delegates, through its compliance mechanism, more authority to the 
Conference of Parties (Karlsson-Vikhuyzen & Vihma, 2009, p. 404; von Stein, 2008, p. 247f.). The Conference 
of Parties monitors the implementation and compliance of climate change mitigation by Annex I countries and 
oversees the flexibility provisions of the Kyoto Protocol (Spilker, 2013, p. 98; von Stein, 2008, p. 248). Hovi et 
al. (2007, p. 437) have argued that the compliance mechanism is weak. Although the Kyoto Protocol has no en-
forcement mechanisms, the monitoring of states can have a reputational cost for those states (von Stein, 2008, p. 
248). Moreover, the treaty takes over the UNFCCC dispute-settlement mechanism (Spilker, 2013, p. 98). The 
Kyoto Protocol can be described as a soft agreement vis-à-vis Non-Annex I countries, as it does not involve bind-
ing obligations (Bernauer et al., 2013, p. 485; Yamagata et al., 2013, p. 255). Nonetheless, the Kyoto Protocol has 
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been contested by developing countries. Active participation in the treaty, beyond its ratification, can also have 
domestic implications. For instance, the clean development mechanisms that support sustainable development and 
environmental protection imply that developing countries must become active in these areas. 
Most scholars have concluded that states are more likely to join soft agreements than hard ones (Downs et al., 
1996; Spilker, 2013; von Stein, 2008). States avoid hard treaties because they have participation costs, stipulate 
precise obligations that involve domestic-policy changes, and imply a shift in authority, monitoring and enforcing 
state behaviour in a way that can limit sovereignty (Spilker, 2013, p. 94). Although states often regard hard treaties 
as more effective, they are associated with higher reputational costs (Spilker, 2013, p. 94). As the Kyoto Protocol 
is only hard for Annex I countries, differences in ratification behaviour between Annex I and Non-Annex I parties 
to the agreement can be assumed (von Stein, 2008, p. 248). Annex I countries may be less likely to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol than Non-Annex I countries because the treaty includes binding greenhouse gas emissions reduction tar-
gets for the former only. According to Spilker (2013, p. 102), treaties that include incentives (e.g., technical and 
financial assistance) increase participation (Spilker, 2013, p. 102). This may also contribute to the ratification of 
the Kyoto Protocol by Non-Annex I countries. In sum, to consider differences in treaty design that affect ratifica-
tion behaviour, UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification must be examined separately for developed and devel-
oping countries.  
Treaty design is also relevant to any analysis of the explanatory factors of climate commitment. Previous studies 
have shown that the relative importance of international and domestic explanatory factors varies between UN-
FCCC ratification and Kyoto Protocol ratification (von Stein 2008; Yamagata et al., 2013). Von Stein (2008) and 
Yamagata et al. (2013) assume that domestic variables matter more for the ratification of hard than soft treaties, 
while international explanatory factors are more important for the ratification of soft international treaties. Thus, 
positive incentives derived from international political integration should apply more to UNFCCC than to the 
Kyoto Protocol ratification (Htreatydesign1). The competition pressures of economic globalisation do not affect soft 
international agreements, which have few costs for participating countries. The effect of the ratification behaviour 
of economic competitors is unclear in the case of hard international law, as represented by the Kyoto Protocol 
(Yamagata et al., 2013, p. 256). States are reluctant to let other countries free-ride on their efforts (Yamagata et 
al., 2013, p. 256). However, as explained above, there are disagreements about the principle of common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities among Annex I and Non-Annex I countries. Given the range of different negotiated 
greenhouse gas emissions targets, it was easier for some Annex I countries to ratify the Kyoto Protocol than for 
others. In sum, there should be no clear effect of international economic integration on UNFCCC and Kyoto Pro-
tocol ratification (Htreatydesign2).  
Yamagata et al. (2013) have argued that domestic explanatory factors are crucial when international agreements 
restricts domestic sovereignty (e.g., economic costs). They find support for their hypothesis that domestic explan-
atory factors explain Kyoto Protocol ratification better than they explain UNFCCC ratification (Htreatydesign3, see 
Table 2.1). Domestic determinants also matter more for the ratification behaviour of countries that profit from 
joining international agreements (e.g., developing countries profit from the spread of technology and financial 
contributes) (Yamagata et al., 2013, p. 254). This finding applies to developing countries that profit from partici-
pation in the Kyoto Protocol. To date, no studies have investigated whether the interaction effects between domes-
tic and international factors that explain international cooperation vary in accordance with treaty design. However, 
it is plausible to assume that they do influence moderation effects, when there is an impact on domestic and inter-
national determinants. Chapter 5 considers treaty design in relation to the possible moderation effects of domestic 
political institutions and globalisation. 
Table 2.1 Hypotheses on treaty design and climate commitment 
Htreatydesign1 International political integration contributes more to explaining UNFCCC than Kyoto Protocol rat-
ification. 
Htreatydesign2 There is no clear effect of international economic integration on UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol ratifi-
cation. 
Htreatydesign3 Domestic political factors matter more for Kyoto Protocol than UNFCCC ratification. 
In sum, this study defines climate commitment as ‘acceptance of the common goals and principles of international 
climate change cooperation’. It uses the delay in ratifying the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol as an indicator of 
climate commitment. There are more recent international climate agreements. The latest is the 2016 Paris Agree-
ment. However, the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol were introduced during the period 1992–2006, for which this 
study has data for all independent and dependent variables. These data also make the present study comparable to 
earlier research. Annex I status makes it possible to take the differing climate-protection obligations of developed 
and developing countries into account. To consider differences in treaty design, UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
ratification are examined separately. Differences in the relative importance of domestic and international explan-
atory factors for UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification can be assumed. The next chapters (Chapters 3–5) will, 
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therefore, formulate separate hypotheses on the effect of international integration and domestic political institu-
tions, as well as their joint effect on UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification.  
2.3 Climate performance 
Section 2.1 defined the second dimension of state participation in international climate policy as implementing 
measures to realise common goals. ‘Implementation refers to measures that countries take to effectuate interna-
tional treaties in their domestic law’ (Brown Weiss & Jacobsen, 1999, p. 19). This book analyses the goal of the 
UN climate change regime: to stabilise greenhouse gas emissions in the global atmosphere. First, climate change 
mitigation is the central goal of UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol (see Chapter 2.2). Second, we can assume that 
explanatory factors and their relative importance vary among the international climate-cooperation goals (e.g., 
determinants of climate change mitigation vs. determinants of sustainable development).17 Third, this limitation is 
in line with similar research (e.g., Bättig et al., 2008; Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2013a). The 
following empirical analysis explains the selected conceptualisation (2.3.1) and the way it is measured using CO2 
emissions (2.3.2).  
2.3.1 Conceptualisation of climate performance 
Similar studies have conceptualised the dependent variable as compliance with international agreements, environ-
mental quality, or environmental performance. Compliance ‘refers to whether countries in fact adhere to the agree-
ment's provisions and to the implementing measures that they have instituted.’ (Brown Weiss & Jacobsen, 1999, 
p. 18). In comparative climate policy research, this definition is used to analyse the compliance of Annex II parties 
with the greenhouse gas emissions targets defined in the Kyoto Protocol or the burden-sharing agreement, in the 
case of EU members (e.g., Jensen & Spoon, 2011). The compliance concept cannot be applied in a worldwide 
study because the climate change regime does not define any binding emissions targets for non-Annex II parties 
(see also Bättig et al. 2008, p. 295). 
Numerous studies of globalisation and the global environment have used, as their dependent variable, either envi-
ronmental quality or environmental degradation. The terms ‘environmental quality’, ‘environmental degradation’, 
and ‘environmental performance’ are used inconsistently in the literature. The first two concepts refer to the state 
of the environment (Jahn, 2013, p. 150). Climate quality, therefore, describes the ‘condition of the climate system’ 
(Meadowcroft, 2014, p. 43), i.e. the levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere or changes in global and regional 
temperatures and weather conditions (Meadowcroft, 2014, p. 43). While it is important to study climate quality 
(see for instance Saretzki, 2007, pp. 421f.), this concept is problematic when analysing the political explanatory 
factors of environmental pollution (Jahn, 2013, p. 150; Jahn & Wälti, 2007, p. 266). First, the condition of the 
international climate system is considerably dependent on natural variables (Roller, 2005, pp. 44f.). Second, po-
litical decisions influence our atmosphere only in the long term (Meadowcroft, 2014, p. 43). Finally, changes in 
the climate system cannot easily be attributed to individual countries (Meadowcroft, 2014, p. 43). 
This study applies the concept of ‘environmental performance’. Performance can be divided into procedural and 
substantive performance (Roller, 2005, p. 21; Weaver & Rockman, 1993, pp. 5f.). The former is defined as ‘the 
capability, stability, and efficiency of the government’ (Hanusch, 2018, p. 31). Substantive performance refers to 
specific policy fields (e.g., environmental performance). As this study aims to explain cross-national variation in 
climate performance, the dependent variable refers to climate performance at the state level. There are two envi-
ronmental-performance approaches (Fiorino, 2011, p. 369f.; Meadowcroft, 2014, p. 29; Saretzki, 2007, p. 427). 
The first approach evaluates a country’s environmental policy outputs. The more active a country is in protecting 
the climate, or the more stringent its climate policy, the better its performance (Duit, 2005, p. 13; Meadowcroft, 
2014, p. 43). The second approach refers to the results of climate policies on the environment (climate policy 
outcomes). Lower levels of greenhouse gas emissions imply a better climate performance. Both approaches have 
advantages and disadvantages. According to Jahn (2014, p. 83), Roller (2005, pp. 32f.) and Scruggs (2003, pp. 
20ff.) environmental performance should be measured by outcome indicators. Jahn (2014, p. 83) maintains that 
‘[w]hile the introduction of an environmental policy or the establishment of an environmental institution or organ-
ization may have the intention of reducing pollution, the empirical proof of its effectiveness can be measured only 
by the outcomes’ (see also Scruggs, 2003, p. 6). Christoff and Eckersley (2011, p. 432) argue that the ‘[t]he ulti-
mate measure of national performance, and the one most relevant to the UNFCCC’s basic objective of minimizing 
the risk of dangerous climate change, is the level of, and changes in, a country’s emissions’ (see also Bättig et al., 
2008, p. 481). Consequently, greenhouse gas emissions are of public interest (Scruggs, 2003, p. 21) and the ‘most 
significant measure in the success of climate policies’ (Burck et al., 2016, p. 7). Finally, the 
 
17 Nonetheless, future research should study other goals of the climate change regime, such as climate change adaptation (see 
also Javeline, 2014). 
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globalisation/environment literature also assumes direct effects of international trade and investment on green-
house gas emissions (see Chapter 3).  
In contrast to the environmental policy outcome, environmental policy output is directly attributable to political 
decision-makers (Saretzki, 2007, p. 424). There are numerous intervening variables between political variables 
and environmental policy outcomes (Tosun, 2012, p. 441). Moreover, greenhouse gas emissions levels and 
changes are also influenced by economic, demographic, social, natural, economic, and international variables 
(Christoff & Eckersley, 2011, p. 432; Compston & Bailey, 2016, p. 2; Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2006, p. 334; Tosun, 
2012, p. 441). Hence, the implicit assumption of a linear relationship between environmental policy output and 
outcome is an empirical question (Saretzki, 2007, p. 424). The conceptualisation of climate performance on the 
basis of policy outputs is not without problems. First, the literature lacks a common conceptualisation of environ-
mental policy performance (Sewerin, 2013, p. 4). Climate-policy instruments also vary considerably among and 
within countries (Garmann, 2014, p. 3). Second, specific conceptualisations are problematic. For instance, the 
assumption that adopting more climate policies implies better performance is questionable (Meadowcroft, 2014, 
p. 43; Scruggs, 2003, pp. 22f.). ‘Taxes on energy are not always raised to influence behavior and reduce emissions, 
but sometimes simply to generate revenues’ (Garmann, 2014, p. 3). Meadowcroft (2014, p. 43) observes that while 
Australia, Canada, and the US provide significant financial resources for researching and developing climate-
mitigation technologies, they avoid actual regulations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Third, climate policy 
outputs can only measure the intention of climate policies (rules of law) (Cao & Prakash, 2012, p. 72; Jahn, 2014, 
p. 83; Scruggs, 2003, pp. 22f.). They tell us nothing about their impact on the atmosphere. Climate change miti-
gation also depends on the implementation (Welsch, 2004, p. 665) and effectiveness of climate policies. Govern-
ments may undermine environmental regulations without changing the law (Cao & Prakash, 2012, p. 70). The US 
Environmental Protection Agency often cannot enforce existing environmental regulations because it is under-
funded (Cao & Prakash, 2012, pp. 70f.). Finally, as climate policy is a cross-cutting policy (Brühl, 2007, p. 710), 
other policies are also associated with greenhouse gas emissions (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010, p. 7; Steves & 
Teytelboyn 2013, pp. 4f.).  
The best approach would be to study climate performance on the basis of output and outcome data. Unfortunately, 
there is insufficient comparable and available cross-sectional or panel data on the adoption and stringency of cli-
mate outputs, especially outside the developed world. This study, therefore, examines climate policy outcomes. 
To address the problem of whether they are influenced by non-political factors, it considers relevant controls on 
CO2 emissions (see also Jahn, 2014, p. 84). Not all research on climate policy outcomes refers to the performance 
concept. Some studies define the dependent variable as environmental quality or environmental degradation and 
study greenhouse gas emissions or specific greenhouse gas emissions. The application of the concept of environ-
mental performance, however, links the present study to previous research and offers a theoretical framework for 
the conceptualisation and measurement of the dependent variable.  
Environmental performance, in relation to environmental outcomes, is defined as the degree of societal attainment 
of environmental goals by political actions (Meadowcroft, 2014, p. 28; Roller, 2005, p. 21). This makes it possible 
to conceptualise the level of measures implemented to realise the common goal of international climate coopera-
tion. Narrow and broad environmental performance concepts can be distinguished (Meadowcroft, 2014, p. 28; 
Tosun, 2012, p. 441). Broad concepts refer to the degree of attainment of multiple environmental policy goals 
(Meadowcroft, 2014, p. 29; Scruggs, 2003, p. 21). Accordingly, this research applies composite indices of envi-
ronmental outcomes (e.g., Scruggs, 2003). As Section 2.1 argues, it is necessary to examine the determinants of 
climate-protection efforts separately from other environmental problems. A narrow conception, limited to a spe-
cific pollutant, is therefore appropriate. As the following section will explain, this study focuses on CO2 emissions. 
To apply environmental performance concepts, political decision-makers must be aware of the particular environ-
mental problem in question – and regard it as solvable (Jahn, 2014, p. 83; Jahn & Wälti, 2007, p. 266). Climate 
change has only been regarded as a political problem since the 1990s (Jahn, 2014, p. 83). Therefore, this study 
only studies climate performance since the beginning of the UN climate change regime (see Chapter 6). The con-
cept of environmental performance makes it possible to evaluate a country’s environmental outcomes (Jahn & 
Wälti, 2007; Meadowcroft, 2014, p. 29). To conceptualise climate performance, it is necessary to have a standard 
for assessing a country’s performance (Meadowcroft, 2014, p. 28). Many studies do not consider this and simply 
examine greenhouse gas emissions or specific global air pollutants. Empirical criteria (e.g., a comparison with 
other countries and time points) or theoretical criteria (e.g., greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets) to compare 
a country’s climate performance can be defined (Burnell, 2012, p. 824; Jahn & Wälti, 2007, p. 265; Roller, 2005, 
pp. 20, 71). Binding emissions targets only exist for Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol. For this reason, 
a country’s climate performance is compared to other countries and other time points as standard. Previous re-
search has examined variations in climate performance among countries worldwide. To a lesser extent, country 
differences among developed (e.g., Tobin, 2017) and developing countries (e.g., Spilker, 2013) have been studied. 
The climate change regime distinguishes between the obligations of Annex I and non-Annex I parties. It is there-
fore important to evaluate and examine the climate performance of developed and developing countries separately. 
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In addition, developed countries have higher greenhouse gas emissions because their industrialisation processes 
started earlier. They also have more political capability to reduce global air pollution.  
In sum, this study conceptualises the second dependent variable as a country’s relative climate performance, based 
on CO2 emissions, in comparison to other developed/developing countries and years during the research period. 
Developed and developing countries are studied separately. 
2.3.2 Measurement of climate performance 
The varied findings of previous studies (see Chapters 3 & 4) may reflect variations in measurement decisions (see 
also Fiorino, 2011, p. 371). This section discusses the validity and reliability of climate-performance measurement 
approaches, while explaining the operationalisation of the dependent variable in the following empirical analysis. 
Qualitative research consists of case studies and QCA (e.g., Never & Betz, 2014; Sewerin, 2013; Tobin, 2017). 
Quantitative research mainly uses data on climate policy outcomes. Based on this conceptualisation of climate 
performance, the present study focuses on approaches that use climate policy outcome data. 
The policy outcome indicators of climate performance are divided into direct and indirect (Gleditsch & Sverdrup, 
2002, pp. 58f.) or primary and secondary indicators (Christoff & Eckersely, 2011, p. 433). Most studies apply 
direct or primary indicators, i.e. greenhouse gas emissions or decarbonisation data (Christoff & Eckersley, 2011, 
pp. 433f.; Gleditsch & Sverdrup, 2002, pp. 58f.). Secondary or indirect indicators refer to drivers of greenhouse 
gas emissions, such as Gross Domestic Products (GDP) and GDP growth, types and sources of energy supplies, 
population growth, population density, consumption patterns, and urban population (Christoff & Eckersley, 2011, 
p. 434; Gleditsch & Sverdrup, 2002, p. 58; Meadowcroft, 2014, p. 44). As the socio-economic structure of a society 
is influenced by political-decision makers over many decades, it can only be used as an indicator of climate per-
formance if it is examined over a long period of time (Meadowcroft, 2014, p. 44). In the short term, the structure 
of a society acts as a context factor, affecting political behaviour (Meadowcroft, 2014, p. 44). The following em-
pirical study controls important context factors (see Chapter 6). 
Primary and direct indicators can be broken down into impact and environmental quality indicators (Scruggs, 
2003, pp. 24f.). Environmental quality indicators aim to capture the state of the environment, i.e. CO2 concentra-
tions in the global/local atmosphere. The use of environmental quality indicators to measure environmental per-
formance is based on the argument that ‘pollutants are dangerous only when concentrated’ (Scruggs, 2003, p. 24; 
see also Bernauer & Koubi, 2013, p. 598). The concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere can have 
natural sources (e.g., volcanic activity) and is therefore not a suitable indicator of environmental performance 
(Jahn, 2014, pp. 83f.)18. Second, concentrations of pollutants make it difficult to evaluate a country’s environmen-
tal performance (Scruggs, 2003, p. 26). Hence, most studies that judge climate performance by climate policy 
outcomes examine greenhouse gas emissions (mainly CO2 emissions). This aligns with environmental perfor-
mance research, which prefers impact indicators, i.e. flow indicators, over environmental quality indicators, i.e. 
stock indicators (Jahn, 2014, p. 83; Meadowcroft, 2014, p. 28f.; Roller, 2005, p. 45). Environmental performance 
should only be measured using indicators that can be shaped by political decision-makers (Jahn & Wälti, 2007, p. 
266). To assess whether global warming will result from the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, 
cumulative emissions can be used. The present study examines current emissions, as climate change has only been 
recognised as a political problem since the 1990s (Meadowcroft, 2014, pp. 41f.). Moreover, cumulative emissions 
can only be changed by political authorities over long periods of time (Jahn, 2014, p. 84). 
There is no agreement in the environmental performance literature on the use of emissions levels (e.g., Bättig & 
Bernauer, 2009) and/or changes (mainly annual changes) (e.g., Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; Garmann, 2014). The 
conceptualisation of climate performance as changes in greenhouse gas emissions is appropriate since the goal of 
international climate policy is to reduce and stabilise greenhouse gas emissions (see also Scruggs, 2003, pp. 20ff.). 
Second, levels can only be changed in the long run (Burck et al., 2014, p. 5; Jahn, 2014, p. 84). Finally, the 
democracy/environment literature argues that democracies cannot be expected to have less pollution than autoc-
racies while undertaking more efforts to reduce pollution (Bättig & Bernauer, 2009, p. 292; Neumayer 2002a, p. 
144). Nonetheless, pollution levels should be studied as well. First, countries with stable low emission levels do 
not perform less well than countries with high reductions and high emission levels (e.g., Christoff & Eckersley, 
2011, p. 432). Second, emissions can change for various reasons that unrelated to changes in climate policy (Mead-
owcroft, 2014, p. 42). Meadowcroft (2014, p. 42) argues that changes in emissions do not necessarily capture 
‘performance’. Third, short-term changes in environmental outcomes are often caused by economic, social, or 
environmental variables (Scruggs, 2003, p. 19). Political factors influence environmental outcomes only in the 
long term (Scruggs, 2003, p. 19). To conclude, both levels and changes in greenhouse gas emissions should be 
studied. Long-term changes are preferable to short-term changes in emissions. In accordance with most studies, I 
limit my analysis to the study of emissions levels, as indicators of climate performance. First, data on emissions-
 
18 Jahn (2014, pp. 83f.) argues that natural disasters can result from environmental policies. However, he opts to not consider 
them, as they do not relate to regular environmental performance (Jahn, 2014, pp. 83ff.). 
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level changes are more uncertain. For instance, short-term trends in CO2 emissions vary in accordance with data 
sources (Macknick, 2011, p. 194). Second, I do not use a summary measure of emissions levels and changes (e.g., 
Jahn & Wälti, 2007), as previous research has shown that political factors, such as democracy quality, affect CO2 
emission levels and changes in different ways (e.g., Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; Escher & Walter-Rogg, 2018). 
The climate change mitigation goal of UN climate cooperation refers to the most important greenhouse gases. In 
accordance with most previous studies, the present study focuses on CO2 emissions. First, the emissions data 
related to other greenhouse gases have higher levels of uncertainty (World Resources Institute, 2015); data avail-
ability is also limited. Second, CO2 emissions are considered the main source of global warming (IPCC, 2015, p. 
5). It is important to note that the statistical results refer only to CO2 emissions. For instance, Kneuer (2012, pp. 
878f.) observes that ‘China is investing heavily in renewable sources of energy while at the same time being a 
major methane producer as a result of its high demand for rice.’  
Two types of data relate to greenhouse gas emissions: estimates based on the relationship between an economic 
activity and emissions, and direct measurements (Rypdal & Winiwarter, 2001, p. 108). Both are characterised by 
uncertainty, as the real extent of emissions is unknown (Rypdal & Winiwarter, 2001, p. 108). The present study 
uses estimated emissions data. Data on actual emissions is not available for large-N analysis. CO2 emissions esti-
mates are available from various sources: CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion, cement production, munic-
ipal waste, land use, forestry and wood burning, natural gas flaring, and biomass combustion (Macknick, 2011, p. 
197). This study examines CO2 emissions data from energy production and use, fossil-fuel combustion, and cement 
manufacturing as these are the most important sources of CO2 emissions (IPCC, 2015, p. 5; Spilker, 2013; p. 25; 
World Bank, 2016a, p. 92). CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion and cement production ‘include carbon 
dioxide produced during consumption of solid, liquid, and gas fuels and gas flaring.’ (World Bank, 2016b, no page 
number). Data on other CO2 sources has limited availability and comparability; it is partly associated with high 
uncertainty levels (Burck et al., 2016, p. 10; Strazicich & List, 2003, p. 264).  
The present study uses data from the World Bank Development Indicators (World Bank, 2016b). It offers CO2 
emissions estimates from fossil-fuel burning and cement manufacturing by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Car-
bon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC), the U.S. Bureau of Mine’s Cement Manufacturing Data Set 
(World Bank, 2016a, p. 92) as well as standardised data from other sources (World Bank, 2016a, pp. 83, 92). 
CDIAC uses fossil-fuel data from the United Nations Statistics Division’s World Energy Data Set (World Bank, 
2016a, p. 92). According to the World Resources Institute (2015, p. 6), the World Bank has the highest data avail-
ability, in relation to numbers of countries and years. Yet, Macknick (2011, p. 194) has argued that global CO2 
emissions from CDIAC fuel-combustion estimates are, on average, higher than estimates from the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) and the Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR). Other data 
sources include CO2 emissions data from the UNFCCC, based on the national communications of treaty parties. 
While these statistics have good accuracy (World Resources Institute, 2015, p. 7), availability is limited for Non-
Annex I countries. Climate Data Explorer (CAIT) data from the World Resources Institute incorporate data from 
the IEA, CDIAC, and US Energy Information Administration (EIA). The use of different data sources makes it 
especially problematic compare data over time (World Resources Institute, 2015, pp. 8f.). Galeotti et al. (2006) 
have found that the source of CO2 emissions data has no effect on their EKC result. 
CO2 emissions refer here to emissions within the country. Thus, the data do not consider ‘embodied energy’ (Bättig 
et al., 2008, p. 487), i.e. CO2 emissions from the production of imported goods. The concept is useful because it 
captures emissions that can be influenced by national governments (Burck et al., 2016, p. 8). However, CO2 emis-
sions data do not consider that countries with low CO2 emission levels may have externalised pollution-intensive 
production to other countries (Meadowcroft, 2014, p. 42) (see also Burck et al., 2016, p. 8). For instance, emissions 
from China reflect its export production. The same is true of CO2 emissions from coal extracted in Australia but 
exported to China (Meadowcroft, 2014, p. 42). An alternative approach would be to measure CO2 emissions from 
consumption, not production (Burck et al., 2016 p. 8). However, ‘attributing emissions to the state which hosts 
their production remains the preeminent means of accounting in the international climate regime. Any changes to 
this notion of responsibility for trade-related emissions would profoundly (re)shape assessments of national re-
sponses to climate change.’ (Christoff & Eckersley, 2011, p. 432).  
Greenhouse gas emissions data, as indicators of climate performance, must be comparable across countries and 
over time (Jahn, 2014, p. 84; Jahn & Wälti, 2007). States differ in the size of their populations and economies, 
their natural resources, industry structure, and national capacity (e.g., GDP, fossil-fuel dependency, population 
growth) (Christoff & Eckersley, 2011; Meadowcroft, 2014, p. 41, Neumayer, 2003, p. 208). To consider this, 
previous studies have used per-capita emissions, per unit of GDP emissions, or a combination of both. Following 
earlier research, the present study has controlled for population size, which varies considerably among countries. 
China has the highest CO2 emission levels. When population size is considered, the US has the highest CO2 emis-
sions per capita rate. To compare climate performance, population size must therefore be controlled; CO2 emis-
sions from different countries are adjusted by the total population size of each country (total CO2 emissions/total 
population size = CO2 emissions per capita) (see also Neumayer, 2003, p. 208; Spilker, 2013, p. 25). Second, from 
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an equity perspective, per-capita emissions are the relevant indicator. Meadowcroft (2014, p. 41) has argued that 
‘there is no a priori justification for one group of humans to be allowed to do more of an activity that harms the 
common weal than another.’ Neumayer (2003, p. 208) has argued that ‘[f]rom a human health perspective, per-
capita pollution is arguably a more relevant indicator than pollution per unit of GDP.’ However, CO2 emissions 
per unit of GDP correct pollution data by the size of the economy, measuring the efficiency of the country’s 
economy with regard to CO2 emissions (Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2013a, p. 198; Meadowcroft, 2014, p. 41). Cao and 
Prakash (2010, p. 485) have argued that this is the relevant indicator for analysing the effect of trade competition 
because it measures the costs of environmental regulations in unit of GDP. In accordance with Bernauer and Böh-
melt (2013a, p. 199), this study uses the ratio of emissions and per-capita GDP. In sum, climate performance is 
measured by CO2 emissions per capita as indicator weighted by the ratio of per-capita GDP (see also Bernauer & 
Böhmelt, 2013a, p. 199).  
As the previous section explains, empirical criteria are used to consider the evaluative component of the perfor-
mance concept and to measure relative climate performance across countries and over time. The empirical criteria 
applied include the best and worst performance values across countries over the entire research period (see Roller, 
2005, p. 71). Given the need for comparable cases (Jahn, 2014, p. 83), I have applied separate criteria for best/worst 
performance among developed and developing countries. The scale ranges from 0 (worst relative performance) to 
100 (best relative performance). 
Most studies of climate performance apply panel regression (time-series cross-sectional analysis, TSCS). The un-
derlying assumption (that explanatory factors have a constant effect on climate performance over time and across 
countries) is questionable. For instance, political explanatory factors, including domestic political institutions, in-
fluence climate outcomes via climate policy outputs in the long term only (Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2006, p. 336). 
Moreover, while some scholars explicitly focus on within variation (see Chapters 3 & 4), many studies that do not 
estimate between-variation are mainly interested in country differences (e.g., Spilker, 2013). To a lesser extent, 
between-variation (cross-sectional OLS regression of averages values over the research period) and/or within-
variation models are tested. Studies that examine separately variation across countries and over time find different 
results related to the effect of explanatory factors (e.g., Escher & Walter-Rogg, 2018). It is therefore important to 
study variance over time and across countries separately. This study focuses on between variation, as institutional 
aspects of democracy vary little over time and presumably take some time to influence climate performance (Fred-
riksson & Neumayer, 2013, p. 12). Here, country averages were examined over the research period (see Chapter 
6) as a dependent variable. 
In sum, this study measures climate performance over the research period, using country averages for CO2 emis-
sions, standardised by country size and the size of the economy and standardised by the best/worst-practice ap-
proach across developed/developing countries and over time. 
2.4 Conclusions 
This study limits the analysis to state participation in the UN climate change regime as explanatory factors may 
vary among environmental policies. Figure 2.1 summarises the conceptualisation and measurement of the depend-
ent variable.  
Figure 2.1 State participation in UN climate cooperation 
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Political decision-makers have fewer incentives to tackle climate change than to address local and regional envi-
ronmental problems. Thus, domestic political institutions tend to make little difference in the effect of globalisation 
on state participation in international climate cooperation. It is an empirical question whether domestic political 
institutions matter to the relationship between globalisation and state participation in international efforts to tackle 
climate change. As Chapter 5 will argue, interaction effects may vary between dimensions of globalisation and 
with specific domestic political and institutional factors. The dependent variable is commitment to the central goals 
and principles of the UN climate change regime (climate commitment) and implementing measures that contribute 
to its central goal (climate change mitigation) (climate performance). For theoretical and empirical reasons, the 
determinants of both dimensions of climate cooperation are studied separately. This study argues that this approach 
is also relevant to interaction effects between globalisation and domestic political institutions. Climate commit-
ment is measured by the delay in ratifying two treaties that fall within the research period: UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol. As explanatory factors may vary in accordance with treaty design, the two climate agreements are studied 
separately. Treaty design must therefore be considered when analysing the joint effect of international integration 
and domestic political institutions. To conceptualise the second dimension, this chapter explains how the climate 
performance concept is used, based on climate policy outcomes, as opposed to other relevant concepts. Finally, I 
distinguish between the two country groups, as international climate regimes define different obligations for de-
veloped and developing countries. 
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3  International integration and climate commitment and per-
formance 
Abstract 
Previous empirical studies have not systematically examined the interaction effects between globalisation and 
domestic political institutions, based on the assumption that the competitive pressures caused by globalisation 
affect climate commitment and performance, independent of domestic politics. The central argument of this chap-
ter is that it is an empirical question whether the effect of globalisation on climate commitment and performance 
is independent of domestic factors. To answer the research question, this chapter examines previous research, 
which asked whether globalisation is good or bad for climate commitment and performance. How does globalisa-
tion affect state participation in climate cooperation, and is its effect moderated by domestic political institutions? 
The discussion suggests that economic openness undermines climate commitment and performance in developing 
countries via the scale and composition effects of economic growth. In the developed world, a country’s climate 
performance depends on the behaviour of important trading partners. Political globalisation should contribute as a 
positive incentive to climate commitment and performance. While competition pressures caused by economic 
globalisation may affect climate commitment and performance, independent of domestic variables, institutional 
constraints and institutional quality can moderate incentives derived from international political integration, as 
well as scale effects of economic openness. Based on the broader literature on policy consequences of globalisation 
three research traditions on the joint effect of globalisation and domestic political institutions are identified: the 
veto-player approach, the political-corruption and the regime-type approach. The following study examines 
whether they apply to climate commitment and performance. 
Following Chaudoin et al. (2015, pp. 282ff.) there are five possible relationships between domestic and interna-
tional explanatory factors of (foreign) policy. First, international variables are unimportant for public policy. Sec-
ond, domestic and international determinants have additive effects on (foreign) policy. Third, international influ-
ences affect policy output indirectly, via their effect on domestic explanatory factors (mediation effects). Fourth, 
a country’s policy is influenced by other countries policies via policy-diffusion mechanisms (interdependence). 
Last, international variables affect the effect of domestic variables or vice versa (moderation effects). This study 
examines the possible moderation effects of domestic political institutions on the effect of international economic 
and political integration on climate commitment and performance.  
To formulate hypotheses on the moderation effects of domestic political institutions, it is necessary to specify the 
causal order of domestic and international explanatory factors of climate commitment and performance (see also 
Chapter 5). The reason is that multiple moderation effects of domestic political institutions are possible. As this 
chapter will show, they can influence government responses to globalisation as well as their implementation, a 
government’s exposure to international influences, and the growth effects of economic globalisation, via a coun-
try’s ability to attract international trade and capital. This chapter therefore begins by examining the globalisa-
tion/environment literature regarding (3.1) the effects of international economic and (3.2) political integration on 
climate commitment and performance. Is globalisation good or bad for climate commitment and performance? 
How does globalisation affect state participation in climate cooperation? Following the conclusions of Chapter 2, 
this discussion of the empirical literature focuses on studies that examine climate commitment and performance 
specifically, as results may vary in accordance with the type of environmental problem. The conclusions of both 
sections (3.1 & 3.2) formulate hypotheses on the relationship between international economic/political integration 
and climate commitment and performance. Based on the discussion in Chapter 2, separate hypotheses are formu-
lated for UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification and climate performance, as well as developed and developing 
countries. The following empirical analysis does not examine climate commitment separately for developed coun-
tries (see also Chapter 6). There is little variation in the ratification of the UNFCCC among industrialised countries. 
Additionally, EU member states entered the Kyoto Protocol together. However, the statistically analysis of climate 
commitment studies the pooled sample and the developing-country sample separately. 
Chapter 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate that there is no uniform effect of globalisation dimensions on climate commitment 
and performance. Based on previous research, this study assumes that economic openness undermines climate 
performance of poor countries via composition and scale effects of economic growth. In the developed world, 
international economic integration influences climate commitment and performance via policy diffusion. 
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International political integration contributes to climate commitment and, to a lesser extent, performance as a 
positive incentive derived from the international level.  
Second, to situate this research question within the academic literature, Sections 3.1 and 3.2 discuss the literature, 
asking whether these effects depend on domestic political institutions. Race-to-the-bottom theory suggests that the 
effect of economic globalisation on climate commitment and performance is independent of domestic political 
factors. Most empirical explanatory models used in similar studies assume additive effects of international inte-
gration. Studies on interaction effects between globalisation and domestic political institutions have focused in 
part on local environmental problems, based on the assumption that competition pressures affect climate commit-
ment and performance, independent of domestic political institutions (e.g., Cao & Prakash, 2012). This chapter 
argues that it is an empirical question, not previously studied, whether the effect of international integration on 
climate commitment and performance is independent of domestic factors. First, the theories underpinning most 
arguments that link international integration to climate commitment or performance assume that domestic factors 
(including domestic political institutions) moderate the effects of international integration. Second, as the literature 
review suggests, no uniform effects of the globalisation dimensions (see above) have been shown. The moderation 
effects of international integration and domestic political institutions may, therefore, vary among dimensions of 
international integration. Finally, as mentioned above, this chapter identifies four possible moderation effects. 
First, political institutions within a government system (i.e., involved in the political decision-making process) 
moderate state responses to incentives and pressures caused by globalisation. Second, implementation institutions 
(e.g., environmental authorities) affect the relationship between globalisation and climate performance. Third, do-
mestic political institutions influence a country’s exposure to international influences derived from international 
integration. This includes arguments that domestic and international pressures and incentives on the government 
can strengthen or weaken each other. Finally, domestic political institutions moderate the effect of economic open-
ness on climate performance via economic growth, as context conditions of international trade and investment. 
While competition pressures caused by economic globalisation may affect climate commitment and performance, 
independent of domestic political institutions, institutional constraints and institutional quality can moderate in-
centives derived from international political integration, as well as scale effects of economic openness. The broader 
literature on the (environmental) policy consequences of international integration examines the possible modera-
tion effects of domestic political institutions. The conclusion (3.3) distinguishes between three theoretical ap-
proaches to the joint influence of globalisation and domestic political institutions: the veto-player approach, the 
joint effect of globalisation and political corruption, and differences among democracies and autocracies in relation 
to the effect of international integration. The following study uses these to analyse climate commitment and per-
formance (see Chapter 5). 
3.1 International economic integration and climate commitment 
and performance 
This chapter examines the academic literature on international economic integration and climate commitment and 
performance. The first section (3.1.1) distinguishes between two conceptualisations of international economic in-
tegration in the globalisation/climate change literature (economic openness and interdependence), arguing that it 
is important to consider both conceptualisations. They are associated with different theoretical arguments, which 
link them to climate commitment and performance. Section 3.1.2 discusses theoretical perspectives on economic 
globalisation and climate commitment and performance (standard economic theory, globalisation, policy-conver-
gence and diffusion research, and neoliberal institutionalism). Is international economic integration good or bad 
for climate commitment and performance? How does economic globalisation affect state participation in climate 
cooperation? Does its effect depend on domestic political institutions? The following section (3.1.3) examines the 
empirical literature on economic globalisation and climate commitment and performance. For the empirical anal-
ysis, the conclusion (3.1.4) formulates hypotheses on the relationship between international economic integration 
and climate commitment and performance. Based on previous research, this study assumes that economic openness 
contributes to global air pollution via the scale and composition effects of economic growth in poor countries. 
International economic integration influences climate performance via policy diffusion in developed countries. 
This chapter argues that, in contrast to the assumptions that underlie theoretical discussions of economic globali-
sation and climate commitment and performance, the explanatory models in most empirical studies assume addi-
tive effects of international economic influences. From a theoretical perspective, multiple moderation effects of 
domestic political institutions are possible. While states may react in similar ways to competition pressures caused 
by economic openness and interdependence, domestic political institutions may moderate the scale effects of eco-
nomic openness. 
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3.1.1 Conceptualisation of international economic integration 
Social and political scientists disagree on what ‘globalisation’ means (Jahn, 2016a, p. 861; Jones, 2010, p. 4f.; 
Rensmann, 2011, p. 106). In the literature on the environmental policy consequences of economic globalisation, 
two important conceptualisations can be distinguished (see also Jahn, 2016b, p. 239). While many studies refer to 
the concept of international economic embeddedness19 (e.g., Boyce, 2004, p. 106; De Soysa & Neumayer, 2005, 
p. 733; Spilker, 2013, pp. 14–19), other scholars use the economic interdependence concept (e.g., Jahn, 2016b, p. 
239; Jahn, 2008, p. 13). The extent to which a country is embedded in the international system is a multidimen-
sional concept (Jahn, 2016b, p. 239). There is no agreement on the dimensions of international embeddedness. 
Dreher et al. (2008, p. 43) identify economic, political, and social dimensions of globalisation. International eco-
nomic embeddedness is conceptualised either as economic liberalisation or as economic openness. Economic lib-
eralisation refers to ‘the cluster of technological, economic, and political innovations that reduce the barrier to 
economic, political and cultural exchange’ (Drezner, 2005, p. 841). Based on the conceptualisation of international 
economic embeddedness, a separate literature explores the effect of economic liberalisation (e.g., Morin et al., 
2018) and economic openness on the environment (e.g., Gallagher, 2009) (see also O’Neill, 2009, p. 144). In 
accordance with similar studies of international economic integration and climate commitment and performance, 
this study focuses on economic openness.  
Concepts of economic openness view international economic integration in terms of cross-border economic inter-
actions – goods, services and capital – among countries (e.g., Garrett, 2000, p. 942; Milner & Keohane, 1996, p. 
4). A country’s economic openness refers to the extent of its economic exchanges of goods, services, and money 
with other countries, relative to the size of its economy (Becker et al., 2007, p. 13; Jahn, 2009, p. 96; Zürn, 2002, 
p. 237). The higher the percentage of international economic transactions in a country’s GDP, ‘the more it interacts 
with other countries’ (Jahn & Stephan, 2015, p. 22) and the higher its exposure to global economic pressures 
(Babones, 2007, p. 147). Empirical research on internationalisation and globalisation conceptualises international 
economic integration as economic openness, measured by trade or capital openness (e.g., Garrett, 1998, p. 1; 
Milner & Keohane, 1996, p. 4) (Gilardi, 2013, p. 455).20 This also applies to studies of the environmental conse-
quences of economic globalisation (e.g., Spilker, 2013). Policy-convergence studies also apply the economic open-
ness concept (e.g., Drezner, 2005, p. 841), based on the assumption that a country’s economic openness implies 
an exposure to international economic pressures to stay competitive (e.g., Holzinger & Knill, 2005, pp. 782, 789; 
Holzinger et al., 2008, p. 561). Based on the type of economic interaction, three dimensions of economic openness 
can be distinguished: international trade, foreign direct investment, and international financial flows (Garrett, 
2000, p. 942; Haas & Hird, 2013, p. xxxiii; Mahler, 2004, p. 1028; Zohlnhöfer, 2015, p. 200). The globalisation/en-
vironment literature focuses on the first two dimensions (see 3.1.2 & 3.1.3). In more recent research on interna-
tional economic integration and the environment, the term ‘economic globalisation’ is often used to denote eco-
nomic openness. In general, economic-globalisation studies rarely differ, in their conceptualisation and measure-
ment of international economic integration, from earlier studies of the effects of international trade (Babones, 
2014, pp. 5, 70).21,22  
Social science research on economic globalisation and the environment also refers to the ‘economic interdepend-
ence’ concept (e.g., neoliberal institutionalist theory). In International Relations, interdependence refers to situa-
tions of ‘mutual dependence between social actors’ (Zürn, 2002, p. 236) or countries; these are the outcomes of 
transactions between countries or social actors within different countries (Keohane & Nye, 1989, p. 8f.; Zürn, 
2002, p. 236). Thus, economic interdependence refers to mutual dependence between countries, resulting from the 
exchange of goods, services, and money. In contrast to international economic interconnectedness, mutual depend-
ence implies that countries are affected by economic transactions (Keohane & Nye, 1989, p. 9; Zürn, 2002, p. 
236). The degree of economic globalisation can vary between nations (Jahn, 2009, p. 92; Zürn, 1998, p. 76). Race-
to-the-bottom theory and race-to-the-top theory refer to the concept of strategic interdependence (Jahn, 2016b, p. 
243f.). This understanding refers to situations in which the actions of a ‘whenever some unit(s)’s actions affect the 
marginal utilities of the alternative actions for some other(s)‘ (Franzese & Hays, 2008, p. 745, see also Cao & 
Prakash, 2010, p. 482; Lake & Powell, 1999, pp. 7f.). More recently, scholars have studied economic interdepend-
ence and the environment from the perspective of the policy diffusion concept (e.g., Jahn, 2016b, p. 239; Jahn, 
2006, pp. 402f.). Globalisation is understood as a process through which governments voluntarily adopt the policy 
innovations (e.g., environmental policies) of other countries (Braun & Gilardi, 2006, p. 299; Braun et al., 2007, p. 
39; Busch & Jörgens, 2005, p. 865; Dobbin et al., 2007, p. 457; Elkins & Simmons, 2005, p. 35; Gilardi, 2013, p. 
 
19 The literature also uses the term ‘international economic interconnectedness’ (e.g., De Soysa & Neumayer, 2005, p. 733) or 
‘internationalisation’ (e.g., Milner & Keohane, 1996, p. 4). 
20 Outcome data are easier to measure than liberalised trade barriers (Milner & Keohane, 2006, pp. 3f.). 
21 Scholte (2005, p. 17) maintains that ‘[f]rom this perspective, ‘global’ is simply another adjective to describe cross-border 
relations between countries, and ‘globalisation’ designates a growth of international exchange and interdependence’. 
22 Accordingly, Jahn (2016a, p. 239) describes globalisation as a ‘catchphrase’ for embeddedness and interdependence. 
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454; Graham et al., 2012, p. 675; Jahn, 2016a, p. 865; Jahn, 2015, p. 255; Jahn & Stephan 2015, p. 27; Simmons 
& Elkins, 2004, p. 173; Simmons et al., 2006, p. 792). 23,24 The policy-diffusion literature, based on multiple the-
oretical traditions, names these ‘diffusion mechanisms’ (Gilardi, 2013, p. 460); they are common causal mecha-
nisms for the way in which political decisions in other countries influence policy outputs (Braun & Gilardi, 2006, 
p. 299; Braun et al., 2007, p. 42 Gilardi, 2013, p. 460; Hedström & Swedberg, 1998, p. 7). The diffusion mechanism 
of ‘economic competition’ assumes that governments adopt policies derived from other countries to secure eco-
nomic competitiveness in their own domestic economies (Dobbin et al., 2007, p. 457; Gilardi, 2013, p. 432; Jahn, 
2015, p. 255; Jahn, 2016a, p. 865; Jahn, 2016b, p. 244; Jahn & Stephan 2015, p. 27; Simmons & Elkins, 2004, p. 
173; Simmons et al., 2006, p. 792). Political authorities are able to identify their competitors, their competitive 
advantages, and relevant policies (Dobbin et al., 2007, p. 458). Esty (2011, p. 160) assumes that the more a country 
trades with another country, the more it is influenced by that country’s environmental and economic policies. This 
conceptualisation of international economic integration is similar to the concept of strategic interdependence (Jahn, 
2016b, p. 244). In fact, economic globalisation results from economic interdependence (Gilardi, 2013, p. 454; 
Jahn, 2006, pp. 402f.). Most studies of climate commitment and performance do not restrict international economic 
integration to interdependence across regions and continents. By contrast, the transformalist definition of globali-
sation introduced by Held et al. (1999, pp. 7ff., 15)25 refers to processes of increased interdependence between 
individuals and societies across regions and continents (Carporaso & Madeira, 2012, p. 8; Held & McGrew, 2000, 
p. 4; Jahn, 2009, pp. 87f.; Zürn, 1998, p. 125). Carporaso and Madeira (2012, p. 8) argue that ‘[i]n one sense, 
globalization is just interdependence (economic, cultural, or political) on a global scale.’ 
In sum, economic globalisation is understood either as a country’s economic openness or as economic interde-
pendence (or policy diffusion) between countries. The next section shows that theoretical approaches link eco-
nomic globalisation to climate commitment and performance in different ways, depending on their conceptualisa-
tion of international economic integration. It follows that it is important to study the effect of both dimensions of 
economic globalisation on climate commitment and performance. 
3.1.2 Review of the main theoretical approaches 
This section reviews the main theoretical approaches in the literature on economic globalisation and the environ-
ment. Is economic openness good or bad for climate commitment and performance, and is its effect independent 
of domestic political institutions? The economic globalisation and climate commitment and performance literature 
refers to the broader theoretical debate on the environmental consequences of economic globalisation, as well as 
the older debate on the effect of international trade on the environment. This chapter distinguishes between three 
theoretical traditions in the academic literature (for more on general public policy, see Busch, 2007, p. 27; Schirm, 
2007, p. 2). First, economic and political science publications refer to standard trade theory (e.g., Bättig & Ber-
nauer, 2009, p. 296; Jahn, 2008, p. 14; Spilker, 2013, pp. 14ff.). Second, political science research studies the 
relationship between globalisation and the environment from the perspectives of internationalisation and globali-
sation, as well as policy convergence and diffusion theory (e.g., Andonova et al., 2007; Yamagata et al., 2013). 
The relationship between international economic integration and a country’s commitment to climate cooperation 
is rarely discussed from these perspectives.26 Finally, scholars have drawn on International Relations theory (ne-
oliberal institutionalism) to discuss the consequences of international economic integration for climate commit-
ment.  
3.1.2.1 Standard economic theory 
Within standard trade theory, scholars draw on empirical research arguments about the impact of economic growth 
on environmental quality to study the effects of economic openness on environmental quality (O’Neill, 2009, p. 
144). The direct and indirect effects of economic openness on the environment are distinguished (Gallagher, 2009, 
p. 283). The former include greenhouse gas emissions caused by increased international transportation of goods 
and services (Gallagher, 2009, p. 283; O’Neill, 2009, p. 145). Trade and capital openness are associated with 
 
23 It can also be applied to other political levels or to non-state actors and is not limited to policies (Gilardi, 2013, p. 454). 
24 The definition of policy diffusion excludes international or supranational law and external coercion (Busch & Jörgens, 2005, 
pp. 865, 861; Elkins & Simmons, 2005, pp. 35, 38; Gilardi, 2013, p. 454; Jahn, 2015, p. 255). While this limitation of the 
diffusion concept is contested (e.g., Börzel & Risse, 2009, p. 9; Braun & Gilardi, 2006, p. 299; Dobbin et al., 2007; Graham et 
al., 2012, p. 690; Holzinger & Knill, 2005, pp. 779ff.; Knill, 2005, p. 767; Simmons et al., 2006, pp. 790f.), it clearly distin-
guishes policy diffusion from related concepts (Holzinger et al., 2007, pp. 14, 29f.). 
25 Held et al. (1999, pp. 2–10) distinguish this understanding from hyperglobalist and sceptical perspectives. Hyperglobalist 
conceptualisations are problematic in the analysis of climate policy because they include the results of these worldwide inte-
gration processes in their definitions (e.g., Zürn, 2013, p. 402) (Jahn, 2016a, p. 862). In contrast to the sceptical position, the 
environmental policy literature assumes that international integration processes limit the autonomy of national governments. 
26 One exception is Bättig and Bernauer (2009). 
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increased greenhouse gas emissions as long as transportation techniques are not environmentally friendly (Gal-
lagher, 2009, p. 283). Following Grossman and Krueger’s (1995) article, the literature distinguishes between three 
indirect effects of international trade and capital openness on the environment: the scale, composition, and tech-
nique effects of economic growth (e.g., Gallagher, 2009, p. 283). There is no agreement on the direction of the 
indirect effects of international trade and investment. International trade and investment increase the scale of eco-
nomic activity in a country (economic growth) (Cole, 2004, p. 72; Esty, p. 2001, p. 115). If economic production 
processes are not altered in way that is environmentally friendly, increased trade and investment will make envi-
ronmental pollution worse (Cole, 2004, p. 72; Copeland & Taylor, 1994, p. 769; Esty, 2001, p. 115; Gallagher, 
2009, p. 283). Capital openness increases pollution via economic activity in developing countries, as foreign in-
vestment usually focuses on large-scale plants in the global south (Spilker, 2013, p. 17). International trade and 
investment also contribute to environmental pollution by increasing domestic consumption (Jahn, 2016b, p. 240). 
By contrast, green political theory assumes that economic openness can contribute, via sustainable development, 
to environmental quality (Esty, 2011, p. 158). In sum, as greenhouse gas emissions result from major economic 
activities, scale effects imply that trade and capital openness are associated with lower levels of climate perfor-
mance if production processes and consumption patterns are not altered in an environmentally sustainable way. 
Composition effects refer to the Heckscher-Ohlin model and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem of standard trade 
theory. Countries specialise in economic sectors in which they have a comparative advantage. Thus, international 
trade and capital generate additional income (Gallagher, 2009, pp. 282f.). Different conclusions are drawn about 
its impact on the environment. The gains-from-trade hypothesis claims that economic openness contributes to 
climate performance via economic growth (Baek et al., 2009, p. 2261; Damania et al., 2003, p. 490; Frankel & 
Rose, 2005, p. 85; Li & Reuveny, 2006, pp. 942f.). Countries with more economic resources should enact and 
implement environmental protection policies and use more environmentally friendly technologies (Clapp & Dau-
vergne, 2011, p. 27; Cole, 2004, p. 72; Dauvergne, 2017, p. 398; Esty, 2011, p. 161f.; Gallagher, 2009, p. 283; 
O’Neill, 2009, p. 145). Moreover, trade and foreign investment improve the environment via employment and 
poverty reduction (De Soysa & Neumayer, 2005, p. 734; Esty, 2011, p. 161). The gains-from-trade hypothesis is 
based on the assumption that citizens and the government have an interest in environmental protection. Following 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) theory, the higher the levels of economic development, the higher the public 
demand for environmental quality. This only applies to developed countries. Governments and the public in rich 
countries, however, often focus on immediate and local environmental problems as well (see Chapter 2). If envi-
ronmental quality has negative income elasticity (inferior good), gains from trade are associated with a higher 
public demand for environmental protection; in this way, they lead (via the use of environmentally friendly pro-
duction technologies) to environmental quality (Baek et al., 2009, p. 2255; Chang, 2015, p. 235; Copeland & 
Taylor, 1994, p. 755; Dean, 2002, p. 820; Gallagher, 2009, p. 283; Jahn, 2008, p. 14). By contrast, international 
trade undermines the environment as a normal good (positive income elasticity) via the scale of economic activity 
(Baek et al., 2009, p. 2255; Chang, 2015, p. 235). Economic growth, based on international trade and investment, 
contributes via the overconsumption of environmental resources, population growth, and economic inequality, to 
environmental degradation (Clapp & Dauvergne, 2011, p. 33, 38ff.). This questions the hypothesis that trade and 
capital openness contribute to climate protection in developed countries. 
Standard trade theory regards the economic sector, which gives a country its comparative advantage, as decisive 
for composition effects (Cole, 2004, p. 72; Jahn, 2016b, p. 240; Spilker, 2013, p. 15). International trade and 
investment contribute to environmental degradation, if a country’s comparative advantage lies in pollution-inten-
sive production or weak environmental regulations (Gallagher, 2009, p. 283). Thus, economic openness has an 
unequal effect on environment across countries (Dauvergne, 2017, p. 402). The literature distinguishes between 
poor and rich countries in this respect. Assuming that the comparative advantage of developed countries lies in 
capital intensive production, while the comparative advantage of developing countries lies in labour-intensive 
production, economic openness has a negative effect on climate performance in rich countries and a positive effect 
in poor countries. Labour-intensive production processes are less polluting (Spilker, 2013, p. 15). By contrast, the 
pollution-haven hypothesis assumes that international trade and investment increase environmental pollution in 
developing countries (Antweiler et al., 2001, p. 877; Cole et al., 2017, p. 467; Xu, 2000, p. 234). They have a 
comparative advantage in the export of pollution-intensive goods and primary commodities (e.g., natural re-
sources). Thus, multinational corporations externalise environmental pollution to developing countries by import-
ing pollution-intensive products and raw materials (Boyce, 2004, p. 110). Developing countries may also have a 
comparative advantage in low environmental standards because they have lower public demand for environmental 
protection (EKC theory) and their governments have less ability to enforce and implement them (Boyce, 2004, p. 
107; Dauvergne, 2017, p. 401). Thus, trade and capital openness undermines climate performance in developing 
countries by shifting pollution-intensive production to countries with low environmental standards (Cole, 2004, p. 
73; Cole et al., 2017, p. 467; Copeland & Taylor, 1994, pp. 767, 769; Copeland & Taylor, 2004, p. 9; Frankel & 
Rose, 2005, p. 85). Simultaneously, climate protection in developed countries (e.g., Japan, the United Kingdom) 
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can profit from international trade and investment (Cole et al., 2017, pp. 480f.; Dauvergne, 2017, p. 402)27. Theo-
retical and empirical research suggests that environmental regulations do not increase production costs enough for 
firms to consider them a reason to relocate (e.g., Antweiler et al., 2001; Boyce, 2004; Copeland & Taylor, 2004; 
Dean, 2002, p. 820; Tobey, 1990; see also Wheeler, 2001, pp. 231f.). A more recent study, which considers types 
of foreign direct investment (FDI), finds support for the pollution-haven hypothesis (Tang, 2015). To conclude, 
international trade and investment, via composition effects, increase greenhouse gas emissions in the developing 
world. They may improve climate performance in developed countries. 
Standard economic theory regards technique effects as good for the environment (e.g., Copeland & Taylor, 2004, 
p. 15). International trade and investment would support the development and distribution of environmentally 
friendly production processes (Cole, 2004, p. 72; Gallagher, 2009, p. 283; Frankel & Rose, 2005, p. 85). Based on 
the assumption that technologies are more environmentally friendly in developed countries, trade and especially 
foreign investment have a positive effect on environmental quality in developing countries (Spilker, 2013, p. 18). 
Multinational corporations presumably use the technology of their home countries (Frankel & Rose, 2005, p. 85; 
Spilker, 2013, p. 18). This leads to the diffusion of technology within countries via supply-chain requirements 
(Spilker, 2013, p. 18). By contrast, case studies have shown that multinational corporations use weaker environ-
mental standards in their host countries than they do in their home countries (Dauvergne, 2017, p. 402). Moreover, 
they may have little interest in developing techniques that decrease global air pollution (vs. local air pollution). 
Econometric and case study results are ambiguous (Cole et al., 2017, p. 477f.). In sum, there is unlikely to be a 
clear effect of technique effects. 
In sum, economic openness affects climate performance via scale and composition effects. Scale effects should 
undermine climate performance. Via composition effects, international trade and investment should increase 
greenhouse gas emissions in the developing world. They may improve climate policy outcomes in developed 
countries. Technique effects are ambiguous. The net effect of trade and capital openness depends on which effect 
(direct, scale composition, technique) dominates (e.g., Copeland & Taylor, 2004, p. 9; Spilker, 2013, pp. 16f., 19). 
Thus, the effect of international trade and investment on climate performance (see also Chang, 2015, p. 235; Li & 
Reuveny, 2006, p. 943) is an empirical question (Bättig & Bernauer, 2009, p. 296; Spilker, 2013, pp. 17, 19). The 
negative scale and composition effects of international trade and investment suggest that trade and capital openness 
should undermine climate performance in developing countries. By contrast, there should be no clear effect in 
developed countries (negative scale effects, unclear composition effects). Although standard trade theory does not 
address the ratification of international climate agreements, composition effects can be used to explain the ratifi-
cation of international agreements (e.g., Bättig & Bernauer, 2009). Developing countries that profit from pollution-
intensive trade and investment should be less committed to climate cooperation than developed countries.  
Standard economic theory tells us little about the interrelationship between economic openness and domestic pol-
itics. The gains-from-trade hypothesis assumes that citizens prefer environmental protection and that governments 
use revenues from international trade and investment to protect the environment. Empirical research has shown 
that public concern about global warming varies among countries (e.g., Kim & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014). It is 
therefore an empirical question whether governments use trade revenues to protect the global atmosphere. 
Work has been carried out, from the perspective of standard trade theory, on possible interactions between domes-
tic political institutions and economic openness. First, Cole and Fredriksson (2009) have argued that the negative 
effect of capital openness is higher in countries with few veto points. Foreign firms lobby the government to reduce 
environmental regulations. The higher the number of veto points, the more costly this becomes. Yet, environmental 
protection may also become more important as the number of veto points rises (see Chapter 5). 
Second, economists expect corruption among political decision-makers and public authorities to strengthen the 
negative effects of economic openness on global air pollution (Chang, 2015; Damania et al., 2003). More corrupt 
governments are more likely to reduce environmental regulations or fail to implement them, reflecting their busi-
ness interests, under conditions of economic globalisation (Chang, 2015, pp. 235f.). Damania et al. (2003, pp. 
492f.) assume that corruption enhances the negative effect of trade liberalisation on the stringency of environmen-
tal policy in the case of protective trade policies. It shifts the government’s focus away from social welfare toward 
bribery (Damania et al., 2003, p. 493). 
Finally, Spilker (2013, pp. 54f., 58ff.) argues that democracy lessens the negative effects and strengthens the pos-
itive effects of international trade and investment on environmental quality in developing countries – for three 
reasons. First, local communities in democracies have more opportunities to pressure firms to implement environ-
mental regulations. Political rights enable them to protest against firm decisions, pressure political decision-mak-
ers, and mobilise public support via the media. Civil rights make it possible to enforce environmental regulations 
through the courts. Transparency also supports the work of courts. Second, citizens in democracies are more in-
formed about environmental problems and, therefore, are better able to monitor environmental policy adoption 
 
27 The pollution-haven hypothesis is compatible with the regulatory race and race-to-the-bottom hypothesis (Gallagher, 2009, 
p. 283) (see the next section). 
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Figure 3.1 International economic integration, the government system, and climate policy output and out-
come 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Economic openness, domestic political institutions, and climate policy outcome 
 
 
and implementation. Finally, the rule of law, including property rights, enables firms to invest in environmentally 
friendly technologies. The literature formulates multiple moderation effects. First, characteristics of the govern-
ment (veto points and political corruption among political decision-makers) moderate the effect of economic open-
ness on climate policy output (e.g., Chang, 2015; Cole & Fredriksson, 2009; Damania et al., 2003) (see Figure 
3.1). Second, domestic political institutions (political corruption among public officials, rule of law, civil rights), 
which implement climate policy outputs, affect climate policy outcomes (climate performance) (e.g., Chang, 2015; 
Damania et al., 2003) (see Figure 3.1). Third, domestic political institutions that control access to the political 
system (e.g., political rights) act as incentives, influencing government responses to pressures of international 
integration (e.g., Spilker, 2013) (see Figure 3.1). Finally, domestic political institutions moderate (as context fac-
tors of international trade and investment) their effects on climate performance through economic growth (see 
Figure 3.2). For instance, civil rights lead firms to invest in environmentally friendly technology (Spilker, 2013, 
p. 59). 
To conclude, standard economic theory argues that trade and capital openness undermine climate commitment and 
performance in the developing world, through scale and composition effects. There is no clear effect of economic 
openness in the developed world. Does the effect of international economic integration depend on domestic polit-
ical institutions? While standard economic theory does not address this question, several studies have suggested 
that the effect of economic openness on the environment depends on the level of political corruption, regime type, 
and veto points. 
3.1.2.2 Globalisation, policy-convergence and policy-diffusion research 
This chapter discusses three strands in the academic literature on international economic integration and the envi-
ronment: (1) a debate on the policy consequences of internationalisation or globalisation; (2) policy-convergence 
research; and (3) policy-diffusion research. These research traditions share assumptions and concepts regarding 
the (environmental) policy consequences of international economic integration and the interrelationship between 
international and domestic explanatory factors. Newer research traditions refer to older ones, adopting and refining 
their assumptions and concepts (see also Gilardi, 2013, pp. 454f.). The debate about the policy consequences of 
internationalisation goes back to the 1970s and has recently been applied to globalisation. Policy-convergence 
research generated fears that globalisation could lead to a race-to-the-bottom in social and environmental policy; 
it led to the discovery of an increasing similarity in policy outputs (e.g., Wheeler, 2001) in certain policy fields 
across spatial units (e.g., countries) over time (Drezner, 2001, p. 53; Holzinger & Knill, 2005, p. 776; Holzinger 
et al., 2008, p. 556; Holzinger et al., 2007, p. 11; Kerr, 1983, p. 3). More recently, policy-diffusion research has 
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addressed the consequences of globalisation for climate performance (e.g., Jahn, 2016b; Jahn, 2008). As explained 
in Section 3.1.1., policy diffusion is understood to be the result of international interdependence as ‘political deci-
sions in a given country are systematically conditioned by prior policy choices made in other countries’ (Gilardi, 
2013, p. 454) (Holzinger et al., 2007, p. 14; Simmons et al., 2006, p. 787). Policy-diffusion and convergence 
research assume that policy outputs are influenced by political decisions made by foreign governments (Dobbin et 
al., 2007, p. 450; Gilardi, 2013, pp. 453–457; Graham et al., 2012, p. 676; Simmons et al., 2006, pp. 782, 787). In 
contrast to policy convergence, policy diffusion refers to a process, i.e. the spread of policies, not the outcome of 
this process28 (Elkins & Simmons, 2005, p. 36; Gilardi, 2013, p. 454). The increasingly similar policy outputs 
across countries may reflect policy diffusion (Busch & Jörgens, 2005, p. 864; Holzinger & Knill, 2005, p. 779; 
Gilardi, 2013, p. 454; Knill, 2005, p. 767). This section begins by discussing the effect of international economic 
integration on climate commitment and performance within these theoretical traditions. Next, it addresses their 
assumptions and conclusions, regarding the interrelationship between international economic and domestic polit-
ical explanatory factors.  
International economic integration and climate commitment and performance  
Scholars of internationalisation and globalisation, policy convergence, and diffusion research refer to the same 
theoretical approaches when discussing the effect of international economic integration on policy output: standard 
trade theory (see Chapter 3.1.2.1) and regulatory competition theory (Schirm, 2007, p. 29). The most prominent 
theoretical approach in regulatory competition theory is race-to-the-bottom theory29. Following its central hypoth-
esis, governments lower their environmental standards below the level of their trading partners or competitors. 
Scholars who study structural factors regard economic interdependence as a form of pressure on firms and gov-
ernments to stay competitive (Becker et al., 2007, p. 16; Garrett, 1998, p. 2; Holzinger & Knill, 2005, p. 782; 
Schirm, 2007, p. 8; Wheeler, 2001, p. 221). Environmental regulations are assumed to increase production costs 
(Drezner, 2001, p. 58; Holzinger & Knill, 2005, p. 782; Kelemen, 2000, p. 140; Wheeler, 2001, p. 221). Interna-
tional economic integration implies mobility of trade and capital, causing companies to transfer their production 
processes to countries with weaker environmental standards to avoid higher costs (Copeland & Taylor, 2004, p. 9; 
Drezner, 2001, pp. 57f.; Holzinger & Knill, 2005, p. 782). In addition, industry representatives pressure govern-
ments to modify their policies to increase the competitiveness of domestic industry (Holzinger et al., 2008, p. 560). 
Governments act in accordance with business interests. First, the incongruity between the international economy 
and the nation-state means that no country can regulate the international market (Drezner, 2001, p. 58). Thus, each 
government’s autonomy, effectiveness, and ability to enact and implement policies is undermined by international 
economic integration (e.g., Cerny, 1995, p. 597; Garrett, 1998, pp. 7f.; Zürn, 2002, pp. 239f.). Consequently, eco-
nomic globalisation reduces a government’s ability to reduce environmental pollution (Cerny, 1995, pp. 610ff.; 
Drezner, 2001, p. 59). Second, governments are concerned about the short-term competitiveness of their econo-
mies, as economic growth affects their re-election prospects, via their tax base and economic outcomes (e.g., un-
employment) (Bernauer & Caduff, 2004, p. 100; Dobbin et al., 2007, p. 458; Drezner, 2001, p. 58; Garrett, 1998, 
p. 7). Regulatory competition theory assumes that policies, such as environmental regulations, affect a country`s 
economic competitiveness in the short or medium term (Simmons et al., 2007, pp. 792f.). In accordance with 
company demands to lower environmental standards (Holzinger & Knill, 2005, p. 782; Tosun, 2015, p. 654), 
governments adopt market-friendly policies, i.e. reduce public spending and taxes to attract mobile capital (Garrett, 
1998, p. 2). As governments know how policy decisions in other countries affect their competitiveness (Simmons 
et al., 2007, p. 793), they regard themselves as dependent (in their environmental regulations) on the environmental 
policies of other countries (Cao & Prakash, 2010, p. 482). They are expected to mutually adjust (Holzinger & 
Knill, 2005, p. 782), i.e. they do not raise (‘regulatory chill’ Bernauer & Caduff, 2004, p. 100) or lower environ-
mental regulations to stay competitive (Bernauer & Caduff, 2004, p. 100). In extreme cases, this could cause 
countries to converge on the level of environmental protection of the country with the lowest level of state regu-
lation (race-to-the-bottom) (Bernauer & Caduff, 2004, p. 100; Drezner, 2001, p. 59; Gallagher 2009, p. 290; Hol-
zinger & Knill, 2005, p. 782).  
From this perspective, economic openness – because it involves greater exposure to competition pressures (e.g., 
Holzinger et al., 2008, p. 561; Jahn, 2008, p. 14) – and economic interdependence (as countries react strategically 
to the climate policies of important trading partners) result in a lower climate performance. Race-to-the-bottom 
theory has also been applied to environmental cooperation. Neumayer (2002, p. 817) argues that concerns about 
economic competitiveness can undermine climate commitment. He cites US policy toward the Kyoto Protocol. 
Harrison and Sundstrom (2010a, p. 19) argue that ‘business opposition is likely to be enhanced to the extent that 
a country’s key trading partners do not make comparable commitments to reduce emissions.’ Esty (2011, p. 159) 
argues that, while governments may not lower environmental standards, they may hinder their implementation and 
 
28 However, it has also been defined as a policy outcome (e.g., Knill, 2005, p. 768).  
29 It is also called the efficiency hypothesis (e.g., Zohlnhöfer, 2015, p. 201) or the regulatory race hypothesis (e.g., Cao & 
Prakash, 2012, p. 66). 
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enforcement to make the domestic economy more competitive. It is harder for the public to control and monitor 
climate policy outcomes than output. Thus, economic globalisation has a stronger effect on climate performance 
than on commitment. 
The race-to-the-bottom hypothesis has been contested. First, its conclusion is questioned (Jänicke, 1998, p. 334f.). 
Increased international economic exchange and competition have not led to a systematic reduction of environmen-
tal regulations (Schirm, 2007, p. 10), especially in developed countries (Vogel, 2000, pp. 265f.). Stricter environ-
mental standards can be a competitive advantage, as well as a condition for market access (Dauvergne, 2017, pp. 
399f.). Higher exposure to the international economy or stricter environmental standards among trading partners 
can even lead, via multilateral trade agreements (Schirm, 2007, p. 10) and exports, to countries adopting higher 
environmental standards (Cao & Prakash, 2010, p. 488; Vogel, 2000, p. 268; Vogel, 1995, pp. 248–270), as well 
as innovative (Jänicke, 1998, pp. 334f.; Jänicke; 2005, p. 134) and stricter (Vogel, 2000, p. 268) environmental 
regulations (see also Cao & Prakash, 2010, p. 488; Jahn, 2008, p. 14). A race-to-the-top, especially with regard to 
product standards, i.e. ‘[t]echnical specifications for a certain product’ (Knill et al., 2008, p. 1021) (e.g., CO2 
emission limits for cars, Holzinger et al., 2008, pp. 561) is also possible (the ‘California effect’, Vogel, 2000, p. 
269, 275). Several publications have argued that this effect depends on trade barriers and international and supra-
national policies (Holzinger & Knill, 2005, p. 790; Knill et al., 2008, pp. 1021f.). The spread of OECD standards 
among countries leave firms with no alternative (Jänicke, 1998, p. 340). Jänicke (1998, pp. 335, 341f.) maintains 
that the race-to-the-top hypothesis may not apply to environmental problems that cannot easily be solved using 
technological solutions (such as global warming). As the previous section explained, the assumption that environ-
mental regulations are decisive for plant location is an empirical question. Theories differ on whether policy con-
vergence is caused by structural economic factors, such as race-to-the-bottom theory, or by ideational factors 
(Drezner, 2001, pp. 55, 57). Assuming that ideational factors are involved, governments may still perceive envi-
ronmental standards as an obstacle to economic competitiveness (Conca, 2000, p. 486). In fact, Porter (1999, p. 
135) has observed that many political decision-makers, bureaucrats and firms in rapidly-industrialising countries 
perceive them as harming competitiveness. Third, developed countries are able to condition trade with developing 
countries on the introduction of stricter environmental policies, which are demanded by their own populations 
(Drezner, 2005, p. 856; Knill et al., 2008, pp. 1020, 1022). Developing countries may not implement them because 
their competitive advantage lies in few environmental regulations (Knill et al., 2008, p. 1020). Thus, economic 
globalisation can still undermine climate performance in poor countries. Finally, Wheeler (2001, pp. 232f.) argues 
that local communities and non-government organisations (NGOs) contribute to environmental protection despite 
the lack of environmental standards (see also the so-called compensation hypothesis, e.g., Zohlnhöfer, 2015, p. 
202). He emphasises, based on previous empirical research, that this does not apply to greenhouse gas emissions 
‘that have no direct impact on the emitting society’ (Wheeler, 2001, p. 238). 
In sum, the literature review suggests that there is no general race-to-the-bottom in climate commitment and per-
formance. Economic openness and interdependence imply positive incentives, as well as negative pressures on 
government climate-protection efforts. The discussion suggests that the negative effects of economic openness 
may be more prevalent in developing countries. Second, policy diffusion is more important in highly integrated 
developed countries. Third, economic openness and policy diffusion are more important to climate performance 
than to climate commitment. 
International economic integration and domestic political institutions 
Regulatory competition theory argues that the effect of international economic integration is independent of do-
mestic politics, including government ideology and political institutions (Doyle 2014, p. 703; Drezner, 2001, p. 
58; Knill et al., 2008, p. 1022; Pinto, 2013, p. 1). Governments follow business interests to secure economic com-
petitiveness (Drezner, 2001, p. 58; Knill et al., 2008, p. 1022). This assumption is contested within the globalisa-
tion, policy convergence, and policy-diffusion literature (Jahn, 2016b, p. 240; Drezner, 2001, pp. 55ff.; Wilson, 
1996). It cannot explain why states respond in different ways to competitive pressures (policy divergence) (Drez-
ner, 2005, pp. 841f.; Eckersley, 2004, p. 69; Simmons, 2001, p. 590) and sometimes choose environmental pro-
tection (Jahn, 2016b, p. 240). For instance, New Zealand’s decision to ban future oil exploration (Aigne Roy, 
2018). 
Gourevitch (1978, pp. 882f., 900, 911) argued, in a seminal article that introduced second-image theory that, while 
international factors, restricted domestic politics, governments could still choose among different policy choices. 
The more recent globalisation, policy convergence, and diffusion literatures share this assumption (Drezner, 2005, 
pp. 841f.; Drezner, 2001, p. 57; Garrett, 1998; Grande, 2012, pp. 189f., 194f.; Jahn, 2009, p. 95; Simmons, 2001, 
p. 590). In particular, economically powerful states with large domestic markets still have agency under conditions 
of international economic integration (Drezner, 2005, p. 842). Globalisation itself is the result of political decisions 
(e.g., Grande, 2012, p. 189).  
Second-image-reversed theory, policy convergence, and diffusion theory claim that domestic politics moderate 
the effect of international economic integration. According to second-image theory, international integration limits 
government options and influences public policy indirectly, via the policy preferences of the winners and losers 
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of globalisation (Milner & Keohane, 1996, p. 4). Milner and Keohane (1996) have argued that domestic political 
institutions moderate both effects. Domestic political institutions may hinder that citizens feel consequences of 
international economic integration (e.g., as price changes by trade barriers) (Milner & Keohane, 1996, p. 21). 
Moreover, the political institutional context affects the ability of domestic interest groups to influence government 
behaviour (Milner & Keohane, 1996, pp. 5, 9f.). Party systems may hinder the access of losers or winners from 
internationalisation to the political system (Milner & Keohane, 1996, pp. 21f.). Garrett and Lange (1996, pp. 49f., 
52ff.) emphasize ‘socioeconomic institutions’ (e.g., trade unions, corporatism) and ‘formal institutions’ (e.g., re-
gime type, electoral rules, veto players) and the centralisation of the bureaucracy. Domestic institutions can affect 
the policy options of governments reacting to internationalisation (e.g., independence of the central bank) (Milner 
& Keohane, 1996, p. 22). Figure 3.3 presents the argument of second-image theory. This figure does not include 
climate performance, as the dependent variable of second-image theory is foreign-policy output. Climate perfor-
mance is defined in Chapter 2 as the climate policy outcome. This study applies the assumptions of second-image-
reversed theory to climate commitment and performance, on the assumption that climate policy output affects 
climate performance. 
Policy convergence theory assumes that domestic politics leads to policy divergence under conditions of economic 
globalisation (e.g., Doyle, 2014, p. 704; Garrett, 1998, pp. 3ff.). Similarly, policy diffusion theory assumes that 
the effect of economic interdependence is filtered by domestic variables, including political institutions (e.g., the 
government) and the domestic context (Braun et al., 2007, p. 50; Jahn & Stephan, 2015, p. 34; Neumayer & 
Plümper, 2012, p. 823). Graham et al. (2012, p. 696; emphasis in original) describe this as ‘the conditional nature 
of policy diffusion’ (see also Neumayer & Plümper, 2012, p. 820). Therefore, economic globalisation does not 
necessarily lead to policy convergence (Braun et al., 2007, p. 50). How do domestic politics moderate the effect 
of economic globalisation? Policy convergence and policy diffusion theory argue that the domestic political deci-
sion-making process influences government responses to globalisation, while the domestic context moderates a 
country’s responsiveness to policy diffusion (Braun et al., 2007, p. 50; Jahn & Stephan, 2015, p. 34; Neumayer & 
Plümper, 2012, p. 823) (see Figure 3.4)30. Zohlnhöfer (2007, p. 46) maintains that globalisation-induced changes 
in domestic policies must be accepted in the domestic political decision-making process. Governments under con-
ditions of globalisation that are aiming for re-election may not respond to international pressures (Zohlnhöfer, 
2005, p. 46; Zohlnhöfer, 2003, p. 61). Thus, the political decision-making process, i.e. the policy preferences of 
political decision-makers and political institutions, filters the influence of economic globalisation (Doyle, 2014, p. 
704; Jahn, 2013, p. 365; Jahn & Stephan, 2015, p. 33; Zohlnhöfer, 2015, p. 206; Zohlnhöfer, 2005). In addition to 
international economic pressures, the government considers its own policy preferences and societal pressures to 
stay in power (Cao & Prakash, 2012, p. 6; Graham et al., 2012, p. 685; Neumayer & Plümper, 2012, p. 823). 
Garrett (1998, p. 4) argues that the negative consequences of globalisation lead to domestic pressures to mitigate 
them. In developing countries, less policy divergence is expected, as labour movements and left-wing parties are 
weaker in those societies (Doyle, 2014, p. 704). Figure 3.4. presents the theoretical assumptions of the policy-
convergence and diffusion literature. As second-image theory, policy-convergence and diffusion research studies 
policy output. This study applies it to climate performance, on the assumption that climate policy outputs affect 
climate performance.
 
30 Drezner (2005, p. 843) also argues that domestic politics is decisive in the context of trade and investment. This is the 
argument made from the perspective of standard trade theory – that domestic political institutions moderate the effect of eco-
nomic openness via economic growth (see Section 3.1.2.1). 
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Figure 3.3 The joint effectof domestic political institution and economic openness, based on second-image 
theory 
 
 
Figure 3.4  The joint effect of domestic political institutions and international economic integration, based 
on the policy-convergence and diffusion literature 
 
Notes: The dashed arrow indicates that international explanatory factors might also strengthen or weaken the influence of 
domestic determinants. 
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There is no agreement on which domestic political factors matter (Graham et al., 2012, pp. 696f.; Zohlnhöfer, 
2015, p. 207; Zohlnhöfer, 2005, p. 47). Two groups of variables that moderate the effect of policy diffusion and 
convergence can be distinguished (Holzinger et al., 2007, pp. 30f.): The cultural, economic, political-institutional, 
economic, and social context (Jahn & Stephan, 2015, p. 34; Neumayer & Plümper, 2012, p. 820f. 823) and char-
acteristics of the policies themselves (e.g., policy-styles, path dependence) (Schirm 2007, p. 31). Multiple domestic 
political factors have been identified. Jahn and Stephan (2015, p. 34) distinguish exposure variables, such as de-
mocracy (e.g., Holzinger et al., 2007, p. 30) and response variables, such as the policy preferences of the govern-
ment and political parties (e.g., Jahn & Stephan, 2015, p. 34; Garrett, 1998; Graham et al., 2012, pp. 685f.; Hol-
zinger et al., 2007, p. 30), political institutional constraints (e.g., Grande, 2012, p. 195; Jahn and Stephan, 2015, p. 
34) and the capabilities of political actors to adopt and implement policies (Garrett et al., 2012, pp. 685f.). Grande 
(2012, p. 195) also regards political-strategic factors (e.g. international environmental treaties) as relevant. 
Few theoretical approaches explicitly address the interrelationship between policy-diffusion mechanisms and do-
mestic (political) factors (Braun et al., 2007, p. 44). A theoretical approach, which has also been applied to envi-
ronmental outcomes (e.g., Cao & Prakash, 2012), uses veto player theory to explain state responses to economic 
globalisation (Zohlnhöfer 2005; see also Ha, 2008). Zohlnhöfer (2005, p. 4; Zohlnhöfer, 2013, p. 377) argues that 
policy changes designed to adapt to economic globalisation require politically binding decisions. Individual and 
collective political actors can block policy changes (Zohlnhöfer, 2005, p. 48). Thus, in any analysis of the policy 
consequences of economic globalisation, the political-institutional context must be considered (Zohlnhöfer, 2005, 
p. 44). Based on veto player theory, he considers the number and ideological heterogeneity of veto players 
(Zohlnhöfer, 2007, p. 46). Zohlnhöfer (2005) also argues that the conditions must be identified under which veto 
players accept policy reactions to economic globalisation (Zohlnhöfer, 2013, p. 377; Zohlnhöfer, 2005, p. 48). He 
assumes that the government aims to stay in power and realise its policy preferences. As most veto players in 
established democracies are political parties, their preferences can be captured by party-difference theory 
(Zohlnhöfer, 2007, p. 46; Zohlnhöfer, 2005, p. 51). Political parties want to realise their policy preferences and 
maximise their voters (Zohlnhöfer, 2007, p. 46). Institutional veto players restrict the ability of parties in govern-
ment to realise their policy preferences (Zohlnhöfer, 2007, p. 50). Domestic politics become especially important 
if the consequences of globalisation can impact re-election (Zohlnhöfer, 2003, p. 61). In sum, the number and 
ideological heterogeneity of institutional and partisan veto players and their policy preferences moderate the effect 
of international integration.  
Porter (1999) argues that regime type and corruption can explain the relatively high environmental regulations in 
developed countries and the low standards in developing countries. He argues that trade competition is more in-
fluential in low-standard and rapidly-industrialising countries than in high-standard OECD countries. Govern-
ments of rich countries refuse to lower environmental standards, reflecting the policy preferences of their citizens 
(Porter, 1999, p. 138). Environmental regulations have gained political legitimacy over time. By contrast, devel-
oping countries are more responsive (via corruption) to opponents of environmental protection. Although many 
poor people would prefer environmental quality, they have no access to the political system or little influence 
(Porter, 1999, pp. 141f.; see also Vogel, 2000, p. 276f.). Thus, developing countries are ‘stuck at the bottom’ 
(Porter, 1999, p. 134). Vogel (2000, pp. 276f.) also stresses government ineffectiveness.  
In sum, second-image-reversed theory, globalisation research, and the literature on policy convergence and diffu-
sion argue first that the domestic political decision-making process moderates government responses to globalisa-
tion (response variables). Second, the domestic context shapes the exposure and responsiveness of the government 
to international incentives and pressures (exposure variables). Multiple domestic political institutional variables 
are identified as relevant to the effect of international economic integration on public policy. Previous comparative 
environmental policy research has discussed the importance of veto players, political corruption, and regime type. 
Conclusions 
The literature on the policy consequences of internationalisation and globalisation, policy convergence, and diffu-
sion suggests that there is no general race-to-the-bottom in climate commitment and performance. Policy diffusion 
is understood to be an international economic incentive or pressure imposed on government behaviour. Economic 
openness is conceptualised as an exposure to such influences. Competition pressures caused by economic openness 
undermine climate commitment and performance in developing countries. Policy diffusion from economic inter-
dependence is more important in highly integrated and developed countries. The direction of this effect is an 
empirical question. Moreover, as it is harder for the public to control and monitor environmental policy outcomes 
than output, policy diffusion is more important for climate performance than the ratification of climate treaties. In 
contrast to race-to-the-bottom theory, most theoretical perspectives believe that domestic political explanatory 
factors moderate the effect of economic openness and interdependence. First, political institutions involved in the 
domestic political decision-making process moderate government responses to globalisation. Second, domestic 
political institutions influence government exposure to international economic incentives and pressures. In contrast 
to the broader literature on environmental consequences of globalisation, few studies have explored the joint effect 
of economic globalisation and domestic political institutions on climate commitment and performance. 
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3.1.2.3 Neoliberal institutionalist foreign-policy theory 
The relationship between international economic integration and climate commitment has also been studied from 
the perspective of neoliberal institutionalism (e.g., Bernauer et al., 2010; Ruoff, 2009; Spilker, 2012). The related 
foreign policy version of this theory identifies explanatory factors of a cooperative foreign policy. States are re-
garded as rational actors, which compare costs and benefits and aim to realise their self-interest (absolute gains) 
(Barkdull & Harris, 2002, p. 70). Countries follow a cooperative foreign policy when it reflects their exogenous 
self-interest (Barkdull & Harris, 2002, pp. 70f.). For instance, countries are expected to strive for economic growth 
(Barkdull & Harris, 2002, p. 71).  
Following neoliberal institutionalism, the international system is characterised by interdependence and anarchy, 
i.e. the lack of a central authority at the international level (Rittberger et al., 2010, p. 88). Uncertainty, as a conse-
quence of anarchy, makes international cooperation unlikely. However, economic interdependence implies that 
states depend on international coordination to realise their self-interest; it therefore, contributes to a cooperative 
foreign policy (Beach, 2012, p. 48; D’Anieri, 2012, p. 79; Harnisch, 2013, p. 419f.; Keohane & Nye, 1989; 
Rittberger et al., 2010, p. 89, Spindler, 2010, p. 111). In addition to economic interdependence, this study also 
considers economic openness (Beach, 2012, p. 48). Within this perspective, scholars expect economic openness 
and interdependence to contribute to climate cooperation (e.g., Bernauer et al. 2010; Fredriksson & Gaston, 2000; 
Spilker 2012; Ruoff 2009). Countries join environmental agreements to avoid reputation costs, i.e. a negative 
impact on trade relationships (Fredriksson & Gaston, 2000, pp. 355f.; Hoel & Schneider, 1997, p. 155; Neumayer, 
2002, p. 816). For instance, Russia ratified the Kyoto Protocol, in exchange for EU member states supporting its 
WTO membership. This argument may apply less to developing countries because they have lower reputation 
costs (Fredriksson & Gaston, 2000, p. 355; Hoel & Schneider, 1997, p. 155)  
The standard explanatory model of neoliberal institutionalist foreign-policy theory assumes that state preferences 
are independent of the domestic political process (Barkdull & Harris, 2002, p. 71). Thus, domestic political insti-
tutions do not contribute to the effect of economic globalisation on foreign policy (Beach, 2012, pp. 47, 49; Spin-
dler, 2010, pp. 107, 118). Nonetheless, neoliberal institutional theorists acknowledge that domestic politics are 
more important for environmental cooperation than for security and trade-related policies (Purdon, 2015, p. 4). 
Purdon (2015, p. 4) argues that domestic politics are important for climate commitment, as solving global warming 
depends on changing domestic policies. Similarly, Peters (2007, p. 821) maintains that interdependence influences 
government behaviour only as an incentive. Government responses depend on the domestic and foreign political 
decision-making processes. 
Conclusions 
Neoliberal institutionalist theory suggests that economic openness and interdependence incentivise countries to 
ratify international climate agreements, which support trade cooperation via issue linkage. Because of their lower 
reputation costs, this effect is less important for developing countries. International economic incentives to coop-
erate at the international level are less important for climate performance. It is harder for the international commu-
nity to control the implementation of international treaties. While most theorists nowadays agree that domestic 
politics moderate the influence of international economic integration, little work has been done from the perspec-
tive of neoliberal institutionalism.  
3.1.2.4 Conclusions 
This section summarises the discussion of the theoretical literature and considers differences in treaty design be-
tween the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol (see Chapter 2).  
Is international economic integration good or bad for climate commitment and performance? How does economic 
globalisation affect state participation in climate cooperation? From a theoretical perspective, economic openness 
and interdependence have both positive and negative effects on climate commitment. Following standard eco-
nomic theory, economic openness (via composition effects) has no clear effect on developed countries. From the 
perspective of the literature on globalisation, and policy convergence and diffusion, economic openness and inter-
dependence should undermine UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification in the developed world, through compe-
tition pressures on government behaviour. This may be more important for the Kyoto Protocol, which includes 
binding emissions targets for rich countries. However, the conclusions of Chapter 2 suggest that the targets of the 
Kyoto Protocol only involve considerable climate change mitigation efforts for some countries. Simultaneously, 
following neoliberal institutionalist theory, economic openness and interdependence provide an incentive for coun-
tries (especially developed countries) to join international climate agreements by supporting trade cooperation via 
issue linkage. This argument applies more clearly to the soft UNFCCC. In sum, there is no clear effect of economic 
openness and interdependence on UNFCCC ratification or Kyoto Protocol ratification in developed countries. 
According to standard economic theory, economic openness undermines the climate commitment of developing 
countries through the composition effects of economic growth, as they profit from pollution-intensive trade (pol-
lution-haven hypothesis). According to neoliberal institutionalism, reputational concerns derived from economic 
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globalisation hardly matter to poor countries. Thus, economic openness can undermine UNFCCC and Kyoto Pro-
tocol ratification in the developing world. There is no effect of economic interdependence on UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol ratification. Developing countries are not expected to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. For this reason, 
competition pressures are of little importance to their ratification behaviour.  
Trade and capital openness have two effects on climate performance. First, they affect global air pollution 
through economic growth. Based on the discussion in the literature, trade openness is likely to undermine climate 
performance in developing countries through negative scale and composition effects. In contrast to scale effects, 
composition effects may positively affect climate performance in developed countries, which shift pollution and 
labour-intensive production to developing countries. There is thus no clear effect of economic openness on climate 
outcomes via economic growth in rich countries. Second, economic openness is likely to affect the climate perfor-
mance of developed countries via international economic pressures. No overall effect of economic openness is 
expected, however, as the effects of the exposure to such influences and economic-growth effects can balance each 
other out. With regard to policy diffusion, a country’s climate policy is assumed to depend on the policies of its 
main trading partners (Esty, 2011, p. 160) and competitors. The direction of this effect is unclear. There are positive 
and negative market pressures on climate protection. In general, the potential effects of policy diffusion have more 
impact on climate performance than on commitment. While Jahn (2015, pp. 255f.) draws on empirical research to 
argue that the adoption of environmental policies is more likely to spread across countries than the implementation 
of those policies, interest groups and the public find it difficult to control the implementation of climate treaties 
(Cao & Prakash, 2012, pp. 70ff.). There is likely to be no effect of policy diffusion on climate performance in 
developing countries, as the climate regime allows them to focus on economic development. 
Does the effect of international economic integration depend on domestic political institutions? Four possible 
moderation effects have been identified. First, government responses to the incentives and pressures of economic 
openness and interdependence depend on the domestic political decision-making process (e.g., veto players). Sec-
ond, institutions responsible for implementation moderate the effect of economic globalisation on climate perfor-
mance. Third, domestic political institutions, which refer to vertical accountability and thus affect a county’s ex-
posure to international influences (e.g., political rights), may strengthen or weaken the incentives and pressures 
caused by economic openness and interdependence. Finally, domestic political institutions influence (as context 
factors) the effect of international trade and investment, via economic growth, on climate performance. While 
race-to-the-bottom theory assumes that competition pressures caused by economic openness and interdependence 
affect climate commitment and performance, independent of domestic political institutions, institutional variables 
can moderate the scale and composition effects of trade and capital openness on climate performance. Little sys-
tematic work has investigated the joint influence of political institutions and international economic integration on 
climate commitment and performance.  
3.1.3 Empirical research 
While empirical research on international economic integration and climate performance mainly employs quanti-
tative methods, the literature on economic globalisation and treaty ratification consists of case studies, as well as 
statistical analyses. The case studies focus on developed countries ratifying the Kyoto Protocol (with few excep-
tions). This research finds that economic interdependence can explain the ratification behaviour of Australia and 
the US (Harrison, 2010; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007; 2010b, p. 277). Australia withdrew from the treaty, while 
the US never ratified it (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007, p. 12). Many developed countries had concerns about eco-
nomic competitiveness. However, especially policymakers in the Australia, Canada, Japan and the US feared los-
ing out, vis-a-vis other countries with lower or no binding emissions targets (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007, p. 12). 
The Bush administration and the Senate (e.g., Byrd-Hagel resolution) opposed legal emissions targets for devel-
oped, but not developing, economies (Harrison, 2010, p. 95). Australia, Canada and Japan were especially con-
cerned about their economic competitiveness vis-à-vis their main trading partner, after the US non-ratification 
(Crowley, 2007, p. 118; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010b, p. 277; Tiberghien & Schreurs, 2010, pp. 140ff.). In con-
trast to other developed countries, Australia and the US negotiated relatively high emissions reduction targets, 
compared to the business-as-usual development of their greenhouse gas emissions (see also Chapter 2). The EU 
burden-sharing agreement and below business-as-usual emissions targets enabled European countries to enter the 
Kyoto Protocol. Harrison and Sundstrom (2007, p. 12) have concluded that competition concerns affected Kyoto 
Protocol ratification in countries with high emissions reduction targets.  
In accordance with the general globalisation literature (e.g., Garrett, 1998, p. 53), most statistical studies focus on 
the effect of trade and capital openness.31 The use of economic-openness indicators to test the hypothesis that a 
country’s (climate) policy depends on the policy of competitors or major trading partners can lead to ambiguous 
findings (Dobbin et al., 2007, p. 459). Simmons et al. (2006, pp. 793f.) have argued that ‘[t]here is no particular 
 
31 To test the California effect on Kyoto Protocol ratification, Dolšak (2013, p. 394) controlled for the effect of exports to 
Germany in his statistical analysis. He has not reported his results. 
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reason to believe that A’s level of exposure to world markets per se is responsible for policy liberalization or 
deregulation, especially if few other countries with whom A competes have themselves done so.’ The focus on 
economic openness clearly limits our knowledge of the relationship between economic globalisation and climate 
commitment and performance. As argued in Chapter 3.1.1, it is important to study both.  
Neumayer (2002) provided the only statistical analysis to focus on economic globalisation and the ratification of 
international environmental and climate agreements. Several studies have controlled for economic openness in 
their multivariate models (e.g., Bättig & Bernauer 2009; Fredriksson & Gaston, 2000). Most studies of UN-
FCCC/Kyoto Protocol ratification have employed a survival analysis (see Chapter 2), pooling rich and poor coun-
tries. Neumayer (2002) reached no coherent result, based on multiple indicators of international economic embed-
dedness (economic openness and liberalisation). Fredriksson and Gaston (2000) also observed no significant effect 
of economic openness on the delay in ratifying the UNFCC. By contrast, Bättig and Bernauer (2009, p. 289) 
concluded that trade openness was associated with a lower climate commitment. The different measures of climate 
commitment (see Table 3.1 & Chapter 2) must be considered. The ambiguous results of quantitative research can 
be explained by the case-study finding that competition concerns derived from economic openness and interde-
pendence mattered only for developed countries with high emissions reduction targets. 
Table 3.1  Quantitative research on international economic integration and climate commitment 
Study Countries Dependent  
variable 
Measurement of 
economic  
globalisation 
Effect 
Fredriks-
son & 
Gaston, 
2000 
Pooled analysis of 
developed and de-
veloping countries 
Ratification 
delay of the 
UNFCCC 
Trade openness 
Sachs-Warner in-
dex (Sachs & War-
ner, 1995) 
/ 
Neuma-
yer, 2002 
Pooled analysis of 
developed and de-
veloping countries 
Ratification of 
the KP 
Multiple indica-
tors, 
Fraser institute in-
dex 
/ 
 
+ 
Bättig & 
Bernauer, 
2009 
Pooled analysis of 
developed and de-
veloping countries 
Climate policy 
output com-
poment from 
Bättig et al. 
(2008) 
Trade openness - 
Dolšak, 
2013 
26 Eastern Euro-
pean countries 
Ratification of 
the KP 
Exports to Ger-
many (California 
Effect) 
Not re-
ported 
Notes:  + positive effect, / no effect, - negative effect on climate commitment. KP = Kyoto Protocol. 
Most quantitative studies of international economic integration and climate performance have examined CO2 emis-
sions per capita levels, or changes (see Table 3.2 & Chapter 2). The present research employs cross-sectional or 
pooled time-series regression analysis. In contrast to the theoretical discussion, most studies have pooled devel-
oped and developing countries. The results on the effect of economic openness are ambiguous. Bättig and Bernauer 
(2009), Jahn (2008), Frankel and Rose (2005), Li and Reuveny (2006), and Ward et al. (2014) all found that trade 
openness was not statistically significantly associated with CO2 emissions per capita. In time-series cross-section 
analyses of developing countries from 1970 to 2000, Spilker (2013; 2012; Ruoff, 2009) showed that trade openness 
increased CO2 per capita emissions in developing countries (see also Biswas et al., 2012), while capital openness 
had no effect. Bättig and Bernauer (2009) observed a significant negative effect of trade openness, only when they 
used the climate policy outcome measure proposed by Bättig et al. (2008). 
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Table 3.2 Quantitative research on international economic integration and climate performance 
Study Countries Dependent  
variable 
Economic glo-
balisation 
Effect 
Frankel & 
Rose, 
2005 
Pooled analysis of de-
veloped and develo-
ping countries 
Industrial CO2 
emissions per 
capita 
Trade openness / 
Li & Reu-
veny, 
2006 
Pooled analysis of de-
veloped and develo-
ping countries 
CO2 emissions 
per capita 
Trade openness / 
Jahn, 
2008 
Developed countries Annual change 
in CO2 emissi-
ons in total/ 
traffic/ industry 
 
Trade openness, 
Policy diffusion 
/ 
 
- on CO2 
emissions 
in industry 
Bättig & 
Bernauer, 
2009 
Pooled analysis of de-
veloped and develo-
ping countries 
Climate policy 
outcome mea-
sure (Bättig et 
al., 2008), CO2 
emissions per 
capita 
Trade openness - on cli-
mate po-
licy out-
come, 
/ on CO2 
emissions 
per capita 
levels and 
changes 
Ruoff, 
2009 
Developing countries CO2 emissions 
per capita 
Trade openness  
Capital open-
ness 
/ 
/ 
Biswas et 
al., 2012 
Pooled analysis of de-
veloped and develo-
ping countries 
CO2 emissions 
per capita 
Trade openness / 
Spilker, 
2012 
Developing countries CO2 emissions 
per caita 
Trade openness 
Capital open-
ness 
- 
/ 
Spilker, 
2013 
Developing countries CO2 emissions 
per caita 
Trade openness 
Capital open-
ness 
- 
/ 
Ward et 
al., 2014 
Autocracies CO2 emissions 
per capita 
Trade openness / 
Chang, 
2015 
Pooled analysis of de-
veloped and develo-
ping countries 
CO2 emissions 
per capita 
Trade openness - 
Notes:  + positive effect, / no effect, - negative effect on climate performance. 
In sum, research suggests that trade openness undermines climate performance in developing countries only, if at 
all. This finding is in line with my discussion of the theoretical literature. There is support for the argument that 
economic interdependence affects climate performance. The results from Jahn (2008) confirm that policy diffusion 
affects changes in traffic CO2 emissions in developed countries. Based on case-study research, Henry and 
Sundstrom (2010, p. 118) have argued that the slow implementation of Kyoto Protocol in Russia reflected concerns 
about economic competitiveness and economic growth.  
Most explanatory models of empirical studies implicitly assume additive effects of economic openness and/or 
interdependence on climate commitment and performance. There has been no quantitative research on the impact 
of interaction effects between domestic politics and international economic integration on climate commitment 
and little research on their impact on climate performance.32 One exception is Spilker (2013), who found that 
regime type, measured using data from Freedom House and Polity IV, weakened the negative effect of trade open-
ness on local air but not on global air pollution (CO2 emissions). Chang (2015) showed that trade openness con-
tributed to CO2 emissions in corrupt countries but decreased pollution in countries with low levels of corruption.  
To summarise, case studies suggest that economic interdependence had an impact on the Kyoto Protocol ratifica-
tion of some countries. Few quantitative studies have examined the effect of policy diffusion via competition on 
 
32 On general empirical globalisation and policy-diffusion research, see, for example, Jahn and Stephan (2015, p. 33) 
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climate commitment and performance. Instead, quantitative research has focused on the effect of economic open-
ness – in particular, trade openness – on climate commitment and performance. The results regarding the ratifica-
tion of international climate agreements are ambiguous. This review suggests that economic openness, measured 
by trade openness, undermines climate performance in developing countries. Economic interdependence has an 
important impact on climate change mitigation in developed countries. There has been little research on the latter 
topic outside the developed world. There has also been scant quantitative research on whether the effect of inter-
national economic integration is moderated by domestic political institutions. 
3.1.4 Conclusions 
Does economic globalisation contribute to or undermine climate commitment and performance? Does its effect 
depend on domestic political institutions? Based on a literature review, this chapter formulates hypotheses on the 
relationship between international economic integration and climate commitment and performance (see also Table 
3.3). It presents the conclusions of the literature review on the interrelationship between economic globalisation 
and domestic political institutions. As various theoretical arguments link economic openness and interdependence 
to climate commitment and performance, hypotheses are formulated for both understandings of international eco-
nomic integration. In accordance with Chapter 2, differences in UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification and 
between developed and developing countries are considered. In accordance with the empirical analysis (see Chap-
ter 7), Table 3.3 formulates hypotheses on climate commitment referring to the pooled and developing-country 
samples. 
Climate commitment 
There is no clear effect of economic openness and interdependence on UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification 
in developed countries. As the UNFCCC has no binding emissions targets, competition concerns are less im-
portant. When business-as-usual development is taken in to account, the greenhouse gas emissions targets of the 
Kyoto Protocol were ambitious for some countries only (see Chapter 2). According to neoliberal institutionalist 
theory, international economic integration also has positive effects on climate-treaty ratification in the developed 
world. Previous findings are ambiguous. There has been a lack of quantitative research on policy diffusion and 
climate commitment. 
According to the theoretical arguments, trade and capital openness can undermine climate commitment in devel-
oping countries via the composition effects of economic growth (pollution-haven hypothesis). However, empirical 
research has produced ambiguous results. Moreover, Chapter 2 argues that international economic integration is 
unlikely to affect climate commitment. For this reason, no effects of economic openness on UNFCCC or Kyoto 
Protocol ratification are expected in developing countries. Economic interdependence is unlikely to affect climate 
commitment in poor countries, as they are not obliged to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. 
Climate performance 
Based on the theoretical discussion and previous results, economic openness is likely to undermine climate per-
formance in developing countries. While the technique effects are ambiguous, the theoretical discussion suggests 
that economic growth has negative scale and composition effects. Previous empirical research has supported a 
negative effect of trade openness on climate performance in developing countries. No clear effects of trade and 
capital openness in developed countries are expected. On the one hand, there may be competition pressure and 
negative scale effects of trade openness. On the other hand, positive composition effects (shifting pollution and 
labour-intensive production to developing countries) are also possible. In the developed world, a country’s cli-
mate performance depends on the policies of its main trading partners or competitors. There is likely to be no 
effect of policy diffusion on climate performance in developing countries, which are allowed to focus on eco-
nomic development. Little empirical research has examined the effect of policy diffusion on climate performance 
in poor countries. 
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Table 3.3 International economic integration and climate commitment and performance 
 
UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol 
Climate 
Performance 
Pooled analysis 
Developing 
countries 
Pooled analysis 
Developing coun-
tries 
Developed 
countries  
Developing 
countries 
Trade openness 
HInt1.1.1 / HInt1.2.1 / HInt1.3.1 / 
HInt1.1.2 / HInt1.2.2 / HInt1.3.2 - 
Capital openness 
HInt2.1.1 / HInt2.2.1 / HInt2.3.1 / 
HInt2.1.2 / HInt2.2.2 / HInt2.3.2 - 
Economic  
interdependence 
HInt3.1.1 / HInt3.2.1 / HInt3.3.1 +/- 
HInt3.1.2 / HInt3.2.2 / HInt3.3.2 / 
Notes:  +  positive effect, / no effect, - negative effect on climate commitment/ performance, +/- direction unclear. 
Race-to-the-bottom theory argues that economic globalisation affects climate commitment and performance via 
competition pressures, independent of domestic political institutions. However, the literature review has found 
multiple effects of economic openness and interdependence on climate commitment and performance. The previ-
ous section has also shown that there are many possible moderation effects of domestic political institutions on the 
influence of economic globalisation and climate commitment and performance. While governments may react in 
similar ways to competition pressures caused by economic openness and interdependence, domestic political in-
stitutions can still impact the implementation of climate policies and/or have indirect effects on international trade 
and investment and, via economic growth, on climate performance. Few theoretical or empirical studies have 
investigated the interaction effects between globalisation and domestic political institutions on climate commit-
ment and performance. With few exceptions, quantitative explanatory models of climate commitment and perfor-
mance have assumed additive effects of international economic integration. Existent studies (Chang, 2015; Spilker, 
2013) have not compared multiple domestic political institutional factors and globalisation dimensions. This study 
intends to fill this research gap. 
3.2 International political integration and climate commitment and 
performance 
This chapter examines the existing theoretical and empirical literature on political globalisation and climate com-
mitment and performance (3.2.2 & 3.2.3). Is international political integration good or bad for climate commitment 
and performance? How does it affect state participation in climate cooperation? Is its effect moderated by domestic 
political institutions? To answer these questions, I begin by discussing the conceptualisation of international po-
litical integration (3.2.1). The conclusion formulates hypotheses about the relationship between international po-
litical integration and climate commitment and performance (3.2.4). The literature review suggests that political 
globalisation, understood as state involvement in IGOs, is likely to contribute to climate commitment and perfor-
mance through exposure to international norms, values, scientific knowledge, and pressures caused by IENGOs 
and foreign governments, as well as increased reputation costs. Neoliberal institutionalist foreign policy, construc-
tivist foreign-policy theory, and world society theory suggest that this relationship is moderated by domestic po-
litical institutions. Little quantitative research has been carried out on this topic. Based on the hypotheses in this 
chapter and the discussion of the literature on domestic political institutions and institutional quality in Chapter 4, 
Chapter 5 contributes to the literature by formulating additional hypotheses on the joint effect of domestic political 
institutions and international political integration. 
3.2.1 Conceptualisation of international political integration 
In the globalisation/environment literature, two conceptualisations of international political integration can be dis-
tinguished: international political embeddedness and a country’s centrality in international political networks. 
Scholars who address the relationship between political globalisation and the environment, within neoliberal in-
stitutionalist theory, define international political integration, in accordance with the international embeddedness 
concept, as state involvement in IGOs (e.g., Bernauer et al., 2013; Bernauer et al., 2010, p. 514; Spilker, 2013, p. 
14; Spilker, 2012, pp. 347f.). Constructivist approaches, including world society theory, adopt a broader under-
standing of international political embeddedness. For instance, world-society theorists consider ‘linkages to world 
society’ (Frank, 1999, p. 527) via a country’s participation in IGOs and international NGOs (INGOs) (Frank, 1999, 
pp. 526f.; Frank et al., 2000, pp. 97f., 103). 
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Ward (2006) introduces a social-network perspective to the literature on political globalisation and the environ-
ment. He assumes that states are linked to other states through their common membership of IGOs, INGOs and 
international agreements (Ward, 2006, p. 150). In contrast to the international political embeddedness concept, 
states are not simply members of environmental regimes, they also belong to the network of environmental regimes 
(Ward, 2006, p. 150). Network centrality is defined as the number of links to other countries and the number of 
treaties that country i and j are members of (Ward, 2006, p. 152). Network centrality indicates a country’s social 
capital (Dorussen & Ward, 2008, pp. 190, 196).  
To conclude, international political integration, in the academic literature on climate commitment and perfor-
mance, is either aligned with the international political embeddedness concept or with the social network concept. 
Conceptualisations of international political integration focus either on state involvement in IGOs or consider 
international treaties and INGOs. I will test both in the statistical analysis. For reasons of data availability, the 
analysis will focus on state involvement in IGOs and state centrality in IGO networks (see Chapter 6). 
3.2.2 Review of the main theoretical approaches 
This section discusses the theoretical literature on political globalisation and climate commitment and perfor-
mance. Three theoretical perspectives can be distinguished in the literature on political globalisation and the envi-
ronment: neoliberal institutionalist foreign-policy theory (3.2.2.1), constructivist and world society theory 
(3.2.2.2), and social network theory (3.2.2.3). Each theoretical perspective is discussed in relation to the following 
questions: Is international political integration good or bad for climate commitment and performance? How does 
it affect state participation in climate cooperation, and does its effect depend on domestic political institutions? 
While these perspectives have also been applied to climate performance, they predominately refer to cooperative 
foreign policy (e.g., climate commitment) as the dependent variable. 
3.2.2.1 Neoliberal institutionalist foreign-policy theory 
Neoliberal foreign-policy theory assumes, in addition to interdependence (see Chapter 3.1.2.3), state participation 
in international institutions contributes to cooperative state behaviour (Beach, 2012, p. 56). International institu-
tions refer to ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ (Krasner, 1983, p. 2). While interdepend-
ence makes states more willing to cooperate, anarchy implies that other states may cheat (Beach, 2012, p. 53). 
Involvement in international institutions, such as IGOs, enables countries to follow cooperative foreign policy 
under conditions of anarchy (Beach, 2012, p. 53; Harnisch, 2013, pp. 419f.). Thus, scholars expect countries that 
are more involved in IGOs to be more committed to climate cooperation and to perform better in climate change 
mitigation (e.g., Bernauer et al., 2010; Spilker, 2013; 2012; Roberts et al., 2004; Ruoff, 2009). IGOs facilitate 
environmental cooperation by reducing transaction costs, uncertainty, and opportunism, while enabling efficient 
problem-solving and bargaining (Bernauer et al., 2010, p. 515f.; Spilker, 2012, p. 348). By providing a negotiation 
framework, they enable states to communicate, find common interests, and discover issue linkages (Beach, 2012, 
p. 55; Harnisch, 2013; Spilker, 2012, p. 346). Furthermore, IGOs raise reputational costs, encouraging countries 
to participate in climate agreements and to act in accordance with them (Kneuer, 2012, p. 873; 348; Ruoff, 2009, 
p. 7; Spilker, 2012, pp. 346). Environmental IGOs contribute to climate performance through compliance 
measures, such as monitoring and sanction mechanisms (Bernauer et al., 2010; Ruoff, 2009, p. 7; Spilker, 2012, 
p. 348). Bernauer et al. (2010, p. 516) and Spilker (2012, p. 356; Ruoff, 2009, pp. 13f.) regard the number of state 
memberships in IGOs as decisive. Involvement in multiple IGOs supports issue linkages and raises reputation 
costs.  
While the standard explanatory model of neoliberal institutionalist theory assumes that international explanatory 
factors influence foreign policy, independent of domestic politics, neoliberal institutionalist foreign-policy theory 
acknowledges the importance of domestic politics in environmental policy (see Chapter 3.1). For instance, Keo-
hane (1996, pp. 24ff.; see also Carbonell & Allison, 2015, p. 83) argues in a study of environmental IGOs and 
state participation in environmental cooperation that future research should consider domestic political institutions. 
With the exception of compliance measures, involvement in IGOs can only be understood as an incentive, encour-
aging governments to join international climate agreements and to adopt and enact climate policies. As the ratifi-
cation of international agreements, as well as climate change mitigation policies, depend on the domestic decision-
making process, it is plausible to assume that domestic political institutions do influence IGOs. Few studies have 
investigated the joint influence of domestic political institutions and IGOs on climate commitment and perfor-
mance. Ruoff (2009, p. 3) has argued that the effect of membership in IGOs on environmental quality is enhanced 
by democracy. Democracies are more likely to join IGOs and are more responsive to the influence of IGOs (Ruoff, 
2009, pp. 9ff.).  
In sum, international political integration, defined as state involvement in IGOs, is likely to contribute to a coop-
erative climate policy by making cooperation between states easier and raising reputational costs. Neoliberal 
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institutionalist theorists acknowledge that domestic political factors have an influence on international political 
integration. 
3.2.2.2 Constructivist foreign-policy theory and world society theory 
Constructivist theory assumes that foreign policy is influenced by domestic and global norms and ideas (Barkdull 
& Harris, 2002, p. 74; Brummer & Oppermann 2014, pp. 56f., 59). Norms are defined as standard[s] of appropriate 
behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p. 891). Within this perspective, policy 
decision-makers are central actors (Brummer & Oppermann, 2014, p. 59). They internalise norms through trans-
national and societal socialisation processes (Brummer & Oppermann, 2014, p. 59). International political inte-
gration is seen as a socialisation mechanism (Brummer & Oppermann, 2014, pp. 61ff.; Young & Levy 1999, p. 
23f.). IGOs are regarded as norm entrepreneurs (Hafner-Burton et al. 2008, p. 178; Young & Levy 1999, p. 23f.). 
Thus, global environmental norms influence a country’s climate policy through international political integration 
(Ruoff, 2009, p. 8; Spilker, 2012, p. 348; Yamagata et al., 2013, p. 252). Yamagata et al. (2013, p. 256) regard 
IGOs, NGOs, and a country´s experience with international environmental agreements as decisive. In addition, the 
number of memberships in IGOs and INGOs is emphasised (Roberts, et al., 2004, p. 25). World society theory 
offers a similar argument: that global norms and ideas affect climate commitment. World models define ‘what the 
nation-state is, what it can do, and how it can relate to other entities are organised and established globally’ (Frank 
et al., 2000, p. 100). They can be informal or formal (e.g., international agreements or IGOs) (Frank, 1999, p. 528). 
The more countries are linked to the world society, the more they are exposed to world models and expected to 
act in accordance with them, i.e to participate in environmental cooperation and protect the environment (Frank, 
1999, pp. 527f., 529f.; Frank et al., 2000, p. 102). Meyer et al. (1997, pp. 626, 629ff.) argue that a common rational 
and scientific interpretation of the environment, at the international level, alongside the international environmen-
tal debate at the United Nations, contributed to environmental protection. Constructivist and world society theory 
assume that countries integrated into international societies are more likely to ratify international climate treaties 
to gain legitimacy and reputation at the international level (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005, p. 1382; Roberts et 
al., 2004, p. 25). Finally, IGOs also provide forums in which environmentally friendly governments and non-state 
actors can influence countries (Ruoff, 2009, p. 8; Spilker, 2012, p. 348). 
Both theoretical perspectives suggest an independent effect of global norms on state behaviour (Barkdull & Harris, 
2002, p. 73; Frank, 1999, p. 528; Frank et al., 2000, p. 99). Nonetheless, several constructivist and world-society 
theorists have argued that domestic norms and structures (including domestic political institutions) influence a 
country’s responsiveness to (or the salience of) global norms (Checkel, 1999, p. 87ff.; Cortell & Davis, 2000, p. 
79; Frank et al., 2000, p. 103). Risse-Kappen (1994, p. 187) argues that epistemic communities only affect foreign 
policy if domestic factors, such as institutions, groups and norms, support this influence. Domestic political insti-
tutions ‘establish rights and obligations, identify what is legitimate and what is not, and, in the process, help na-
tional actors define their interests domestically and internationally’ (Cortell & Davis, 2000, p. 79). Thus, domestic 
and international norms can enhance or weaken each other (Boekle et al., 2001, p. 80; Brummer & Oppermann, 
2014, p. 59). Structures and norms already established in countries moderate the effect of international norms, 
allowing governments to respond in different ways to international political integration (Finnemore & Sikkink, 
1998, p. 893). Societal groups and transnational actors can influence foreign policy (Brummer & Oppermann, 
2014, p. 64) or use international norms to pressure foreign policy decision-makers (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, 
p. 893). 
In sum, constructivist and world society theory assume that international political integration contributes to climate 
commitment and performance. Countries embedded in the international political system internalise international 
environmental environment norms, values, and scientific understandings. Moreover, they are pressured by foreign 
governments and international ENGOs to consider climate cooperation. Finally, participation in climate coopera-
tion increases their international reputations. Constructivist and world-society theorists argue that domestic polit-
ical institutions influence a country’s responsiveness to international political integration and, therefore, strengthen 
or weaken international incentives. 
3.2.2.3 Social Network Theory 
Following Ward (2006), scholars have examined the relationship between international political integration and 
climate and environmental policy from the perspective of social network theory (e.g., von Stein, 2008). Ward 
(2006, p. 150) agrees with neoliberal institutionalism that a country’s embeddedness in international political in-
stitutions makes cooperation more likely among states. He regards the centrality of states in networks of interna-
tional institutions as crucial for each country’s environmental policy (Ward, 2006, p. 150). Second, state prefer-
ences are regarded as endogenous and influenced by their centrality in international networks.  
Ward (2006, p. 151) refers to social network theory and democracy peace theory to explain the importance of 
international networks to state preferences. States are linked into networks via their common membership in IGOs 
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and international treaties (Ward, 2006, p. 151f.). Following social network theory and democracy peace theory, 
Ward (2006, pp. 150f., 154, 162) argues that state centrality in international networks contributes, via social capi-
tal, to a more cooperative foreign policy, sustainable state behaviour, and effective international cooperation (see 
also von Stein, 2008, p. 252). Network links make reciprocal behaviour possible, offer more opportunities for 
sanctioning bad behaviour (e.g., via issue linkage), increase information transfer and the spread of norms, and 
increase trust among countries (Ward, 2006, pp. 150ff.). Multiple network links imply that a country can be more 
easily encouraged by other countries to consider environmental protection (Ward, 2006, pp. 152, 154). Such coun-
tries should, therefore, give more thought to the responses of other states toward their environmental policies. 
Jänicke (2005, p. 132) has argued that IGOs and networks of IGOs increase the diffusion of environmental policies 
among innovative countries. 
To conclude, the social network perspective suggests that a country’s centrality in international IGO and INGO 
networks contributes to a more cooperative climate policy through norms, social trust and reputation, the diffusion 
of environmental of environmental policies, and pressures applied by foreign governments. Scholars have not 
addressed their interrelationship with domestic explanatory factors within this perspective. 
3.2.2.4 Conclusions 
Is political globalisation good or bad for climate commitment and performance? How does it affect state partici-
pation in climate cooperation? The theoretical literature agrees that international political integration, understood 
as state membership in IGOs and INGOs or as state centrality in international networks, contributes to climate 
commitment and performance through the exposure to international norms, values, and scientific knowledge, as 
well as through pressures caused by IENGOs and foreign governments and increased reputation costs. IGO in-
volvement affects climate commitment and performance because it exposes governments to international incen-
tives to take part in climate cooperation. International political integration matters more to climate commitment 
than to performance. First, it is harder to monitor the ratification of international agreements than their implemen-
tation. Second, other factors (e.g., competition pressures) have more influence on climate performance. While 
neoliberal institutionalist and constructivist foreign-policy theory explains foreign policy, this book applies its 
assumptions to climate performance, arguing that climate policies influence climate performance. 
Figure 3.5 The joint effect of domestic political institutions and international political integration 
 
Does the effect of international political integration depend on domestic political institutions? The theoretical tra-
ditions regard state involvement in IGOs either as an incentive, encouraging governments to participate in inter-
national climate cooperation, or as constitutive of government preferences. Thus, international and domestic in-
centives that target government behaviour can strengthen or weaken each other. Constructivist and world society 
perspectives acknowledge that domestic (political) factors are important to the effect of international political 
integration. Domestic political institutions affect the responsiveness of governments to incentives derived from 
international political integration (see Figure 3.5). Few theoretical studies have examined climate commitment and 
performance in this regard. Ruoff (2009) argues that democratic governments, which are generally more open to 
international cooperation, should also perform better when it comes to environmental and climate protection. 
3.2.3 Empirical research 
Previous empirical research on political globalisation and climate commitment and performance includes both 
case studies and statistical analyses. Most quantitative studies measure international political integration, either by 
state involvement in IGOs or INGOs or by state centrality in IGO networks. Given the available data, there is little 
research on multiple operationalisations. In accordance with the theoretical perspectives, previous work has fo-
cused on climate commitment. 
Case studies support the view that political globalisation contributes to Kyoto Protocol ratification. They show 
that international norms play a role. Harrison and Sundstrom (2007, p. 11) argue that the norms of the Canadian 
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president were decisive for the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Harris (2000, pp. 48f.) argues that the turn 
towards climate cooperation under the Clinton administration, in comparison to the previous Bush administration, 
resulted partly from the acceptance of norms of fair and equitable burden sharing. Yet, Harrison (2010, p. 95) 
maintains that economic globalisation was more important to the non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Second, 
the case studies show that international reputation was important. The Russian president, Putin, entered the Kyoto 
Protocol to secure Russia’s alliance with the EU and to gain European support for Russia’s World Trade Organi-
sation (WTO) membership (Harrison 2010, p. 116; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010b, p. 275f.; Harrison & Sundstrom, 
2007, p. 11; Henry & Sundstrom, 2010, p. 114).33 
Survival analyses offer mixed results on the relationship between political globalisation and the ratification of 
climate treaties. Von Stein (2008) finds that the centrality of states in the IGO network accelerated UNFCCC 
ratification among Annex I countries. She finds no clear effect of network centrality on Kyoto Protocol ratification 
in Annex I and Non-Annex I countries. Yamagata et al. (2013) observe no significant effect of the number of IGOs 
and membership in the International Council for Science on UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification. They ob-
serve that the number of important international ENGO offices in a country contributes to UNFCCC ratification. 
There has been a lack of quantitative research on the joint influence of political globalisation and domestic politics 
on climate commitment. 
The results of research on international political integration and climate change mitigation are also ambiguous. 
Henry and Sundstrom (2010, p. 120) argue that Russia was slow to report to the UNFCCC, submitting only in-
complete reports and data because membership had little effect on its international reputation. Spilker (2012, 2013) 
has found, through a multivariate time-series-cross-sectional analysis of CO2 emissions in developing countries 
from 1970 to 2000, that membership in the IGO reduces global air pollution. In an earlier analysis of developing 
countries, she found that, while the effect of IGO membership on SO2 emissions, a local air pollutant, was higher 
in democracies, there was no significant interaction effect on CO2 emissions (Ruoff, 2009, p. 16). 
In sum, there is support for the theoretical expectation that the positive effect of political globalisation matters 
more to climate commitment than to performance. Second, the results indicate that the importance of international 
political integration varies between the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, as well as among Annex I and Non-
Annex I parties. Explanatory models of quantitative studies assume additive effects of political globalisation on 
climate commitment and performance. 
3.2.4 Conclusions 
International political integration is understood either as state memberships in IGOs and the presence of INGOs 
in countries, or as centrality in IGO and/or INGO networks. The lack of available data (see Chapter 6) limits this 
empirical analysis to state memberships in IGOs and centrality in IGO networks. Based on a discussion of the 
theoretical and empirical literature, this section proposes hypotheses on the relationship between international 
political integration and climate commitment and performance (see Table 3.4). It also summarises the conclusions 
of the theoretical and empirical literature on the possible moderation effects of domestic political institutions. 
The theoretical and empirical literature suggests that IGO involvement has a positive effect on climate commitment 
and performance (see Table 3.4) because it exposes governments to international incentives – international norms, 
values, and scientific knowledge, pressures caused by IENGOs and foreign governments, and increased reputation 
costs – to join climate cooperation. The effect of international political integration is more important for climate 
commitment (ratification of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol) than for climate performance. First, ratifying cli-
mate treaties costs very little, in contrast to climate change mitigation. Second, other factors may be more important 
to implementing climate-protection policies. In accordance with the conclusions drawn in Chapter 2, political 
globalisation has a more positive effect on UNFCCC than on Kyoto Protocol ratification. It is easier for govern-
ments to ratify the UNFCCC than the Kyoto Protocol, due to international incentives. First, for developed coun-
tries, the Kyoto Protocol encompasses binding emissions reduction targets. Second, the Kyoto Protocol includes 
domestic implementations for developing countries. For instance, the clean-development mechanisms include sup-
port, provided by industrialised countries, of sustainable development and environmental protection in poor coun-
tries.  
  
 
33 Since its ratification was needed for the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force, it was able to put pressure on European govern-
ments (Henry & Sundstrom, 2010, p. 106). Russia’s commitment under the Kyoto Protocol implied that it could considerably 
increase CO2 emissions and still meet its greenhouse gas target (Henry & Sundstrom, 2010, p. 108).  
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Table 3.4  International political integration and climate commitment and performance 
 
UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol 
Climate 
Performance 
Developed & 
developing countries 
Developed &  
developing countries 
Developed & develop-
ing countries 
Political  
globalisation 
HInt4.1 + HInt4.2 + HInt4.3 + 
Notes: + positive effect, / no effect, - negative effect on climate commitment/ performance, +/- direction unclear. 
Based on the theoretical literature, domestic political institutions moderate the effect of international political in-
tegration. Constructivist and world society perspectives assume that domestic incentives affect the responsiveness 
of governments to incentives derived from international political integration. Thus, international and domestic 
explanatory factors can strengthen or weaken each other. There has been little theoretical or empirical research on 
this topic. Previous research has focused on whether the effect of political globalisation on climate performance 
varies among democracies and autocracies. Based on the analysis of the literature on relevant domestic political 
institutional factors of climate commitment and performance discussed in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 will discuss pos-
sible moderation effects. 
3.3 Conclusions 
To examine whether domestic political institutions moderate the effect of globalisation on climate commitment 
and performance, this chapter began by analysing the relationship between globalisation and climate commitment 
and performance in the previous literature. The literature review shows that both economic and political globali-
sation have multiple effects on climate commitment and performance. With regard to economic globalisation, it is 
also important to distinguish between economic openness and interdependence. Economic openness influences 
state participation in climate cooperation through exposure to competition and reputational pressures, as well as 
the scale, composition, and technique effects of economic growth. Economic interdependence makes countries 
consider the climate commitment and performance of important trading partners and economic competitors. In 
this context, political globalisation is understood to be state involvement in IGOs. International political integration 
influences climate commitment and performance via exposure to international norms, values, and scientific un-
derstandings, as well as to the influence of IENGOs and foreign governments and increased reputation costs. 
Chapters 3.1 and 3.2 formulated hypotheses on the effects of international economic and political integration on 
climate commitment and performance. Based on the literature, this study assumes that economic openness under-
mines Kyoto Protocol ratification and performance in developing countries, via scale and composition effects. In 
the developed world, international economic integration influences climate commitment and performance through 
policy diffusion. International political integration contributes to climate commitment because it increases expo-
sure to incentives to join climate cooperation. Chapter 5 will add hypotheses on the joint relationship between 
international integration and domestic political institutions, in relation to climate commitment and performance.  
Second, this chapter has examined the existing literature to determine whether domestic political institutions mod-
erate the effects of economic and political globalisation. Race-to-the-bottom theory and neoliberal institutionalist 
theory assume that globalisation affects climate commitment and performance, independent of domestic political 
institutions. However, as explained above, both economic and political globalisation have multiple effects on cli-
mate commitment and performance. Moreover, the theoretical discussion has shown that most underlying theoret-
ical approaches, which link economic and political globalisation to climate commitment and performance, assume 
that domestic political institutions moderate the effect of international integration. Four possible moderation ef-
fects have been identified. First, international economic and political integration are regarded as incentives or 
pressures on governments to behave in a certain way (e.g., globalisation, policy convergence, and diffusion the-
ory). Thus, state responses to international integration depend on the domestic decision-making process. Second, 
domestic political factors involved in the implementation of climate policies influence the relationship between 
international integration and climate performance. Third, domestic political institutions affect a country’s exposure 
to international incentives and pressures and should, therefore, strengthen or weaken incentives and pressures 
related to international integration. Finally, domestic political institutions and institutional quality influence the 
effect of international economic embeddedness as context factors, on climate performance via economic growth. 
Thus, while government institutions make little difference to state responses to competition pressures caused by 
economic globalisation, domestic political institutions moderate the effects of economic globalisation because they 
affect the implementation of climate policies. Moreover, there are multiple effects of economic globalisation (com-
petition pressures, reputation costs associated with joining international cooperation, and scale, composition, and 
technique effects) and political globalisation (exposure to international norms and values, pressures caused by 
international ENGOs and foreign governments, and reputation costs). Thus, while domestic political institutions 
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make little difference to state responses to competition pressures, they moderate other effects of economic and 
political globalisation. 
There has been little theoretical or empirical work on the joint influence of domestic politics and globalisation on 
the ratification and implementation of climate treaties. The policy-diffusion literature simply offers categories of 
possible domestic (political) moderator variables. There is no agreement on what domestic (political) factors have 
a decisive impact on international integration. However, three different strands can be distinguished in the broader 
literature on the joint influence of domestic political institutions and globalisation on public policy. They have also 
been applied to environmental commitment and performance. First, scholars have examined state responses on 
globalisation from the perspective of veto player theory (e.g., Cao & Prakash, 2012; Ha, 2012, 2008; Wenzelburger 
& Zohlnhöfer, 2015; Zohlnhöfer, 2005). The underlying assumption is that political authorities must agree to pol-
icy changes. The smaller the number of veto players involved and the lower the ideological distance among them, 
the greater the effect of international pressures and incentives derived from globalisation on public policy (Ha, 
2008, pp. 791f.). The underlying assumption that is that a small number of veto players with little ideological 
heterogeneity enables governments to react fast to international pressures (Ha, 2008, pp. 791f.). Different effects 
on environmental policy outputs and outcomes are expected (e.g., Cao & Prakash, 2012). This literature also con-
siders possible interaction effects among the partisan composition of governments and globalisation (e.g., Ha, 
2012; Zohlnhöfer, 2005). Cao and Prakash (2012) have used this explanatory model to explain domestic pollution. 
To date, it has never been applied to climate commitment and performance. 
Second, as explained in Chapter 3.1, economists argue that the effect of economic globalisation on environmental 
protection depends on institutional quality (e.g., Chang, 2015; Damania et al., 2003). This research examines en-
vironmental quality or pollution as the dependent variable. With regard to institutional quality, the focus is on 
political corruption. Political corruption strengthens the negative effects of international economic integration on 
climate performance. Corrupt governments are more likely to reduce environmental regulations or fail to imple-
ment environmental regulations, reflecting the interests of industry lobbies (Chang, 2015, pp. 235f.). When there 
is government corruption, bribery becomes more important than social welfare (Damania et al., 2003, p. 492). 
Third, comparative environmental and social policy research has examined differences in state responses to glob-
alisation on (environmental) policy outputs and outcomes between democracies and autocracies. This perspective 
combines the literature on globalisation and public policy and regime type and public policy; it ‘considers joint 
effects of regime type and globalization’ (Rudra & Haggard, 2005, p. 1016). Rudra and Haggard (2005, p. 1016) 
summarise the main research question in this literature: ‘How do regimes of different types respond to globaliza-
tion?’ While the globalisation-social policy literature assumes that international pressures lead to lower social-
welfare commitments, independent of domestic politics, the regime-type/public-policy literature assumes that de-
mocracies perform better than autocracies, when it comes to social policy (Rudra & Haggard, 2005, p. 1016). This 
literature therefore assumes that democracy lessens the negative effects and strengthens the positive effects of 
globalisation on social (e.g., Rudra & Haggard, 2005) and environmental policy (e.g., Spilker, 2012). As Chapter 
3.1 explained, Spilker (2013, p. 59) offers an additional argument: that the rule of law allows firms to invest in 
environmentally friendly technology; this suggests that regime type, as a context factor influencing the behaviour 
of firms and investors, affects the relationship effect of trade openness on environmental performance via eco-
nomic growth. 
This study contributes to the literature initially by testing these explanatory models of climate commitment and 
performance. Few studies have investigated multiple explanatory models of the joint influence of domestic insti-
tutional factors and globalisation on climate commitment and performance (e.g., Ruoff, 2009; Spilker, 2013). Sec-
ond, in contrast to previous research, this study considers multiple globalisation dimensions: economic openness, 
economic interdependence and international political integration. This chapter has shown that aspects of globali-
sation vary in their effect. 
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4  Domestic political institutions and climate commitment and 
performance 
Abstract  
Three research traditions have investigated the moderation effects of domestic political institutions on the influ-
ence of globalisation: the veto-player approach, the political-corruption approach, and the regime-type approach. 
To formulate additional hypotheses on the joint relationship between globalisation and domestic political institu-
tions, this chapter examines the impact of veto players, political corruption, and regime type on climate commit-
ment and performance. As the veto-player approach also emphasises the importance of political parties in govern-
ment, this chapter addresses the influence of government ideology. It is important to analyse the effect of these 
political institutional variables on climate commitment and performance at a disaggregated level. The veto-player 
approach discusses the importance of ideological distance among veto players, as well as veto points for climate 
commitment and performance. There is no agreement on whether specific veto points have uniform effects (gov-
ernment fragmentation, presidentialism, or bicameralism/federalism). While the literature assumes that political 
corruption among political decision-makers and public officials undermines climate commitment and perfor-
mance, their relative importance is unclear. Democracies and autocracies are likely to differ systemically in the 
ratification of soft international treaties such as UNFCCC. No uniform effect of democratic quality dimensions 
(vertical and horizontal accountability; political and civil rights) on Kyoto Protocol ratification and climate per-
formance can be assumed. Based on these conclusions, the following chapter argues that the moderation effects of 
domestic political institutions should also be studied at a disaggregated level. 
Does the effect of international integration on climate commitment and performance depend on domestic political 
institutions? The last chapter identified three research traditions that have investigated the possible moderation 
effects of domestic political institutions: the veto-player approach, the literature on a joint effect of political cor-
ruption and international integration, and the literature on differences between democracies and autocracies in 
relation to globalisation. These research traditions have built on the literature on veto players, political corruption, 
and regime type and the environment. This chapter examines these literatures and formulates hypotheses on the 
effects of veto players, political corruption, and regime type on climate commitment and performance. As the veto-
player approach also refers to the literature on political parties and the environment, when considering the policy 
preferences of veto players (e.g., Zohlnhöfer, 2005), this chapter reviews that literature as well. This makes it 
possible to formulate hypotheses on the joint influence of international economic and political integration and 
domestic political institutions in the next chapter.34 As the three approaches vary in their understanding of domestic 
political institutions, the chapters also discuss the conceptualisation of veto players, political corruption, and re-
gime type. In accordance with the conclusion of Chapter 2, separate hypotheses relate to UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol ratification, as well as developed and developing countries. As explained in Chapter 3, climate is exam-
ined in the empirical analysis (Chapters 7 and 8) for the pooled and developing countries sample, but not separately 
for developed countries. The developed-country sample consists only of democracies (see Chapter 6). For this 
reason, the regime-type approach is applied only to the pooled sample of developed and developing countries and 
to the developing-country sample in the statistical analysis. Accordingly, this chapter formulates hypotheses based 
on the regime-type approach for the pooled and developing-country samples. 
This chapter argues that it is important to analyse the effect of veto players, political corruption, and regime type 
on climate commitment and performance at a disaggregated level. Based on this conclusion, the following chapter 
shows that the same applies to analyses of the joint influence of globalisation and domestic political institutions. 
From the perspective of veto player theory, comparative climate policy research examines the effect of ideological 
heterogeneity among veto players and democratic institutional constraints (veto points). There is no agreement on 
whether specific veto points have uniform effects (government fragmentation, presidentialism, and bicameral-
ism/federalism). For this reason, specific veto points must be studied separately. While the literature generally 
assumes that political corruption among political decision-makers and public officials undermines climate com-
mitment and performance, their relative importance is unclear. While democracy and autocracies are assumed to 
differ systemically in their ratification of soft international treaties such as UNFCCC, no uniform effect of demo-
cratic quality dimensions (vertical and horizontal accountability, political and civil rights) on Kyoto Protocol rat-
ification or climate performance can be assumed. 
 
34 The multivariate analysis controls other relevant political institutional explanatory factors (see Chapter 6). 
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4.1 Political parties and climate commitment and performance 
To explain state responses to globalisation, the veto-player approach considers policy preferences using party-
difference theory35 (Hibbs, 1992; Zohlnhöfer, 2005) (see Chapter 3). This chapter, therefore, focuses on political 
parties and climate commitment and performance. Political institutions alone cannot explain a country’s climate 
commitment and performance (Desai, 2002, p. 7; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010a, p. 17). They merely enable or 
restrict political decision-makers (Schmidt & Ostheim, 2007b, p. 70; Zohlnhöfer, 2008, p. 161).36 Party-difference 
theory states that a cross-national variation in policy outputs and outcomes results from differences in the party 
composition of national governments (Hibbs, 1992, pp. 261f.; Schmidt, 1996, p. 155; Schmidt & Ostheim, 2007a, 
p. 51; Wenzelburger & Neumann 2015, p. 256). This section discusses the theoretical and empirical literature on 
political parties and climate commitment and performance, formulating hypotheses for the following discussion 
on joint effects with globalisation. 
4.1.1 Conceptualisation of party influence  
There are two variants of party-difference theory. According to the original version of partisan-difference theory 
(Hibbs, 1992, 1977), political parties act in accordance with the socio-economic interests of their constituents to 
secure (re-)election (Hibbs, 1992, pp. 361ff.; Hibbs, 1977, p. 1470; Schmidt, 1996, p. 156; Schmidt & Ostheim, 
2007a, pp. 51f.). They represent social groups with divergent socio-economic interests. Zohlnhöfer (2005, p. 53) 
argues that the members of political parties share values and assumptions about cause-and-effect relationships. 
Thus, political parties act in accordance with their own ideological preferences. As will be shown in the next 
section, theoretical arguments on the relationship between political parties and climate commitment and perfor-
mance refer to both variants of party-difference theory. Zohlnhöfer (2005, p. 55) argues that strategic considera-
tions matter more when policy decisions are crucial for elections. Climate or environmental protection is not a 
priority for most voters (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010a, p. 3).37 Thus, the ideas and values of political parties also 
impact their climate-policy preferences (e.g., Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010a, pp. 3, 15). Since reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions produces winners and losers in the short-term, as a result of climate change mitigation, the socio-
economic interests of the electorate are presumed to be more important for climate performance and the ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol for Annex I countries.  
4.1.2 Review of the theoretical literature 
Possible party effects on climate commitment and performance are discussed in the left/right dimension and the 
green/growth dimension (e.g., Garmann, 2014; Jahn, 2016a; Jensen & Spoon, 2011, 2006; see also Carter, 2013, 
p. 74). Assuming that political parties differ in their policy preferences because of the socio-economic interests of 
their voters, the literature is unclear regarding the climate-policy preferences of left- and right-wing parties38. Left-
wing parties may be reluctant to introduce and implement climate policies. Workers employed in industrial sectors, 
which are negatively impacted by reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, and their labour unions are likely to 
oppose climate protection (Garmann, 2014, p. 2; Lim & Duit, 2018, p. 221; Neumayer, 2003, p. 204). Left-wing 
parties may cater to their traditional voters by focusing on employment and economic growth (Knill et al., 2010, 
p. 304; Neumayer, 2003, p. 206). In addition, left-wing voters may pay more climate change mitigation costs (e.g., 
via energy prices) than their right-wing counterparts (Garmann, 2014, p. 2; Lim & Duit, 2018, p. 222). Garmann 
(2014, p. 2) has observed that private households often face a higher environmental tax burden than business 
owners. Simultaneously, traditional left-wing voters, i.e. workers and the poor, are more vulnerable to global en-
vironmental change (Garmann, 2014, p. 2; Lim & Duit, 2018, p. 221; Neumayer, 2003, p. 205). Additionally, 
traditional left-wing parties are expected to act strategically to prevent left-libertarian or green parties from gaining 
voter support (Neumayer, 2003, p. 204). This is particularly true in countries with electoral laws that favour small 
parties (Neumayer, 2003, pp. 204f.). Scruggs (1999, p. 10) notes that ENGOs often cooperate with left-wing par-
ties. The theoretical literature is also unclear regarding the climate-policy preferences of right-wing parties. Right-
wing parties represent capital owners in the political system (Garmann, 2014, p. 29). They may decline to ratify 
climate agreements and measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions because these imply higher taxes and pro-
duction costs (Dunlap & Allen, 1976, p. 384; Garmann, 2014, p. 2; Harrison, 2007, p. 95; Lim & Duit, 2018, p. 
221). However, businesses can profit from environmental regulations via production efficiency and economic 
 
35 also Partisan Theory (Hibbs, 1992) 
36 Simultaneously, it is important to consider political institutions when analysing government ideology related to climate com-
mitment and performance (Jensen & Spoon, 2011, pp. 101f.; Pinto, 2013, p. 30; Wenzelburger & Neumann, 2015, p. 257). 
They limit the government’s potential opportunities for policy change (Pinto, 2013, p. 30). 
37 More recently, awareness of the consequences of global warming have contributed to a politicisation of the climate crisis. 
38 The assumption that the electorate can be divided into social groups with common interests and voting preferences has been 
challenged (e.g., Zohlnhöfer, 2005, p. 52). 
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competitiveness (Lim & Duit, 2018, p. 222; Vogel, 1995, pp. 250f.). Finally, climate-policy preferences vary 
among economic sectors.  
There is no agreement on the effect of left- or right-wing parties, based on their ideological policy preferences. 
Left-wing parties share the assumption that state interventions are necessary to correct market failures (Zohlnhöfer, 
2008, pp. 159f.). Right-wing parties regard them as dysfunctional (Schmidt, 2001, no page number) and prefer 
market solutions (Schmidt, 2001, no page number). Thus, left-wing parties are more willing to undertake the mar-
ket interventions and changes to the economic system needed to tackle global warming (Garmann, 2014, p. 2; 
Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007, p. 8; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010a, p. 16). Right-wing parties prefer economic 
efficiency (Schmidt, 2001, no page number) and voluntary market solutions to binding greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction targets (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010a, p. 16). Left-wing parties may also be more committed to inter-
national climate policy and perform better in climate change mitigation, as they are more open to international 
cooperation and value distributive equality on the domestic and international level (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010a, 
p. 15; Schmidt, 2001, no page number; Thérien, 2002, p. 450). Accordingly, left-libertarian and green parties that 
support environmental protection come from the left-wing political spectrum (Neumayer, 2003, p. 205). Yet, left-
wing parties also value economic growth, in accordance with socialism (Jahn, 1998, p. 121; Touraine et al., 1987, 
pp. 26ff.). In fact, Lim and Duit (2018, p. 224) have argued, based on empirical studies, that environmental issues 
are more important to young urban citizens with high levels of education than to traditional left- and right-wing 
voters. 
In sum, the effect on climate commitment and performance of political parties in government on a left/right scale 
is theoretically ambiguous (see also Garmann, 2014, p. 2). The climate policy of left- and right-wing parties may 
be context and situation specific. Lim and Duit (2018, p. 222) have argued that both left- and right-wing parties 
adopt environmental-protection policies if there are few costs involving workers and businesses (e.g., job loss, 
bureaucratic costs) and few opportunity costs. They argue that left-wing governments in redistributive welfare 
states are more likely to protect the environment because social welfare reduces costs for workers (Lim & Duit, 
2017, pp. 224f.). Right-wing parties in less redistributive welfare states are more likely to adopt environmental 
measures (Lim & Duit, 2017, pp. 224f.). Finally, Christian-democratic parties and religious parties are differenti-
ated from right and left-wing parties. These parties may favour environmental protection over economic growth 
(Knill et al., 2010, p. 304). Carter (2013) has found that left-wing parties are more environmentally friendly than 
right or Christian-democratic parties, but that European centre-right parties are also open to environmental issues. 
The literature uniformly assumes that, based on their policy preferences, green and left-libertarian political parties 
are more likely than other parties to prioritise environmental protection, including the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions over economic growth (Carter, 2013, p. 75; Garmann, 2014, p. 1; Jensen & Spoon, 2011, p. 101; 
Kitschelt, 1988, p. 198; Neumayer, 2003, p. 205). It is important to distinguish between the parliamentary strength 
of left-wing and left-libertarian parties. ‘Given that green parties are minority parties in all countries, the effect is 
likely to work through forcing other parties and governments to take environmental demands seriously’ (Neu-
mayer, 2003, p. 218).  
To conclude, while scholars agree that green and left-libertarian parties in government are likely to be more willing 
than other parties to commit to climate cooperation and to mitigate global warming, the effect of left-wing and 
right political parties in government is context-dependent. To ensure re-election, left-wing parties are likely to 
support climate protection when few costs are involved. There is a lack of research on partisan differences in 
climate commitment and performance in developing countries (Garmann, 2014, p. 9). Party-difference theory has 
been developed in the context of Western industrialised democracies. Second, party systems may not be compa-
rable among world regions. However, the left/right dimension is regarded as the basic political-conflict dimension 
in nearly all countries worldwide (Huber & Inglehart, 1995, pp. 73, 90; Imbeau et al., 2001, p. 6). While classic 
party-difference theory assumes that governments have the capability to realise their policy preferences (Schmidt, 
1996, p. 156, 162; Wenzelburger & Neumann 2015, p. 256; Zohlnhöfer, 2008, pp. 159), most scholars 
acknowledge that other variables, such as globalisation (Wenzelburger & Neumann, 2015, p. 259; Zohlnhöfer, 
2008, p. 160) have an impact. It is therefore relevant to study the extent to which political parties make a difference 
under conditions of international integration. 
4.1.3 Empirical research 
Few quantitative studies have considered party ideology as an explanatory factor in the commitment to climate 
cooperation (e.g., Garmann, 2014, p. 9). Case studies show that government ideology in the left/right dimension 
only influenced some countries in their Kyoto Protocol ratification (e.g., Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010a; Harrison 
& Sundstrom, 2007, p. 8). Harrison and Sundstrom (2010a, 2007) have concluded that left-wing parties were more 
willing to ratify international climate treaties in North America and Europe. European Social Democrats supported 
climate cooperation and climate change mitigation more than centre and right-wing parties did (Harrison & 
Sundstrom, 2007, p. 8). US President Clinton and the Canadian liberal government of Jean Chrétien supported 
Kyoto Protocol ratification (Harrison, 2007, p. 95; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007, p. 96). The conservative 
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government of Stephen Harper reduced Canada’s climate change commitments (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007, p. 
96). There were left-wing parties that opposed climate cooperation and right-wing parties in government and par-
liament that supported the ratification of climate change (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010b, pp. 271f.). Democrats 
and Republicans in the US Congress opposed the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (Harrison, 2007, pp. 95f.). 
They were influenced by trade unions, which did not want to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (Harrison, 2007, p. 99). In 
some countries, government ideology has no impact (e.g., Russia and China) (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010b, p. 
271). Its effects also depend on the institutional context. President Clinton was unable to ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
without the agreement of the US Congress (Harrison, 2007, p. 96). The lack of party discipline in the US Congress 
makes Republican and Democratic senators focus on local business interests (Harrison, 2007, p. 96). Liberal mem-
bers of the Canadian parliament, who were sceptical of climate protection, had to vote with the party line for Kyoto 
Protocol ratification (Harrison, 2007, p. 96).  
Case studies confirm that green parties contribute to climate protection, but they have ambiguous findings with 
regard to left/right-wing parties. The Australian Green party has used its power in the Senate to introduce climate 
change mitigation policies (Crowley, 2007, p. 127). Left-wing parties have been more willing to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions in North America and Europe (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010b, p. 271). The Labour government of 
Tony Blair and Gordon Brown introduced ambitious climate-protection policies in the UK (Carter & Jacobs, 2014, 
p. 125). In the US, Democrats are more in favour of climate change mitigation; the values of Clinton and Gore led 
to the acceptance of high emissions reductions in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations (Harrison, 2010, p. 76, 81). They 
knew that the Kyoto Protocol would not pass the Senate. They may, therefore, have pursued a symbolic policy 
(Bang et al., 2012, pp. 759f.). Republican politicians have questioned human-caused climate change (Harrison, 
2010, p. 75). The conservative government of Howard in Australia prioritised economic growth and economic 
competitiveness over climate protection and questioned climate change, under pressure from the fossil-fuel indus-
try (Crowley, 2007, p. 125, 136). Jensen and Spoon (2011, p. 110) have found that both left- and right-wing parties 
within the EU support or reject environmental protection. In Australia, conflicts within the Labour Party and with 
trade unions prevented a common position on climate change (Crowley, 2007, p. 123; Harrison & Sundstrom, 
2010b, p. 270). Later the Australian Labour Party supported climate cooperation and state interventions in the 
market to reduce climate change (Crowley, 2007, p. 123). The Canadian New Democratic Party opposed the in-
troduction of taxes on CO2 emissions (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010b, pp. 271f.). Accordingly, both centre and 
right-wing parties can support climate change protection. For instance, the Republican state government of Arnold 
Schwarzenegger (California) and Pataki (New York), as well as the German Christian Democrats and the French 
UMP, have supported climate change mitigation because of electoral incentives (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010b, 
p. 272). Climate scepticism is not shared by all conservative-party members in the US and Australia (Crowley, 
2007, p. 125; Harrison, 2010, p. 93f.).  
Previous quantitative studies of variation in climate performance have focused on developed countries (see Table 
4.1) (e.g., Garmann, 2014; Jahn, 2008; Jensen & Spoon, 2006, 2011; Madden, 2014). Studies have applied cross-
sectional (e.g., Jensen & Spoon, 2011, 2007) or pooled cross-sectional regression analyses (e.g., Garmann, 2014; 
Jahn, 2008; Jensen & Spoon, 2011, 2007; Madden, 2014). Tobin (2017) has used a fuzzy-set qualitative compar-
ative analysis (fsQCA). Party ideology is captured either using the share of seats held by political parties in gov-
ernment (e.g., Garmann, 2014; Tobin 2017) or parliament (e.g., Garmann, 2014) or by the left/right or 
green/growth position of government or parliamentary political parties, based on party manifesto data. The latter 
performs better with regard to validity, but data are lacking for developing countries. Statistical results suggest 
that left-wing parties are more likely to contribute to climate performance. Garmann (2014) and Neumayer (2003) 
have observed that left-wing parties in government decrease the growth (Garmann, 2014) and levels of CO2 emis-
sions per capita (Neumayer, 2003, pp. 214f.). Jahn (2008) has found that left-wing government involvement de-
creases industrial CO2 emissions only. Tobin (2017) concludes that left-wing government ideology is a sufficient 
condition for an ambitious climate policy. Neumayer (2003, p. 214f.) has shown a negative effect of left-wing seat 
share and green or left-libertarian parties in parliament on CO2 emissions per capita. Left-wing parties may be 
more willing to protect the environment when they are in parliament, rather than in government (Neumayer, 2003, 
p. 218). Garmann (2014) has found that centre government parties contribute to more CO2 emissions reductions 
than left-wing parties.  
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Table 4.1 Quantitative research on political parties and climate performance 
Study Dependent vari-
able/s 
Political parties Effect 
Neumayer, 2003 CO2 emissions Left party strength in govern-
ment 
Left party strength in parlia-
ment 
Left-libertarian party strength 
in parliament 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
Jahn, 2008 CO2 emissions  
Industry specific 
CO2 emissions 
Green government ideology 
Left government ideology 
+ 
+ 
Jensen & Spoon, 2011 Compliance with 
emissions targets 
Pro-environmental positions 
of government parties 
Green parties in government 
Green parties in parliament 
+ 
 
+ 
/ 
Garmann, 2014 Growth of CO2 
emissions 
Left parties 
Centre parties 
+ 
+ 
Madden, 2014 Adoption of cli-
mate policies 
Pro-environmental positions 
of government parties 
Green parties in parliament 
- 
 
/ 
Notes:  + positive effect, / no effect, - negative effect on climate performance. 
The results are ambiguous with regard to the green/growth dimension. Green governments are associated with an 
annual reduction in total CO2 emissions (Jahn, 2008); they contribute to the convergence of CO2 emissions with 
the greenhouse gas emissions target of EU countries (Jensen & Spoon, 2011). By contrast, Madden (2014) has 
found that more pro-environment governments adopt fewer climate policies. However, there is no independent 
effect of the number of green party seats in the legislature on the adoption of climate policies. With regard to the 
latter, Jensen and Spoon (2011, p. 108) have reached the same conclusion on the environmental policy positions 
of political parties in government: depending on their environmental policy preferences, government parties may 
react in different ways to green-party strength in parliament (Jensen & Spoon, 2011, p. 109). Garmann (2014) has 
observed that party effects were stronger in the 1990s. Climate awareness and green political parties may have 
contributed to a convergence of political positions on climate change over time in the developed world (Garmann, 
2014, p. 6). In recent times, climate protection has become more polarised in the left/right scale in public opinion 
and among politicians, especially in the US (Dunlap et al., 2016; Tobin, 2017, p. 13).  
4.1.4 Conclusions 
Table 4.2 summarises the hypotheses based on the literature review. While green and left-libertarian parties are 
more likely to ratify international climate agreements and contribute to climate performance, no clear effect of 
political parties in government and parliament in the left/right dimension on climate commitment and performance 
in developed and developing countries can be assumed. Left-wing parties in government tend to contribute more 
to climate commitment and performance. Differences in the partisan ideologies of governments may have less 
impact on UNFCCC ratification, which costs far less than Kyoto Protocol ratification. The database limits the 
analysis of party effects. The focus lies on the left/right dimension. The empirical analysis of climate commitment 
also considers left-libertarian parties in government. 
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Table 4.2 Political parties and climate commitment and performance 
 UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol 
Climate 
Performance 
 
Developed  
countries 
Developing  
countries 
Developed  
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Developed  
countries 
Developing  
Countries 
Left parties in govern-
ment 
HParty1.1.1 / HParty1.2.1 / HParty1.3.1 / 
HParty1.1.2 / HParty1.2.2 / HParty1.3.2 / 
Right parties in gov-
ernment 
HParty2.1.1 / HParty2.2.1 / HParty2.3.1 / 
HParty2.1.2 / HParty2.2.2 / HParty2.3.2 / 
Centre parties in gov-
ernment 
HParty3.1.1 / HParty3.2.1 / HParty3.3.1 / 
HParty3.1.2 / HParty3.2.2 / HParty3.3.2 / 
Left-libertarian parties 
in government 
 +  +  + 
 +  +  + 
Notes: + positive effect, / no effect, - negative effect on climate commitment/ performance.. 
It is important to distinguish between political parties in government and parliament (see also Neumayer, 2003, 
p. 218). Finally, Lim and Duit (2018) argue that political parties influence environmental policy only in the long 
term. 
4.2 Veto players and climate commitment and performance 
This study examines whether veto players moderate the effect of globalisation on climate commitment and perfor-
mance. This chapter examines the conceptualisation of veto players (4.2.1) and discusses the theoretical (4.2.2) 
and empirical literature (4.2.3), as well as formulating hypotheses (4.2.4).  
4.2.1 Conceptualisation of veto players 
Veto player theory refers to theoretical approaches that share the assumption that individual or collective actors, 
with the ability to block political decisions, use their veto power to realise their preferences (Ganghof, 2003, p. 2; 
Tsebelis, 2010, p. 4; Tsebelis, 2002, p. 2). The most influential veto-player approach comes from Tsebelis (2002; 
1995). It aims to explain the (political) stability of public policies (Tsebelis, 2010, p. 4; Tsebelis, 2002, pp. 1, 6f., 
21; Tsebelis, 1995, p. 292; Wenzelburger & Zohlnhöfer, 2014, p. 318).39 Tsebelis (1995, p. 293) describes veto 
players as ‘individual or collective actor[s] whose agreement is required for a policy decision’ (see also Tsebelis, 
2002, pp. 2, 4, 19). Veto player theory distinguishes between institutional and partisan actors that can block polit-
ical decisions (Tsebelis, 2002, p. 2; Tsebelis, 1995, p. 302).  
Institutional veto players are individual or collective actors with veto powers defined in the constitution (Tsebelis, 
2002, pp. 2, 19, 79; Tsebelis, 1995, p. 302). The president (Zohlnhöfer, 2005, p. 49), the government (Birchfield 
& Crepaz 1998, p. 181), the lower chamber (Birchfield & Crepaz 1998, p. 181) and the upper chamber of the 
legislature (Birchfield & Crepaz 1998, p. 181; Zohlnhöfer, 2005, p. 49), federalism (Birchfeld & Crepaz 1998, p. 
181), the electoral system (Birchfield & Crepaz 1998), constitutional courts (Jahn & Müller-Rommel, 2010, p. 24) 
and public referenda (Jahn & Müller-Rommel, 2010, p. 24; Stadelmann-Steffen, 2011, p. 488; Zohlnhöfer, 2005, 
p. 49) are all described as possible institutional veto players in democracies. Following Jahn (2010), this study 
focuses on the most important potential veto players: the president, the coalition government, and the first and the 
second chamber of the legislature. Federalism is not considered, as it is redundant to the upper chamber of the 
legislature (Jahn, 2010, p. 49). Bicameralism indicates that the central government and federal states must decide 
together (Wälti, 2004, p. 607). Immergut and Orlowsky (2013, p. 207) note that federalism has a separate effect 
when it impacts financial resources in a policy field (see also Wenzelburger & Zohlnhöfer, 2014, p. 320; 
Zohlnhöfer, 2003, p. 257) and/or if there is a joint political decision-making process involving central and state 
government. It is plausible to expect this to affect climate commitment and performance. Bicameralism does not 
measure the autonomy of federal states in policy fields, or their fiscal independence from the federal government 
(Wälti, 2004 p. 607). Given the available data, it is not possible to consider federalism in the present empirical 
analysis. It should therefore be considered in further research. Constitutional courts and public referenda are not 
included, since they can only block policy decisions when called or ordered to (Zohlnhöfer, 2003, p. 256f.). More-
over, appointed judges often have the same policy preferences as the government (Zohlnhöfer, 2003, pp. 256f.). 
 
39 It makes no statements regarding the direction of policy change (Tsebelis, 2002, p. 17). 
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Electoral systems have no direct effect on policy output. Their effect is mediated by institutional and partisan veto 
players.40 It is important to note that the status of institutional veto players varies in international treaty ratification 
(e.g., between UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification) and domestic policy (e.g., climate performance). This 
has been neglected in empirical research (see Chapter 4). 
Partisan veto players are political parties within institutional veto players (Tsebelis, 2002, p. 79; Tsebelis 1995, p. 
302; Zohlnhöfer, 2005, p. 409). Veto player theory makes no assumptions about the content of their preferences 
(Ganghof, 2003, p. 8). Tsebelis (2002 pp. 2, 20) assumes a spatial policy model, which implies that partisan veto 
players choose political options that are close to their own policy preferences (Wenzelburger & Zohlnhöfer, 2014, 
p. 317). Furthermore, veto players do not distinguish between policy alternatives with the same distance from their 
ideal policy output (circular indifference curves) (Tsebelis, 2002, p. 20). 
4.2.2 Review of the theoretical literature 
While previous research has mainly investigated environmental and climate performance, the underlying theoret-
ical arguments are relevant to an analysis of a country’s climate commitment. The ratification of climate treaties 
depends on the domestic political decision-making process (Schulze, 2014, p. 120). Fredriksson and Ujhelyi (2006, 
p. 1) have rightfully noted the implication that veto players can block the ratification process. Accordingly, insti-
tutionalist explanatory approaches have also been used to analyse country differences in environment commitment 
(e.g., Fredriksson & Ujhelyi, 2006). Based on veto player theory and veto point theory scholars argue that the 
higher the number of institutional and partisan veto players and the higher their ideological heterogeneity, i.e. the 
more divergent policy preferences among veto players, the fewer state efforts there will be to protect the global 
environment (e.g., Fuchs et al., 2009, p. 12; Knill et al., 2010, p. 306; Madden, 2014, p. 571).  
Many researchers have focused on the effect of the number of veto players (veto points) and environmental or 
climate commitment and performance (e.g., Fuchs et al., 2009, p. 12; Knill et al., 2010, p. 306). A high number of 
veto points implies that more actors can block efforts to mitigate climate change (Beer, 1998, no page number; 
Madden, 2014, p. 571; Poloni-Staudinger, 2008, p. 412), offering more opportunities for opponents of climate 
protection to prevent participation in climate cooperation (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007, p. 9). This makes com-
promise necessary (Rechia, 2002, p. 475; Scruggs, 1999, p. 10); it is often associated with the conflicting policy 
preferences of political decision-makers (Madden, 2014, p. 571). Moreover, in countries with many veto players, 
industry lobbying against the ratification of climate agreements tends to be more influential than environmentally 
friendly pressure from ENGOs (Fredriksson & Ujhelyi, 2006, p. 2). Industry representatives only need the support 
of a single veto player (Fredriksson & Ujhelyi, 2006, p. 2). The presence of many veto players can significantly 
impede ambitious climate policies that imply high costs (Fuchs et al., 2009, p. 12) for a small number of polluters 
(Madden, 2014, pp. 575f.). The assumption that centralised power and a low number of veto players contributes 
to solving environmental problems is shared by the Environmental Authoritarianism literature (e.g., Beeson, 2018, 
2016, 2010; Gilley, 2012). By contrast, from the perspective of veto player and point theory scholars, the number 
of veto points might also increase environmental protection. The more veto players, the more opportunities for 
non-state actors to influence policy actors (Fiorino, 2011, p. 381). It ‘may even create a competitive dynamic 
among institutions and levels of government that facilitate change’ (Fiorino, 2011, p. 381). This argument has also 
been made, based on Lijphart’s (2012 [1999]) distinction between consensual and majoritarian democracies (e.g., 
Poloni-Staudinger, 2008, p. 412). Consensual institutions ‘aim at broad participation in government and broad 
agreement on the policies that the government should pursue’ (Lijphart, 2012 [1999], p. 2). They are characterised 
by the distribution of political power. Consensual democracies represent minority groups better, include more 
interests in the political decision-making process, and enable green parties to compete for power (Poloni-
Staudinger, 2008, p. 412). Thus, they provide more incentives for the government to consider a range of interests, 
i.e. the policy preferences of the entire electorate (e.g., Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007, p. 16; Fredriksson & Woll-
scheid, 2007, p. 382; Knill et al., 2010, p. 306; Poloni-Staudinger, 2008, p. 412). Climate change mitigation has 
been described as “the diffuse problem par excellence” (Mercier, 2006, p. 105; emphasis in original). By contrast, 
majoritarian institutions favour special-interest groups (Fredriksson & Wollscheid, 2007, p. 382; Knill et al., 2010, 
p. 306). In sum, there is no consensus in the theoretical debate on the relationship between political-institutional 
constraints and climate commitment and performance. 
More recently, climate-performance studies have considered the ideological heterogeneity of veto players (e.g., 
Jahn, 2016; Jensen & Spoon, 2011). This literature assumes that the more divergent the policy preferences among 
veto players, the worse a country’s climate performance (e.g., Jahn, 2016, pp. 171f.; Jensen & Spoon, 2011, p. 
102). The importance of the policy preferences of veto players in relation to the left/right and green/growth di-
mensions has been studied (e.g., Jahn, 2016, pp. 172f.). Jahn (2016, p. 174) argues that it is theoretically ambiguous 
which dimension is more important for the environment. Jensen and Spoon (2011, p. 102) suggest that the more 
divergent the government positions on environmental issues, the less likely it is that the government will adopt 
 
40 Relevant political institutions, which are not veto players, are treated as a control variables. 
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policy measures to achieve the Kyoto Protocol greenhouse gas emissions target. Jensen and Spoon (2011, p. 110) 
have observed that ‘the left-wing and right both have parties that emphasize the environment and those that do 
not.’ Nonetheless, it is important to study this dimension as well as ‘the left-right dimension represents the seman-
tics of established politics’ (Jahn, 2016, p. 174). In sum, while we can assume that policy divergence in the 
green/growth dimension undermines climate commitment and performance, the effect in the left/right-dimension 
is theoretically ambiguous. 
In contrast to the holistic approach of veto player theory, many publications focus on specific political institutions. 
The following section discusses the effect of specific veto points, focusing on the most important: government 
fragmentation, presidentialism, and bicameralism (see previous section).41 
According to veto player theory, government fragmentation makes the adoption of climate policies less likely. 
On the one hand, more veto points imply higher decision costs (Garmann, 2014, pp. 2f.). Persson et al. (2007, p. 
157) argue that voters can distinguish between different coalition parties. As climate change mitigation is associ-
ated with losers and winners, it also makes it more likely that veto players will have divergent economic and 
environmental interests. Because of electoral competition, government parties may focus on policies that have an 
immediate effect on their voters’ wellbeing. Minority governments must make compromises for the majority and 
focus less on implementing their own policy preferences (Garmann, 2014, p. 3). On the other hand, a larger number 
of government parties increases the likelihood that diffuse policy preferences will be represented. Garmann (2014, 
p. 3) observes that it may be easier for coalition governments to adopt unpopular policies, such as greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions, because accountability is lower than in single-party governments. In sum, the effect of gov-
ernment fragmentation on climate commitment and performance is an empirical question. 
From the perspective of veto player theory, higher levels of legislative centralisation and cohesion in parliamentary 
systems (Dolšak, 2001, p. 419; Fredriksson & Wollscheid, 2007, p. 382) make it easier for governments to ratify 
international climate treaties and adopt climate policies than it is for presidential democracies (Christoff & Eck-
ersley, 2011, p. 440; Lantis, 2009, p. 8f.). Wurster (2013, pp. 80f.) assumes that semi-presidential democracies 
perform less well in ecological sustainability than either presidential or parliamentary systems, as they are char-
acterised by a higher number of veto players. In addition, parliamentary governments must provide more public 
goods than presidential systems (e.g., Persson & Tabellini, 1999; Persson et al., 2000). Competition in parliamen-
tary systems is often lower than in presidential systems because the government is supported by most of the legis-
lature (Persson & Tabellini, 1999, p. 721). Moreover, as political authorities depend on the cooperation of political 
parties and the support of most voters, governments are obliged to provide public goods (Persson & Tabellini, 
1999, p. 721; Persson et al., 2000, p. 1126; Ward, 2008, p. 402). In presidential systems, the independent legislative 
and executive elections enable voters to discipline political decision-makers (Persson et al., 2000, p. 1126). The 
separation of powers creates competition among voters and politicians in presidential systems (Persson & Tabel-
lini, 1999, pp. 703f., 719; Persson et al., 2000, p. 1126), as well as bargaining between the legislative and the 
executive branches (Christoff & Eckersley, 2011, p. 440). This ‘gives too many opportunities for economic special 
interests to scupper environmental initiatives’ (Ward, 2008, p. 406). Consequently, presidential democracies un-
derprovide public goods as they focus on a minority of voters (Persson & Tabellini, 1999, pp. 719, 721).  
By contrast, according to selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) presidential systems are more com-
mitted to climate cooperation and perform better in climate protection (e.g., Bernauer & Koubi, 2009; Böhmelt et 
al., 2015; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, pp. 54f.). The larger the winning coalition, the more the government 
provides public goods to stay in power (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003, pp. 101, 104). Presidential systems pre-
sumably have a larger winning coalition, as governments need the support of more than 50% of the selectorate to 
be elected (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p. 54). Böhmelt et al. (2015, pp. 100f.) add that having fewer effective 
parties than presidential systems with plurality voting makes it more likely that the government will provide envi-
ronmental public goods (Chhibber & Nooruddin, 2004, pp. 161ff.; Persson & Tabellini, 1999). Finally, Dolšak 
(2001, p. 419) assumes that the centralisation of accountability in parliamentary systems (Weaver & Rockman, 
1993, p. 15f.) hinders the adoption of unpopular climate policies. To conclude, the relationship between presiden-
tialism and climate commitment and performance is theoretically unclear (see also Bernauer & Koubi, 2009, p. 
1360; Dolšak, 2001, p. 419).  
As previously explained, federalism is a redundant veto point, in relation to bicameralism. In additional, data 
availability issues make it impossible for this empirical study analyse bicameralism. Veto player theory suggests 
that bicameralism and federalism undermine the ratification of environmental and climate treaties and the adoption 
and implementation of environmental and climate-protection policies (e.g., Dolšak, 2001, p. 420; Harrison, 2007, 
pp. 96f.; Jahn & Wälti, 2007, p. 264; Steuer & Clar, 2015, p. 88; see also Hudson, 2012). Bicameral and federal 
systems imply an additional veto player, able to impede environmental or climate policy (Dolšak, 2001, p. 401; 
Harrison, 2007, pp. 96f.). Opponents of environmental protection at the regional level can block environmental 
reform (Dolšak, 2001, p. 420; Wälti, 2004, p. 605). They also make it difficult to respond quickly to global 
 
41 The first chamber of the legislature is not considered, as it exists in most democracies. 
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warming (Jahn & Wälti, 2007, p. 3). Further arguments suggest that federal systems, in particular, undermine 
climate commitment and performance. While climate change mitigation occurs mainly at the local level, only the 
future generation will benefit from climate protection. Federal states often have little interest in solving national 
or global environmental problems (Jahn & Wälti, 2007, p. 264) that depend on national or international responses 
(Wälti, 2004, p. 602). Christoff and Eckersley (2011, p. 441) argue that federalism especially hinders the adoption 
of climate policies when industries that expect to be negatively impacted by climate protection (e.g., the fossil-
fuel industry) are concentrated in specific states or regions. With regard to climate performance, federalism may 
lead, via the decentralisation of responsibilities, to coordination problems and incoherent and inefficient climate 
policies (Clar et al., 2013, p. 4; Galarraga et al. 2011, p. 165; Goulder & Stavins, 2010; Kloepfer, 2004, p. 761; 
Poloni-Staudinger, 2008, p. 412; Scruggs, 1999, p. 10; Steuer & Clar, 2015, p. 88). Unitary states are likely to be 
more effective at solving environmental problems that result from spill-over effects (Wälti, 2004, p. 603). Addi-
tionally, economic competition among federal states can lead to a race-to-the-bottom (Wälti, 2004, p. 603). How-
ever, bicameralism and federalism may also contribute to climate commitment and performance. More veto play-
ers also imply that ENGOs and citizens have more opportunities to influence political decisions (Fiorino, 2011, p. 
380; Kincaid, 2001, p. 88; Poloni-Staudinger, 2008, p. 414; Wälti, 2004, pp. 605f.; Ward, 2008, p. 406). They also 
facilitate the monitoring of environmental regulation implementation by ENGOs (Fiorino, 2011, p. 380). Thus, 
bicameral or federal states may be better able to represent generalised interests and to reduce the influence of 
special-interest groups (Fiorino, 2011, p. 381; Milner, 1993, p. 347; Rechia, 2002, pp. 474f.). As the consequences 
of global warming are felt at the local level, it cannot be assumed that federal states in general have no interest in 
climate change mitigation. Federal states may be more responsive to local demands to protect the environment 
(Fiorino, 2011, p. 380; Galarraga et al., 2011, p. 181; Kincaid, 2001, p. 88) and citizens of federal states may be 
more willing to accept the costs of environmental quality (Steurer & Clar, 2015, p. 89; Wälti, 2004, pp. 603f.). 
Federal states may perform better in climate performance because they are better at understanding regional differ-
ences (Kincaid, 2001, p. 88). Instead of a race-to-the-bottom, federalism may lead, via experimentation and the 
diffusion of environmental policies, to a race-to-the-top (e.g., Chappell, 2001, p. 61; Christoff & Eckersley; 2011, 
p. 441; Kincaid, 2001, p. 88; Poloni-Staudinger, 2008, pp. 413f.).  
In sum, bicameralism and federalism have both positive and negative effects on climate protection. The total effect 
depends on whether supporters or opponents of climate protection are in power in both chambers of the legislative, 
as well as the vertical distribution of climate-policy responsibilities and resources (Chappell, 2001, p. 60; Christoff 
& Eckersely, 2011, p. 441; Pierson, 1995, p. 463). While the Canadian provinces were unable to block Kyoto 
Protocol ratification, they can undermine national efforts to reduce climate emissions because they are responsible 
for natural-resource extraction (e.g., oil, coal, gas) (Christoff & Eckersley, 2011, p. 441; Harrison, 2007, p. 97). 
By contrast, the federal system enables California to mitigate climate change, despite receiving little support from 
the federal government.  
To conclude, the existing literature has either adopted a holistic approach and discussed the effect of institutional 
constraints or focused on the effect of specific political institutions. There is no agreement, either on the direction 
of the effect of the number of veto points, or on the direction of the effect of specific veto points on climate 
commitment and performance. Alongside ideological heterogeneity among veto players, this study investigates 
separately the effects of specific veto points. 
4.2.3 Empirical research 
While much of the empirical literature examines the effect of veto players on environmental policy, few studies 
have investigated climate commitment and performance specifically (see also Madden, 2014, p. 571). In particular, 
this is scant research on the ideological heterogeneity of veto players and climate commitment. In accordance with 
the theoretical debate, empirical research has investigated specific political institutions, as well as institutional 
constraints in general.  
The existing literature on institutional constraints and climate commitment consists mainly of case studies, which 
focus on the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by developed countries. They suggest that institutional constraints 
undermined Kyoto Protocol ratification. The separation of powers in the US suggests that opponents of climate 
change need the support of just one institution (Harrison, 2010, p. 76). Case studies show that the effect of con-
centration of power depends on its interaction with the policy preferences of political decision-makers (Harrison 
& Sundstrom, 2010b, p. 273; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007, pp. 9f.). In political systems with few veto players 
(e.g., Canada, Russia), the policy preferences of political decision-makers were decisive for Kyoto Protocol rati-
fication (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010b, p. 273; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007, pp. 9f.). demonstrated by Harrison 
(2007). Canada and the US accepted comparable greenhouse gas emissions targets during the negotiations (Harri-
son, 2007, p. 92). Both the Clinton administration and the government of the liberal Jean Chrétien in Canada 
supported the Kyoto Protocol (Harrison, 2007, pp. 95f.). However, Bill Clinton was unable to ratify the climate 
treaty because the US Congress had veto power (Harrison, 2007, pp. 95ff.). Similarly, Sussman (2004, p. 365) 
concludes from his case analysis of US global environmental policy that US efforts to protect the environment 
75 
 
 
have been constrained by the divergent partisanship of Congress and the President, alongside the influence of 
powerful business and industry interest groups. The Canadian provinces opposed to the Kyoto Protocol were un-
able to hinder ratification by the majority in parliament. Simultaneously, the concentration of authority enabled 
the later Canadian Prime Minster, Stephen Harper, to stop state efforts to mitigate climate change (Harrison & 
Sundstrom, 2007, pp. 9f.). Finally, the centralisation of power enabled the Russian president to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol and realise his economic and foreign-policy preferences (Henry & Sundstrom, 2010, p. 107).  
Political institutions appear to interact with electoral rules and incentives. Harrison and Sundstrom (2007, p. 10) 
have found, through case studies, that more veto players imply more opportunities for environmental and industry 
interest groups to influence climate commitment and performance. Weak party discipline in the US Congress 
makes members of the Senate more open to the influence of local business interests (Harrison, 2010, pp. 68, 69, 
77; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007, p. 10). Accordingly, Republican and Democratic senators opposed treaty ratifi-
cation because of labour interests (Harrison, 2010, p. 69). Harrison (2010, p. 67) concludes that the lack of electoral 
incentives, together with institutional constraints, resulted in the non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in the US. 
Business strongly opposed climate cooperation and climate change mitigation efforts and funded right-wing think 
tanks that questioned climate change (Harrison, 2010, pp. 67, 69f.). In contrast to the European public, US citizens 
were less supportive of the leadership principle of the Convention (Harrison, 2010, p. 71). Public support was, 
therefore, not strong enough to limit the influence of business opposition to Kyoto Protocol ratification (Harrison, 
2010, p. 67). In Canada, public support for climate cooperation was low; fossil-fuel intensive companies also 
opposed the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (Harrison, 2007, pp. 94f., 112). A unilateral ratification by Canada 
implied that its businesses would be less competitive than their US counterparts within NAFTA (Harrison, 2007, 
p. 92). The low number of veto players, however, enabled the government to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Fredriksson 
and Ujhelyi (2006, pp. 4f.) have found, through their survival analysis of Kyoto Protocol ratification, support for 
the hypothesis that the number of veto players measured via bicameralism and by the checks-and-balances indica-
tor from the World Bank Database of Political Institutions, weakens the positive effect of ENGOs on ratification. 
The checks-and-balances indicator cannot be described as a valid indicator of veto points (see Chapter 6). 
Steurer and Clar (2015, p. 99) have argued that federalism has been an obstacle for greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions in the Austrian building sector because the national government had to coordinate, not just various 
national ministries, but also provincial policies. In accordance with the conclusions of the theoretical discussion, 
Harrison and Sundstrom (2007 p. 10) have argued, based on case studies, that federalism has influenced Kyoto 
Protocol ratification in various ways, ‘depending on the particular division of powers, the regional distribution of 
costs, and electoral incentives’. The Canadian federal government was able to ratify the Kyoto Protocol despite 
opposition from provinces that depended on the fossil-intensive industries because they had no power to veto the 
treaty ratification (Harrison, 2007).  
Dolšak (2001) argues in his cross-sectional analysis that parliamentary systems are more likely than presidential 
systems to commit to climate cooperation. However, his summary measure of climate commitment also considers 
climate change mitigation42. Previous quantitative analyses have not taken into account the fact that veto players 
vary between domestic policy and international treaty ratification; instead, they have used indicators developed to 
explain domestic policy output. Table 4.3 summarises the previous quantitative research. 
Quantitative studies have examined the effect of the number and ideological heterogeneity of veto players on 
climate performance (see Table 4.4, e.g., Fuchs et al., 2009; Jahn, 2008; Madden, 2014). Climate performance is 
measured using climate policy outputs (e.g., Madden, 2014) or outcomes (mainly CO2 emissions) (e.g., Fuchs et 
al., 2009; Jahn, 2008; Jensen & Spoon, 2011). Madden (2014) has examined the adoption of climate policies and 
reforms. Jensen and Spoon (2011) have measured a country’s compliance with its greenhouse gas emissions tar-
gets. While most pooled time-series analyses have focused on short-term changes in the dependent variable, Fuchs 
et al. (2009) have studied short- and long-term changes. Most studies have focused on OECD countries (e.g., Jahn,  
  
 
42 He uses an ordinal measure to indicate whether a country has signed or ratified the UNFCCC, submitted a national plan to 
the UNFCCC Secretariat, publicly announced an intention to mitigate climate change, and implemented climate change miti-
gation policies (Dolšak, 2001, pp. 421f.).  
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Table 4.3 Quantitative research on veto players and climate commitment 
Study Dependent  
variable 
Measurement of  
veto players 
Effect 
Dolšak, 2001 Ordinal variable 
taking into ac-
count signature 
and ratification 
behaviour, inter-
national aid, nati-
onal communica-
tions, Rio emissi-
ons target, enact-
ment of carbon 
taxes 
Parliamentary democracy 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
Fredriksson & 
Ujhelyi, 2006 
Ratification of the 
KP 
 
Number of veto players 
 
The number 
of veto play-
ers de-
creases the 
positive 
effect of 
ENGO 
strength  
Notes: + positive effect, / no effect, - negative effect on climate commitment. KP = Kyoto Protocol. 
2008; Jensen & Spoon, 2011; Madden, 2014). This has enabled them to measure the ideological heterogeneity of 
veto players in the left/right and green/growth dimensions, using data from the Party Manifesto Project. Madden 
(2014, p. 578) has applied an additive veto-player index, which counts the number of institutional and partisan 
veto players (Madden, 2014, p. 578). He considers federalism, bicameralism, the president, plurality voting rules, 
referenda, constitutional courts, and plural interest-group systems. Jensen and Spoon (2011) have examined gov-
ernment parties and the president. Based on the assumption that the number and ideological heterogeneity of veto 
players moderates the effect of the policy preferences of government parties on climate policy, Jahn (2008) has 
measured the policy preferences of government parties, examining the number and ideological heterogeneity of 
veto players. Studies that consider countries outside the OECD have used the political constraints measure devel-
oped by Henisz (2002) or the checks-and-balances measure derived from the database of political institutions 
(DPI) (Cruz et al., 2016) (e.g., Fuchs et al., 2009; Tobin, 2017; Wurster, 2013). Neither measure can be regarded 
as a valid or reliable indicator of the ideological heterogeneity of veto players or the number of veto points (see 
Chapter 6). 
Jensen and Spoon (2011, p. 109) have argued that the more divergent the ideological positions of veto players in 
relation to the environment, the higher the divergence between greenhouse gas emissions and greenhouse gas 
emissions targets. By contrast, the ideological range of veto players in the left/right dimension does not influence 
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol (Jensen & Spoon, 2011, p. 110). Madden (2014, pp. 580f.) has shown that the 
number of veto players decreases the number of climate policies and major climate-policy reforms. However, 
climate policies that distribute costs equally among many actors are more likely to be adopted by countries with 
many veto players than concentrated-cost climate policies (Madden, 2014, pp. 575f., 580f.). Tobin (2017) con-
cludes that the lower the political constraints measure (Henisz, 2002), the more ambitious the climate policies. By 
contrast, Fuchs et al. (2009) have observed, using the same indicator, that institutional constraints reduce CO2 
emissions only outside the OECD. Wurster (2013) has found no significant effects of the separation of power, 
measured using the checks-and-balances indicator (Cruz et al., 2016), on CO2 emissions in his worldwide analysis.  
Several studies have focused on the influence of specific political institutions on climate change mitigation. Gar-
mann’s (2014) analysis of changes in CO2 emissions per unit GDP in 20 OECD countries shows that government 
fragmentation and coalition governments are associated with lower CO2 emissions reductions. The effect of a 
coalition government is stronger than the effect of the number of government parties. Wurster (2013) observes no 
effect of the type of democracy (parliamentary, semi-presidential, or presidential democracy) on CO2 emissions in 
his time-series analysis of 130 countries. He also finds no significant effect of decentralisation, measured using 
data from the Database of Political Institutions. 
In accordance with theoretical considerations, qualitative research has shown that the effect of federalism depends 
on the responsibilities of federal states, as well as the importance of natural-resource extraction and pollution-
intensive pollution in federal states. Harrison (2007, p. 114) has shown that, independent of their ratification be-
haviour, Canada and the United States both have ineffective climate policies. He argues that opposition to climate 
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change mitigation may be stronger than opposition to commitment (Harrison, 2007, p. 114). Moreover, the Cana-
dian provinces have more opportunities to block the implementation of climate policies (Harrison, 2007, p. 114) 
because they own and control natural resources (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007, p. 10). Several provinces depend 
on the fossil-fuel and automobile industries (Alberta, Ontario); they have therefore blocked federal efforts to re-
duce emissions (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007, pp. 10f.) Federalism in Canada has been described as ‘an obstacle 
to adoption of climate policies’ (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007, p. 10). In the US, federalism has enabled states 
such as California and New York to take the lead on climate change mitigation (Harrison, 2010, p. 68; Harrison 
& Sundstrom, 2007, p. 10). They do not depend on the fossil-fuel industry and have relatively low emissions 
(Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007, p. 10). In Australia, federal states are responsible for environmental policy (Crow-
ley, 2007, p. 125). Crowley (2007, p. 125) argues that they have little interest in climate protection, as they depend 
on natural-resource exploitation (e.g. coal extraction). She notes that the federal government can achieve climate 
change mitigation by pressuring them through a tax-redistribution policy (Crowley, 2007, p. 125).  
Table 4.4 Quantitative research on veto players and climate performance 
Study Dependent  
variable 
Measurement of  
veto players 
Effect 
Jahn, 2008 CO2 emissions 
change (annual), to-
tal, industry and 
traffic 
Green government ideology 
corrected for the number of 
veto players 
Left/ right government ideo-
logy corrected for the num-
ber of veto players 
/ 
 
 
+ 
Jensen & Spoon, 
2011 
Compliance with 
green house gas 
emissions targets 
Ideological heterogeneity 
among government parties 
and the president on envi-
ronmental issues 
Ideological heterogeneity 
among government parties 
and the president on the 
left/right dimension 
- 
 
 
 
/ 
Fuchs et al., 2009 CO2 emissions 
CO2 emission 
changes 
Political constraints index 
from Henisz (2002) 
+ in Non 
OECD-
countries 
Wurster, 2013 CO2 emissions Types of democracy 
Checks and balances 
Decentralisation 
Monarchic dictatorship 
Military dictatorship 
Civil dictatorship 
/ 
/ 
/ 
- 
/ 
/ 
Garmann, 2014 CO2 emissions 
change per unit 
GDP 
Governmental fragmenta-
tion 
Minority/ majority govern-
ment 
- 
 
/ 
Madden, 2014 Adoption of climate 
policies 
Number of veto players 
Ideological polarisation of 
government parties 
- 
- 
Notes: + positive effect, / no effect, - negative effect on climate performance. 
In sum, institutional constraints influence climate commitment. However, their effect depends on the policy pref-
erences of the political authorities and on electoral incentives. Studies have reached different conclusions on 
whether the number of veto points matters to climate performance; there are no uniform effects of specific veto 
players. It is therefore important to study the effect of specific institutional constraints (see also Madden, 2014, p. 
584). Empirical research that has found effects of veto points suggests that they undermine climate performance. 
The ideological heterogeneity of veto players in the left/right dimension does not influence climate performance, 
but polarisation in the green/growth dimension undermines efforts to reduce global air pollution (see also Jensen 
& Spoon, 2011, p. 110). Most studies have focused on developed countries. 
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4.2.4 Conclusions 
Both the ratification of international climate agreements and the adoption and implementation of climate policies 
depend on a political process that is structured by the political institutionalist context. Based on the literature 
review, this section formulates hypotheses on the effect of specific veto points and ideological heterogeneity 
among veto players on climate commitment and performance (see Table 4.5).  
In examining democracies and non-democracies, this study must address the transfer of the veto-player approach 
to autocracies. Veto player theory is not restricted to democracies (Cao & Prakash, 2012, p. 69; Tsebelis, 2002, p. 
78). The number of non-democratic veto players, not based on democratic principles, varies across autocracies 
(Tsebelis, 2002, p. 78). Nonetheless, the veto-player approach has been developed in the context of established 
developed democracies. This study, therefore, focuses on democratic veto players. Domestic political institutional 
constraints in autocracies are not regarded as potential veto points (see also Hensiz, 2002). This empirical analysis 
considers democracy as a condition of the effect of specific veto points and ideological distance among veto play-
ers (see Chapter 6). The multivariate analysis controls institutional differences among autocracies (see Chapter 6). 
Data availability limits this analysis of the effect of veto-player influence on the left/right dimension43. In devel-
oped countries, the green/growth dimension is not examined, as there is little variation on the measures discussed 
here, during the research period in question. Tsebelis (2010, p. 5; Tsebelis, 1999, p. 595) has argued that, in a one-
dimensional policy space, only the distance between the two most extreme veto players represents a decisive policy 
change. With regard to the effect of ideological heterogeneity on climate commitment, only the veto player who 
disagrees the most with the international treaty is crucial (Schulze, 2014, p. 119). On the left/right dimension, 
right-wing ideology is less in favour of international cooperation. Thus, a right-wing veto player is likely to reduce 
a country’s commitment to the climate cooperation. 
The presence of a right-wing veto player is unlikely to affect the ratification of the UNFCCC, which incurs few 
costs in developed and developing countries. In the absence of any right-wing government ideology, the ratifica-
tion of hard climate treaties, such as the Kyoto Protocol, generally depends on their legal implications (e.g., green-
house gas emissions target), especially in developed countries. 
Table 4.5  Veto players and climate commitment and performance 
 
UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol 
Climate 
Performance 
Pooled analysis 
Developing 
countries 
Pooled analysis 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Right veto player/ Ideo-
logical heterogeneity* 
HVeto1.1.1 / HVeto1.2.1 - HVeto1.3.1 / 
HVeto1.1.2 / HVeto1.2.2 - HVeto1.3.2 / 
Government  
fragmentation 
HVeto2.1.1 / HVeto2.2.1 - HVeto2.3.1 - 
HVeto2.1.2 / HVeto2.2.2 - HVeto2.3.2 - 
Presidentialism 
HVeto3.1.1 / HVeto3.2.1 / HVeto3.3.1 / 
HVeto3.1.2 / HVeto3.2.2 / HVeto3.3.2 / 
Bicameralism 
HVeto4.1.1 / HVeto4.2.1 / HVeto4.3.1 / 
HVeto4.1.2 / HVeto4.2.2 / HVeto4.3.2 / 
Notes: + positive effect, / no effect, - negative effect on climate commitment, +/- direction unclear. * Climate commit-
ment: presence of a right veto player. Climate performance: ideological heterogeneity on the left/right dimension 
among veto players. 
Ideological heterogeneity in the left/right dimensions is unlikely to affect climate performance.44 Based on previ-
ous empirical findings, this study assumes that government fragmentation undermines climate commitment and 
performance. As discussed above, this does not apply to the soft UNFCCC. The effect of presidentialism is theo-
retically ambiguous; there has been little empirical research with regard to climate commitment and performance. 
Overall, no independent effect of bicameralism/federalism is expected. The effect depends on who is in power and 
the distribution of political responsibility and financial resources between the federal and state levels. 
 
43 Jensen and Spoon (2011, pp. 113; footnote) have found that government positions in the left/right and green/growth dimen-
sions are highly correlated; for this reason, they have not tested their effects simultaneously (see also Jahn, 2016a, p. 174). 
44 On the green/growth dimension, green parties are more likely to ratify international climate treaties than other parties, given 
that green parties support international cooperation and climate protection. 
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4.3 Political corruption and climate commitment and performance 
Economists and political scientists study the importance of political corruption on climate output and outcome. 
This chapter addresses the conceptualisation of corruption (4.3.1). It discusses the theoretical and empirical liter-
ature (4.3.2 & 4.3.3) and formulates hypotheses on the relationship between political corruption and climate com-
mitment and performance (4.3.4). 
4.3.1 Conceptualisation of political corruption 
There are multiple concepts of political corruption. Public understandings of corruption are not suitable for scien-
tific analysis, as they are emotional-laden and have a moral component (Pellegrini, 2011, p. 14). Legal definitions 
vary across countries (Pellegrini, 2011, pp. 15f.). In economics and political science, corruption is commonly 
defined as ‘the misuse of public office for private gain’ (Treisman, 2000, p. 399; see also Knack, 2006, p. 5; Kurer, 
2005, p. 234; McMann et al., 2016, p. 8; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008, p. 170; Treisman, 2007, p. 211). Corruption 
is limited to political or public sector corruption. Private-sector corruption is often neglected (Pellegrini, 2011, p. 
14). While corruption in the business sector does affect climate performance, the focus here is on political and 
public sector corruption, highlighting the interrelationship between domestic political institutional factors and 
globalisation. ‘Misuse’ is often limited to illegal actions (Knack, 2006, p. 5).45 Pellegrini (2011, p. 17) notes that 
the misuse of public office is a universal norm shared by most cultures. Many definitions do not further specify 
the type of misuse (Pellegrini, 2011, p. 16). Rothstein and Teorell (2008, p. 170) have defined political corruption, 
following Kurer (2005), as the misuse of public office for private gain, which violates impartiality in the exercise 
of public authority. Treisman (2000, p. 211) notes that: 
‘[t]he quintessential corrupt transaction envisioned is the gift of a bribe by a private citizen to a public 
official in return for some service that the official should either provide for free (e.g., registering a firm) or not 
provide at all (e.g., inside information).’ 
McMann et al. (2016, p. 8) define corruption as ‘bribes, undocumented extra payments, kickbacks, contracts for 
personal gain, future employment, theft, embezzlement, and misappropriation’ (see also Nye, 1967, p. 419; Pelle-
grini. 2011, p. 17). 
Wilson and Damania (2005, p. 518) have argued that different forms of political corruption should be distinguished 
in analyses of the environment. They distinguish between grand and petty corruption (Wilson & Damania, 2005, 
p. 517). This classification system categorises political corruption by political level (Knack, 2006, p. 5). Grand 
corruption refers to payments made directly to political decision-makers in the political decision-making process 
(Wilson & Damania, 2005, p. 517) and to high-level bureaucrats (Rose-Ackermann, 1999, p. 11). Petty corruption 
involves payments made to bureaucrats to avoid sanctions under existing law (Wilson & Damania, 2005, p. 517). 
Accordingly, Pellegrini (2011, p. 19) distinguishes between political and bureaucratic corruption; McMann et al. 
(2016) focus on executive, legislative, judicial, and public sector corruption. The present study examines the effect 
of executive, legislative, and public sector corruption as these dimensions overlap with the distinction between 
political and bureaucratic corruption. 
In sum, the academic literature focuses on the analysis of political corruption, defined as the misuse of public 
office by political decision-makers and public-sector officials for private gain in relation to climate policy. Scholars 
have proposed distinguishing between corruption in political decision-makers and public officials. 
4.3.2 Review of the theoretical literature 
Most scholars assume that political corruption undermines environmental performance (López & Mitra, 2000, pp. 
138f.). The direct and indirect negative effects of political corruption on environmental protection policy adoption 
and implementation have been examined (e.g., Cole, 2007, pp. 637f., 640; Damania et al., 2003, p. 492; Welsch, 
2004, p. 664). Political corruption affects climate commitment and performance directly, as governments accept 
bribes in exchange for not adopting or implementing environmental regulations. Public-sector officials can be 
pressured to avoid monitoring the behaviour of firms or implementing environmental regulations (Holmberg et 
al., 2009, p. 152; Miller, 2011, p. 51; Robbins, 2000, p. 430; Smith & Walpole, 2005, pp. 251f.; Wilson & Dama-
nia, 2003, p. 516). Thus, political corruption provides an incentive for non-state actors to bribe political decision-
makers and bureaucrats (Povitkina, 2018, p. 415). In contrast to ENGOs (Fredriksson et al., 2007, p. 234), industry 
lobby groups appear better organised and have more financial resources at their disposal. They use these to per-
suade politicians and bureaucrats to refuse to ratify climate treaties or reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Hahn, 
1990, p. 23; Halkos, et al. 2015, pp. 624f.). Second, corrupt governments are less responsive to environmental 
protection demands and less willing to adopt stricter environmental regulations (Damania et al., 2003, p. 493; 
Wilson & Damiana 2005, p. 529). Political corruption moves economic resources from public-good provision to 
 
45 The concept of corruption may not apply political-transition situations (Pellegrini, 2011, p. 18). 
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private consumption (Morse, 2006). Accordingly, it creates incentives for public-sector officials to refuse to un-
dermine the implementation of climate policies (Damania 2002, p. 410; Povitikina, 2018, p. 415). Third, the long-
term experience of public sector corruption may make the adoption and implementation of climate-protection 
policies unlikely, as political decision-makers expect corrupt behaviour to undermine their efforts in the long term. 
(Dahlström et al., 2013, pp. 523ff.; Fredriksson & Neumayer, 2016, p. 454). At the same time, polluters do not 
comply with environmental regulations because political corruption reduces their trust in political institutions to 
implement and enforce them (Povitkina, 2018, p. 415; Rothstein & Eek, 2009, p. 82f.).  
Political corruption also affects climate performance indirectly, via its impact on economic development, defined 
as GDP per capita (Cole, 2007, pp. 637f.; Holmberg et al., 2009, p. 152; Welsch, 2004, p. 664).46 Economists 
assume that government quality contributes to economic growth (e.g., Kaufmann et al., 1999). Institutional quality 
is a condition for large domestic and foreign investments in natural-resource extraction and production (Duit, 2014, 
p. 14). This implies that political corruption contributes to climate performance by lowering the scale effects on 
pollution. Welsch (2004, p. 664) supports EKC theory in arguing that the indirect effect of corruption depends on 
the level of economic development. López and Mitra (2000, pp. 149f.; see also Leitão, 2010) assume that corrupt 
governments do not adopt stricter environmental regulations, in accordance with business interests. Political cor-
ruption in developing countries shifts the EKC turning point to a higher per capita income level (López & Mitra, 
2000, pp. 149f.). Particularly in developing countries, political corruption undermines climate-protection efforts. 
Finally, political corruption reduces the financial resources a government needs to address climate change (Pov-
itkina, 2018, p. 412; Tanzi & Davoodi 1998, p. 51). 
The literature discusses the extent to which political corruption interacts with other variables, including political 
stability (Fredriksson & Svensson, 2003), democracy (Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2006, p. 332; Povitikina, 2018), po-
litical competition (Wilson & Damania, 2005), and economic globalisation (see Chapter 3). 
To conclude, most theoretical arguments suggest that corruption among political decision-makers and public offi-
cials undermines climate commitment and performance (see also Cole, 2007, p. 639; Halkos et al., 2015, p. 622). 
This applies in particular to developing countries (Damania, 2002, p. 407; Desai, 1998b, p. 299f.; López & Mitra, 
2000; Welsch, 2004, pp. 663ff.). Developing countries are characterised by low levels of government effective-
ness, weak governments, and corruption. The negative effect of corruption is more pronounced in relation to cli-
mate performance, rather than commitment, as emissions are influenced by public sector corruption and the gov-
ernment’s ability to implement environment regulations (Welsch, 2004, p. 665). However, political corruption also 
contributes to climate performance through the lower scale effects of economic growth. 
4.3.3 Empirical research 
There is little quantitative research on the impact of political corruption on climate commitment (see Table 4.6). 
Fredriksson et al. (2007) have examined the effect of political corruption and interest-group influence on Kyoto 
Protocol ratification, using the stratified hazard model, in 170 countries. Political corruption increases the positive 
influence of ENGOs on a country’s climate commitment. Most statistical studies have examined the relationship 
between corruption and climate performance in developed and developing countries using time-series cross-sec-
tional regression (see Table 4.7, e.g., Biswas et al., 2012; Cole, 2007; Holmberg et al., 2009) or cross-sectional 
regression (Chang, 2015; Fredriksson & Neumayer, 2016). Climate performance is measured by CO2 emissions. 
Fredriksson and Neumayer (2016) have examined climate-policy stringency via the CLIMI index, which combines 
indicators of climate commitment and performance (see Chapter 2). Political corruption is captured using corrup-
tion data from the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) developed by Transparency International (e.g., Biswas et 
al., 2012; Fredriksson & Neumayer, 2016) and/or the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) (e.g., Biswas et 
al., 2012; Cole, 2007; Fredriksson & Neumayer, 2016). Both measures have validity and reliability problems (see 
Chapter 6). Povitkina (2018) has applied the political corruption index developed by McMann et al. (2016). Pre-
vious quantitative research has not distinguished between corruption among political decision-makers and public 
officials. 
  
 
46Some scholars regard corruption as endogenous to economic growth (Goldsmith, 2007, p. 165; Holmberg et al., 2009, p. 
140). 
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Table 4.6  Quantitative research on political corruption and climate commitment 
Study Dependent va-
riable/s 
Measurement of  
political corruption 
Effect 
Fredriksson et al., 
2007 
KP ratification CPI, WGI corruption meas-
ure 
Govern-
ment cor-
ruption in-
creases the 
positive 
effect of 
ENGO in-
fluence. 
Notes: KP = Kyoto Protocol, CPI = Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International, WGI = World Govern-
ance Indicators. 
Most studies support the theoretical expectation that corruption undermines climate performance (e.g., Biswas et 
al., 2012; Cole, 2007; Fredriksson & Neumayer, 2016; Holmberg et al., 2009). Holmberg et al. (2009) have shown 
that corruption control correlates positively with global air pollution, concluding that ‘the less local a particular 
type of pollution is and the more externalities it has, the less likely governments are to tackle pollution’ (Holmberg 
et al., 2009, p. 154). Fredriksson and Neumayer (2016) have demonstrated that, while the current level of corrup-
tion is not decisive, the historical experience is relevant to climate-policy stringency. This finding raises questions 
about the analysis of the short-term effects of political corruption. Cole (2007) has observed that political corrup-
tion has a negative effect on CO2 emissions, which becomes weaker with GDP per capita and positive for high 
levels of GDP per capita. This finding offers some support for the argument that the effect of political corruption 
varies between developed and developing countries. In developing countries, political corruption is associated 
with lower levels of global air pollution via scale effects of economic growth. Finally, quantitative research indi-
cates that corruption moderates the effects of shadow-economy size (Biswas et al., 2012) and democracy on CO2 
emissions (Povitkina, 2018). 
To conclude, most statistical studies support the argument that political corruption undermines climate perfor-
mance. There is little research on the importance of political corruption for climate commitment. Political corrup-
tion among political decision-makers and public sector corruption are not distinguished in previous studies. 
Table 4.7 Quantitative research on political corruption and climate performance 
Study Dependent  
variable/s 
Measurement of  
political corruption 
Effect 
Cole, 2007 CO2 emissions ICRG corruption 
measure, 
WGI corruption 
measure 
- 
 
- 
Holmberg et al., 
2009 
CO2 emissions CPI + 
Biswas et al., 
2012 
CO2 emissions per 
capita 
ICRG corruption 
measure 
WGI corruption 
measure 
Corruption 
strengthens the ne-
gative effect of the 
size of the shadow 
economy 
Fredriksson & 
Neumayer, 2016 
Stringency of cli-
mate policies 
(CLIMI) 
Historical experi-
ence with corruption 
control 
- 
Povitkina, 2018 CO2 emissions per 
capita 
V-Dem political 
corruption index 
- 
Notes: + positive effect, - negative effect on climate performance, CPI = Corruption Perception Index from Transparency 
International, WGI = World Governance Indicators. 
4.3.4 Conclusions 
The literature suggests that political corruption undermines climate commitment and performance, both directly 
and via economic development. The theoretical literature distinguishes between the corruption of political deci-
sion-makers and public sector corruption. The latter has no direct effect on the ratification of international agree-
ments. Previous empirical analyses have not differentiated between dimensions of political corruption. 
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The data provided by V-Dem and McMann et al. (2016) make it possible to distinguish between executive, legis-
lative, and public sector corruption. The negative effects of executive, legislative, and public sector corruption (see 
Table 4.8) apply especially to developing countries. Political corruption has more impact on climate performance 
than on commitment. The former is not only influenced by corruption among political decision-makers, but also 
by public sector corruption. 
Table 4.8  Political corruption and climate commitment and performance 
 
UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol 
Climate 
Performance 
Global analysis 
Developing  
countries 
Global analysis 
Developing 
countries 
Developed  
countries 
Developing  
countries 
Executive Corrup-
tion 
HCorr1.1.1 / HCorr1.2.1 - HCorr1.3.1 - 
HCorr1.1.2 / HCorr1.2.2 - HCorr1.3.2 - 
Legislative Corrup-
tion 
HCorr2.1.1 / HCorr2.2.1 - HCorr2.3.1 - 
HCorr2.1.2 / HCorr2.2.2 - HCorr2.3.2 - 
Public Sector Cor-
ruption 
    HCorr3.1 - 
    HCorr3.2 - 
Notes: + positive effect, / no effect, - negative effect on climate commitment/ performance, +/- direction unclear. 
There is likely to be no negative effect of political corruption on the ratification of soft climate treaties, such as the 
UNFCCC, which cost little to ratify. Corrupt governments and parliaments may ratify such treaties to enhance 
their international reputations. By contrast, the Kyoto Protocol has domestic consequences for developed countries 
(greenhouse gas emissions targets) as well as for developing countries (support of sustainable development and 
environmental protection by industrialised countries). 
4.4 Regime type and climate commitment and performance47 
The relationship between democracy and the global atmosphere has been addressed by both policymakers (Pether-
ick, 2014) and scientists. Al Gore (1992, p. 179) wrote that ‘the spread of democratic government to more nations 
of the world … [is] an essential prerequisite for saving the environment.’ Academic work on democracy and global 
warming refers to an older debate on the environmental consequences of regime type, which began in the 1970s. 
The democracy/climate change literature refers to theoretical approaches drawn from comparative politics, inter-
national relations, political philosophy, and economics. Publications within the democracy/global-warming liter-
ature define democracy and autocracy in different ways. This chapter begins by discussing the conceptualisation 
of democracy in analyses of climate commitment and performance (4.4.1); on this basis, it examines the theoretical 
and empirical literature (4.4.2 & 4.4.3). The final section (4.4.4) summarises these conclusions. The developed-
country sample used in this study consists of democracies (see Chapter 6). This section, therefore, formulates 
hypotheses related to the pooled analysis of the climate commitment of developed and developing countries, as 
well as the separate analysis of the climate performance of developing countries. 
4.4.1 Conceptualisation of regime type 
The term democracy comes from the Greek word demokratia, which consists of the words demos, i.e. people, and 
kratein, i.e. to rule (Held, 2006, p. 1). Accordingly, ‘[d]emocracy means a form of government in which […] the 
people rule’ (Held, 2006, p. 1). Scholars disagree about what constitutes democracy, apart from (competitive) 
elections (Coppedge et al., 2011, pp. 248, 258; Geissel et al., 2016, p. 574; Merkel, 2016, p. 444). The literature 
encompasses various normative models of democracy (e.g., Held, 2006; Merkel, 2004). Most scholars distinguish 
between democracy understandings, with regard to the number of democracy attributes (e.g., Geissel et al., 2016; 
Merkel, 2004). Merkel (2016, pp. 457ff.) identifies minimalistic, procedural, and maximalist models of democ-
racy. Minimalistic democracy concepts reduce democracy to competitive elections, i. e. participation and compe-
tition (‘electoral accountability’) (Merkel, 2016, p. 457). Maximalist democracy conceptions consider policy out-
puts and outcomes (e.g., economic equality), as additional attributes of democracy (Merkel, 2016, pp. 457f.). Mer-
kel (2016, p. 458f.) locates procedural understandings of democracy between minimalist and maximalist concep-
tions of democracy. They exclude policy outputs and outcomes but include additional institutional elements of 
democracy, alongside participation and competition. Finally, empirical democracy research discusses whether 
 
47 Parts of this chapter have been used in Escher & Walter-Rogg (2020, 2018). 
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democracy is a continuous or binary variable (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002, pp. 17f.; Elkins, 2000; Wahman et al., 
2013, p. 21).  
This section argues that the choice of a democracy concept depends on the research question and hypotheses (see 
also Collier & Adcock, 1999; Wahman et al., 2013, p. 21). Minimalistic models of democracy distinguish electoral 
democracies from autocracies and make it possible to examine the effect of regime-type difference on climate 
commitment and performance (Cheibub et al., 2010, p. 73). Accordingly, Bernauer and Koubi (2009), Pellegrini 
and Gerlagh (2006), and Wurster (2013) apply a minimalist democracy concept. With regard to the ratification of 
the soft UNFCC, democracies seem more likely to join international climate cooperation (see the following sec-
tion) (see also Coppedge et al., 2016, p. 584). To test this hypothesis, the present study applies a minimalist con-
ception of democracy (see also Cheibub et al., 2010, p. 73, Wurster, 2013, p. 82). Accordingly, it conceptualises 
regime type as dichotomous when analysing UNFCCC ratification (see also Hadenius & Teorell, 2007, p. 145; 
Wurster; 2013, p. 82). In the statistical analysis, a more demanding democracy conception is also used to consider 
arguments that a country’s experience with democracy is decisive.48 As the following section will show, the de-
mocracy/environment literature debates the influence of multiple democracy-quality dimensions, apart from com-
petitive elections, on climate commitment and performance. Minimalistic models of democracy do not allow a 
comprehensive evaluation of a country’s democracy quality. They are, therefore, less useful for conceptualising 
and measuring the quality of specific institutional traits of democracy.  
Multiple scholars who theorise the relationship between democracy and the environment have adopted, at least 
implicitly, a maximalist model of democracy. They emphasize economic development and market economy (e.g., 
Desai 1998a, p. 11; Midlarsky, 1998, p. 344; Neumayer, 2002a, p. 141; Payne, 1995, p. 48ff.), as well as interna-
tional cooperation (e.g. Midlarsky, 1998, p. 344; Payne, 1995, p. 46), in examining environmental commitment 
and performance. A procedural understanding of democracy, as opposed to a maximalist understanding of democ-
racy, enables us to analytically separate the effects of the quality of political democracy on climate commitment 
and performance from the effects of the association of democracy with international cooperation and economic 
development. The next chapter will address the joint effect of regime type and international political integration. 
Economic variables will be treated as controls in the empirical analysis. 
Procedural models of democracy consider different aspects of democracy, as well as competitive elections 
(Coppedge et al., 2016, p. 581; Coppedge et al., 2011, pp. 248, 258; Geissel et al., 2016, p. 574; Merkel, 2016, p. 
444). Scholars discuss whether electoral, liberal, deliberative, or participatory democracy is better for environmen-
tal protection. To systemise the literature, this study adopts the internal embeddedness dimension of Merkel’s 
(2016; 2004) embedded democracy concept, from a liberal democracy understanding. This study examines climate 
commitment and performance at the national level. Green political theorists, who favour deliberative and partici-
patory democracy, emphasize the importance of deliberation and the involvement of citizens at the local level. The 
embedded democracy concept assumes that the quality and stability of democracy depends on five interdependent 
democratic partial regimes: electoral and horizontal accountability, political and civil rights, the effective power 
to govern of democratically elected representatives (internal embeddedness), as well as their interdependence with 
several external conditions (external embeddedness) (Merkel, 2016, p. 460; Merkel, 2004, p. 36). Thus, it makes 
a comprehensive evaluation of democracy quality possible. Second, the distinction between internal and external 
embeddedness of democracy enables us to separate the theoretical work that links democracy or its quality to 
climate policy, via its association with international cooperation (e.g., Midlarsky, 1998, pp. 345f.; Payne, 1995, p. 
46) and economic development (e.g., Burnell, 2012; Midlarsky, 1998; Neumayer, 2002a; Payne, 1995), from ar-
guments that stress the procedural attributes of political democracy. Third, in comparison to democracy concepts 
that focus on political rights and civil liberties (e.g., Collier & Levitsky, 1997, p. 434; Freedom House, 2017, no 
page number), it identifies democracy-quality dimensions that are regarded as important in the democracy/envi-
ronment literature: electoral accountability, horizontal accountability, political liberties, and civil liberties 49 
(Escher & Walter-Rogg, 2018). Finally, it is still relatively parsimonious (e.g., Diamond & Morlino, 2005, p. Xii). 
In its analysis of democratic qualities – vertical and horizontal accountability, political and civil rights – and cli-
mate commitment and performance, this study regards democratic qualities as continuous concepts. 
4.4.2 Review of the theoretical literature 
Numerous publications within the democracy/environmental literature emphasize vertical accountability, i.e. the 
universal right to participate in free and fair elections of political authorities (Merkel, 2016, p. 261; Merkel, 2004, 
p. 42). First, scholars expect competitive elections to strengthen climate commitment and performance because 
 
48 The analysis of the importance of the policy preferences of veto players and veto points tests hypotheses developed during 
the analysis of established democracies; it therefore requires a more demanding democracy conception.  
49 I do not consider effective government to be a dimension of democracy quality. It is contested whether effective government 
is a trait of democracy (Geissel, et al., 2016, p. 575). Another study has shown that the effective power to govern has no effect 
on climate commitment and performance (Escher & Walter-Rogg, 2018). 
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the median voter prefers stricter environmental policies than do political and economic elites in autocracies (Con-
gleton, 2002, p. 258; Congleton, 1992, p. 417; Barrett & Graddy, 2000, p. 434; Bernauer & Koubi, 2009, p. 1356). 
Democratic governments are more responsive to the climate-policy preferences of median voters than their auto-
cratic counterparts, since they depend on re-election (Congleton, 1992, p. 413). In autocracies, political power lies 
in the hands of one or several rulers, who depend on the support of political and economic elites (Congleton, 1992, 
p. 413). As the autocratic ruling class controls a large part of the country’s national income, it is likely to oppose 
the adoption of stricter environmental regulations (Bernauer & Koubi, 2009, p. 1356; Congleton, 1992, pp. 416f., 
421). According to Barrett and Graddy (2000, p. 434), the higher the level of economic development (GDP per 
capita), the more citizens presumably strive for non-material goods, such as environmental quality.  
Second, public goods theory suggests a positive relationship between electoral accountability and environmental 
protection (e.g., Bernauer & Koubi, 2009; Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003). Bueno De Mesquita et al. (2003, pp. 
8f., 10, 29, 51) assume that political decision-makers allocate tax revenues in the form of public and/or private 
goods to realise their policy preferences and stay in power. In contrast to private goods the number of persons that 
benefit from public goods such as climate protection cannot be limited (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003, pp. 30f., 
58). The cost of public-goods provision falls, relative to the price of private goods, with the size of the selectorate, 
i.e. those who choose political leaders and the part of the selectorate that keeps political leaders in power (the 
winning coalition) (Cao & Ward, 2015, p. 265; Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003, pp. 41f., 51). Size and membership 
of the selectorate and winning coalition vary across political systems (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003, pp. 42, 49). 
Free and fair elections imply that all adult citizens belong to the selectorate (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003, p. 
49). As democracies have larger winning coalitions and selectorates than autocracies, democratic governments 
must provide more environmental public goods than private goods to stay in power (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 
2003, p. 104; see also Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2006, p. 334; Ward, 2008, p. 387; Wurster, 2013, p. 80). 50 In autoc-
racies, political and economic elites have little interest in bearing the cost of environmental protection, while the 
whole population profits from it (Bernauer & Koubi, 2009, p. 1356). 
Third, citizens in countries with competitive elections are more likely to consider environmental regulations than 
their autocratic counterparts, where government legitimacy depends on economic and social performance (Burnell, 
2012, p. 823; Burnell, 2009, p. 6; Wurster, 2013, p. 79). Fourth, autocratic governments are assumed to have a 
short time horizon; they are probably less willing to accept risks, given that their rule is more uncertain (Congleton, 
1992, pp. 417, 421). Hence, democracies are more likely to adopt long-term climate-protection policies (Congle-
ton, 1992, p. 417). In addition, ecological sustainability is thought to depend on a stable political environment 
(Wurster, 2013, p. 79). Autocracies are considered less stable than democracies (Padró I Miquel, 2007, p. 1271; 
Wurster, 2007, p. 79). Electoral accountability also contributes to learning and the correction of errors (Wurster, 
2013, p. 79). Payne (1995, p. 44) argues that elections enable green parties to gain political influence and to im-
plement environmental policies. Finally, scholars have claimed that the positive effect of elections depends on 
competition (e.g., Fredriksson et al., 2005, p. 350; List & Sturm, 2006, p. 1259; Wilson & , 2005; Wurster, 2013, 
p. 79). Governments only consider citizens’ climate-policy preferences when they are relevant to their re-election. 
It is questionable whether competitive elections contribute to climate commitment and performance. Apart from 
the hypothesis that competitive elections enable green parties to gain political influence, most theoretical argu-
ments assume that citizens are environmentally friendly (Spilker, 2013, p. 78; Ward, 2008, p. 389). Survivalist 
theorists regard most citizens as lacking the knowledge to understand the importance of sustainable environmental 
policies (e.g., Ophuls, 1977, pp. 159f.). Inhabitants of low-income countries may prioritize economic development 
(Barrett & Graddy, 2000, p. 434; Neumayer, 2002a, p. 150; Spilker, 2013, 12f.). Burnell (2009, p. 5) notes that 
many citizens of high-income countries don’t act in environmentally friendly ways (N-shaped relationship between 
economic development and pollution). Empirical research has found that climate concern varies among countries 
(e.g., Kim & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014). Lim and Duit (2018, p. 221) have argued that relatively few voters con-
sider environmental performance in their individual votes. According to Midlarsky (2001, p. 159), writing about 
resource scarcity, democratic governments may prefer to address economic problems, rather than environmental 
pollution. Thus, democratically elected governments prefer to promote economic growth, tax revenues, and em-
ployment over environmental protection (Duit, 2014, p. 2). The salience of the climate issue is expected to increase 
as the climate problem grows more urgent (Hofrichter & Reif 1990, p. 120; Lim & Duit, 2018, p. 224; Rohrschnei-
der, 1988).  
The assumption that democracies provide more climate protection – because it is a public good and everyone 
profits – is also problematic. Public-good policies are always a mix of private and public-good allocation. Accord-
ing to Lafferty and Meadowcroft (1997, p. 5), ‘in reality environmental problems touch different groups in differ-
ent ways’ (see also Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003, p. 30).  
Finally, characteristics of the climate change problem question the positive effects of vertical accountability. Dem-
ocratic governments are accountable to citizens within the nation-state and may, therefore, be no more willing than 
 
50 A similar argument has been made by Lake and Baum (2001). 
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autocracies to deal with global environmental pollution (Fredriksson & Neumayer, 2013, p. 12; Held & Hervey, 
2011, p. 90; Lafferty & Meadowcroft, 1997, p. 5; Midlarsky, 2001, p. 160; Midlarsky, 1998, p. 345; Paehlke, 1997, 
p. 28). The diffuse character of climate change makes emissions irrelevant to most citizens’ election decisions. 
Democratically elected decision-makers may have a short-time horizon (Bernauer & Koubi, 2009, p. 1357; Un-
derdal, 2010). Global warming mainly affects future generations and climate policies will only impact emissions 
in the long term; their effectiveness depends on the actions of other countries (Cao & Ward, 2015, p. 271; Wurster, 
2013, p. 90). Autocracies may therefore find it easier to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (see also Bernauer & 
Koubi, 2009, p. 1357). The solution of the climate change problem is associated with considerable socio-economic 
opportunity costs and necessitates considerable changes in citizens’ daily lives, and in the way economy works 
(Holden, 2002, p. 10). Democratic governments face citizens who are unwilling to accept the socio-economic costs 
of protecting the climate (Holden, 2002, p. 10) and who therefore prioritize economic development (Shearman & 
Wayne, 2007, pp. xivf., 83). Thus, democratically elected decision-makers may avoid supporting climate cooper-
ation or implementing climate policies. Instead, they prioritize economic development and produce greenhouse 
gases, in order to be re-elected, despite the long-term consequences for the common-pool resource (Shearman & 
Wayne, 2007, pp. xivf., p. 83). Non-elected governments are not necessarily more willing to participate in inter-
national efforts to mitigate climate change. Their legitimacy also rests on socio-economic performance. Overall, 
an effect of vertical accountability on climate commitment and performance cannot be expected. Government 
behaviour depends on whether supporters or opponents of climate protection are elected. 
Democratic decision-makers are not simply accountable to their citizens via periodic competitive elections, their 
autonomy is also limited by checks and balances. The theoretical discussion on horizontal accountability and 
climate commitment and performance overlaps with academic work on institutional constraints and the global 
atmosphere (see Section 4.2). Horizontal accountability, i.e. the separation of powers and interdependence between 
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government (Merkel, 2016, p. 462; Merkel, 2004, pp. 40f.; 
O’Donnell, 1994, p. 61) may make the government more responsive to climate protection demands; alternative 
policy choices are more likely to be discussed, while the public is informed about environmental policies and their 
implementation (Burnell, 2012, p. 823). At the same time, a single veto player opposed to climate protection can 
hinder the ratification of climate treaties and the adoption of policies to mitigate global warming. The environ-
mentalist authoritarian literature maintains that fast action is needed to mitigate climate change; this is hindered 
by the democratic decision-making process (Gilley, 2012, p. 289; Fliegauf & Sanga, 2010, no page number). 
Democratic governments must reach agreement with veto players ‘who see measures to mitigate global warming 
as detrimental to their short-term economic and/or political interests’ (Fliegauf & Sanga, 2010, p. 2; see also 
Wurster, 2013, p. 79). In the case of a crisis such as climate change, autocratic governments find it easier to reach 
and implement political decisions (Beeson, 2010, p. 289; Fliegauf & Sanga, 2010, p. 1). Consequently, horizontal 
accountability may hinder climate-protection efforts. Overall, a uniform effect of checks and balances on climate 
commitment and performance cannot be expected. 
The democracy/environmental literature also emphasises political rights, i.e. freedoms of expression, association, 
and the media, as well as the autonomy of civil society (Merkel, 2004, p. 39). These institutional traits enable 
citizens to inform themselves about pollution (Barrett & Graddy, 2000, p. 434; Bernauer et al., 2013; p. 93f.; 
Payne, 1995, p. 43), to express their environmental policy preferences (Bernauer et al., 2013, p. 93), to form EN-
GOs, to mobilise public support (Fredriksson & Neumayer, 2013, p. 12; Gleditsch & Sverdrup, 2002, p. 48), and 
to influence the government’s decisions (Burnell, 2009, p. 6; Payne, 1995, p. 43). An independent civil society 
makes it more likely that citizens will express their policy preferences (Böhmelt et al., 2016, p. 1277). Free media 
enable citizens, journalists, and scientists to monitor government policy (Payne, 1995, p. 45) and support techno-
logical innovation and the spread of scientific knowledge (Gleditsch & Sverdrup, 2002, p. 47). Political rights can 
also impede climate change mitigation efforts. According to Olson (1982), democracy supports the influence of 
powerful special-interest groups around narrow interests; this can block environmental policy reforms (e.g., Ber-
nauer & Koubi, 2009, p. 1357; Held & Hervey, 2011, p. 90; Midlarsky, 1998, p. 544; Never & Betz, 2014, p. 12; 
Payne, 1995, p. 43; Shearman & Wayne 2007, pp. 89, 91). Competition among interest groups can also affect the 
implementation of environmental regulations (Midlarsky, 1998, p. 344). It is important to acknowledge that EN-
GOs may mobilise support mainly to solve local and regional environmental problems. To conclude, political 
rights do not automatically lead to climate commitment and performance. However, they are the condition that 
ensures that diffuse interests, such as climate protection, are at least considered in the political decision-making 
process. 
In the 1970s, green political theorists argued that civil rights, i.e. constitutional rights protecting the individual 
against the state (including the rule of law, protection of life and freedom, private property) (Merkel, 2016, p. 272; 
Merkel, 2004, pp. 39f.) helped individuals follow their own self-interest, versus the common interest of environ-
mental protection (Hardin, 1968; Heilbroner, 1974; Ophuls, 1994; Ophuls, 1992; Ophuls, 1977, pp. 145ff.; Ophuls 
& Boyan, 1992). Citizens would not accept reductions in their standard of living (e.g., Heilbroner, 1974, p. 115, 
137f.; Ophuls, 1977, pp. 152, 163). From this perspective, the environmental crisis can be regarded as a ‘tragedy 
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of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968, see also Doherty & Geus, 1996, p. 1), which can only be solved by reducing 
individual liberty (Heilbroner, 1974, pp. 137f.). Only autocracies are able to enforce the necessary restrictions on 
the individual use of scarce environmental resources (Ophuls, 1977, pp. 152, 163). Thus, civil rights undermine 
climate-protection efforts. This argument depends on the climate-policy preferences of citizens (see the discussion 
of vertical accountability and climate commitment and performance). In addition, the effectiveness of repression, 
when used to enforce environmental policies, is limited (Stehr, 2015, p. 450; Wurster, 2013, p. 80). Civil rights 
also enable citizens to demand the implementation of climate policies through the courts. For instance, in Germany, 
the ENGO Deutsche Umwelthilfe aims to contribute, through the courts, to the implementation of European emis-
sions standards. Spilker (2013, pp. 55, 59) has argued that this democratic trait ensures that local communities can 
use the courts to pressure firms to consider environmental regulations. According to these arguments, civil rights 
contribute to efforts to mitigate global warming. The first argument depends on previous government climate 
change mitigation efforts. With regard to the second argument, the behaviour of firms is also determined by eco-
nomic competitiveness. Democracies may support environmental protection more often than autocracies because 
they respect human rights and the lives of their citizens (Burnell, 2012, p. 823; Payne, 1995, p. 43). Berge (1994) 
describes both democracy and human rights as necessary conditions of sustainable resource use. This mechanism 
depends on a country’s vulnerability to climate change, a factor that varies among countries and has long-term 
effects on human health (Neumayer, 2002a, p. 141). Consequently, no clear effect of civil rights on climate per-
formance can be assumed. Finally, countries that accept the rule of law at the domestic level may also be more 
likely to enter into and implement international climate treaties (Brown Weiss & Jakobson, 1999, p. 39; Povitkina, 
2018, p. 413). Thus, civil rights may contribute to the ratification of climate treaties.  
In sum, the literature review suggests no uniform effect of democracy-quality dimensions on climate commitment 
and performance. Among democratic qualities, civil rights may contribute to climate commitment and political 
rights may contribute to climate commitment and performance. It is important to consider treaty design when 
analysing regime type and climate commitment. There should be a systemic difference between democracies and 
autocracies, with regard to the ratification of the soft climate treaty (UNFCCC). The International Relations liter-
ature assumes that democracies are, in general, more cooperative at the international level than their autocratic 
counterparts (e.g. democratic peace theory). At the same time, autocracies may ratify the UNFCCC to enhance 
their international reputations. It is an empirical question whether democracies or autocracies are more likely to 
ratify the UNFCCC. However, regime type cannot explain Kyoto Protocol ratification. It is easier for governments 
to join the UNFCCC to boost their international reputations because it does not necessarily have domestic conse-
quences. By contrast, the Kyoto Protocol encompasses binding greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals for de-
veloped countries and may require clean development mechanisms and environmental protection efforts in devel-
oping countries. 
Finally, civil and political rights are likely to affect climate commitment and performance only in the long term. 
Only then will democratic freedom rights lead to an informed and critical society and the formation of ENGOs 
(Fredriksson & Neumayer, 2013, p. 12; Gallagher & Thacker, 2008, pp. 8f.). It takes time for governments to 
develop foreign environmental policies and deal with long-term policy goals, such as climate protection (Fredrik-
kson & Neumayer, 2013, p. 12; Gallagher & Thacker, 2008, pp. 8f.). Kneuer (2012, p. 869) assumes that ‘inter-
mediate regimes’ could be restricted in their climate policies by institutional instability and ‘governance capabili-
ties’. Industry may also invest in environmentally friendly technology in a stable environment (Fredriksson & 
Neumayer, 2013, p. 12).  
4.4.3 Empirical research 
In response to global environmental change, scholars have increasingly focused on the effect of regime type on 
climate commitment and performance. This literature employs statistical analysis methods. Most studies examine 
whether democracies are more climate-friendly than autocracies. While some studies have applied democracy 
measures based on a minimalist democracy concept (e.g., Wurster, 2013), most rely on measures that are based on 
broader democracy understandings (e.g., the polity2 index from Polity IV, Political Rights and Civil Rights from 
Freedom House). In the statistical analysis, a continuous or dichotomous variable is applied (see Tables 4.9 & 
4.10). The choice of democracy measure or measurement level is often not explained. Although several studies 
have analysed the robustness of their results using multiple democracy measures (e.g., Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; 
Neumayer, 2002a; Ruoff, 2009; Spilker, 2013, 2012), most do not discuss their validity and reliability.51 In com-
parison to the theoretical literature (e.g., Burnell, 2012; Held & Hervey, 2011), few studies have analysed the 
effects of specific democratic qualities on climate commitment and performance (e.g., Escher & Walter-Rogg, 
2018; Fredriksson & Neumayer, 2013; Wurster, 2013) (see also Böhmelt et al., 2016, p. 1273). Neumayer (2002a) 
and Midlarsky (2001) acknowledge the different theoretical mechanisms and take this issue into consideration, in 
 
51 Gallagher and Thacker (2008, p. 11) as well as Ward (2008, p. 390) only refer to high correlations among the Freedom House 
and Polity IV measures. 
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their empirical analyses, by using multiple measures of democracy. However, they apply measures that summarise 
multiple democracy-quality dimensions.  
Climate commitment 
Climate-commitment studies (see Table 4.9) mostly examine the ratification or ratification delay of international 
climate agreements as a dependent variable, using statistical analysis methods (see Chapter 2). Quantitative re-
search supports the theoretical expectation that democracies are more committed to climate agreements and ratify 
international climate agreements faster (e.g. Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; Böhmelt et al. 2016; Dolšak 2009; Fredrik-
sson & Gaston, 2000; Fredriksson & Ujhelyi, 2006; Fredriksson et al., 2007; Gallagher & Thacker, 2008; Li & 
Reuveny, 2006; Neumayer, 2002a, 2002b; von Stein, 2008; Tubi et al., 2012; Zahran et al., 2007). Most statistical 
analyses pool developed and developing countries. Neumayer (2002a, p. 157) has found that his results remain the 
same when he excludes developed countries. By contrast, Von Stein (2008) has found that democracy is only 
significantly associated with commitment to international climate cooperation in Non-Annex I countries. Kneuer 
(2012) has observed no difference between democracies in consolidation and established democracies, in relation 
to national and international climate commitment. However, intermediate regimes show a higher level of interna-
tional commitment than national commitment (Kneuer, 2012, p. 873).  
The theoretical discussion above suggests that democracy-quality dimensions do not have a uniform impact on 
climate commitment. Few studies have explored the effect of specific institutional traits of democracy on climate 
commitment. Such studies are needed to determine whether particular aspects of democracy contribute to climate 
commitment or whether democracies in general are more likely to ratify international climate agreements. Escher 
and Walter-Rogg (2018) conclude that, among the characteristics of democracy, only political rights contribute to 
climate commitment. 
Climate performance 
The empirical literature is ambiguous with regard to the relationship between regime type and climate performance 
(see Table 4.10). Most statistical studies focus on the combined variation of between- and within-variation, using 
pooled OLS analyses. Clulow (2018) finds differences in the effect of democracy quality on within- and between-
variation. Institutional variables are in general relative constant over time. Thus, it is unlikely that short-term 
changes in various CO2 emissions can be traced back to democracy or to institutional aspects of democracy. On 
the one hand, studies have argued that democracies are associated with implementing climate policies (Dolšak, 
2009, p. 561) and have lower CO2 emissions than autocracies (e.g., Farzin & Bond, 2006, Gleditsch & Sverdrup, 
2002; Li & Reuveny, 2006). Other studies have either observed no difference in the climate policy outcomes of 
democracies and autocracies (e.g., Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; Böhmelt et al., 2016; Frankel & Rose, 2005; Ruoff, 
2009; Spilker, 2013, 2012; Wurster, 2013) or have found that autocracies perform better (e.g., Midlarsky, 2001, 
1998; Tubi et al., 2012). The results are also ambiguous when developed and developing countries are analysed 
separately.  
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Table 4.9 Quantitative research on democracy and climate commitment 
Study Dependent  
variable 
Measurement of democracy Effect 
Fredriksson & 
Gaston, 2000 
Ratification delay FH Civil liberties  + 
Neumayer, 2002a KP ratification  Combined index of FH Civil lib-
erties and FH Political rights 
+ 
Neumayer, 2002b KP signature Multiple dichotomous democ-
racy indicators based on: the 
combined index of FH Civil Lib-
erties and FH Political rights, 
Polity2 from Polity IV, 
Vanhanen’s Index of Democrati-
zation, Voice and Accountability 
from the World Bank 
+ 
Fredriksson & 
Ujhelyi, 2006 
KP ratification & 
KP ratification de-
lay 
FH status index based on FH 
Civil liberties and FH Political 
rights (free, partly free, not free) 
+ 
Fredriksson, 2007 KP ratification 
delay 
FH status index based on FH 
Civil liberties and FH Political 
rights (free, partly free, not free) 
+ 
Zahran et al., 2008 KP ratification & 
KP ratification de-
lay 
Combined index based on FH 
Civil liberties and FH Political 
rights, polity2 from Polity IV 
+ 
Von Stein, 2008 UNFCCC & KP 
ratification delay 
Polity2 from Polity IV + 
Bättig & Bernauer, 
2009 
Climate coopera-
tion commitment 
index (Bättig & 
Bernauer, 2009) 
FH Political rights + 
Dolšak, 2009 Summary measure 
of climate policy 
outputs  
FH Civil liberties + 
Notes: + positive effect, / no effect on climate commitment, KP = Kyoto Protocol, FH = Freedom House, BTI = Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index, V-Dem = Varieties of Democracy. 
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Table 4.9 Quantitative research on democracy and climate commitment (continuation) 
Study Dependent 
variable 
Measurement of democracy Effect 
Kneuer, 
2012 
National climate pol-
icy component and  
international climate 
policy component of 
the Germanwatch Cli-
mate Change Perfor-
mance Index  
Dichotomous indicators on de-
mocracies, defective democracy, 
highly defective democracy, 
moderate autocracy based on 
data from the BTI 
/ 
Tubi et 
al., 2012 
Climate cooperation 
commitment (Bättig 
& Bernauer, 2009); 
Climate Laws, Institu-
tions and Measures 
Index, International 
component of the 
Germanwatch Climate 
Change Performance 
Index 
FH Political rights, polity2 from 
Polity IV 
+ 
Yamagata 
et al., 
2013 
UNFCCC and KP rat-
ification delay 
FH Political rights + 
Bernauer 
& Böh-
melt, 2013 
Climate cooperation 
commitment (Bättig 
& Bernauer, 2009) 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
Index of Democracy 
Not reported 
Böhmelt 
et al., 
2016 
Climate cooperation 
commitment (Bättig 
& Bernauer, 2009) 
Parcomp from Polity IV (com-
petitiveness of inclusion), Inclu-
siveness-Index from Coppedge 
et al. (2008) based on multiple 
democracy measures  
+ 
Escher & 
Walter-
Rogg, 
2018 
Climate cooperation 
commitment (Bättig 
& Bernauer, 2009) 
V-Dem measures on vertical ac-
countability, horizontal account-
ability, political rights and civil 
rights 
+ (only politi-
cal rights) 
Notes: + positive effect, / no effect on climate commitment, KP = Kyoto Protocol, FH = Freedom House, BTI = Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index, V-Dem = Varieties of Democracy. 
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The findings either suggest that there is no effect of democracy quality in rich and poor countries (e.g., Bättig & 
Bernauer, 2009; Spilker, 2013, 2012) or that democracy quality alone is associated with lower CO2 emissions in 
developing countries (e.g., Biswas et al., 2012; Fuchs et al., 2009). Dolšak (2009, p. 561) finds, in her analysis of 
climate-policy implementation, no difference between the pooled and separate analyses of developing countries. 
There are also various findings with regard to the level of democratisation, experience with democracy, and climate 
policy outcomes. According to Fredriksson and Neumayer (2016, 2013), it is not the current level of democracy 
but democracy capital that is associated with stricter climate change mitigation policies. Gallagher and Thacker 
(2008) have found that democracy capital only reduces CO2 emissions in developing countries. Finally, Kneuer 
(2012) has shown that, while capitalist autocracies have considerable deficits, intermediate regimes perform well 
in climate change mitigation.  
Christoff and Eckersely (2011, p. 439) conclude that a simple distinction between democracy and autocracy cannot 
explain cross-national variation in climate performance (see also Wurster, 2013, p. 89). Despite high democracy 
levels, there are considerable differences in climate performance among developed countries (Christoff & Eck-
ersley, 2011, p. 439; Povitkina, 2018, p. 411). It is important to explain this variation among democracies. Some 
research has investigated the separate effect of democratic qualities. Empirical research has found no clear support 
for the argument that institutional constraints contribute to or undermine in climate protection (e.g., Fredriksson 
& Neumayer, 2013; Garmann, 2014; Wurster, 2013). Fredriksson and Neumayer (2013, p. 18) have found no 
support for the theory that competitive elections explain cross-national variation in climate-policy stringency. In 
Böhmelt et al. (2016), democratic inclusiveness contributes to climate commitment but is not statistically associ-
ated with climate policy outcomes. Accordingly, Escher and Walter-Rogg (2018) find no effect of vertical and 
horizontal accountability – or political and civil rights – on CO2 emissions.  
Table 4.10  Quantitative research on democracy and climate performance 
Study Dependent  
variable/s 
Measurement of  
regime type 
Effect 
Midlarsky, 
1998 
CO2 emissions FH Political rights, Index of 
liberal democracy from Bollen 
(1993), polity from Polity III 
- 
Midlarsky, 
2001 
CO2 emissions FH Political rights, polity from 
Polity III, index of liberal de-
mocracy from Bollen (1993) 
- 
Gleditsch & 
Sverdrup, 
2002 
CO2 emissions Dichotomous democracy indi-
cator based on polity from Pol-
ity III Index 
+ 
Frankel & 
Rose, 2005 
CO2 emissions Polity2 from Polity IV Not reported 
Farzin & 
Bond, 2006 
CO2 emissions Polity2 from Polity IV + 
Li & Reu-
veny, 2006 
CO2 emissions Polity2 from Polity IV and di-
chotomous democracy and au-
tocracy variables based on pol-
ity2 
+ 
Gallagher & 
Thacker, 2008 
CO2 emissions Sum of polity2 from Polity IV 
since 1900 with an annual de-
preciation rate of one percent 
+ 
Bättig & Ber-
nauer, 2009 
CO2 emissions  
CO2 emission 
changes 
FH Political rights / 
Dolšak, 2009 Summary measure 
of climate policy 
outputs  
FH Civil liberties + 
Fuchs et al., 
2009 
CO2 emissions  
CO2 emission 
changes 
Polity2 from Polity IV - 
Ruoff, 2009 CO2 emissions Polity2 from Polity IV / 
Biswas et al., 
2012 
CO2 emissions Polity2 from Polity IV / 
Notes: + positive effect, / no effect, - negative effect on climate performance, KP = Kyoto Protocol, FH = Freedom House, 
BTI = Bertelsmann Transformation Index, V-Dem = Varieties of Democracy.  
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Table 4.10  Quantitative research on democracy and climate performance (continuation) 
Study Dependent 
variable/s 
Measurement of 
regime type 
Effect 
Kneuer, 2012 Germanwatch Cli-
mate Performance 
Index  
BTI democracy classification: 
established, democracies, de-
mocracies, defective democ-
racy, highly defective democ-
racy, moderate autocracy 
Intermediate 
regimes per-
form well. 
Spilker, 2012 CO2 emissions Polity2 from Polity IV / 
Tubi et al., 
2012 
Climate Laws, In-
stitutions and 
Measures, Index, 
National compo-
nent of the Cli-
mate Change Per-
formance Index of 
Germanwatch, av-
erage growth rate 
of CO2 emissions 
from 1990-2004 
FH Political rights, polity2 
from Polity IV 
- 
Bernauer & 
Böhmelt, 
2013 
CO2 emissions Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
Index of Democracy 
Not reported 
Fredriksson & 
Neumayer, 
2013 
Climate Laws, In-
stitutions and 
Measures, Index 
Polity2 from Polity IV 
Sum of democratic years since 
1900/1950 based on polity2 
with an annual depreciation rate 
/ 
+ 
Spilker, 2013 CO2 emissions Polity2 from Polity IV / 
Wurster, 2013 CO2 emissions Dichotomous regime type indi-
cator from Cheibub et al. 
(2010) 
/ 
Böhmelt et al., 
2016 
CO2 emissions Parcomp from Polity IV (com-
petitiveness of inclusion), In-
clusiveness-Index from 
Coppedge et al. (2008) based 
on multiple democracy mea-
sures  
/ 
Notes: + positive effect, / no effect, - negative effect on climate performance, KP = Kyoto Protocol, FH = Freedom House, 
BTI = Bertelsmann Transformation Index, V-Dem = Varieties of Democracy. 
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Table 4.10  Quantitative research on democracy and climate performance (continuation) 
Study Dependent 
variable/s 
Measurement of 
regime type 
Effect 
Fredriksson & 
Neumayer, 2016 
Climate Laws, In-
stitutions and 
Measures, Index 
Polity2 from Polity IV  
Sum of democratic years 
since 1900/1950 based 
on the polity2 with an 
annual depreciation rate 
/ 
+ 
Clulow, 2018 CO2 emissions Polity2 from Polity IV, 
Freedom House, V-Dem  
+ 
Povitkina, 2018 CO2 emissions V-Dem Liberal Democ-
racy Index 
+ in countries 
with low cor-
ruption levels 
Escher & Walter-
Rogg, 2018 
CO2 emissions per 
capita 
V-Dem measures on 
vertical accountability, 
horizontal accountabil-
ity, political rights and 
civil rights 
/ 
Notes: + positive effect, / no effect, - negative effect on climate performance, KP = Kyoto Protocol, FH = Freedom House, 
BTI = Bertelsmann Transformation Index, V-Dem = Varieties of Democracy. 
Some studies have found that the effect of democracy on climate performance depends on other variables. Clulow 
(2018) has shown that democratisation reduces CO2 emissions in majoritarian electoral systems and increases them 
in PR systems. Povitkina (2018) has found that democracy is only associated with lower CO2 emissions in coun-
tries with low levels of corruption. As noted in Chapter 3, Ruoff (2009) concludes that democracy strengthens the 
positive effect of membership in IGOs on CO2 emissions. Chapter 5 discusses possible moderation effects of 
regime type and democracy-quality dimensions on the effect of globalisation on climate commitment and perfor-
mance. 
4.4.4 Conclusions 
Based on the literature review, this section formulates hypotheses for the empirical analysis (see Table 4.11). As 
the developed-country sample consists entirely of democracies, this section formulates hypotheses for the pooled 
analysis of the climate commitment of developed and developing countries and the separate analysis of the climate 
performance of developing countries (see Chapter 6). The regime type is expected to matter to UNFCCC ratifica-
tion. Empirical research suggests that democracies are more likely to join soft climate agreements. From a theo-
retical perspective, it is also possible that autocracies will choose to ratify international climate agreements, such 
as the UNFCCC. The review of the theoretical discussion suggests that there is no uniform effect of democratic 
qualities on Kyoto Protocol ratification or climate performance. 
Table 4.11  Regime type and climate commitment and performance  
 
UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol 
Climate 
Performance 
Pooled analysis 
Developing 
countries 
Pooled analysis 
Developing 
countries 
 
Developing  
countries 
Democracy 
(Regime type) 
HDem1.1.1 / HDem1.2.1 /   
HDem1.1.2 + HDem1.2.2 / HDem1.3.1 / 
Vertical  
accountability 
HDem2.1.1 / HDem2.2.1 /   
HDem2.1.2 / HDem2.2.2 / HDem2.3.1 / 
Horizontal  
accountability 
HDem3.1.1 / HDem3.2.1 /   
HDem3.1.2 / HDem3.2.2 / HDem3.3.1 / 
Political rights 
HDem4.1.1 / HDem4.2.1 +   
HDem4.1.2 / HDem4.2.2 + HDem4.3.1 / 
Civil rights 
HDem5.1.1 / HDem5.2.1 /   
HDem5.1.2 / HDem5.2.2 / HDem5.3.1 / 
Notes: + positive effect, / no effect, - negative effect on climate commitment/ performance, +/- direction unclear.  
Among the dimensions of democracy quality, political rights may help to explain the ratification of Kyoto Protocol. 
These rights enable citizens and interest groups to pressure the government into considering climate protection. 
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The regime type or specific democracy-quality dimensions may not explain country differences in climate perfor-
mance. Previous empirical research has shown no relationship between democratic qualities and climate perfor-
mance. In fact, ‘some of the world’s leading democracies have also been laggards in climate mitigation’ (Clulow, 
2018, p. 2) (e.g., Australia, Canada, and the United States). In accordance with the conclusions of Chapter 2, and 
in contrast to the ratification of climate treaties, the reduction of global air pollution is associated with considerable 
socio-economic costs. It is more difficult for the public to control climate policy outcomes than climate policy 
outputs (Cao & Prakash, 2012, p. 67; Neumayer, 2002b, p. 145).  
4.5 Conclusions  
This chapter has examined the literature on veto players, political corruption, and regime type, in relation to climate 
commitment and performance. The conclusions serve as basis for an analysis of the joint effect of domestic polit-
ical institutions and globalisation in the following chapter. Based on existing research, it is important to study the 
effects of veto players, political corruption, and regime type on the ratification and implementation of climate 
treaties at a disaggregated level. The veto-player approach identifies ideological distance among veto players and 
veto points as factors that explain climate commitment and performance. While ideological heterogeneity among 
veto players and government ideology in the left/right dimension cannot be assumed to affect climate commitment 
or performance, the effects of specific veto points constitute an empirical question. The literature on political 
corruption and the environment indicates that political corruption among political decision-makers and public-
sector officials undermines climate commitment and performance. The relative importance of both forms of cor-
ruption is unclear. While we can assume that democracies and autocracies differ systemically in their ratification 
of the UNFCCC, no systemic difference between democracies and autocracies in Kyoto Protocol ratification and 
climate performance can be assumed. However, political rights may contribute to the ratification of hard climate 
treaties, such as the Kyoto Protocol. In the following chapter, I will argue that the disaggregated analysis of veto 
players, political corruption, and regime type improves our understanding of the interaction effects of globalisation 
and these domestic political institutional factors on climate commitment and performance. 
References 
Bättig, Michèle B., and Thomas Bernauer. 2009. National institutions and global public goods: Are democracies more coope-
rative in climate change policy? International Organization 63(2):281-308. 
Bang, Guri, Hovi, Jon, and Detlef F. Sprinz. 2012. US presidents and the failure to ratify multilateral environmental agreements. 
Climate Policy 12(6):755–763. 
Barrett, Scott, and Kathryn Graddy. 2000. Freedom, growth, and the environment. Environment and Development Economics 
5:433–456. 
Beer, Samuel. 1998. Liberalism rediscovered: the roots of new Labour. The Economist (7 Feb 1998) 
Beeson, Mark. 2010. The coming of environmental authoritarianism. Environmental Politics 19(2):276–294. 
Beeson, Mark. 2016. Environmental authoritarianism and China. In The Oxford handbook of environmental political theory, 
eds. Teena Gabrielson, Cheryl Hall, John M. Meyer, and David Schlosberg, 520–532: Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Beeson, Mark. 2018. Coming to terms with the authoritarian alternative: The implications and motivations of China's environ-
mental policies. Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies 5(1):34–46. 
Berge, Erling. 1994. Democracy and human rights: Conditions for sustainable resource utilization. In Who pays the price? The 
sociocultural context of environmental crisis, ed. Barbara Rose Johnston, 187–193. Washington, D.C. & Covelo (CA): 
Island Press. 
Bernauer, Thomas, and Tobias Böhmelt. 2013. Are economically "kinder, gentler societies" also greener? Environmental Sci-
ence & Technology 47(21):11993–12001. 
Bernauer, Thomas, Tobias Böhmelt, and Vally Koubi. 2013. Is there a democracy-civil society paradox in global governance? 
Global Environmental Politics 13(1):88–107. 
Bernauer, Thomas, and Vally Koubi. 2009. Effects of political institutions on air quality. Ecological Economics 68(5):1355–
1365. 
Birchfield, Vicki, and Markus M.L. Crepaz. 1998. The impact of constitutional structures and collective and competitive veto 
points on income inequality in industrialized democracies. European Journal of Political Research 34:175–200. 
Biswas, Amit K., Mohammad Reza Farzanegan, and Marcel Thum. 2012. Pollution, shadow economy and corruption: Theory 
and evidence. Ecological Economics 75:114–125.  
Böhmelt, Tobias, Thomas Bernauer, and Vally Koubi. 2015. The marginal impact of ENGOs in different types of democratic 
systems. European Political Science Review 7(1):93–118. 
Böhmelt, Tobias, Marit Böker, and Hugh Ward. 2016. Democratic inclusiveness, climate policy outputs, and climate policy 
outcomes. Democratization 23(7):1272–1291.  
Bollen, Kenneth. 1993. Liberal democracy: Validity and method factors in cross-national measures. American Journal of Po-
litical Science 37(4):1207–1230. 
Brown Weiss, Edith, and Harold K. Jacobson. 1999. Getting countries to comply with internationl agreements. Environment: 
Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 41(6):16–20. 
Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. 2003. The logic of political survival. 
Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press. 
94 
 
 
Burnell, Peter. 2009. Is democratisation bad for global warming? Coventry: The University of Warwick. Department of Politics 
and International Studies (CSGR Working Paper 257/09). 
Burnell, Peter. 2012. Democracy, democratization and climate change: complex relationships. Democratization 19(5):813–
842. 
Cao, Xun, and Aseem Prakash. 2012. Trade competition and environmental regulations: Domestic political constraints and 
issue visibility. The Journal of Politics 74(1):66–82. 
Cao, Xun, and Hugh Ward. 2015. Winning coalition size, state capacity, and time horizons: An application of modified selec-
torate theory to environmental public goods provision. International Studies Quarterly 59(2):264–279. 
Carter, Neil. 2013. Greening the mainstream: party politics and the environment. Environmental Politics 22(1):73–94. 
Carter, Neil, and Michael Jacobs. 2014. Explaining radical policy change: The case of climate change and energy policy under 
the British Labour government 2006-10. Public Administration 92(1):125–141. 
Chang, Shu-Chen. 2015. The effects of trade liberalization on environmental degradation. Quality & Quantity 49(1):235–253. 
Chappell, Louise. 2001. Federalism and social policy: The case of domestic violence. Australian Journal of Public Administ-
ration 60(1):59–69. 
Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public 
Choice 143(1-2):67–101. 
Chhibber, Pradeep, and Irfan Nooruddin. 2004. Do party systems count? Comparative Political Studies 37(2):152–187. 
Christoff, Peter, and Robyn Eckersley. 2011. Comparing state responses. In Oxford handbook of climate change and society, 
eds. John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, and David Schlosberg, 431–448. Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press. 
Clar, Christoph, Andrea Prutsch, and Reinhard Steurer. 2013. Barriers and guidelines for public policies on climate change 
adaptation: A missed opportunity of scientific knowledge-brokerage. Natural Resources Forum 37(1):1–18. 
Clulow, Zeynep. 2018. Democracy, electoral systems and emissions: explaining when and why democratization promotes mi-
tigation. Climate Policy 36:1–14. 
Cole, Matthew A. 2007. Corruption, income and the environment: An empirical analysis. Ecological Economics 62(3-4):637–
647. 
Collier, David, and Robert Adcock. 1999. Democracy and dichotomies: A pragmatic approach to choices about concepts. 
Annual Review of Political Science 2(1):537–565. 
Collier, David, and Steven Levitsky. 1997. Democracy with adjectives. Conceptual innovation in comparative research. World 
Politics 49:430–451. 
Congleton, Roger D. 1992. Political institutions and pollution control. The Review of Economics and Statistics 74(3):412–421. 
Congleton, Roger D. 2002. Governing the global environmental commons: The political economy of international environ-
mental treaties and institutions. In International Environmental Economics. A Survey of the Issues, eds. Günther 
Schulze, and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 241–263. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Steven Fish, and Allen Hicken. 2011. Conceptualizing 
and measuring democracy: A new approach. Perspectives on Politics 9(2):247–267. 
Coppedge, Michael, Staffan Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, and Jan Teorell. 2016. Measuring high level democratic principles 
using the V-Dem data. International Political Science Review 37(5):580–593. 
Crowley, Kate. 2007. Is Australia faking it? The Kyoto Protocol and the greenhouse policy challenge. Global Environmental 
Politics 7(4):118–139. 
Cruz, Cesi, Philip Keefer, and Carlos Scartascini. 2016. Database of political institutions dataset, 2015 update (DPI2015). 
Updated version of Beck, Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh. 2001. New tools 
in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions. World Bank Economic Review 15(1):165-176. 
Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank. http://www.iadb.org/en/research-and-data/publication-de-
tails,3169.html?pub_id=IDB-DB-121. Accessed 18 May 2016. 
Dahlström, Carl, Johannes Lindvall, and Bo Rothstein. 2013. Corruption, bureaucratic failure and social policy priorities. Po-
litical Studies 61(3):523–542. 
Damania, Richard. 2002. Environmental controls with corrupt bureaucrats. Environment and Development Economics 
7(3):407–427. 
Damania, Richard, Per G. Fredriksson and John A. List. 2003. Trade liberalization, corruption, and environmental policy for-
mation: theory and evidence. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 46:490–512. 
Desai, Uday. 1998a. Environment, economic growth, and government in developing countries. In Ecological Policy and Poli-
tics in Developing Countries. Economic Growth, Democracy, and Environment, ed. Uday Desai, 1–45. New York: 
State University of New York Press. 
Desai, Uday. 1998b. Poverty, government, and the global environment. In Ecological policy and politics in developing count-
ries: Economic growth, democracy, and environment, ed. Uday Desai, 297–305. New York: State University of New 
York Press. 
Desai, Uday. 2002. Institutions and environmental policy in developed countries. In Environmental politics and policy in in-
dustrialized countries, ed. Uday Desai, 1–27. Cambridge (MA) & London: The MIT Press. 
Diamond, Larry, and Leonardo Morlino. 2005. Introduction. In Assessing the quality of democracy, eds. Larry Diamond, and 
Leonardo Morlino, xi–xliii. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press 
Doherty, Brian, and Marius de Geus. 1996. Democracy and green political thought. Sustainability, rights and citizenship. In 
Democracy and green political thought. Sustainability, right and citizenship, eds. Brian Doherty, and Marius de Geus, 
1–15. London & New York: Routledge. 
Dolšak, Nives. 2001. Mitigating global climate change: Why are some countries more committed than others? Policy Studies 
Journal 29(3):414–436. 
Dolšak, Nives. 2009. Climate change policy implementation: A cross-sectional analysis. Review of Policy Research 26(5):551–
570. 
Duit, Andreas. 2014. Introduction: The comparative study of environmental governance. In State and environment. The com-
parative study of environmental governance, ed. Andreas Duit, 1–24. Cambridge (MA) & London: MIT Press. 
95 
 
 
Dunlap, Riley E., and Michael P. Allen. 1976. Partisan differences on environmental issues: A congressional roll-call analysis. 
Western Political Quarterly 29(3):384–397. 
Dunlap, Riley E., Aaron M. McCright, and Jerrod H. Yarosh. 2016. The political divide on climate change: Partisan polarization 
widens in the U.S. Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 58(5):4–23. 
Elkins, Zachary. 2000. Gradations of democracy? Empirical tests of alternative conceptualizations. American Journal of Poli-
tical Science 44(2):293–300. 
Escher, Romy, and Melanie Walter-Rogg. 2020. Environmental Performance in Democracies and Autocracies. Democratic 
Qualities and Environmental Protection. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Escher, Romy, and Melanie Walter-Rogg. 2018. Does the conceptualization and measurement of democracy quality matter in 
comparative climate policy research? Politics and Governance 6(1):117–144. 
Farzin, Y. Hossein, and Craig A. Bond. 2006. Democracy and environmental quality. Journal of Development Economics 
81(1):213–235. 
Fiorino, Daniel J. 2011. Explaining national environmental performance: approaches, evidence, and implications. Policy Sci-
ences 44(4):367–389. 
Fliegauf, Mark T., and Sanga, Sarath 2010. Steering toward climate tyranny? http://www.eisanet.org/sitecore/content/be-
bruga/eisa/publications/feeds/stockholm.aspx. Accessed 2 Nov 2017. 
Frankel, Jeffrey A., and Andrew K. Rose. 2005. Is trade good or bad for the environment? Sorting out the causality. Review of 
Economics and Statistics 87(1):85–91.  
Fredriksson, Per G., and Noel Gaston. 2000. Ratification of the 1992 climate change convention: What determines legislative 
delay? Public Choice 104:345–368. 
Fredriksson, Per G., and Eric Neumayer. 2013. Democracy and climate change policies: Is history important? Ecological Eco-
nomics 95:11–19. 
Fredriksson, Per G., and Eric Neumayer. 2016. Corruption and climate change policies: Do the bad old days matter? Environ-
mental and Resource Economics 63(2):451–469. 
Fredriksson, Per G., Eric Neumayer, Richard Damania, and Scott Gates. 2005. Environmentalism, democracy, and pollution 
control. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 49, 343–365. 
Fredriksson, Per G., Eric Neumayer, and Gergely Ujhelyi. 2007. Kyoto Protocol cooperation: Does government corruption 
facilitate environmental lobbying? Public Choice 133(1-2):231–251. 
Fredriksson, Per G., and Jakob Svensson. 2003. Political instability, corruption and policy formation: the case of environmental 
policy. Journal of Public Economics 87(7-8):1383–1405. 
Fredriksson, Per G., and Gergely Ujhelyi. 2006. Political institutions, interest groups, and the ratification of international en-
vironmental agreements. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Per_Fredriksson. Accessed 13 Nov 2019. 
Fredriksson, Per G., and Jim R. Wollscheid. 2007. Democratic institutions versus autocratic regimes: The case of environmental 
policy. Public Choice 130(3-4):381–393. 
Freedom House. 2017. Freedom in the world 2017. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedomworld-2017. Ac-
cessed 7 Jun 2018. 
Fuchs, Doris, Detlef Sprinz, Michael Aklin, and Richard Meyer-Eppler. 2009. Does politics impact carbon emissions? Münster: 
Universität Münster. FB Erziehungswissenschaft und Sozialwissenschaften. Institut für Politikwissenschaft. 
https://nbnresolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-257419. Accessed 14 Nov 2019. 
Galarraga, Ibon, Mikel Gonzalez-Eguino, and Anil Markandya. 2011. The role of regional governments in climate change 
policy. Environmental Policy and Governance 21(3):164–182. 
Gallagher, Kevin P., and Strom C. Thacker. 2008. Democracy, income, and environmental quality. Amherst: Political Economy 
Research Institute. University of Massachusetts. (Working Paper Series 164). 
Ganghof, Steffen. 2003. Promises and pitfalls of veto player analysis. Swiss Political Science Review 9(2):1–25. 
Garmann, Sebastian. 2014. Do government ideology and fragmentation matter for reducing CO2-emissions? Empirical evi-
dence from OECD countries. Ecological Economics 105, S. 1–10.  
Geissel, Brigitte, Marianne Kneuer, and Hans-Joachim Lauth. 2016. Measuring the quality of democracy: Introduction. Inter-
national Political Science Review 37(5):571–579.  
Gilley, Bruce. 2012. Authoritarian environmentalism and China's response to climate change. Environmental Politics 
21(2):287–307. 
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, and Bjørn Sverdrup. 2002. Democracy and the environment. In Human Security and the Environment. 
International Comparisons, eds. Edward A. Page, and Michael Redclift, 45–70. Cheltenham & Northhampton (MA): 
Edward Elgar. 
Goldsmith, Arthur A. 2007. Is governance reform a catalyst for development? Governance 20(2):165–186. 
Gore, Al. 1992. Earth in the balance. Ecology and the human spirit. New York et al.: Plume. 
Goulder, Lawrence H., and Robert N. Stavins. 2010. Interactions between state and federal climate change policies. Cambridge: 
National Bureau of Economic Research. (Working Paper 16123). 
Hadenius, Axel, and Jan Teorell. 2007. Pathways from authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy 18(1):143–156. 
Hahn, Robert W. 1990. The political economy of environmental regulation: Towards a unifying framework. Public Choice 
65(1):21–47. 
Halkos, George E., Aksel Sundström, and Nickolaos G. Tzeremes. 2015. Regional environmental performance and governance 
quality: a nonparametric analysis. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 17(4):621–644. 
Hardin, Garrett. 1968. The tradegy of the commons. Science 162:1243–1248. 
Harrison, Kathryn. 2007. The road not taken: Climate change policy in Canada and the United States. Environmental Politics 
7(4):92–117. 
Harrison, Kathryn, and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom. 2007. The comparative politics of climate change. Global Environmental 
Politics 7(4):1–18. 
96 
 
 
Harrison, Kathryn, and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom. 2010a. Introduction: Global commons, domestic decisions. In Global com-
mons, domestic decisions. The comparative politics of climate change, eds. Kathryn Harrison, and Lisa McIntosh Sund-
strom, 1-22. Cambridge & London: The MIT Press. 
Harrison, Kathryn, and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom. 2010b. Conclusion: The comparative politics of climate change. In Global 
commons, domestic decisions. The comparative politics of climate change, eds. Kathryn Harrison, and Lisa McIntosh 
Sundstrom, 261–290. Cambridge & London: The MIT Press. 
Heilbroner, Robert L. 1974. An inquiry into the human prospect. New York: Norton. 
Held, David. 2006. Models of democracy. Cambridge: Polity. 
Held, David, and Angus Hervey. 2011. Democracy, climate change and global governance: Democratic agency and the policy 
menu ahead. In The Governance of Climate Change. Science, Economics, Politics and Ethics, eds. David Held, Angus 
Hervey, and Marik Theros, 89–110. Cambridge & Malden: Polity Press. 
Henisz, Witold J. 2002. The institutional environment for infrastructure investment. Industrial and Corporate Change 
11(2):355–389. 
Henry, Laura A., and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom. 2010. Russia and the Kyoto Protocol: From hot air to implementation. In 
Global commons, domestic decisions. The comparative politics of climate change, eds. Kathryn Harrison, and Lisa 
McIntosh Sundstrom, 105–138. Cambridge & London: The MIT Press. 
Hibbs, Douglas A., JR. 1977. Political parties and macroeconomic policy. The American Political Science Review 71(4):1467–
1487. 
Hibbs, Douglas A., JR. 1992. Partisan theory after fifteen years. European Journal of Political Economy 8:361–373. 
Hofrichter, Jürgen, and Karlheinz Reif. 1990. Evolution of environmental attitudes in the European Community. Scandinavian 
Political Studies 13(2):119–146. 
Holden, Barry. 2002. Democracy and global warming. London & New York, NY: Continuum.  
Holmberg, Sören, Bo Rothstein, and Naghmeh Nasiritousi. 2009. Quality of government: what you get. Annual Review of 
Political Science 12(1):135–161. 
Huber, John, and Ronald Inglehart. 1995. Expert interpretations of party space and party locations in 42 societies. Party Politics 
1(1):73–111. 
Hudson, Blake. 2012. Federal constitutions, global governance, and the role of forests in regulating climate change. Indiana 
Law Journal 87:1455–1515. 
Imbeau, Louis M., Francois Pétry, and Moktar Lamari. 2001. Left-right party ideology and government policies: A meta-ana-
lysis. European Journal of Political Research 40:1–29. 
Immergut, Ellen M., and Matthias Orlowski. 2013. Veto points and the environment. In Staatstätigkeiten, Parteien und Demo-
kratie. Festschrift für Manfred G. Schmidt, ed. Klaus Armingeon, 205–217. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. 
Jahn, Detlef. 1998. Environmental performance and policy regimes: Explaining variations in 18 OECD-countries. Policy Sci-
ences 31(2):107–131. 
Jahn, Detlef. 2008. The politics of climate change. Paper prepared for delivery at the 2008 Joint Sessions of Workshops Friday 
11th-Wednesday 16th April 2008 in Rennes (France) in the Workshop "The Politics of Climate Change" organized by 
Hugh Compston (Cardiff University). https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/b230ae79-4191-48be-93d3-
631a05c7b90f.pdf. Accessed 13 Nov 2019. 
Jahn, Detlef. 2010. The veto player approach in macro-comparative politics: Concepts and measuruement. In Reform processes 
and policy change, eds. Thomas König, Marc Debus, and George Tsebelis, 43–68. New York, NY: Springer. 
Jahn, Detlef. 2016. The politics of environmental performance. Institutions and preferences in industrialized democracies. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Jahn, Detlef, and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel. 2010. Political institutions and policy performance: A comparative analysis of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of Public Policy 30(1): 23–44. 
Jahn, Detlef, and Sonja Wälti. 2007. Umweltpolitik und Föderalismus. In Politik und Umwelt (Politische Vierteljahresschrift 
Sonderheft 39/2007), eds. Jacob Klaus, Frank Biermann, Per-Olof Busch, and Peter H. Feindt, 262–279. Wiesbaden: 
VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Jensen, Christian B., and Jae-Jae Spoon. 2007. Putting the party back in: Explaining EU member state compliance with the 
Kyoto Protocol, 1998-2003. Paper prepared for presentation at the European Union Studies Association Meeting, 16-
20 May 2007, Montreal. http://aei.pitt.edu/7919/1/jensen-c-04h.pdf. Assessed 14 Nov 2019. 
Jensen, Christian B., and Jae-Jae Spoon. 2011. Testing the ‘party matters' thesis: Explaining progress towards Kyoto Protocol 
targets. Political Studies 59(1):99–115. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón. 1999. Governance Matters. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank 
Development Research Group Macroeconomics and Growth and World Bank Institute Governance, Regulation, and 
Finance (Policy Research Working Paper 2196). 
Kim, So Young, and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias. 2014. Cross-national public opinion on climate change: The effects of affluence 
and vulnerability. Global Environmental Politics 14(1):79–106. 
Kincaid, John. 2001. Economic policy-making: advantages and disadvantages of the federal model. International Social Sci-
ence Journal 53(167):85–92. 
Kitschelt, Herbert P. 1988. Left-libertarian parties: explaining innovation in competitive party systems. World Politics 
40(2):194–234. 
Kloepfer, Michael. 2004. Federalismusreform und Umweltrecht*. Natur und Recht 26 (12):759–764. 
Knack, Stephen. 2006. Measuring corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. A critique of the cross-country indicators. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3968). 
Kneuer, Marianne. 2012. Who is greener? Climate action and political regimes: trade-offs for national and international actors. 
Democratization 19(5):865–888. 
Knill, Christoph, Marc Debus, and Stephan Heichel. 2010. Do parties matter in internationalised policy areas? The impact of 
political parties on environmental policy outputs in 18 OECD countries, 1970-2000. European Journal of Political 
Research 49(3):301–336. 
97 
 
 
Kurer, Oskar. 2005. Corruption: An alternative approach to its definition and measurement. Political Studies 53:222–239. 
Lafferty, William M., and James Meadowcroft. 1997. Democracy and the environment: congruence and conflict – preliminary 
reflections. In Democracy and the Environment. Problems and Prospects, eds. William M. Lafferty, and James 
Meadowcroft, 1–17. Cheltenham & Lyme: Edward Elgar. 
Lake, David A., and Matthew A. Baum. 2001. The invisible hand of democracy. Political control and the provision of public 
services. Comparative Political Studies 34(6):587–621. 
Lantis, Jeffreyh S. 2009. The life and death of international treaties. Double-edged diplomacy and the politics of ratification in 
comparative perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Leitão, Alexandra. 2010. Corruption and the environmental Kuznets curve: Empirical evidence for sulfur. Ecological Econo-
mics 69(11):2191–2201. 
Li, Quan, and Rafael Reuveny. 2006. Democracy and environmental degradation. International Studies Quarterly 50(4):935–
956. 
Lijphart, Arend. 2012 [1999]. Patterns of democracy. Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries. Second Edi-
tion. New Haven & London: Yale University Press. 
Lim, Sijeong, and Andreas Duit. 2018. Partisan politics, welfare states, and environmental policy outputs in the OECD count-
ries, 1975-2005. Regulation & Governance 12 (2):220–237. 
List, John A., and Daniel M. Sturm. 2006. How elections matter: Theory and evidence from environmental policy. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(4):1249–1281. 
López, Ramón, and Siddhartha Mitra. 2000. Corruption, pollution, and the Kuznets environment curve. Journal of Environ-
mental Economics and Management 40(2):137–150. 
Madden, Nathan J. 2014. Green means stop: veto players and their impact on climate-change policy outputs. Environmental 
Politics 23(4):570–589.  
McMann, Kelly, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Jan Teorell, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2016. Strategies of validation: Assessing 
the varieties of democracy corruption data. Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg. The Varieties of Democracy Insti-
tute & Department of Political Science. (Working Paper 23). 
Mercier, Jean. 2006. American hesitations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: an institutional interpretation. International 
Review of Administrative Sciences 72(1):101–121.  
Merkel, Wolfgang. 2004. Embedded and defective democracies. Democratization 11(5):33–58.  
Merkel, Wolfgang. 2016. Eingebettete und defekte Demokratien. In Zeitgenösische Demokratietheorie. Band 2: Empirische 
Demokratietheorien, eds. Oliver W. Lembcke, Claudia Ritzi, and Gary S. Schaal, 455–484.Wiesbaden: Springer VS. 
Midlarsky, Manus I. 1998. Democracy and the environment: An empirical assessment. Journal of Peace Research 35(3):341–
361. 
Midlarsky, Manus I. 2001. Democracy and the environment. In Environmental Conflict, eds. Paul F. Diehl and Nils Petter 
Gleditsch, 155–178. Boulder & Oxford: Westview Press. 
Miller, Michael J. 2011. Persistent illegal logging in Costa Rica: The role of corruption among forestry regulators. The Journal 
of Environment & Development 20(1):50–68. 
Milner, Helen V. 1993. Maintaining international commitments in trade policy. In Do institutions matter? Government capa-
bilities in the United States and abroad, eds. R. Kent Weaver, and Bert A. Rockman, 345–369. Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution. 
Morse, Stephan. 2006. Is corruption bad for environemntal sustainability? A cross-national analysis. Ecology and Society 11(1), 
no page numbers. 
Munck, Gerardo L., and Jay Verkuilen. 2002. Conceptualizing and measuring democracy. Comparative Political Studies 
35(1):5–34. 
Neumayer, Eric. 2002a. Do democracies exhibit stronger international environmental commitment? A cross-country analysis. 
Journal of Peace Research 39(2):139–164. 
Neumayer, Eric. 2002b. Does trade openness promote multilateral environmental cooperation? The World Economy 25(6): 
815–32. 
Neumayer, Eric. 2003. Are left-wing party strength and corporatism good for the environment? Evidence from panel analysis 
of air pollution in OECD countries. Ecological Economics 45(2):203–220. 
Never, Babette, and Joachim Betz. 2014. Comparing the climate policy performance of emerging economies. World Develop-
ment 59:1–15. 
Nye, Joseph. 1967. Corruption and political development: A cost-benefit analysis. American Political Science Association 
61(2):417–427. 
O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 1994. Delegative democracy. Journal of Democracy 5(1):55–69.  
Olson, Mancur. 1982. The rise and decline of nations. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Ophuls, William. 1977. Ecology and the politics of scarcity: Prologue to a political theory of the state. San Francisco: W.H. 
Freeman.  
Ophuls, William, 1994. Requiem for modern politics: The tragedy of the enlightenment and the challenge of the new millen-
nium. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Ophuls, William, and Stephan A. Boyan. 1992. Ecology and the politics of scarcity revisited: The unraveling of the American 
dream. New York: W.H. Freeman. 
Padró i Miquel, Gerard. 2007. The control of politicians in divided societies: The politics of fear. The Review of Economic 
Studies 74(4):1259–1274.  
Paehlke, Robert. 1997. Environmental challenges to democratic practice. In Democracy and the environment. Problems and 
prospects, eds. William M. Lafferty, and James Meadowcroft, 18–38. Cheltenham & Lyme: Edward Elgar. 
Payne, Rodger A. 1995. Freedom and the environment. Journal of Democracy 6(3):41–55.  
Pellegrini, Lorenzo. 2011. Corruption, development and the environment. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. 
Pellegrini, Lorenzo, and Reyer Gerlagh. 2006. Corruption, democracy, and environmental policy. The Journal of Environment 
& Development 15(3):332–354. 
98 
 
 
Persson, Torsten, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini. 2000. Comparative politics and public finance. Journal of Political 
Economy 108(6):1121–1161. 
Persson, Torsten, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini. 2007. Electoral rules and government spending in parlimanetary de-
mocracies. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2(2):155–188. 
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 1999. The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians. 
European Economic Review 43:699–735. 
Petherick, Anna. 2014. Seeking a fair and sustainable future. Nature Climate Change 4(2):81–83. 
Pierson, Paul. 1995. Fragmented welfare states: Federal institutions and the development of social policy. Governance 
8(4):449–478. 
Pinto, Pablo M. 2013. Partisan investment in the global economy. Why the left loves foreign direct investment and FDI loves 
the left. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press. 
Poloni-Staudinger, Lori M. 2008. Are consensus democracies more environmentally effective? Environmental Politics 
17(3):410–430. 
Povitkina, Marina. 2018. The limits of democracy in tackling climate change. Environmental Politics 27(3):411–432. 
Rechia, Steven P. 2002. International environmental treaty engagement in 19 democracies. Policy Studies Journal 30(4):470–
494. 
Risse, Thomas. 2000. Rational choice, constructivism, and the study of international institutions. Presented at the Annual Mee-
ting of the American Political Science Assoication, Washington DC, August 31- September 3, 2000. 
Robbins, Paul. 2000. The rotten institution: corruption in natural resource management. Political Geography 19(4):423–443. 
Rohrschneider, Robert. 1988. Citizens' attitudes toward environmental issues. Comparative Political Studies 21(3):347–367. 
Rose-Ackermann, Susan, and Bonnie J. Palifka. 2016. Corruption and government. Causes, consequences, reform. Second 
Edition. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Rothstein, Bo, and Daniel Eek. 2009. Political corruption and social trust. Rationality and Society 21(1):81–112. 
Rothstein, Bo, and Jan Teorell. 2008. What is quality of government? A theory of impartial Government Institutions. Gover-
nance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 21(2):165–190. 
Ruoff, Gabriele. 2009. Grow rich and clean up later? Joint effects of IGO membership and democracy on environmental per-
formance in developing countries. National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) (Challenges to Democracy in 
the 21st Century Working Paper 33). 
Schmidt, Manfred G. 1996. When parties matter: A review of the possibilities and limits of partisan influence on public policy. 
European Journal of Political Research 30:155–183. 
Schmidt, Manfred G. 2001. Parteien und Staatstätigkeit. Zentrum für Sozialpolitik. Universität Bremen. (ZeS-Arbeitspapier 2). 
Schmidt, Manfred G., and Tobias Ostheim. 2007a. Die Lehre von der Parteiendifferenz. In Der Wohlfahrtsstaat. Eine Einfüh-
rung in den historischen und internationalen Vergleich, eds. Manfred G. Schmidt, Tobias Ostheim, Nico A. Siegel, 
and Reimut Zohlnhöfer, 51–62.Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Schmidt, Manfred G., and Tobias Ostheim. 2007b. Politisch-institutionalistische Theorien. In Der Wohlfahrtsstaat. Eine Ein-
führung in den historischen und internationalen Vergleich, eds. Manfred G. Schmidt, Tobias Ostheim, Nico A. Siegel, 
and Reimut Zohlnhöfer, 63–74.Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Schulze, Kai. 2014. Do parties matter for international environmental cooperation? An analysis of environmental treaty parti-
cipation by advanced industrialised democracies. Environmental Politics 23(1):115–139. 
Scruggs, Lyle A. 1999. Institutions and environmental performance in seventeen western democracies. British Journal of Po-
litical Science 29(1):1–31.  
Shearman, David, and Joseph Wayne Smith. 2007. The climate change challenge and the failure of democracy. Westport (CT) 
& London: Praeger Publishers. 
Smith, Robert J., and Matthew J. Walpole. 2005. Should conservationists pay more attention to corruption? Oryx 39(3):251 –
256. 
Spilker, Gabriele. 2012. Helpful organizations: Membership in inter-governmental organizations and environmental quality in 
developing countries. British Journal of Political Science 42(2):345–370. 
Spilker, Gabriele. 2013. Globalization, political institutions and the environment in developing countries. New York, London: 
Routledge. 
Stadelmann-Steffen, Isabelle. 2011. Citizens as veto players: climate change policy and the constraints of direct democracy. 
Environmental Politics 20(4):485–507. 
Stehr, N. 2015. Democracy is not an inconvenience. Nature Climate Change 525(24):449–450. 
Steuer, Reinhard, and Christoph Clar. 2015. Is decentralisation always good for climate change mitigation? How federalism 
has complicated the greening of policies in Austria. Policy Sciences 48:85–107. 
Sussman, Glen. 2004. The USA and global environmental policy: Domestic constraints on effective leadership. International 
Political Science Review 25(4):349–369.  
Tanzi, Vito, and Hamid Davoodi. 1998. Corruption, public investment, and growth. In The welfare state, public investment, 
and growth. Selected Papers from the 53rd Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, eds. Shibata 
Hirofumi, and Toshihiro Ihori, 41–60. Tokyo et al.: Springer. 
Thérien, Jean-Phillippe. 2002. Debating foreign aid: Right versus left. Third World Quarterly 23(3):449-466. 
Tobin, Paul. 2017. Leaders and laggards: Climate policy ambition in developed states. Global Environmental Politics 17(4):28–
47. 
Touraine, Alain, Michael Wieviorka, and François Dubet. 1987. The workers' movement. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Treisman, Daniel. 2000. The causes of corruption: a cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics 76(3):399–457. 
Treisman, Daniel. 2007. What we learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of cross-national empirical research? 
American Review of Political Science 10:211–244. 
Tsebelis, George. 2010. Veto player theory and policy change: An introduction. In Reform processes and policy change, eds. 
Thomas König, Marc Debus, and George Tsebelis, 3–18 New York, NY: Springer. 
99 
 
 
Tsebelis, George. 1995. Decision making in political systems: Veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicamera-
lism and multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science 25(3):289–325. 
Tsebelis, George. 1999. Veto players and law production in parliamentary democracies: An empirical analysis. American Po-
litical Science Review 93(3):591–608. 
Tsebelis, George. 2002. Veto players. How political institutions work. New York & Princeton (NJ): Rusell Sage Foundation 
& Princeton University Press. 
Tubi, Amit, Itay Fischhendler, and Eran Feitelson. 2012. The effect of vulnerability on climate change mitigation policies. 
Global Environmental Change 22(2):472–482.  
Underdal, Arild. 2010. Complexity and challenges of long-term environmental governance. Global Environmental Change 
20(3):386–393. 
Vogel, David. 1995. Trading Up. Consumer and environmental regulation in a global environment. Cambridge (MA) & Lon-
don. 
von Stein, Jana. 2008. The international law and politics of climate change. Ratification of the United Nations Framework 
Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(2):243–268. 
Wahman, Michael, Jan Teorell, and Axel Hadenius. 2013. Authoritarian regime types revisited: updated data in comparative 
perspective. Contemporary Politics 19(1):19–34.  
Wälti, Sonja. 2004. How multilevel structures affect environmental policy in industrialized countries. European Journal of 
Political Research. 43(4):599–634. 
Ward, Hugh. 2008. Liberal democracy and sustainability. Environmental Politics 17(3):386–409. 
Ward, Hugh, Xun Cao, and Bumba Mukherjee. 2014. State capacity and the environmental investment gap in authoritarian 
states. Comparative Political Studies 47(3):309–343. 
Weaver, R. Kent, and Bert A. Rockman. 1993. Assessing the effects of institutions. In Do Institutions Matter? Government 
Capabilities in the United States and Abroad, eds. R. Kent Weaver, and Bert A. Rockman, 1–41. Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution. 
Welsch, Heinz. 2004. Corruption, growth, and the environment: a cross-country analysis. Environment and Development Eco-
nomics 9(5):663–693. 
Wenzelburger, Georg, and Frieder Neumann 2015. Vergleichende Staatstätigkeitsforschung: Entwicklungslinien - Heidelber-
ger Schule - integrative Erklärungsansätze. In Einführung in die Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft. Institutionen – 
Akteure – Policies, eds. Uwe Wagschal, Sebastian Jäckle, and Georg Wenzelburger, 251–264. Stuttgart: Verlag W. 
Kohlhammer. 
Wenzelburger, Georg, and Reimut Zohlnhöfer. 2014. Institutionen und Public Policies. In Lehrbuch der Politikfeldanalyse. 3., 
aktualisierte und überarbeitete Auflage, eds. Klaus Schubert, and Nils C. Bandelow, 311-340. Munich: De Gruyter & 
Oldenbourg. 
Wilson, John K., and Richard Damania. 2005. Corruption, political competition and environmental policy. Journal of Environ-
mental Economics and Management 49(3):516–535. 
Wurster, Stefan. 2013. Comparing ecological sustainability in autocracies and democracies. Contemporary Politics 19(1):76–
93. 
Yamagata, Yoshiki, Jue Yang, and Joseph Galaskiewicz. 2013. A contingency theory of policy innovation: how different the-
ories explain the ratification of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, 
Law and Economics 13(3):251–270. 
Zahran, Sammy, Eunyi Kim, Xi Chen, and Mark Lubell. 2007. Ecological development and global climate change: A cross-
national study of Kyoto Protocol ratification. Society & Natural Resources 20(1):37–55.  
Zohlnhöfer, Reimut. 2003. George Tsebelis: Veto players. How political institutions work. New York & Princeton: Russell 
Sage Foundation & Princeton University Press 2002, 317 S., £ 13,95. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 44(2):255–258. 
Zohlnhöfer, Reimut. 2005. Globalisierung der Wirtschaft und nationalstaatliche Anpassungsreaktionen. Theoretische Überle-
gungen. Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 12(1):41–75. 
Zohlnhöfer, Reimut. 2008. Stand und Perspektiven der vergleichenden Staatstätigkeitsforschung. In Die Zukunft der Policy-
Forschung, eds. Frank Janning, and Katrin Toens, 157–174. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
100 
 
 
5  Globalisation, domestic political institutions, and climate 
commitment and performance 
Abstract 
The broader literature on the environmental consequences of globalisation explores the importance of veto players, 
regime type, and political corruption. The study applies these themes to an analysis of climate commitment and 
performance. To formulate hypotheses for the empirical analysis, this chapter begins by specifying the causal order 
and interrelationship of domestic and international explanatory factors; on this basis, it develops explanatory mod-
els of the joint influence of globalisation with veto players, political corruption, and regime type. This chapter 
argues that, while domestic political institutions should not influence competition pressures caused by economic 
interdependence, they can moderate the effects of economic openness and political globalisation. The veto-player 
approach adds little to our understanding of the relationship between globalisation and climate commitment and 
performance. Left- and right-wing veto players consider a country’s international competitiveness. The importance 
of specific veto points is theoretically ambiguous. According to previous research, political corruption is likely to 
moderate the effect of economic openness on climate performance in developing countries. In contrast to previous 
research, the present study distinguishes between forms of political corruption. Second, this chapter explains that 
regime type can influence the relationship between globalisation, climate commitment, and climate performance. 
It adds to research showing that, compared to the UNFCCC, there is no systemic difference between democracies 
and autocracies in the effect of political globalisation on the harder Kyoto Protocol. However, political and civil 
rights, together with political globalisation, contribute to Kyoto Protocol ratification. It also explores the effect of 
economic openness on climate performance. It is an empirical question whether the negative effect of economic 
openness is stronger or weaker in developing countries with high levels of political and/or civil rights. 
Is the effect of globalisation on climate commitment and performance moderated by domestic political institutions? 
The broader literature on the environmental consequences of globalisation studies the importance of institutional 
constraints and ideological heterogeneity among veto players, regime type, and political corruption. To answer the 
research question, this study applies these explanatory approaches to the analysis of climate commitment and 
performance. To formulate hypotheses on possible interaction effects between specific political institutions and 
globalisation, it is necessary to specify the causal order and interrelationship between domestic and international 
explanatory factors. Political-corruption and regime-type approaches, as well as, in part, the veto-player regime 
approach to state responses to globalisation, refer to multiple types of moderation effects. The literature discussion 
in Chapter 3 has identified four possible moderation effects. First, state responses to globalisation depend on do-
mestic political institutions involved in the domestic political decision-making process. Second, domestic political 
factors involved in implementing climate policies influence the relationship between international integration and 
climate performance. Third, domestic political institutions affect a country’s openness to international influences. 
Domestic political institutions, such as regime type, affect the government’s exposure to international incentives 
and pressures. They are likely, therefore, to strengthen or weaken the incentives and pressures of international 
integration. Finally, political institutions moderate the effects of international economic integration on climate 
performance, as context factors of international trade and investment. To formulate hypotheses on moderation 
effects, it is necessary to specify the relationships between international and domestic factors that explain the three 
explanatory approaches. For instance, executive corruption may not simply affect a government’s efforts to miti-
gate the negative consequences of economic globalisation, it may also affect climate outcomes, as a context factor 
in international trade and investment. 
The previous chapter has explained the need to examine the effect of domestic political institutions on climate 
commitment and performance, on a disaggregated basis. This chapter argues that the same applies to the study of 
the interrelationship between domestic political institutions and globalisation. For instance, with regard to regime 
type, horizontal accountability has a direct effect on a government’s response to globalisation. It refers to political 
institutions that are involved in the political decision-making process. By contrast, political and civil rights incen-
tivise governments. They can only influence a country’s responsiveness to international pressures. All democratic 
qualities can affect climate performance, as context factors of international trade and investment. 
To specify the causal order of the explanatory factors, I refer to the explanatory model of cross-national variation 
in public policy proposed by Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer (2015). Section 5.1 explains the choice of this theo-
retical framework and Section 5.2 partly reformulates it, using it to analyse climate commitment and performance. 
Sections 5.3–5.5 specify, on this basis, explanatory models of the joint influence of veto players, political 
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corruption, and regime type. They formulate hypotheses that are tested in the following empirical analysis. Chapter 
3 concluded that climate performance in developed countries depends on policy diffusion and that economic open-
ness undermines climate commitment and climate change mitigation in developing countries. Chapter 3 also ex-
plained that international political integration is likely to contribute to climate commitment and performance. 
These sections examine whether domestic political institutional variables moderate these relationships.52 The last 
section summarises the conclusions (5.6).  
The central argument of this chapter is as follows: while there is little reason to expect institutional constraints and 
institutional quality to influence the relationship between economic interdependence and climate performance in 
developed countries, domestic political institutions are likely to moderate the effects of economic openness and 
international political integration on climate commitment and performance. This study argues that the veto-player 
approach cannot explain the relationship between globalisation and climate commitment and performance. Left- 
and right-wing veto players assess a country’s international competitiveness. The importance of specific veto 
points, for the relationship between political globalisation and Kyoto Protocol ratification or the relationship be-
tween economic interdependence and climate outcomes in developed countries, is theoretically ambiguous. While 
corrupt and non-corrupt countries may react in similar ways to international pressures to stay competitive, political 
corruption is expected to worsen the negative growth effects of economic openness in the developing world. In 
contrast to previous studies, this research distinguishes between forms of political corruption. Finally, this chapter 
argues that regime type matters for the relationship between globalisation and climate commitment and climate 
performance. This study adds to the literature by explaining that, in contrast to the UNFCCC, there is no systemic 
difference between democracies and autocracies in the effect of political globalisation on the harder Kyoto Proto-
col or the effect of economic openness on climate performance. Together with political globalisation, political and 
civil rights should contribute to Kyoto Protocol ratification. It is an empirical question whether the negative effect 
of economic openness is stronger or weaker in developing countries with high levels of political and/or civil rights. 
5.1 Selection of the theoretical framework 
This chapter explains the use of Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer’s (2015) explanatory model of cross-national var-
iation in public policy as a theoretical framework. On this basis, the chapter develops explanatory models of the 
joint influence of globalisation and veto players, political corruption, and regime type. It then formulates hypoth-
eses for the empirical analysis.  
Most explanatory models of quantitative studies of globalisation and climate commitment and performance assume 
additive effects of international integration (see Chapter 3). This is in line with standard explanatory models of 
comparative foreign policy research and comparative policy research. Standard explanatory models of comparative 
public and foreign policy assume additive and independent effects of domestic and international determinants (e.g., 
Cohen, 2002, p. 433; Roller, 2005; Schmidt, 1993; Zohlnhöfer, 2008). They consider domestic and international 
determinants side-by-side in an integrated explanatory model of cross-national variation in (foreign) policy output. 
The literature review in Chapter 3 shows that most theoretical approaches to the policy consequences of interna-
tional integration assume or acknowledge that domestic political factors (including domestic political institutions) 
moderate the effect of globalisation. Few existing theoretical approaches of foreign or domestic policy are able to 
consider the interrelationship between explanatory factors on different levels of analysis (Cohen, 2002, p. 433). 
Qualitative research on the interrelationship between domestic and international explanatory factors of climate 
commitment (e.g., Harrison, 2000) refers to the two-levels game approach (Putnam, 1988). This liberal foreign-
policy theory examines the relationship between international and domestic factors that explain government be-
haviour in international negotiations (Harnisch, 2013, p. 424). It distinguishes between two phases of the adoption 
of international agreements: the negotiation between national governments and the domestic adoption of the inter-
national treaty via the domestic ratification process. It regards international, political, and societal influences as 
incentives and constraints on government behaviour. In relation to international influences, it focuses on the be-
haviour of foreign governments, assuming that governments use domestic and international influences strategically 
to secure re-election. While the two-level games approach addresses the interrelationship between domestic and 
international explanatory factors, it cannot be applied to climate commitment and performance. First, it focuses on 
explaining the process of negotiating international agreements. This study focuses on cross-national variations in 
the ratification and implementation of international climate agreements. Second, it does not specify the interrela-
tionship between international integration and domestic explanatory factors. 
Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer (2015) have proposed a modified model of the explanatory model of cross-national 
variation in ‘Heidelberg School’ public policy, based on Zohlnhöfer (2005) (see Chapter 3), which addresses the 
interrelationship between domestic and international explanatory factors. They argue that the causal order of 
 
52 Nevertheless, the statistical analysis examines interaction effects between all domestic political institutional and international 
explanatory factors considered in this study. 
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factors that explain policy outputs must be specified to understand their interrelationship (Wenzelburger & 
Zohlnhöfer, 2015, p. 30). Accordingly, the explanatory model specifies the causal order of the explanatory factors 
of the ‘Heidelberg School’ (Wenzelburger & Zohlnhöfer, 2015, pp. 28ff.). Following Zohlnhöfer (2005) and veto 
player theory, they assume that political decision-makers (i.e., the government) are central to the adoption of pol-
icies (Wenzelburger & Zohlnhöfer, 2015, p. 28). Aspects of government are causally prior to other explanatory 
factors. Following Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer (2015, p. 28), theoretical approaches to comparative policy the-
ory, they identify three characteristics of government as factors that explain cross-national variation in policy 
output: the partisan composition of the government (party-difference theory), the number and ideological hetero-
geneity of veto players (veto player theory) and the diffusion of policies and ideas (policy diffusion). Other do-
mestic explanatory factors identified by comparative policy theories include context conditions, which influence 
government policy as incentives and pressures, i.e. they have no direct effect on policy output (Wenzelburger & 
Zohlnhöfer, 2015, p. 28f.). Globalisation and the socio-economic context are causally the furthest from policy 
outputs (Wenzelburger & Zohlnhöfer, 2015, p. 29). Thus, government responses to these context factors depend 
on aspects of the government and causally prior domestic-context factors (Wenzelburger & Zohlnhöfer, 2015, p. 
29). International integration has no direct or independent effect on policy output (Wenzelburger & Zohlnhöfer, 
2015, pp. 28f.). Its effect is moderated by the government and domestic context factors. The advantage of this 
explanatory model is that it describes the causal order of explanatory factors of cross-national variation in policy 
output, making it possible to specify the interrelationship between domestic and international factors. Second, its 
assumptions are in line with most theoretical approaches to the policy consequences of globalisation (see Chapter 
3). Finally, the explanatory model of the ‘Heidelberg School’ can be complemented by other explanatory factors 
(Zohlnhöfer, 2013, p. 377).  
In sum, the explanatory model developed by Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer (2015) makes it possible to specify the 
causal order of domestic political institutional and international explanatory factors of the three perspectives on 
the joint influence of domestic political institutions and globalisation.  
5.2 Theoretical framework 
This section partly reformulates the explanatory model and uses it to examine cross-national variations of climate 
commitment and performance. First, in contrast to Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer (2015), I do not regard policy 
diffusion as an aspect of the government. Second, the explanatory model does not consider policy outcomes (such 
as climate performance). Third, the theoretical framework of the ‘Heidelberg School’ does not address institutional 
quality in general or political corruption in particular. Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer’s (2015) explanatory model 
was developed in the context of established democracies. The present study includes regime type. The reformu-
lated explanatory model makes it possible to specify the causal order of domestic political institutional and inter-
national determinants of the three perspectives on the joint influence of domestic political institutions and global-
isation and their interrelationship, thus helping to formulate hypotheses for the empirical analysis.  
Following Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer (2015), this study assumes that the government is causally prior to other 
domestic and international explanatory factors. Governmental aspects, therefore, moderate the effect of interna-
tional and domestic context factors on climate policy output. Veto player theory is used to identify political insti-
tutions that belong to the governmental system, i.e. that are involved in political decision-making processes. Veto 
players are defined as individual or collective actors, with the ability to block political decisions (see Chapter 4).53 
Following Fuchs (2000, pp. 32f.), I distinguish institutions within the governmental system from other political 
institutions. They are institutions with the function of vertical accountability (e.g. elections, political rights, the 
party system) or the relationship between citizens and the government (e.g., political and civil rights). These po-
litical institutions influence policy outputs indirectly, via the government system. They are context conditions of 
government behaviour.  
Climate performance has been conceptualised as climate policy outcomes (see Chapter 2). In this respect, it is 
important to consider another category of political institutions: implementation or administrative institutions, i.e. 
political institutions that implement political decisions. These institutions have a direct impact on policy outcomes 
(e.g., climate performance). They have no effect on climate policy outputs (i.e. the ratification of climate treaties 
or the adoption of climate change mitigation policies).  
In contrast to Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer (2015), this study considers regime type and political corruption. Both 
concepts refer to multiple categories of political institutions. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 specify the causal order of ex-
planatory factors related to regime type and the political-corruption approach, discussing their interrelationship 
with international integration.  
 
53 Broader definitions of veto players include actors and institutions that cannot block political decisions but put pressure on 
political decision-makers (e.g., interest groups). For the present study, it is important to consider the causal order of explanatory 
factors. Relevant societal veto players are viewed as controls.  
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Following the discussion in the literature review (see Chapter 3), the present study focuses on the influence of 
international political integration, economic openness, and economic interdependence as relevant international 
explanatory factors. Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer (2015) focus on economic globalisation and EU integration. 
They do not explicitly refer to international political integration, understood as embeddedness in IGOs. While the 
present study does not focus on the effect of EU integration, it is a control variable (see Chapter 6). In accordance 
with Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer’s (2015) explanatory model, international integration is seen as an external 
incentive and pressure on the government. This study does not consider policy diffusion to be an as aspect of the 
governmental system. In accordance with the policy-diffusion literature, economic interdependence constitutes an 
incentive or pressure on national governments to act in accordance with trading partners (see Chapter 3). Wenzel-
burger and Zohlnhöfer (2015) argue that globalisation is causally distant from policy outputs. The influence of 
international economic and political integration on climate commitment and performance is therefore affected by 
domestic-context factors and the government system.  
The present explanatory model considers the four moderation effects identified in the discussion of the theoretical 
literature in Chapter 3. First, the government system moderates the effect of international incentives and pressures. 
It can act in accordance with them but does not necessarily do so. Second, domestic institutional context factors, 
i.e. domestic political institutions that are not part of the government system (domestic political institutions with 
the function of leadership selection) and international context factors are seen as incentives and pressures on gov-
ernment behaviour. They can strengthen or weaken each other. For instance, this assumption underpins the argu-
ment that democracies are more open to international influences. Third, country differences in implementation 
institutions can influence the effect of international integration on climate policy outcomes (climate performance). 
For instance, a failure to implement environmental regulations can moderate the effect of economic openness on 
climate performance via economic growth. So far, I have assumed, with Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer (2015), 
that international integration has no direct effect on climate commitment and performance. Following economic 
theory, economic openness affects climate performance via economic growth, independent of the government 
system (see Chapter 3). This relationship can be moderated by all kinds of political institutions, as context factors 
of international trade and investment. 
Figure 5.1 summarises the explanatory model of cross-national variation in climate commitment and performance.  
As explained in Chapter 3, this study focuses on veto players, political corruption, and regime type as possible 
moderating factors. It does not consider all possible interrelationships between domestic and international explan-
atory factors.54 Moreover, this study does not assume that political institutions and globalisation alone can explain 
cross-national variation in climate commitment and performance. Alternative explanations must be considered 
when analysing country differences in climate commitment and performance (Christoff & Eckersley, 2011, p. 
444). Relevant control variables are addressed in Chapter 6. The following sections formulate hypotheses on the 
joint effect of domestic political institutions – veto players, dimensions of political corruption, and regime type – 
and globalisation on climate commitment and performance. 
Figure 5.1 Explanatory model 
 
 
 
54 For instance, second-image theory assumes that international integration indirectly affects policy output, as the winners and 
losers of globalisation can influence climate policy outputs, via the regime type and vertical accountability. This causal pathway 
should be studied in future research. 
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5.3  The joint effects of veto points, policy preferences of veto 
players, and globalisation on climate commitment and perfor-
mance 
Following previous research on environmental and social policy (e.g., Cao & Prakash, 2012; Ha, 2012, 2008; 
Wenzelburger & Zohlnhöfer, 2015; Zohlnhöfer, 2005) (see Chapter 3), this chapter formulates hypotheses on the 
joint influence of domestic political institutions and globalisation on climate commitment and performance, from 
the perspective of veto player theory (Tsebelis, 2002). Based on the discussion of the literature on veto players and 
climate commitment and performance in Chapter 4, this chapter considers the ideological heterogeneity among 
veto players, specific veto points, and government ideology, as possible moderator variables. The following sec-
tion specifies the causal position of these explanatory factors, vis-à-vis globalisation and climate commitment and 
performance (5.3.1). Section 5.3.2 formulates hypotheses on the possible interaction effects. 
5.3.1 Specification of the explanatory model 
The most elaborate theoretical approach in veto player theory comes from Tsebelis (2002). In comparison to veto-
point theory, it has the advantage of theorising the interaction between political institutions and political actors; 
this gives it a micro-foundation (Jahn, 2010, p. 47). In veto player theory, ideological distance among veto players 
is decisive. Given the available data, this study focuses in the left/right dimension (see Chapter 6). In relation to 
the ratification of international agreements, only the veto player who disagrees the most with the international 
treaty is crucial (Schulze, 2014, p. 119) (see Chapter 4). 
Following the conclusion of Chapter 4, this study also examines possible joint effects of globalisation on specific 
veto points. Previous theoretical and empirical research has found no uniform effect of institutional veto points – 
bicameralism, presidentialism, and the number of government parties – on climate commitment and performance. 
As Chapter 4 explains, this study does not consider the effect of federalism separately from bicameralism. Second, 
previous research on state responses to globalisation from the perspective of veto player theory (e.g., Zohlnhöfer, 
2005) has examined the joint effect of government ideology and globalisation, given that government parties are 
agenda setters in the political decision-making process. Government parties, especially in parliamentary systems, 
have the ability to make policy proposals that other veto players can either accept or decline (Tsebelis, 2002, p. 2, 
62; Zohlnhöfer, 2005, p. 51). To consider this topic, this study applies partisan-difference theory, which suggests 
that the partisan composition of the government is decisive for climate commitment and performance (see Chapter 
4, Schmidt, 1996, p. 155; Schmidt & Ostheim, 2007, p. 51).  
The ideological heterogeneity of veto players, specific veto points, and government ideology refer to aspects of 
the governmental system. They therefore have a direct effect on the ratification of climate treaties and the adoption 
of climate change mitigation policies (climate policy output). They are causally prior to other domestic and inter-
national influences. This means that they moderate the effect of international economic and political integration 
on climate commitment and performance. In addition, the ideological heterogeneity of veto players, veto points, 
and the partisan composition of the government can affect the relationship between economic openness and climate 
performance via economic growth, as context factors of international trade and investment. For instance, they 
affect a country’s attractiveness for foreign investment (see Section 5.3.4). Figure 5.2 presents the joint influence 
of veto players and globalisation on climate policy outputs and climate policy outcomes. 
To conclude, this study examines, from the perspective of veto player theory, whether ideological heterogeneity 
among veto players, government ideology, and specific institutional veto points moderate the effect of international 
integration on climate commitment and performance. 
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Figure 5.2 Veto players, veto points, and climate commitment and performance 
 
Notes:   Dashed lines refer to effects that are not considered in the original veto-player approach to state responses to global-
isation. This study does not examine that climate policy outputs might moderate as context conditions of international 
trade and investment the effect of economic openness on climate policy outcomes. 
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5.3.2 Ideological heterogeneity of veto players and government ideology 
This section argues that the policy preferences of veto players in the left/right dimension make no difference to 
the effect of international economic and political integration on climate commitment and performance. 
International economic integration 
This study assumes no effect of the presence of a right-wing veto player, ideological heterogeneity among veto 
players in the left/right dimension, or international economic integration (economic openness or policy diffusion) 
on Kyoto Protocol ratification and climate performance. Following Cao and Prakash (2012, p. 69, footnote) right-
wing governments with few veto players are most likely to act in accordance with trade-competition pressures, in 
contrast to left/green governments with few veto players. However, left- and right-wing parties both care about 
international competitiveness and have no clear positions on climate change mitigation (see Chapter 4). This study, 
therefore, assumes no effect of the presence of a right-wing veto player on Kyoto Protocol ratification, or of ideo-
logical distance on climate performance. The absence of a right-wing veto player enabled Chrétien in Canada to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol. By contrast, the Clinton administration was aware that the Kyoto Protocol would never 
be ratified by Congress; it never intended to start the ratification process. This enabled it to support international 
climate cooperation during and after negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, irrespective of international competitive-
ness concerns. Apart from the absence of right-wing veto players, competition concerns did not apply to the red-
green government in Germany or the Labour government in the United Kingdom, as the business-as-usual devel-
opment of their greenhouse gas emissions enabled them to accept their emissions reduction targets. Accordingly, 
no difference in the effect of international economic integration on Kyoto Protocol ratification and climate perfor-
mance is expected in countries with left- or right-wing government ideologies. 
The present study also expects no moderation effect of government ideology in the left/right dimension (or the 
presence of a right-wing veto player) on the effect of international economic integration on UNFCCC ratification. 
International competition concerns are of less importance for UNFCCC ratification, which does not involve sig-
nificant costs. Thus, left- and right-wing veto players do not affect the relationship between international economic 
integration and UNFCCC ratification. 
International political integration 
As left-wing parties are more open to international cooperation, right-wing government ideology (or the presence 
of a right-wing veto player) can weaken the positive effect of international political integration on UNFCCC and 
Kyoto Protocol ratification and climate performance (see Chapter 4). However, as it does not cost much to ratify 
the former, the effect of international political integration is unlikely to differ in countries that do or do not have 
right-wing veto players. In fact, most developed countries that are, in worldwide comparisons, highly involved in 
IGOs, ratified the UNFCCC quickly, independent of government ideology or the presence of a right-wing veto 
player. Is the effect of international political integration on Kyoto Protocol ratification and climate performance 
stronger in countries with left-wing government ideology or no right-wing veto player? As previously explained, 
in developed countries, support for the Kyoto Protocol among left-wing veto players has varied with the green-
house gas emissions targets. Left-wing veto players in developing countries may be more inclined to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol than their right-wing counterparts because they are more open to international support for sustain-
able development. Simultaneously, a right-wing veto player may also accept international support for climate 
change mitigation.  
To conclude, this study assumes that policy preferences in the left/right dimension cannot explain state responses 
to economic and political globalisation. 
5.3.3 Veto points 
While there may be no joint effect of the policy preferences of veto players in the left/right dimension and global-
isation on UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification and climate performance, veto points can moderate the effect 
of globalisation. As explained in Chapter 4, veto points either support or undermine climate commitment and 
performance. Accordingly, institutional constraints may strengthen or weaken the effects of economic and political 
globalisation. The effects of international economic and political integration on climate commitment and perfor-
mance may be stronger in countries with few government parties, no bicameralism, and no presidential veto player. 
It is easier for such countries to act in accordance with international economic or political incentives or to resist 
international pressures. With regard to the positive effect of international political integration, more veto points 
also imply that diffuse interests are better represented in the political system. However, the negative effects of 
international economic integration may be stronger and the positive effects of political integration weaker on cli-
mate commitment and performance in countries with high levels of government fragmentation, bicameral systems, 
or presidential systems. A single opponent of climate protection who acts in accordance with international eco-
nomic pressures or against international political incentives may prevent the ratification of the climate treaties and 
the adoption of climate change mitigation policies. Competition concerns blocked the ratification of the Kyoto 
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Protocol by the US Congress. Canadian provinces that expected to lose from climate change mitigation blocked 
climate change mitigation policies.  
With regard to climate performance, an additional argument suggests that the effect of economic openness varies 
with government fragmentation, the presence of a president, and/or bicameralism. Veto points are a context factor 
in international trade and investment. The literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment examines 
whether veto points help a country attract international trade and investment (e.g., Ahlquist, 2006, p. 689; Henisz, 
2002; Henisz, 2000, p. 338f.; Jensen, 2003, pp. 594f.; Li & Resnick, 2003, pp. 186f.). This literature discusses 
whether a low or high number of veto points is attractive for international trade and investment.  
In sum, it is theoretically unclear whether veto points contribute to a stronger or weaker effect of international 
economic integration on climate performance. Chapter 4 has shown that no uniform effect of specific veto points 
on climate commitment and performance can be assumed. This chapter argues that the same applies to the joint 
effect of specific veto points and globalisation. 
Chapter 4 has shown that the relationship between government fragmentation and climate commitment and per-
formance is ambiguous, from a theoretical perspective. It is also not clear whether the number of government 
parties affects state responses to globalisation. The number of veto points may hinder or support the effect of 
international incentives and pressures (see above). In addition, government fragmentation is associated with the 
accountability of political parties (see Chapter 4). When a larger number of government parties implies lower 
accountability for individual government parties, this may support a country’s ability to act in accordance with 
economic pressures. Simultaneously, it may weaken the effect of positive incentives related to international polit-
ical integration. However, as Chapter 4 explained, it is unclear, from a theoretical perspective, whether more gov-
ernment parties implies lower levels of accountability. In sum, it is unclear whether government fragmentation 
strengthens or weakens the negative effects of international economic integration on climate performance and the 
positive effects of political globalisation on climate commitment and performance. 
With regard to the joint effect of globalisation and bicameralism on climate commitment and performance, the 
conclusion of the literature review in Chapter 4 should be considered. The effect of bicameralism depends on 
whether supporters or opponents are in power; it also reflects the division of responsibility and costs between the 
federal and state levels. While the Australian upper chamber enabled Greens to influence climate change mitigation 
policy, the US Congress opposed the ratification of climate treaties and the introduction of climate change mitiga-
tion policies, among others, because of international competitiveness concerns. Thus, there may be no general 
moderation effect of bicameralism on the relationship between international economic integration and climate 
commitment and performance – or on the relationship between international political integration and climate com-
mitment.  
In this developed-country sample, only the United States has had a presidential veto player during the research 
period. For this reason, no interaction effects between presidentialism and international integration in developed 
countries could be formulated. Scholars do not agree on whether parliamentary or presidential systems are more 
likely to consider diffuse interests, such as climate change protection, and are willing to introduce climate policies 
despite economic pressures and the lower negative scale effects of economic openness (see Chapter 4). Thus, it is 
theoretically unclear whether a presidential veto-player moderates the effects of economic and political globalisa-
tion. With regard to economic openness and climate performance, the literature also discusses whether parliamen-
tary or presidential systems are more open to international trade and investment. This can affect climate perfor-
mance, via scale effects. Presidential systems may be more open to trade, leading to higher negative scale effects 
of economic openness on climate performance. By contrast, Persson and Tabellini (2006, p. 322) have argued that 
parliamentary democracies are more likely to adopt liberal trade policies, i.e. to liberalise trade, because they 
consider the policy preferences of more voters. To conclude, whether presidential and non-presidential democra-
cies vary in the effect of international economic integration on Kyoto Protocol ratification and performance is an 
empirical question. 
To conclude, the moderation effects of veto points on the relationship between globalisation and climate commit-
ment and performance may vary between specific veto points. No interaction effect of international economic 
integration – openness and policy diffusion – is expected with government fragmentation, a presidential veto 
player, or bicameralism on UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification. Chapters 2 and 3 conclude that there is no 
general effect of economic globalisation on UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol ratification. With regard to economic 
globalisation and the Kyoto Protocol, competition concerns regarding the Kyoto Protocol varied among developed 
countries. It does not cost any country much to ratify the UNFCCC. For this reason, there are no interaction effects 
of veto points and international political integration on participation in the UNFCCC. 
5.3.4 Conclusions 
This study assumes that government ideology and ideological heterogeneity in the left/right dimension do not 
influence the relationship between globalisation and climate commitment and performance. Left- and right-wing 
parties care about the competitiveness of the domestic economy. It is theoretically unclear whether specific veto 
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points strengthen or weaken the effects of international economic and political integration on Kyoto Protocol rat-
ification and performance. Specific veto points and their interaction with globalisation should be examined sepa-
rately. The reason for this is that moderator effects can vary between specific veto points. No interaction between 
veto points and international economic integration on UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification is expected, as 
there is no clear effect of economic globalisation on climate commitment. Hxveto1–14 formulate competing hypoth-
eses regarding the joint effects of globalisation and the policy preferences of veto players on Kyoto Protocol rati-
fication and climate performance. As no effect of economic openness in developed countries is expected, these 
hypotheses refer only to interactions developing countries. For the same reasons, hypotheses on the interaction 
between veto players and policy diffusion (economic interdependence) refer only to developed countries. Table 
5.1 summarises the hypotheses on the joint effects of globalisation with government ideology and veto players. 
Table 5.1 Veto players, globalisation, and climate commitment and performance 
Hxveto1 The positive effect of international political integration on Kyoto Protocol 
ratification should be stronger in countries with higher levels of govern-
ment fragmentation. 
Hxveto2 The positive effect of international political integration on Kyoto Protocol 
ratification should be weaker in countries with higher levels of govern-
ment fragmentation. 
Hxveto3 The positive effect of international political integration on Kyoto Protocol 
ratification should be stronger in presidential democracies. 
Hxveto4 The positive effect of international political integration on Kyoto Protocol 
ratification should be weaker in presidential democracies. 
Hxveto5 The positive effect of international political integration on Kyoto Protocol 
ratification should be stronger in bicameral democracies. 
Hxveto6 The positive effect of international political integration on Kyoto Protocol 
ratification should be weaker in bicameral democracies. 
Hxveto7 The negative effect of economic openness on climate performance should 
be stronger in developing countries with higher levels of government frag-
mentation. 
Hxveto8 The negative effect of economic openness on climate performance should 
be weaker in developing countries with higher levels of government frag-
mentation. 
Hxveto9 The negative effect of economic openness on climate performance should 
be stronger in presidential developing democracies. 
Hxveto10 The negative effect of economic openness on climate performance should 
be weaker in presidential developing democracies. 
Hxveto11 The negative effect of policy diffusion on climate performance should be 
stronger in developed countries with higher levels of government frag-
mentation. 
Hxveto12 The negative effect of policy diffusion on climate performance should be 
weaker in developed countries with higher levels of government fragmen-
tation. 
Hxveto13 The negative effect of policy diffusion on climate performance should be 
stronger in bicameral developed countries. 
Hxveto14 The negative effect of policy diffusion on climate performance should be 
weaker in bicameral developed countries. 
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5.4  The joint effects of political corruption and globalisation on 
climate commitment and performance 
Previous research indicates that political corruption worsens the negative impact of economic openness on climate 
performance (see Chapter 3). In contrast to the existing literature, this section discusses multiple dimensions of 
globalisation. Based on the conclusions in Chapter 4, it also includes a separate discussion of forms of political 
corruption and examines both climate commitment and performance. Executive, legislative, and public sector cor-
ruption are expected to strengthen the negative effects of economic openness on climate performance in developing 
countries. This chapter begins by specifying the explanatory model. Next, it discusses the joint impact of globali-
sation and political-corruption dimensions on climate commitment and performance. Finally, it presents conclu-
sions. 
5.4.1 Specification of the explanatory model 
Political corruption has been defined as the misuse of public office for private gains by political decision-makers 
and public officials (see Chapter 4). The literature review recommends distinguishing between corruption among 
political decision-makers and public-sector officials (see Chapter 4). The data from McMann et al. (2016) enables 
this study to differentiate between executive, legislative, and public sector corruption.55 The conceptualisation of 
political corruption on different levels of the political system makes it possible to consider the causal order of 
explanatory factors in the analysis of interaction effects (see Figure 5.3). Executive and legislative corruption have 
a direct effect on climate policy output (e.g., climate commitment) because they refer to characteristics of the 
governmental system. They can make a difference to government responses to globalisation. Public sector corrup-
tion has no direct effect on climate output (including climate commitment). It directly affects climate policy out-
come (including climate performance) because it undermines the implementation of climate policies. Executive, 
legislative, and public-sector corruption influence the effects of economic openness on climate performance via 
economic growth. They are context conditions of international trade and investment. 
Public sector corruption can also influence the behaviour of political decision-makers as a context factor (see 
Chapter 4). This assumption underlies the argument that governments that are aware of high levels of public sector 
corruption may be less likely to pursue ambitious climate policies (see Chapter 4). Climate commitment is, how-
ever, understood here to be the ratification of international climate treaties. For this reason, public sector corruption 
is not considered in this analysis of climate commitment. 
 
Figure 5.3 Political corruption, globalisation, and climate commitment and performance 
 
Notes: The main argument of this figure is displayed by solid lines. 
5.4.2 Executive, legislative, and public sector corruption 
The following section formulates hypotheses on the joint effect of globalisation – economic and political globali-
sation – and political-corruption dimensions. 
International economic integration 
As Chapter 3 has explained, economists expect the effect of economic openness on climate performance to be 
stronger in corrupt countries (e.g., Chang, 2015; Cole, 2007; Damania et al., 2003). The influence of polluters is 
stronger on corrupt members of government and parliament (see Figure 5.4), who tend to be more open to business 
interests in exchange for bribes; they have little interest in adopting or implementing climate-protection policies. 
The negative effect of economic openness on climate performance is higher in countries with high levels of public 
sector corruption. Public sector corruption undermines the monitoring and implementation of environmental reg-
ulations because it enables domestic and international firms to bribe public-sector officials. In sum, the negative 
 
55 This study does not consider judicial corruption. 
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effects of trade and capital openness on climate performance are likely to be higher in countries with high levels 
of executive, legislative, or public sector corruption.  
Political corruption makes a country less attractive for international investment (see Figure 5.5). Bribes imply 
higher costs for investors and uncertainty about the future behaviour of governments and public officials (Biglaiser 
& DeRouen, 2006, p. 53; Biglaiser & Staats, 2010, p. 510). The economic literature suggests that FDI inflows are 
lower in corrupt countries (e.g., Fredriksson et al., 2003; Peres et al., 2018). Thus, political corruption may be 
associated with lower CO2 emissions, via lower scale effects of economic growth. From this perspective, trade and 
capital openness are likely to undermine climate performance in countries with higher levels of executive, legis-
lative, and/or public sector corruption. 
To conclude, forms of political corruption are likely to moderate the effect of economic openness in developing 
countries. The direction of the interaction effect is an empirical question. This study assumes no joint effect of 
economic openness and political corruption in developed countries. As Chapter 3, has explained, no effect of 
economic openness in rich countries is expected. Chapters 2 and 3 argue that there is no effect of economic glob-
alisation on climate commitment. Likewise, there are expected to be no interaction effects with executive or leg-
islative corruption on UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol ratification. 
Chapter 3 argues that international economic integration affects climate performance in developed countries via 
policy diffusion. Executive and legislative corruption may strengthen this effect on climate performance in devel-
oped countries. Corrupt members of government and parliament may be less open to other policy preferences, 
such as climate protection. To ensure economic competitiveness, governments may undermine the implementation 
of environmental regulations and public-sector officials may accept bribes. Thus, the effect of policy diffusion 
may be stronger in countries with higher levels of executive, legislative, and/or public sector corruption.  
 
Figure 5.4 Political corruption dimensions, globalisation, and climate commitment and performance 
 
Notes: The main argument of this figure is displayed by solid lines. 
 
Figure 5.5 Political corruption dimensions, globalisation, and climate performance 
 
Notes: The main argument of this figure is displayed by solid lines. 
 
However, both corrupt and non-corrupt governments consider the international competitiveness of their domestic 
economies. Thus, no interaction effects are expected between political-corruption dimensions and policy diffusion 
on climate performance. 
International political integration 
The literature has not addressed the relationship between political globalisation and political corruption. Based on 
the corruption/environment literature (see Chapter 4), corruption leads politicians to focus more on their own self-
interest than on generalised interests. Thus, they may be less open to positive incentives of international political 
integration, declining to ratify climate agreements quickly or to adopt and implement climate change mitigation 
policies. With regard to climate commitment, countries with corrupt governments and parliaments are more likely 
to ratify climate treaties fast. Corrupt countries may participate in international cooperation to enhance their inter-
national reputations. Thus, involvement and centrality in IGO networks may contribute to climate-treaty 
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ratification, especially in corrupt countries. This is particularly relevant to soft climate treaties, such as the UN-
FCCC. Overall, political corruption may strengthen or weaken the positive incentives derived from international 
political integration. These effects can balance each other out. Executive and legislative corruption are thus not 
expected to influence the positive effect of international political integration on climate commitment and perfor-
mance.  
5.4.3 Conclusions 
The political-corruption approach makes an important contribution to our understanding of the relationship be-
tween economic openness and climate performance in developing countries. Political corruption is likely to mod-
erate the effect of economic openness on climate performance in developing countries (see Table 5.2). The direc-
tion of the effect on climate performance is an empirical question. To ascertain whether specific forms of political 
corruption are decisive, executive, legislative, and public sector corruption are examined separately. 
Table 5.2 Political corruption, globalisation, and climate commitment and performance 
Hxcorr1a The negative effect of economic openness on climate performance should 
be higher in developing countries with higher levels of executive/legisla-
tive/public sector corruption. 
Hxcorr1b The negative effect of economic openness on climate performance should 
be higher in developing countries with lower levels of executive/legisla-
tive/public sector corruption. 
5.5 Joint effect of regime type and globalisation on climate com-
mitment and performance 
The regime-type approach to the policy consequences of globalisation assumes that democracies and autocracies 
differ in their responses to international integration (see Chapter 3). As all developed countries are democracies, 
and as democracy-quality indicators do not vary significantly, this approach has been applied only to developing 
countries (analysis of climate commitment and performance) and the pooled sample (analysis of climate commit-
ment). As explained in Chapter 3, Spilker (2013) finds no joint effect of regime type and trade openness on CO2 
emissions in developing countries. To date, no studies have investigated climate commitment. The present study 
examines the effect of specific democratic qualities on the relationship between globalisation and climate commit-
ment and performance, in addition to regime-type differences, based on the conclusions in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 
shows that, while there may be a systemic difference in the ratification of the UNFCCC between democracies and 
autocracies, no uniform effect of democratic qualities – vertical or horizontal, political and civil rights – on Kyoto 
Protocol ratification and climate performance can be assumed. Moreover, the present study considers economic 
and political globalisation.  
This chapter argues that there is likely to be a systemic difference between democracies and autocracies in the 
effect of political globalisation on UNFCCC ratification. In contrast to previous research (e.g., Ruoff, 2009), it 
explains that it is unclear, from a theoretical perspective, whether international political integration contributes 
more to UNFCCC ratification in democracies or autocracies. While democracies may be more open to international 
cooperation, autocracies can ratify the UNFCCC fast to enhance their international reputations. With regard to the 
Kyoto Protocol and climate performance, only specific democratic qualities, such as political and civil rights, are 
likely to moderate the effect of political and economic globalisation. Unlike the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol has 
been contested by both developed and developing countries. Political and civil rights may strengthen the positive 
effects of international political integration on Kyoto Protocol ratification. Political rights enable ENGOs to pres-
sure governments to act in accordance with international incentives. Countries that accept the rule of law may be 
more open to climate cooperation. Political and civil rights also moderate the effect of trade and capital openness 
on climate performance in developing countries. On the one, hand political and civil rights can weaken the negative 
effects of economic openness; on the other hand, they can contribute to global air pollution by making a country 
more attractive for international trade and investment. This chapter begins by specifying the explanatory model 
used to consider democracy-quality dimensions. The second section discusses the interrelationship between re-
gime-type characteristics and globalisation. The last section summarises the hypotheses. 
5.5.1 Specification of the explanatory model 
The literature on the joint effect of regime type and globalisation assumes that governments in democracies and 
autocracies react in different ways to international integration. Accordingly, the following section begins by for-
mulating hypotheses on the joint effect of regime type and international integration on climate commitment and 
performance. The academic literature suggests that democracies are more open than autocracies to international 
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influences. As Chapter 4 makes clear, in contrast to UNFCCC ratification, no uniform effect of vertical and hori-
zontal accountability or political and civil rights on Kyoto Protocol ratification and climate performance can be 
assumed. For this reason, the interaction effects between institutional aspects of democracy and globalisation are 
examined separately. Regime type includes characteristics of various categories of political institutions, relative 
to its causal position vis-à-vis policy outputs. To formulate hypotheses on moderation effects with international 
integration, the explanatory model must specify the position of the democracy-quality dimensions, relative to other 
determinants (see Figure 5.6). 
As Chapter 4 has explained, this study distinguishes between four democracy-quality dimensions: electoral and 
horizontal accountability and political and civil rights. Horizontal accountability, i.e. checks and balances, refers 
to an aspect of the government system. In fact, it partly overlaps with the veto-player approach, which also exam-
ines institutional constraints on government. Accordingly, checks and balances have a direct effect on the ratifica-
tion of climate treaties and the adoption of climate change mitigation policies. It moderates government responses 
to domestic and international influences. Its effect on climate performance is moderated by implementation insti-
tutions. Vertical accountability, political rights, and civil rights have an indirect effect on climate policy output via 
the governmental system. Vertical accountability influences which actors have access to the governmental system. 
Political and civil rights are the institutional context of citizens and interest groups, which pressure the government 
to consider their climate-policy preferences. In terms of their interplay with globalisation, this means that they (as 
an incentive to government behaviour) may strengthen or weaken the effect of international incentives and pres-
sures on the ratification of climate treaties and the adoption of climate policies. For instance, political rights may 
enable public support for climate cooperation. This could make a government open to international incentives 
decide to join international climate cooperation.  
Vertical and horizontal accountability, as well as political and civil rights, also have an effect on climate policy 
outcomes, independent of climate policy output. They influence the behaviour of citizens and firms. Thus, they 
can moderate the scale effects of economic openness on climate policy outcomes. The following sections formulate 
hypotheses on possible moderation effects of regime type, democracy-quality dimensions, and international inte-
gration.  
 
Figure 5.6 Democracy-quality dimensions, globalisation, and climate commitment and performance 
 
 
5.5.2 Regime type 
International economic integration 
The International Relations literature assumes that international economic integration contributes to international 
cooperation (see Chapter 3). International Political Economy research suggests that democratic developing coun-
tries are more open to trade and foreign capital (Jakobsen & de Soysa 2006, p. 388; Milner & Kubota, 2005). The 
reason is that they have abundant labour, i.e. workers, who profit from trade and investment and have more influ-
ence over the democratic political decision-making process than workers would have in autocracies. By contrast, 
capital owners stand to lose from economic openness because it undermines their monopolistic position in the 
domestic economy; they have more control over the political decision-making process in autocratic developing 
countries. Thus, the positive incentives of trade and capital openness to ratify international climate agreements are 
more prevalent in democracies than in autocracies. The assumption that democracies are more open to international 
trade and investment is contested (e.g., Persson & Tabellini, 2006, p. 321). Moreover, the Chapter 3 discussion of 
the globalisation/environmental literature expected no overall effect of economic openness in developed countries 
and a negative effect on climate performance in developing countries.  
As economic openness implies an exposure to the pressure to stay economically competitive, the negative effect 
of trade and foreign investment could be stronger in developing democracies than in autocracies. Presumably, both 
democratic and non-democratic governments consider the competitiveness of their economies in order to stay in 
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power. Therefore, no joint effect of regime type and economic openness is expected because of pressures to stay 
competitive. For the same reason, this study assumes no joint effect of regime type and economic interdependence 
on climate commitment and performance (see also Cao & Prakash, 2012, p. 6 with regard to domestic pollution). 
There may, however, be a joint effect of regime type and economic openness on climate performance via economic 
growth. International trade and investment contribute to CO2 emissions via economic growth (see Chapter 3). The 
regime type is a context factor in the behaviour of firms. Economists and political scientists often discuss whether 
democracies or autocracies are more attractive for foreign investors (Desbordes & Verardi, 2017, p. 43; Li & 
Resnick, 2003, p. 176; Li et al., 2018). Attractiveness to foreign capital may undermine climate performance via 
scale effects of economic growth. On the one hand, democracies are expected to attract FDI because vertical ac-
countability, horizontal accountability, political rights (e.g., media freedom), and civil rights (e.g., property rights) 
reduce uncertainty and expropriation risk, contribute to political stability, and enable long-term investments 
(Ahlquist, 2006, p. 689; Choi & Samy, 2008; Desbordes & Verardi, 2017, p. 43; Feng, 2001; Jensen, 2003, pp. 
594f.; Li & Resnick, 2003, p. 176; Olson, 1993, p. 573; Pastor & Hilt, 1993, p. 492; Pastor & Sung, 1995, p. 226). 
On the other hand, autocracies may be more attractive to multinational enterprises, given that horizontal account-
ability can hinder policy reform, vertical accountability can lead to policies that harm foreign investment (i.e. 
protection of domestic firms and adoption of social policies) and political rights, such as media freedom, may 
prevent deals between multinational corporations and government officials (Biglaiser & Staats, 2010, p. 510; Des-
bordes & Verardi, 2017, pp. 43f.; Haggard, 1990, pp. 258f.; Li & Resnick, 2003, p. 176; O’Donnell, 1978; Oneal, 
1994, p. 567). Harms and Ursprung (2002) conclude that the theoretical literature is ambiguous. Li and Resnick 
(2003) argue that democracy has positive and negative effects on FDI. Biglaiser and DeRouen (2006) note that 
democracies and autocracies do not differ in their attractiveness to foreign capital. The empirical research is am-
biguous. In a recent study, Desbordes and Verardi (2017) have found that democracy contributes to FDI. Thus, no 
joint effect of democracy and capital openness on climate performance is expected. ‘Democracy by itself, does not 
necessarily support greater profit opportunities or reduce risk’ (Biglaiser & Staats, 2010, p. 518). As the following 
sections will argue, specific traits of democracy can make a country attractive to international trade and foreign 
investors. 
International political integration 
The International Relations literature suggests that democracies are more cooperative, at the international level, 
than their autocratic counterparts (see Chapter 4). Thus, democratic countries involved in IGOs tend to be more 
exposed and open to the positive effects of international political integration on climate commitment and perfor-
mance (Payne, 1995, p. 48; Ruoff, 2009; Spilker, 2012). Similarly, the democracy/environment literatures assume 
that democracies are more environmentally friendly because they are, in general, more cooperative at the interna-
tional level (e.g., Midlarsky, 1998, pp. 345f.). Following Midlarsky (1998, p. 346) the arguments that link democ-
racy to peace – citing mutual identification among democracies, cooperation among countries, and representative 
institutions – also apply to environmental protection. Learning from other democracies via international coopera-
tion also contributes to environmental protection (Midlarsky, 2001, p. 161; Midlarsky, 1998, p. 346). In sum, the 
literature suggests that the positive effect of international political integration on climate protection is stronger in 
democracies than in autocracies. As Chapter 4 explains, this study assumes that regime type matters only for 
UNFCCC ratification (vs. Kyoto Protocol ratification and climate performance).  
Based on the literature on autocracies and the ratification of human-rights treaties, autocracies embedded in the 
international political system are more likely to ratify soft climate treaties (e.g., the UNFCCC). Hafner-Burton and 
Tsutsui (2005) have argued, drawing on world society theory, that states which lack the willingness or ability to 
protect human rights do ratify human-rights treaties to gain legitimacy in international society. This is especially 
true in the case of international treaties that lack enforcement mechanisms; as these are ratified by many states, it 
is easy to identify as deviants states that are not signatories. World society theory suggests that legitimacy becomes 
more important when a country is integrated into international society (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005, p. 1382). 
Thus, autocracies that are well-integrated into the international political system are more likely to ratify the UN-
FCCC to enhance their international reputations. To conclude, regime type matters to the relationship between 
IGO involvement and the ratification of soft international climate treaties, such as the UNFCCC. Whether the 
positive effect of political integration is stronger in democracies or autocracies is an empirical question. 
To conclude, this study assumes that regime type and international political integration together influence the 
ratification of the UNFCCC. It is an empirical question whether democracies or autocracies involved with IGOs 
are more likely to ratify the UNFCCC. On the one hand, democracies are more open to participating in soft inter-
national agreements. On the other hand, autocracies that participate in international initiatives tend to ratify soft 
international treaties to enhance their international reputations. No general difference between democracies and 
autocracies, regarding the effect of economic openness and interdependence on climate commitment and perfor-
mance, is expected. 
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5.5.3 Vertical accountability 
The theoretical discussion shows that no effect of competitive elections on climate commitment and performance 
can be expected. The effect depends on whether supporters or opponents of climate protection are elected. Ac-
cordingly, competitive elections alone make no difference to the relationship between international economic and 
political integration and climate commitment and performance.  
As detailed above, some scholars believe that vertical accountability incentivises foreign capital because it reduces 
political uncertainty (such governments are more likely to keep their commitments to ensure re-election) (e.g., 
Jensen, 2003). It has also been argued that democracies are better at implementing necessary policy measures to 
ensure economic growth because they enjoy higher levels of public acceptance through being elected (Pastor & 
Hilt 1993, p. 492). However, other explanatory factors have been found to be more important (e.g., Biglaiser & 
Staats, 2010).  
To conclude, this study assumes no joint influence of vertical accountability and international political or economic 
integration on climate commitment and performance. 
5.5.4 Horizontal accountability 
The discussion about checks and balances and climate commitment and performance is linked to the debate on 
veto players and climate protection. While horizontal accountability can strengthen the positive effects and lessen 
the negative effects of international political and economic integration by considering a range of policy prefer-
ences, a single veto player opposed to climate cooperation and protection can delay the process of ratifying the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol and hinder the adoption and implementation of climate policies. In addition, no 
uniform interaction effects of specific veto points are expected, alongside international political and economic 
integration on climate commitment and performance. In this respect, no interaction effects on climate commitment 
and performance can be assumed between horizontal accountability and international economic and political inte-
gration. 
Chapter 3 expected to find a negative effect of economic openness on climate performance in developing countries 
via scale and composition effects. Checks and balances are beneficial for economic growth because they enable 
long-term investments by domestic and international firms (e.g., Henisz, 2002; Henisz, 2000, p. 338f.). Horizontal 
accountability is also attractive to foreign capital because it contributes to political stability and reduces the risk 
of expropriation (Ahlquist, 2006, p. 689; Jensen, 2003, pp. 594f.; Li & Resnick, 2003, pp. 186f.). The negative 
effects of trade and investment may, therefore, be stronger in developing countries with high values of horizontal 
accountability. However, other institutional traits of democracy have been found to have more impact on the de-
cisions of foreign investors (Biglaiser & Staats, 2010). 
In sum, no interaction effect is expected between horizontal accountability and international political or economic 
integration, on either climate commitment or climate performance. 
5.5.5 Political rights 
The positive effect of international political integration may be more prevalent in countries with freedoms of ex-
pression, association, media, and an independent civil society. Both international political integration and political 
rights are here regarded as incentives, encouraging governments to join international climate cooperation (see 
Chapters 3 & 4). As Chapter 3 explains, constructivist and world-society theorists assume that domestic political 
institutions can strengthen or weaken international influences because they affect a country’s responsiveness. In 
this respect, ecological-modernisation theory assumes that political and civil rights reflect ‘a country’s institutional 
reflexivity and receptivity to environmental reform’ (Zahran et al., 2007, p. 43). They therefore make a country 
more likely to consider environmental protection (Leroy & van Tatenhove, 2000, pp. 196f., 200; Zahran et al., 
2007, pp. 41, 43). In addition, domestic interest groups can use international cooperation to enforce their climate-
policy preferences by demanding the ratification of international agreements (Payne, 1995, p. 47). This interaction 
effect is likely to be weaker in relation to climate performance than commitment. It is more difficult for domestic 
groups and foreign countries to monitor the implementation of climate-policy goals than the ratification of climate 
treaties. Governments may not act in accordance with international incentives involving international political 
integration. In sum, the positive effect of international political integration on climate commitment is likely to be 
stronger in countries with more political rights. 
The negative effects of economic openness and interdependence on climate commitment and performance may be 
weaker in countries with more political rights. This is a positive incentive, encouraging governments to ratify 
international climate agreements, despite concerns about economic competitiveness. For instance, in the developed 
world, public support contributed to Kyoto Protocol ratification despite competition concerns. Public support of 
the Kyoto Protocol was important for EU ratification. The Japanese government ratified the Kyoto Protocol, de-
spite fears that it would lose economic competitiveness, because of public pressure to ratify the international treaty 
named for a Japanese city. However, as competition concerns vary across developed countries, no general 
115 
 
 
interaction effect on the Kyoto Protocol can be assumed. In addition, chapter 3 concluded that economic openness 
should not undermine climate commitment. This interaction effect might also not apply to climate performance 
because issue visibility is higher for the ratification of international treaties than for their implementation. Moreo-
ver, climate change mitigation is associated with considerable costs. 
Political rights, however, can moderate the effect of economic openness on climate performance via economic 
growth. On the one hand, the negative scale effects of trade and investment on climate performance may be less 
prevalent in countries with high-level political rights because they enable local communities to pressure firms to 
consider environmental regulations via the media, courts, protests, and lobbying (Spilker, 2013, pp. 55, 58f.). On 
the other hand, political rights, including media freedom, reduce political uncertainty and thus make a country 
more attractive to domestic and foreign investment (Choi & Samy, 2009, pp. 87f.). Harms and Ursprung (2002) 
have found that lower levels of political and civil repression are associated with higher levels of FDI. It follows 
that countries with high-level political rights have higher levels of trade and capital openness, and (via scale ef-
fects) higher CO2 emissions. Political rights also contribute to economic stability, as they enable the government 
to obtain knowledge of economic problems (Pastor & Hilt, 1993, p. 492). In sum, the direction of the interaction 
effect between political rights and international economic integration is an empirical question. Spilker (2013) has 
found support for the hypothesis that political rights weaken the negative aspects of international trade; for this 
reason, we can expect the negative effect of trade openness to weaken as freedom rights increase. 
In sum, the positive effect of international political integration on climate commitment is stronger in countries 
with higher levels of political rights. No such interaction effects are expected in relation to climate performance, 
as it is more difficult for the public to monitor the implementation of climate policies, which are also associated 
with considerable costs. Political rights may weaken negative pressures caused by economic openness on govern-
ment behaviour, and strengthen the implementation of environmental regulations. However, the negative effects 
of economic openness on climate performance might also be stronger in countries with high- level political rights. 
They affect a country’s ability to attract international trade and investment. 
5.5.6 Civil rights 
Based on the existing theoretical and empirical literature, no independent effect of civil rights on climate commit-
ment is expected (see Chapter 4). The positive effects of international political integration may be more prevalent 
in countries with extensive civil rights. Acceptance of the rule of law makes it more likely that governments will 
enter into international climate treaties and act in accordance with their guidelines. Thus, the two incentives pro-
moting international integration can strengthen each other. Governments that are more involved in IGOs and accept 
the rule of law at the domestic level tend to be more willing to join international climate agreements (and also 
perform better in reducing greenhouse gas emissions) than countries that have few civil rights and are less politi-
cally integrated at the international level. Moreover, as explained above, ecological-modernisation theory suggests 
that political and civil rights make a country more likely to consider environmental protection. This interaction 
effect is weaker on climate performance than commitment, as climate change mitigation is associated with con-
siderable costs and is harder for the domestic and international public to control. 
Following neoliberal institutionalism, economic openness (trade and capital openness) provides an incentive for 
countries to cooperate at the international level (see Chapter 3). Thus, the governments of economically open 
countries, which accept the rule of law at the domestic level, may be more willing to join international climate 
agreements than economically closed countries with few civil rights. However, Chapters 2 and 3 conclude that 
there is no clear effect of economic openness or economic interdependence on climate commitment. For this rea-
son, no interaction effects with civil rights are expected.  
Countries that accept the rule of law are more likely to implement environmental regulations. In addition, local 
communities can demand that the government act in accordance with existing law. However, in the case of climate 
change, there is a trade-off between economic growth from international trade and investment and climate protec-
tion. Independent of civil rights, the pressure to stay economically competitive is likely to be more important to 
climate performance. In this respect, therefore, no joint influence of economic openness and civil rights on climate 
performance is expected. For the same reason, no joint influence of economic interdependence and civil rights on 
climate commitment and performance is expected. While the rule of law may provide an incentive by encouraging 
governments to act in accordance with international treaties, market pressures matter more to governments.  
Economic openness influences climate performance also via its effect on economic growth. Civil rights may, as 
context factors of international trade and investment, moderate their effect on climate performance via economic 
growth. Spilker (2013, pp. 55, 59) has argued that democracy lessens the negative effects of economic openness 
(via economic growth) on the environment because civil rights, including property rights and the rule of law, 
provide a secure investment environment. This enables firms to use newer and more environmentally friendly 
technologies. In particular, capital openness may be associated with higher CO2 emissions in countries with ex-
tensive civil rights. The democracy-FDI literature suggests that civil rights, such as property rights and the rule of 
law, make a country more attractive to multinational corporations by reducing the risk of expropriation (e.g., 
116 
 
 
Jensen, 2003, p. 594; Henisz, 2000; Olson, 1993, p. 573; Peres et al. 2018, p. 628). The absence of the rule of law 
makes firms uncertain about their legal rights (Drabek & Payne, 2002, p. 782; Peres et al., 2018, p. 629). Inade-
quate rule of law contributes to corruption (Dahlström & Johnson, 2007; Peres et al., 2018, p. 629). In addition, 
property rights enable firms and individuals to use natural resources for their short-term interests. Biglaiser and 
Staats (2010) asked CEOs of US firms investing in Latin America about their investment decisions. They found 
that, among the characteristics of democracy, rule of law, democratic property rights, and a functioning court 
system were decisive for investment. This statistical analysis supports their survey results. They concluded that 
‘regime type alone is less important than factors more directly tied to investment risk’ (Biglaiser & Staats, 2010, 
p. 509). Biglaiser and DeRouen (2006) have observed that property rights contribute to FDI. Harms and Ursprung 
(2002) have shown that political and civil repression make a country less attractive for FDI. Peres et al. (2018) 
have found that rule of law is an important explanatory factor in FDI. There is a separate literature on human rights 
and FDI. It has been argued that countries with low levels of human rights are more attractive for FDI because 
they allow multinational corporations to pay lower wages (Blanton & Blanton, 2007, p. 144; Tuman & Emmert, 
2004, p. 13f.). Blanton and Blanton (2007, p. 146) have argued that wages have become less important to multi-
national corporations. This finding is in line with the argument that human rights imply higher levels of political 
stability and lower levels of uncertainty for foreign investment. Their empirical analysis supports this hypothesis. 
To conclude, the positive effect of international political integration on climate commitment is likely to be higher 
in countries with higher levels of civil rights. No such effect is expected on climate performance, which is associ-
ated with considerable socio-economic costs and is more difficult for the domestic and international public to 
control. Economic openness may interact with civil rights, in relation to its effect on climate performance. It is 
unclear whether there is a stronger negative effect of trade and capital openness in countries with high or low levels 
of civil rights. 
5.5.7 Conclusions 
This section presents hypotheses on the joint influence of regime type and international political and economic 
integration (see Table 5.3). The regime-type approach to the policy consequences of globalisation assumes that 
democracies and autocracies differ in their responses to international integration. Previous research has focused 
on climate performance (Ruoff, 2009; Spilker, 2013). With regard to climate commitment, this chapter assumes 
that treaty design matters to the joint relationship between political globalisation and climate commitment. It ex-
pects the positive effect of international political integration on UNFCCC ratification to vary between democracies 
and autocracies (see Figure 5.7). It is an empirical question whether democracies or autocracies involved in IGOs 
are more likely to ratify the UNFCCC. Therefore, two competing hypotheses have been formulated. 
Figure 5.7  Political globalisation, regime type, and UNFCCC ratification 
 
While systemic differences are expected between democracies and autocracies, with regard to the effect of inter-
national political integration on UNFCCC ratification, only specific democratic qualities are likely to moderate 
the effect of international political integration on the more ambitious Kyoto Protocol. The positive effect of inter-
national political integration on Kyoto Protocol ratification is likely to be higher in countries with high-level po-
litical and/or civil rights, which enable ENGOs to pressure the government. Domestic pressures caused by ENGOs 
and international incentives derived from IGO involvement in Kyoto Protocol ratification may strengthen each 
other (see Figure 5.8). Second, governments that accept the rule of law at the domestic level may also be more 
likely to ratify hard climate treaties. 
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Figure 5.8  Political globalisation, political and civil rights, and Kyoto Protocol ratification 
 
This study assumes that neither regime type nor specific democratic qualities moderate the effect of international 
political integration on climate performance, as it is difficult for the public to monitor the implementation of cli-
mate policies, which are also associated with considerable costs. Previous research has found no systemic differ-
ences between democracies and autocracies, with regard to the effect of international political integration on CO2 
emissions (Ruoff, 2009). 
Among democratic qualities, political and civil rights may moderate the effect of international trade and investment 
on climate performance. As previously explained, there are competing hypotheses. On the one hand, they may 
weaken negative pressures caused by economic openness on government behaviour, and strengthen the implemen-
tation of environmental regulations (see Figure 5.9). On the other hand, they affect a country’s ability to attract 
international trade and investment (see Figure 5.10). Political and civil rights are likely to moderate the effect of 
economic openness on climate performance via economic growth. 
Table 5.3 Democracy, globalisation, and climate commitment and performance 
Hxdemocracy1a International political integration contributes to UNFCCC ratification in 
democracies. 
Hxdemocracy1b International political integration contributes to UNFCCC ratification in 
autocracies. 
Hxdemocracy2a The positive effect to international political integration on Kyoto Proto-
col ratification should be stronger the higher a country’s levels of politi-
cal rights. 
Hxdemocracy2b The positive effect to international political integration on Kyoto Proto-
col ratification should be stronger the higher a country’s levels of civil 
rights. 
Hxdemocracy3a The negative effect of economic openness on climate performance 
should be weaker the higher a developing country’s levels of political 
rights. 
Hxdemocracy3b The negative effect of economic openness on climate performance 
should be stronger the higher a developing country’s levels of political 
rights. 
Hxdemocracy4a The negative effect of economic openness on climate performance 
should be weaker the higher a developing country’s levels of civil rights. 
Hxdemocracy4b The negative effect of economic openness on climate performance 
should be stronger the higher a developing country’s levels of civil 
rights. 
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Figure 5.9  Economic openness and political and civil rights as incentives for government behaviour 
 
Notes: The main argument of this figure is displayed by solid lines. 
 
Figure 5.10 Political and civil rights as incentives for international trade and investment 
 
Notes: The main argument of this figure is displayed by solid lines. 
5.6 Conclusions 
Do the effects of economic and political globalisation on climate commitment and performance depend on domes-
tic political institutions? The broader literature on the environmental policy effects of international integration 
studies the importance of institutional constraints and ideological heterogeneity among veto players, regime type, 
and political corruption to explain state responses to globalisation. In response to the research question, this chapter 
has specified explanatory models of climate commitment and performance, based on these three perspectives, and 
formulated hypotheses for the empirical analysis.  
The central argument of this chapter is as follows: while there is little reason to assume that domestic political 
institutions influence the relationship between economic interdependence and climate outcomes in developed 
countries, institutional variables are likely to moderate the effects of economic openness and international political 
integration on climate commitment and performance. The veto-player approach adds little to our understanding of 
the relationship between globalisation and climate commitment and performance. Left- and right-wing veto play-
ers consider a country’s international competitiveness. It is an empirical question whether specific veto points 
matter to the relationship between political globalisation and Kyoto Protocol ratification, or to the effect of eco-
nomic interdependence on climate outcomes in developed countries. In line with previous research, political cor-
ruption may influence the negative relationship between economic openness and climate performance in develop-
ing countries. It is an empirical question whether specific dimensions of political corruption are crucial and whether 
they strengthen or weaken the negative effects of international trade and investment. In contrast to earlier research, 
this chapter argues there is no general difference between democracies and autocracies in the effect of economic 
openness on global air pollution. Political and civil rights may moderate the effect of economic openness. This 
may explain why Spilker (2013) found no interaction effect between regime type and trade openness on climate 
performance. The present study assumes that the regime-type approach contributes to our understanding of the 
relationship between international political integration and climate commitment. The effect of international polit-
ical integration on the UNFCCC may be higher in democracies or autocracies. By contrast, political and civil rights 
are likely to moderate the effect of international political integration on Kyoto Protocol ratification. In sum, the 
possible interaction effects of globalisation and domestic political institutions are likely to help explain cross-
national variation in state participation in international climate cooperation. They vary, in accordance with the 
globalisation dimensions, between climate commitment and performance, as well as between UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol ratification. 
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6 Research Design 
Abstract 
This study uses statistical methods to study the joint effect of globalisation and domestic political institutions on 
climate commitment and performance. This chapter describes case selection, the research period, the measurement 
of independent variables, and the treatment of missing values. To make these results comparable to earlier research, 
standard indicators of international economic and political integration are used. Chapters 4 and 5 conclude that the 
possible moderation effects of veto players, political corruption, and regime type on the influence of globalisation 
should be examined on a disaggregated basis. This chapter examines the concept validity of the selected measure-
ment approaches. Finally, this chapter formulates control hypotheses and explains their measurement. 
To answer the research question, this study applies statistical methods. I am interested in the cross-national vari-
ance of climate commitment and performance worldwide. Quantitative methods are suitable for analysing a large 
number of countries (e.g., Obinger, 2004, p. 32). Moreover, they make it possible to test the hypotheses (Lauth et 
al., 2009, pp. 16, 22). To address causal relationships, the statistical analyses are supplemented with short case 
studies. The varied findings of previous studies reflect, in part, differences in research design (see Chapters 2, 3 & 
4). This chapter begins by explaining case selection and the research period (6.1). Second, it describes the meas-
urement of independent variables (6.2).56 Section 6.3 formulates control hypotheses for the multivariate analysis 
and explains their measurement. The criteria for the operationalisation of the independent variables were, in addi-
tion to validity and reliability, data availability and data comparability. Unfortunately, some data are still missing. 
The final section explains the treatment of missing values (6.4). 
6.1 Case selection and research period 
Global warming has only been regarded as a political problem at the international level since the early 1990s (see 
also Chapter 2). As this study focuses on state participation in climate cooperation within the UN climate change 
regime, the research period starts with the process of ratifying the UNFCCC in 1992 and ends in 2006. First, the 
global financial and economic crisis of 2007 changed the context of climate policy and resulted in economic 
growth-related reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. This is important to consider when analysing climate per-
formance. Second, data are available for most variables up to 2006.57 Finally, both international climate treaties 
(UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol) came into force during this time. 
As sampling methods cannot be used in macro-quantitative research, case selection determines possible inferences. 
A cross-county quantitative analysis also depends on comparable cases. Political processes in very small countries 
differ considerably from political decision-making processes in larger states. Following previous research, this 
study considers countries with at least 500,000 citizens during the research period. Data on population size from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) have been used (data access 2016). Only states that were 
independent for most years during the research period were examined.58 The climate policies of non-independent 
countries depend on political processes in other countries. The data on county independence came from von Stein 
(no year a) and was expanded using information from the CIA World Factbook (data access 2016). Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Liberia, and Somalia were dropped from the analysis, as they did not have functioning independent govern-
ments during much of the research period. In accordance with the polity2 variable of the Polity IV project, they 
were in a phase of transition, interruption, or interregnum. 
Most authors of similar studies have pooled data on developed and developing countries (see Chapters 3 & 4). As 
Chapter 2 explained, it is important to consider differences between rich and poor countries when analysing climate 
commitment and performance. At the same time, there is a lack of variance among Annex I countries that ratified 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol; EU member states joined the Kyoto Protocol together. This analysis of 
climate commitment therefore follows Prakash and Potoski (2007, p. 358) and Dolšak (2009, p. 562). I test ex-
planatory models for the pooled analysis of countries worldwide, while statistically controlling Annex I status and 
the developing-country sample. In global-comparative studies, data availability is the only criterion used for case 
 
56 The measurement of the dependent variables is explained in Chapter 2. 
57 Data on policy diffusion and state membership in IGOs are available until 2005, and on IGO network centrality until 2003. 
58 East Timor was not analysed, as it only became independent in 2001. The Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, and Eritrea 
became independent in 1993. They are included in the analysis because they were independent for most of the research period. 
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selection (Jahn, 2013a, p. 236). Thus, the pooled sample includes all independent countries with a population of 
at least 500,000, for which data are available, which have not been in a phase of transition, interruption, or inter-
regnum for much of the research period. 
This study examines the climate performance of developed and developing countries separately. An important 
criterion for differentiation between poor and rich countries in cross-national climate policy research is the Annex 
I status. In addition to GDP per capita this classification is based on a country’s contribution to worldwide green-
house gas emissions and political considerations (Gupta, 2010, pp. 639, 641). I therefore consider a country’s level 
of economic development (e.g., Landman, 2008, p. 269) to identify developed and developing countries. This 
study applies the World Bank classification of high-income economies as a threshold (see also Baek et al., 2009; 
Spilker, 2012). The WTO classified countries in 2005, using a GNI per capita higher than 10,725 US dollars (The 
World Bank Group, no year).59 The 2005 threshold constitutes a high threshold, as the last year of the research 
period for most independent variables (with the exception of network centrality) (see also Spilker, 2012). Using 
the World Bank criteria, Annex I and Non-Annex I parties encompass both developed and developing countries 
(see Table A6.1 in the annex). This analysis of climate performance considers only high-income Annex I countries 
and non-high-income Non-Annex I countries. Annex I and Non-Annex I countries that are not classified as devel-
oped or developing countries, based on the World Bank criteria (e.g., Turkey), have been dropped from the anal-
yses of climate performance and climate commitment in developing countries. 
Given the limited comparability of the dependent variable, this analysis of climate performance does not consider 
post-communist countries (see also Garmann, 2014, p. 3; Obinger, 2000, p. 3). Post-communist countries have 
been identified in accordance with McCormick (2001, p. 7). Following the economic breakdown after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, there was a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions that was not the result of environmental 
policies (Lynch, 2000, p. 430; Tosun, 2012, p. 441). Post-communist Annex I countries are also classified within 
the UNFCCC as economies in transition. For this reason, they have different obligations from other Annex I coun-
tries (Annex II countries) (UN, no year). Unfortunately, it is not possible to analyse them separately, due to a lack 
of data on major Eastern European countries. Moreover, this country group includes high-income and non-high-
income countries, as well as Annex I and Non-Annex I parties to the UNFCCC. Data availability further restricts 
the developed and developing-country sample. The resulting developing-country sample encompasses up to 68 
countries. The developed-country sample includes only 21 countries. However, the selected rich countries form a 
relatively homogenous sample of established democracies. McCormick (2001, p. 7) has identified them all as 
liberal democracies. The present sample of developed countries thus conforms to the most-similar-systems case 
design, which makes it possible to test hypotheses, as context-factors are controlled through the selection of similar 
countries (Jahn, 2013a, p. 252).60  
6.2 Measurement of the independent variables61 
This section describes the measurement of the main independent variables. As explained in Chapter 3, two con-
ceptualisations of international economic integration are considered (economic openness and policy diffusion via 
important trading partners) as well as international political integration (state involvement in IGOs and state cen-
trality in IGO networks). With regard to the measurement of these variables, this study applies standard indicators 
to make the results comparable.  
The disaggregated measurements of the ideological heterogeneity of veto players and veto points, political-cor-
ruption dimensions, and regime-type differ from those in similar studies. To assess their validity and reliability, I 
have used the framework of concept validity developed by Pickel et al. (2015), which is based on the work of 
Munck and Verkuilen (2002) and Müller and Pickel (2007). Its underlying idea is that measurement approaches 
that fulfil criteria of empirical social research in the phases of index construction (conceptualisation, measurement 
and aggregation) constitute valid and reliable measurements.  
Validity in the conceptualisation phase results from the transparency and adequacy of concept specification and 
concept logic (Pickel et al., 2015, pp. 500, 504ff.; see also Müller & Pickel, 2007; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002). 
Concept specification refers to the identification of a concept’s attributes. Concepts must be differentiated from 
related variables, applicable to various cultural and spatial contexts (contextual range), and must include all rele-
vant elements, while excluding irrelevant elements (parsimony). Transparency implies that concept attributes and 
their components are described and defined at different levels of abstraction. Concept logic refers to vertical and 
horizontal relationships between concept elements. Pickel et al. (2015, pp. 500, 506) have suggested the following 
criteria: explaining the relationships between the elements (coherence); assigning elements to the appropriate level 
 
59 For Iraq, Kosovo, North Korea, and Somalia, no data on GNI per capita in 2005 are available. Following McCormick (2001), 
they have been classified as developing countries. 
60 Chapter A6.1 in the annex describes the selection of developed countries in more detail. 
61 Parts of this chapter have been used in Escher & Walter-Rogg (2020, 2018). 
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of abstraction (no conflation); and ensuring that elements at different levels do not overlap (no redundancy). The 
following criteria are important in the measurement phase: the validity and reliability of indicators, multiple data 
sources, the possibility of replicating the measurement approach, and explaining data sources and measurement 
levels. The measurement level must maximise the homogeneity of cases within measurement classes and minimise 
the number of measurement classes (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002, p. 17). Jahn (2010, p. 45) adds that indicators 
should vary over time to allow for a panel analysis. Indicators must also be equivalent across countries. I also 
consider data availability and comparability across the whole country sample and research period. To evaluate 
validity in the aggregation phase, the literature recommends a theory-based aggregation rule, a theoretically and 
empirically adequate aggregation level that uses the horizontal and vertical relationships between elements of the 
concept, and theory-based weights as quality criteria. Reliability, robustness tests, and replicability are additional 
quality criteria in this phase.  
6.2.1 Economic openness 
Two types of indicators of economic openness can be distinguished (Chang, 2015, p. 243, see also Jahn, 2016b, p. 
864; Schirm, 2007, p. 3). The first are indicators of policy openness, which measure the degree of liberalisation of 
a country’s trade policy (e.g., trade tariffs, capital market controls) (Chang, 2015, p. 243; Holzinger et al., 2008, 
p. 561). The second are indicators of trade policy outcomes, i.e. trade, capital and financial flows (openness of 
outcome) (Chang, 2015, p. 243; Gilardi, 2013, p. 455). The latter approach ‘measures the actual degree of trade 
openness’ (Chang, 2015, p. 243). This study focuses on economic openness, defined as the extent of a country’s 
economic interactions with other countries (see Chapter 3). It therefore applies indicators of openness of out-
come62. Following EKC theory, the separate measurement of the technique, scale, and composition effects of trade-
induced economic growth is preferred (e.g., Dean, 2002, p. 822). In accordance with most studies, the present 
study uses data on economic exchanges as a percentage of GDP (Babones, 2007, p. 146; De Soysa & Neumayer, 
2005, p. 733; Jahn, 2009, p. 100; Milner & Keohane, 1996, p. 4; Zürn, 2002, p. 237, see also Chapter 3). First, this 
research is interested in the overall effect of economic openness. Second, data availability and comparability are 
limited, making it difficult to measure technique, scale, and composition effects separately. 
The standard indicators of openness in outcome in empirical globalisation research are the percentage of total 
exports and imports of GDP (trade openness) and the percentage of the stock or flow of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) of GDP (capital openness) (Babones, 2007, p. 146; Gilardi, 2013, p. 455). In accordance with previous 
research on climate commitment and performance (see Chapter 3), the present study considers trade and capital 
openness. To reduce positive skewness, the percentage of the sum of exports and imports of GDP has been logged. 
As smaller countries often have a relatively high degree of trade openness, this is captured, following Babones 
(2007, pp. 147f.), by the residual of the OLS regression of logged trade openness on logged population size. Data 
on total imports and exports as a share of domestic GDP come from the World Bank Development Indicators (The 
World Bank Group, 2016a). FDI inflows, as a percentage of GDP, change fast (Babones, 2007, pp. 149f.). Thus, 
this study captures capital openness via the stock of FDI inflows, as a proportion of GDP (foreign investment 
penetration concept) based on data from UNCTAT (2015). Data on the indicators of trade and capital openness 
are available for countries worldwide and the complete research period. The effect of trade and capital openness 
are analysed separately. First, empirical studies find only low correlations between the dimensions of economic 
openness (Garrett & Mitchell, 2001, p. 156). Second, trade and capital openness may affect climate commitment 
and performance in different ways (see also Zohlnhöfer, 2015, p. 200). Given the available data, this study distin-
guishes between the type of goods traded between countries and the source of FDI.63  
6.2.2 Economic interdependence 
A country’s degree of economic interdependence is conceptualised as policy diffusion via important trading part-
ners (see Chapter 3). This study applies the spatial-regression measurement approach, which includes a spatial-
effect variable as an independent variable in multiple regression models (Jahn, 2015, p. 262; Jahn, 2009, pp. 98ff.). 
This measurement approach makes it possible to analyse the effect of policy diffusion alongside other explanatory 
factors (Jahn, 2009, pp. 98f.) and interaction effects. There are various spatial models (Neumayer & Plümper, 
2010, p. 589). Based on the assumption that climate commitment and performance in other countries influence the 
ratification and implementation of climate treaties in a particular country, a spatial lag-model (also spatial-auto-
regressive model) is used (Franzese & Hays, 2007, p. 143; Jahn, 2015, p. 262; Neumayer & Plümper, 2010, p. 
589). The spatial effect or spatial lag variable results from the values of the dependent variable of connected coun-
tries (Jahn, 2015, pp. 262ff.; Jahn, 2009, pp. 98). It is estimated by comparing the weighed values of the dependent 
variables of all other countries with the values of the so-called spatial connectivity or weighting matrix. This matrix 
 
62 The validity and reliability of indicators of trade liberalisation are also restricted (Chang, 2015, p. 243). 
63 This may be an interesting research field for future studies (see Chapter 9). 
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measures the degree of intensity of the relationship of country i with all other countries k (Jahn, 2015, p. 262; 
Neumayer & Plümper, 2010, pp. 589, 591). This reflects the assumption that the more intense the relationship 
between countries, the stronger its effect on their policy outputs and outcomes (Jahn & Stephan, 2015, p. 24). 
To construct the spatial-lag variable, a dichotomous or continuous variable is needed to measure the intensity of 
each country’s interactions with all other countries (Jahn & Stephen, 2015, p. 24; Neumayer & Plümper, 2010, p. 
591). Most studies have used bilateral trade flows as connectivity indicators (Jahn & Stephan, 2015, p. 27f.). The 
assumption is that a country’s climate commitment and performance are influenced by the climate policies of its 
important trading partners (Jahn, 2013a, p. 366). Cao and Prakash (2010) have used the similarity of exported 
goods as a connectivity indicator. This measurement approach considers direct competition effects (Jahn & 
Stephan, 2015, p. 28). The present study uses data on bilateral trade flows as a connectivity variable. Domestic 
policymakers use simpler heuristics, such as the policies of important trading partners, when evaluating policy 
options (Jahn, 2006, p. 408). In addition, imports can also influence a country’s climate performance (e.g., car 
imports). The connectivity variable can be directed or undirected (Neumayer & Plümper, 2010, p. 591). This study 
applies an undirected connectivity variable. To make the data collection manageable, a dichotomous variable is 
used to identify the five most important trading partners of each country, based on trade-relationship data (total 
imports and exports). The data come from the UN Comtrade database (UN Comtrade, 2017),64 which provides 
data on trade flows (exports and imports) between country pairs. Trade flows are measured in US dollars, based 
on market and official exchange rates (Babones, 2007, p. 149). This study uses annual data on exports and imports 
of commodities. As I have collected time-series cross-sectional data, the connectivity indicator is used to create a 
NxNxT spatial-weights matrix W for country pairs i and j (Jahn, 2006, p. 411f.)65. The connectivity matrix has 
been row-standardised i.e. ‘each cell of the [connectivity] matrix is divided by the row-sum of cells’ (Neumayer 
& Plümper, 2010, p. 591). Plümper and Neumayer (2010, p. 420; Neumayer & Plümper, 2012, p. 828; Neumayer 
& Plümper, 2010 p. 591) argue that the application of row-standardisation depends on the theoretical assumptions 
and research design. Row-standardisation assumes that exposure to diffusion is equal across countries (Neumayer 
& Plümper, 2012, p. 827f.). I regard the five most important trading partners as equally influential. The values of 
the weighting matrix for country pairs it and jt is then multiplied by an N vector of the dependent variable of linked 
countries j,t. The spatial lag variable results from total product of each country i. I multiply the connectivity matrix 
by the vector of the dependent variable (climate commitment and performance). The following countries were 
considered in the construction of the spatial-lag variables: all countries used in the analysis of climate commitment 
and selected developed and developing-country samples used to analyse climate performance. To estimate the 
spatial-lag variable, I used the STATA spmon command cited by Neumayer and Plümper (2010). 
6.2.3 International political integration 
The political globalisation/environment literature conceptualises international political integration as either state 
involvement in international IGOs and/or INGOs, or as state centrality in international IGO/INGO networks. The 
present study limits international political integration to state involvement in IGOs and state centrality in IGO 
networks. Data were not freely available on the presence of INGOs in countries at the time of data collection.66 
Moreover, this measurement approach makes these results comparable to similar studies. Panel data on network 
centrality is only available for IGO links (von Stein, 2008, p. 264f.). Ward (2006, pp. 150) finds that ‘[c]entrality 
in the environmental network is highly correlated with centrality in more general international networks.’ The 
KOF index of political globalisation uses the number of foreign embassies, per capita state contributions to UN 
Security Council missions, and international treaties that a country has signed and ratified (Dreher, 2006, p. 1093; 
Gygli et al., 2019, pp. 545, 555, 557f.). Data on participation in UN peacekeeping missions is not comparable 
across countries, as the form of participation varies considerably between countries (Martens & Zywitz, 2006, p. 
347). The diplomatic-relations indicator cannot adequately capture the level of international political integration 
of small countries, which often install embassies covering multiple countries (Martens & Zywitz, 2006, p. 338). 
The ratification of international treaties overlaps with climate commitment. Consequently, this study focuses on 
state involvement in IGOs.  
Four approaches to measuring IGO influence can be distinguished: a country’s annual number of IGO member-
ships, IGO co-memberships (e.g., Russett & Oneal, 2001), and IGO ties to other countries (network centrality) 
(e.g., von Stein, 2008; Ward, 2006), as well as the spatial lag of IGO co-memberships and the dependent variable 
(e.g., Yamagata et al., 2013). This study applies the most common indicator: a country’s annual number of IGO 
memberships (e.g., Bernauer et al., 2010; Ruoff, 2009; Spilker, 2013, 2012). Martens and Zywitz (2006, p. 341) 
 
64 Data from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) are not freely available. 
65 To construct the spatial lag variable, a dyadic dataset was created (Neumayer & Plümper, 2010, p. 595). It contains two 
variables that indicate units i and k, a year variable, the connectivity variable, and the lagged dependent variable. 
66 Since 2018, the KOF Index of globalisation has included data on international NGOs. Yet, it offers only data on the overall 
index (Gygli et al., 2019). 
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have argued that the more IGO memberships a country has, the more linkages it has to global institutions. They 
prefer this measure to the number of new IGO memberships in a year because existing memberships limit new 
ones (Ruoff, 2009, pp. 13f.).  
Several studies differentiate between types of IGOs (e.g., Ruoff, 2009, p. 19; Spilker, 2012). Given the available 
data, this study focuses on the general influence of IGO memberships, relying on annual IGO membership data 
through 2005 from the Correlates of War Project International Governmental Organisations Data Set (version 2.3) 
(Pevehouse et al. 2010, see also Bernauer et al., 2010; Ruoff, 2009; Spilker, 2013, 2012). These data consider only 
IGOs that have (1) at least three members that are sovereign states, (2) regular plenary sessions (at least one in ten 
years), and (3) permanent headquarters (Pevehouse & Nordstrom, 2003, p. 2). The present study counts full mem-
berships in IGOs. Bernauer et al. (2010, p. 527) found no difference in their results when they analysed full, 
associated, and observer membership IGOs; full memberships alone; or full membership and observer status. 
Missing values (-1) and ‘no state system member’ (-9) of individual IGOs are coded as zero in this study (no 
membership).  
Following Ward (2006), this study also tests a country’s degree of international political integration via its cen-
trality in the IGO network. Ward (2006) measures a country’s centrality by ‘the number of network ties it has to 
other countries’ (von Stein, 2008, p. 251). Network ties refer to the number of co-memberships of country i with 
another country j (Ward, 2006, p. 152). Thus, network centrality ‘increases as a function of the number of other 
nations i is linked with and, for any such nation j, the number of treaties both i and j are parties to’ (Ward, 2006, 
p. 152). Annual data on state centrality in IGO networks are drawn from von Stein (2008, p. 252, von Stein, no 
year b); these data are from 1991 to 2003. She counts a country’s annual number of IGO links to other states (von 
Stein, 2008 p. 252). 
6.2.4 Ideological heterogeneity among veto players 
As Chapter 4 explains, this study considers both ideological heterogeneity among veto players and institutional 
constraints. Accordingly, two measurement approaches can be distinguished within the veto-player and point lit-
erature: following Tsebelis’s (2002, 1995) analysis of the interaction between the policy preferences of political 
actors and institutional constraints, and the measurement of institutional constraints of government autonomy (i.e. 
the number of potential veto points) (Jahn, 2010, pp. 46f.). This section outlines the ways in which ideological 
heterogeneity is measured among veto players. The following section explains the operationalisation of political 
institutional constraints.  
There is a lack of valid and reliable panel data on the ideological heterogeneity of veto players outside the devel-
oped world. While many measurement approaches refer to Tsebelis’s veto-player concept, they conceptualise and 
measure veto-point influence (Wenzelburger & Zohlnhöfer, 2014, p. 319). This applies, for instance, to the DPI’s 
‘Checks and Balances’ measure, which offers time-series cross-sectional data for large N-studies (Cruz et al., 
2016a). Only Hensiz’s (2002, 2000) measures offer worldwide panel data and conceptualise and measure the in-
teraction between political institutions and the policy preferences of political actors (Tsebelis, 2010, p. 12; Tsebe-
lis, 2002, pp. 204f.). Chapter A6.2 in the annex examines these in order to establish whether they are valid and 
reliable measures of veto-player influence. It concludes that they show considerable validity and reliability prob-
lems in all three phases of index construction. Variation in both measures reflects the number of veto players and 
the fractionalisation of legislative chambers. Additionally, existing veto-player measures do not acknowledge that 
potential veto players vary between domestic policy and international treaty ratification. This section explains the 
measurement approach used in this study. 
According to Tsebelis (2010, p. 8), potential institutional veto players must be identified for each country year, 
during the phase of conceptualisation (see also Wenzelburger & Zohlnhöfer, 2014, p. 319). Institutional veto play-
ers are defined by the constitution (Tsebelis, 2002). As Chapter 5 explains, following Jahn (2010), only the most 
important potential veto players should be considered; these people (the president, coalition government and upper 
and lower chamber) are involved in nearly all political decisions. The analysis of climate commitment and perfor-
mance must take into account the fact that the number and composition of institutional veto players varies between 
domestic policy and international treaty ratification. Second, partisan veto players, i.e. political parties within in-
stitutional veto players, must be identified (Tsebelis 2010, p. 8). Partisan veto players are government parties. In 
cases where there is no government majority in the legislature, this study considers opposition parties as well. 
Third, the number of policy-preference dimensions must be examined (Tsebelis, 2010, p. 8). This study regards 
policy preferences as unidimensional across the left/right dimension (see Chapters 4 & 5). Fourth, the distance 
between veto players’ policy preferences must be estimated (Wenzelburger & Zohlnhöfer, 2014, p. 319). As Chap-
ter 4 explains, in a one-dimensional policy space, the ideological distance between the most extreme veto players 
is decisive (Tsebelis, 2002). Ideological heterogeneity among veto players in this analysis of climate performance 
is defined as the distance between left- and right-wing partisan veto players, within institutional veto players (the 
president, coalition government, and first and second legislative chambers) (see Chapter 5). In the analysis of 
climate commitment, only the presence of a right-wing veto player is decisive (see Chapter 4).  
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The following section explains the measurement approach used in this study. Separate veto-player measures have 
been developed for the commitment and performance models. This means that, in the analysis of UNFCCC and 
Kyoto Protocol ratification, political institutions are only considered if they have veto-player status in international 
treaty ratification. With regard to climate performance, veto players in domestic policy are relevant, as they must 
agree to changes in domestic law, supporting the adoption and to implementation of climate policies. 
For the president, as well as the upper and lower chambers, two dichotomous variables are created that indicate 
veto-player status in international treaty ratification and domestic policy. Given the available data, codings of 
developed and developing countries rely on different data sources. This study codes the veto-player status of the 
president, in the ratification process of developing countries, based on information from Simmons (2009); it codes 
the status of the upper and lower legislative chambers in developing countries, based on information from Hatha-
way (2007). Simmons (2009) provides descriptions of the formal ratification process, based on national constitu-
tions and worldwide laws. A code indicates whether the president of a particular country is a veto player in the 
ratification process. The veto-player status of political institutions in developed countries ratifying international 
treaties is coded, when possible, using information from Bookmann (no year); otherwise, information is drawn 
from Hathaway (2008) and Simmons (2009), as described above. Hathaway’s (2008) information is also used to 
code the veto-player status of upper and lower legislative houses in developing countries. The veto-player status 
of the president in poor countries is captured by the ‘system indicator from the Database of Political Institutions 
(DPI) 2015 (Cruz et al., 2016a). System codes political systems as parliamentary (2), assembly-elected president 
(1), and presidential (0). Countries described as presidential systems are coded as having a presidential veto player. 
The veto-player status of the upper and lower chambers of the legislature and the president in developed countries 
are coded using information provided by Jahn (2010). While Bookmann (no year), Hathaway (2008), and Simmons 
(2009) offer legal information, Jahn (2010) considers the rules in use, as well as changes over time. Unfortunately, 
such data are not available for developing countries. 
Within Tsebelis' veto player theory the preferences of political actors must be measured to assess the relative 
position of veto players (Ganghof, 2003, p. 3; Jahn, 2010, p. 45; Tsebelis, 2002, p. 8). Previous measurement 
approaches have relied on different data types: (1) the ideology positions of parties, based on party programs or 
expert survey assessments; (2) assessments of the ideology of political parties; (3) text analyses; and (4) estimated 
preferences (Ganghof, 2003, p. 3; Tsebelis, 2010, p. 8; Wenzelburger & Zohlnhöfer, 2014, p. 319). From a theo-
retical perspective, it is preferable to have a metric measurement of the political preferences of partisan veto play-
ers. Unfortunately, there is a lack of data on the policy preferences of partisan veto players in developing countries. 
Party ideology is therefore used an as an indicator of the policy preferences of veto players. The Database of 
Political Institutions (2015), cited in Cruz et al. (2016a), provides the broadest set of data available on the number 
of countries. It encompasses data on the name and party ideology (left, right, centre) of the head of the executive 
branch, the three largest government parties in the lower house, and the largest opposition parties in the lower 
house. Its codes for political ideology are solely based on party descriptions. Alternative indicators are used where 
available (mainly in developed countries). Dichotomous variables created for each institutional veto player indi-
cate whether a left, right, or centre partisan veto player is present. If a political institution has no veto-player power, 
political ideology dummies of partisan veto players are coded with zero. I use the DPI (2015) party ideology 
variable (‘execrlc’) for the head of the executive branch, drawn from Cruz et al. (2016a) as an indicator of the 
president’s party ideology. Using information on the president’s party in Hensiz (2002, data release 2012) (exec-
utive party), I code, for developed countries, the president’s party ideology as left/right/centre, using the party-
ideology codes proposed by Armingeon et al. (2015). Where available, I code the dichotomous variables, based 
on information on the relative share of left/right and centre parties in government, provided by Armingeon et al. 
(2015), as indicators of the policy preferences of partisan veto players in the lower house of parliament. In Swit-
zerland (1991), Denmark (1995–1997), Finland (1991), and the Netherlands (2002) there is no majority of a group 
of parties that share the same ideology. In these cases, I consider the party ideology of all party families that share 
the largest number of seats. For all other countries, this study uses DPI (2015) information on the party ideology 
of the three largest government parties in the lower house of parliament. Unfortunately, the DPI only provides 
information on the party ideologies of the three largest government parties in parliament. For the lower house of 
parliament, I code dichotomous variables, which measure whether at least one government party has a left, right, 
or centre ideology. A dummy variable indicates whether the government has a majority in the lower house of 
parliament or not. Data on the number of government party seats in parliament (‘numgov’) and total seats in par-
liament (‘totalseats’) come from the DPI (2015). Three additional dichotomous variables record the party ideolo-
gies of opposition parties, if the government has no majority in the lower house of parliament. Three dummies 
measure whether, in the case of a minority government, there is a left, right or centre majority among opposition 
parties. If the government has no majority in the lower house of parliament, I use, where available (developed 
countries), Swank’s (2013) indicators of the largest relative share of left/right/centre parties in the lower chamber 
to indicate the opposition’s policy preference. For all other countries, I use the political ideology of the largest 
opposition party, based on the DPI indicator. 
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No data on the political ideologies of political parties in the upper house are available for developing countries. 
Henisz (2002) provides data on the party affiliation of the president and upper and lower houses of parliament. He 
does not distinguish between government and opposition parties. Henisz’s (2002) data on the party composition 
of the upper house are coded, using party codes provided by Armingeon et al. (2015), where available (developed 
countries). In all other cases, these data come from the DPI 2015 (Cruz et al., 2016a) codings of the ideologies of 
political parties. To measure the policy preferences of partisan veto players in the upper house, dichotomous var-
iables are coded; these measure whether most seats are held by political parties with left, centre, or right political 
ideologies. If there is no left/centre/right majority in the upper house of parliament, all political parties are regarded 
as veto players (where no additional information is available).  
Only nominal data on the party ideologies of partisan veto players are available for developing countries. For this 
reason, the ideological distance between the two most extreme veto players cannot be measured. As an alternative, 
a dichotomous variable is coded to measure left/right polarisation among institutional veto players. To this end, I 
code three dichotomous variables, which indicate whether there is at least one left, right, or centre partisan veto 
player political party within the group of institutional veto players. On this basis, I code three dichotomous varia-
bles that measure whether there is at least one left, centre, or right veto player in a country year. For the analysis 
of climate performance, a dummy variable measures whether there is at least one left and one right partisan veto 
player in a country year, in order to measure veto-player influence on a left/right-scale. In accordance with the 
absorption rule, centre veto players are not considered. Following Schulze (2014, pp. 122f.), I use a dummy vari-
able that indicates whether there is at least a right veto player in a country year, to analyse climate commitment.  
Table 6.1 Bivariate correlations among veto player indices (Developed countries, 1991–2005) 
 Left-right 
polarisation 
Jahn1 Jahn2 Polcon iii Polcon v 
Left-right  
polarisation 
1     
Jahn1 .464*** 1    
Jahn2 .461*** .990*** 1   
Polcon iii .304*** .204*** .195*** 1  
Polcon v .141** .231*** .248*** .443*** 1 
Notes:  N=308 
The veto-player concept has been developed in the context of established democracies. For this reason, I have not 
applied indicators to non-established democracies. Non-established democracies have the value 0 for both veto-
player influence measures (see also Hensiz, 2002). A dichotomous variable measures whether a country is a de-
mocracy in a particular year, based on information from Polity IV (Marshall et al., 2015) and Freedom House 
(2015). A country is regarded as a democracy in a particular country year if its Freedom House status is free or 
partly free and the polity2 index from Polity IV is greater than 5. The country is also regarded as a democracy if 
either polity2 or the Freedom House status index indicate a democracy and the other one is missing. I use data 
from Freedom House in order to transfer the veto-player concept, as the measurement is based on a more demand-
ing understanding of democracy than the electoral democracy concept. Freedom House also considers rules in use. 
I supplement this data via the polity2 indicator. Unlike Freedom House, it considers checks and balances. A stricter 
threshold value is applied to the Polity IV index, which focuses mainly on rules of law. Finally, Freedom House 
and Polity IV data are available for most countries and the whole research period. Both veto player indices are 
defined as missing in democratic country-years of transition, occupation, or interruption as the veto-player status 
of political institutions is questionable during such periods. Table 6.1 examines the bivariate correlations between 
multiple measures of ideological heterogeneity of veto players for the panel data set of the developed Annex I 
country sample (from 1991 to 2005). In addition to the proxy for left/right polarisation, I consider the measures 
proposed by Henisz (2002, 2000) and Jahn (2010). Jahn1 is based on Tsebelis’s measure and Jahn2 performs well 
with regard to validity and reliability in the three phases of index construction. Jahn1 and Jahn2 have a higher 
correlation with left/right polarisation than with Hensiz’s (2000, 2002) polcon iii or polcon v. In addition, the 
results of the following analysis of climate performance in developed countries stay stable when Jahn2 is used 
instead of left/right polarisation. 
6.2.5 Veto points 
Based on the literature review, Chapter 4 argued that no uniform effect of institutional veto players could be as-
sumed. This study therefore tests the effect of institutional veto players separately. Data from the World Bank 
Dataset of Political Institutions (Cruz et al., 2016a) are used to consider the fragmentation of government by mul-
tiple government parties. In accordance with the veto-player measures, the number of government parties is zero 
in non-democracies (see Section 6.2.4) and in years of transition, interruption, and interregnum (Polity IV). A 
dichotomous variable, which indicates the veto-player status of the president in domestic policy/international treaty 
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ratification, is used to assess the difference between presidential and parliamentary systems. The measurement is 
described in Section 6.2.4. The measurement of the veto-player status of the upper chamber of the legislature in 
the analysis of climate commitment and performance has been described in the previous section. In the climate-
performance analysis, data from Cheibub et al. (2010, 2009) are also used to consider differences between presi-
dential and semi-presidential democracies. Presidentialism is not considered in the present analysis of climate 
performance in developed countries, due to a lack of variance (see Chapter 8).  
6.2.6 Government ideology 
Statistical analyses of government ideology and climate commitment and performance have used multiple indica-
tors. These have included the seat share of political parties belonging to a particular party family in government 
or parliament or the policy preferences of political parties, based on expert evaluations of party manifestos. Data 
on the policy preferences of political parties, based on expert evaluations, are unavailable for most countries out-
side the developed world. The present indicators are therefore based on the seat share of particular party families 
in government. The available data make it possible to distinguish left, right, centre, and green or left-libertarian 
political parties in developed countries and left, right, and centre political parties outside the developed world. 
This study therefore focuses on the left/right dimension. To consider variation among non-left parties (Schmidt, 
1996, p. 158), I apply a left-centre-right categorisation. The analysis of the climate performance of developed 
countries controls the effect of left-libertarian parties in parliament. Left-libertarian government ideology is not 
considered, as there was little variation during the research period. The available data makes it possible to measure 
government ideology by the percentage of governments seats held by political parties that belong to the same party 
family, in this analysis of the climate performance of developed countries. Government ideology is measured in 
the commitment and performance analyses of developing countries by the ideology of the largest government party 
in parliament in parliamentary democracies and of the chief of executive in presidential democracies (see Section 
6.2.4) or, if available, the ideology of the largest party family present in government, as measured by cabinet seats. 
Party-difference theory was developed in the OECD context. For this reason, non-established democracies receive 
the value 0 for government ideology variables (see Section 6.2.4). 
6.2.7 Political corruption 
This chapter explains the use of the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem) corruption measures (McMann et 
al., 2016), discussing their validity and reliability in the phases of index construction. The Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) developed by Transparency International (TI) (2016a, b) and the Control of Corruption measure cre-
ated by World Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann et al., 2010) have been frequently used in cross-national 
research; they show considerable validity problems, as indicators of political corruption in all three measurement 
phases (see Chapter A6.3 in the annex). Moreover, they measure public perceptions of corruption, rather than 
political corruption itself. The WGI index is broader than the political-corruption concept in its measurement. The 
corruption measure provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) has also been applied in previous 
research (see Chapter 4). Its data and methodology description are not freely available. 
The V-Dem Political Corruption Index performs well during the conceptualisation phase. Political corruption has 
been defined as ‘the misuse of public office for private gain’ (Treisman, 2000, p. 399) by political decision-makers 
and public officials (see Chapter 4, see also Knack, 2006, p. 5; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008, p. 170; Treisman, 2007, 
p. 211). This conceptualisation underlies the V-Dem measure (McMann et al., 2016, p. 8). The Political Corruption 
Index presents no problems in relation to concept specification or logic. Its underlying concept is restricted to the 
corrupt behaviour of political decision-makers and public officials, differentiating it from related concepts (e.g., 
the corrupt behaviour of non-political actors) (McMann et al., 2016, p. 10). Second, it addresses various forms of 
political corruption that are considered equally important: corruption by the executive, judicial, and legislative 
branches, and by the public sector. It further specifies sub-dimensions of executive and public sector corruption. 
Third, it considers grand and petty corruption (McMann et al., 2016, p. 9); it is also transparent.  
Political-corruption measures developed for large-N analyses, are based on expert evaluations and/or citizen and 
firm surveys67. The V-Dem corruption data are based only on the former (McMann et al., 2016, p. 6). They may 
be culturally biased, when non-native experts are considered (Treisman, 2007, p. 215). McMann et al. (2016, pp. 
6, 14) strengthen the reliability of their measurement by using multiple coders, including native scholars for each 
country year, and applying the same coding procedures over time and across countries. Many scholars prefer to 
use survey data to measure corruption, as opposed to data derived from expert evaluations (McMann et al. 2016, 
pp. 1f.). However, citizens’ perceptions limit the measurement of political corruption to public-service corruption 
(McMann et al., 2016, p. 13; Knack, 2006, p. 6) and thus neglect corruption within the state (Knack, 2006, p. 6). 
 
67 As corruption refers to illegal behaviour, there are no easily available observable indicators to measure the level of corruption 
in a country (Transparency International, 2016b). 
129 
 
 
Citizens primarily have contact with public officials. They may underestimate corruption in stable democracies, 
where political corruption ‘is more removed from citizen lives’ (McMann et al., 2016, p. 13). Pellegrini (2011, p. 
25) assumes that public-perception data overrate corruption during corruption scandals and underrate it at times 
of economic growth. Moreover, corruption-perception data may depend on cross-national differences in trust in 
government, satisfaction with the socio-economic situation, the importance of corruption as a media topic, and 
anti-corruption policies (Donchev & Ujhelyi, 2014, p. 314; Treisman, 2007, p. 215). Finally, survey items can be 
understood in different ways, depending on the cultural context (Treisman, 2007, pp. 215f.). To summarise, both 
expert evaluations and citizen perceptions have advantages and disadvantages. Measures that consider multiple 
data types are therefore preferable. 
The Political Corruption Index is based on six indicators. Legislative and judicial corruption are each measured 
by a single indicator. The measures of executive and public sector corruption are based on two indicators. The 
index considers all dimensions of political corruption and performs well with regard to content validity, based on 
the definition of political corruption (McMann et al., 2016, p. 8f, 12). With regard to face-validity, the measure 
does not include indicators that measure other concepts (McMann et al., 2016, p. 10). Few countries are left off 
the V-Dem political corruption index, which is comparable across countries and over time (McMann et al., 2016, 
pp. 15ff.). First, it is based on the same indicators for each country year (McMann et al., 2016, p. 15). Second, 
comparability is achieved by using the same coding rules and coders for each country year (McMann et al., 2016, 
p. 15). The aggregation rule reflects the underlying concept. It explains its aggregation rule via its concept of 
political corruption. V-Dem begins by aggregating the expert evaluations, using an item-response theory-meas-
urement model (McMann et al., 2016, p. 6). The indicators related to executive corruption and public corruption 
are aggregated using a Bayesian factor analysis (McMann et al., 2016, p. 14). Corruption is the mean value of the 
six forms of political corruption measures. Therefore, each form of political corruption is weighted equally 
(McMann et al., 2016, p. 14).  
To summarise, the Political Corruption Index presents no problems with regard to validity during the conceptual-
isation and aggregation phase. A disadvantage of the Political Corruption Index during the measurement phase is 
the fact that it considers only expert evaluations from the V-Dem data. However, alternative measures, which rely 
on citizen perceptions, face problems with validity and reliability. In addition, the Political Corruption Index offers 
sub-indices of legislative, executive, judicial, and public-authority corruption. This makes it possible to test the 
effect of specific forms of political corruption (McMann et al., 2016, p.11). It also enables researchers to examine 
executive, legislative, and public sector corruption separately, as discussed in the conclusion to Chapters 4 and 5. 
The overall political corruption measure is applied in some models as a control variable.  
6.2.8 Regime type 
As Chapters 4 and 5 explain, this study examines the effect of regime type, as well as specific democratic qualities, 
on climate commitment and performance. It also conceptualises and measures regime type as a dichotomous var-
iable. As Chapter 4 argues, a minimalist conception of democracy is well-suited to studying systemic differences 
between democracies and autocracies, in relation to climate commitment and performance. Here, data from 
Cheibub et al. (2010, 2009) are applied. This approach is based on a minimalist conception of electoral democracy; 
it performs well during the three phases of index construction. To consider arguments that the length of the expe-
rience of democracy is decisive, this study also tests a regime-type variable, based on a maximalist conception of 
democracy (see Chapter 4). The regime-type variable is derived from the construction of indicators of veto-player 
veto points and policy preferences (see Section 6.2.4). As previously explained, this dichotomous variable uses 
data from Freedom House and Polity IV.  
For the separate measurement of the effect of vertical and horizontal accountability and political and civil rights, 
it is necessary to have valid and reliable measures, with indicators and data that do not overlap, are available and 
comparable for countries worldwide, and cover the whole research period. The present study relies on mid-level 
indices from V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2016) to operationalise the institutional traits of democracy. The following 
four sections explain the measurement of specific democracy-quality dimensions.  
6.2.9 Vertical accountability 
Merkel (2004, pp. 38, 42; Merkel, 2016, p. 261) identifies four institutional aspects of electoral regimes that secure 
vertical accountability: universal and active suffrage, the universal and passive right to vote, free and fair elections, 
and elected political representatives. It is important to consider competition as well. Governments are only respon-
sive to citizens’ climate-policy preferences if elections make a difference (see Chapter 4). Bühlmann et al. (2012, 
p. 125), following Bartolini (2000, p. 61), distinguish between two sub-dimensions of competition: contestability, 
i.e. the opportunities for parties and candidates to participate in elections, and vulnerability, i.e. uncertainty of 
election results. 
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The following empirical analysis relies on the Vertical Accountability Index cited by Lührmann et al. (2017), 
Coppedge et al., (2017a), and Pemstein et al. (2017). Alternative measures, which have been used in similar studies 
and offer data for large-N analyses, have validity and reliability problems (Freedom House Political Rights Meas-
ure and Vanhanen’s Index of Democratisation). The Freedom House Political Rights measure is associated with 
validity problems in all three phases of index construction, as an indicator of vertical accountability. The index of 
democratisation is problematic in the conceptualisation and measurement phase. While the concept underpinning 
the former is too maximalist, the latter neglects relevant elements of vertical accountability. Indicators from both 
measures have problems with content validity; comparability over time is restricted. The aggregation rule in the 
political rights measure is not explained. The Democracy Barometer offers only disaggregated data for developed 
countries. Disaggregated data from Freedom House are not available for the complete research period. Chapter 
A6.4 in the annex discusses the reliability and validity of these measurement approaches in detail. The Voice and 
Accountability Index produced by the World Bank Governance Indicators is not considered here. It summarises 
data on electoral regimes and political rights. The following section explains that Lührmann et al.’s (2017) Vertical 
Accountability Index performs well, in relation to validity and reliability, during the three phases of index con-
struction.  
The Vertical Accountability Index performs well during the conceptualisation phase. First, it is transparent. Sec-
ond, conceptualisation does not violate the concept logic criteria. It explains the horizontal and vertical interrela-
tionship between elements in the concept, which is not characterised by redundancy or conflation. The underlying 
concept is also coherent. The index identifies sub-components of accountability via elections and political parties, 
specifying the hierarchical structure of its elements. Lührmann et al. (2017) assume that political systems without 
electoral accountability have lower levels of vertical accountability, regardless of political parties. They understand 
vertical accountability to be ‘the ability of a state’s population to hold its government accountable through elections 
and political parties’ (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 7; see also Coppedge et al., 2017b, p. 77). Thus, two components 
of vertical accountability are identified: citizens can control their governments by participating in free and fair 
elections (electoral accountability) and also by organising and participating in political parties (Coppedge et al., 
2017b, p. 77; Lührmann et al., 2017, pp. 7, 11). Lührmann et al. (2017, p. 12) distinguish three components of 
electoral accountability: the quality of elections (free and fair elections), the percentage of the enfranchised popu-
lation (non-exclusion of citizens from elections) and the direct or indirect election of the head of the executive 
branch. Citizen control over the exercise, via elections and political parties, is situated on the same level of the 
concept tree. Third, it applies to both democracies and non-democracies. It is acknowledged that autocracies can 
also be characterised, to some extent, by accountable governments (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 9). However, coun-
tries without national elections are treated as having lower levels of accountability, regardless of the extent to 
which citizens control the government via political parties (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 61). Fourth, the basic concept 
is parsimonious. It considers nearly all relevant elements of vertical accountability, following Merkel (2016, p. 
261; Merkel, 2004, pp. 38, 42), with the exception of active suffrage. The concept includes the extent to which 
citizens organise and participate in political parties. In many democracies, political parties are of central im-
portance to active suffrage.  
The Vertical Accountability Index has no problems in the measurement phase. Its indicators are characterised by 
content validity and cover the complete underlying concept. It considers indicators of the autonomy and capacity 
of the body ‘charged with administering national elections’ (Coppedge et al., 2017b, p. 87), the existence and use 
of an election voter registry, voting irregularities, government intimidation, and the extent to which elections are 
free and fair (Coppedge et al., 2017b, p. 77). It also includes the government’s treatment of the opposition 
(Coppedge et al., 2017b, p. 77). The extent to which citizens are excluded from electoral accountability is measured 
using the percentage of people within the population who have the right to vote (Coppedge et al., 2017b, p. 77; 
Lührmann et al. 2017, p. 12). Finally, the index captures whether the head of the executive branch is chosen 
through direct or indirect elections (Coppedge et al., 2017b, p. 77). Citizen control over the government, via or-
ganisation and participation in political parties, is captured by multiple indicators: barriers to forming a political 
party, restriction of opposition parties, and their degree of independence from the ruling regime (Lührmann et al., 
2017, p. 13). The reliability of the indicator is increased by the definition of stable coding rules over time and 
across countries, and the use of multiple coders, including native coders (Coppedge et al., 2016, pp. 581f.). V-
Dem considers rules in use. Data are available and comparable across countries and over time. One critical point 
is that the index relies exclusively on expert evaluations and codings from V-Dem.  
Lührmann et al. (2017, p. 58) have estimated a hierarchical Bayesian factor model to summarise their indicators 
and consider hierarchical relationships between variables. Their model assumes that vertical accountability is a 
direct function of the components and presence or absence of vertical accountability (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 
59). Indicators of accountability, via political parties, are treated as hierarchically nested within the overall model 
(Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 59). Consequently, political systems without elections are characterised by a lower 
degree of vertical accountability than countries with elections, regardless of the role of political parties. Overall, 
the aggregation rule confirms the underlying concept. 
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6.2.10 Horizontal accountability 
Horizontal accountability refers to the separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches. It is defined as oversight of the elected authorities by relatively autonomous political institutions (Mer-
kel, 2016, p. 462; Merkel, 2004, pp. 40f.). Few approaches to measuring horizontal accountability provide com-
parable data for global comparative analyses (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 10). The present study captures the sepa-
ration and interdependence of powers, using Lührmann et al.’s (2017) Horizontal Accountability Index, based on 
Coppedge et al. (2017a). The Voice and Accountability indicator included in the World Bank Governance Indica-
tors focuses on vertical accountability and political rights. Several studies have used Henisz’s (2002) measures of 
veto-player influence to capture horizontal accountability. While the two concepts overlap, this study examines 
their importance to climate commitment and performance separately. Chapter A6.5 in the annex discusses the 
validity and reliability of the Rule of Law indicator from the Worldwide Governance Indicators and exconst from 
Polity IV. In their democracy measurement, Lauth and Kauff (2012, p. 15) use the Rule of Law indicator included 
in the World Bank Governance Indicators as an indicator of the control dimension of democracy. Neither in its 
conceptualisation nor in its measurement does it consider other elements of horizontal accountability. The concept 
of the Polity IV exconst indicator provides a measurement characterised by overinflation. Moreover, its reliance 
on a single indicator reduces reliability.  
The Horizontal Accountability Index is characterised by concept validity in the conceptualisation phase. It per-
forms well with regard to transparency, concept specification, and logic. Lührmann et al. (2017) consider all rele-
vant dimensions of horizontal accountability. They define horizontal accountability as the ‘capacity of state insti-
tutions such as legislatures and the judiciary to oversee the government by demanding information, questioning 
officials and punishing improper behaviour’ (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 4). The components and sub-components 
of their concept, as well as their vertical and horizontal interrelationship, are specified. Following O’Donnell 
(1998) they assume that the extent of horizontal accountability depends on the ability of the legislature, judiciary, 
oversight agencies, ombudsmen, and prosecutor generals to monitor government behaviour and impose sanctions 
(Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 7). They identify three types of political institutions that exercise control over the gov-
ernment: the legislature, the judiciary, and political institutions specifically created for this purpose, such as over-
sight agencies (i.e. the general prosecutor and ombudsmen) (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 13). They regard all three 
forms of horizontal accountability as being of equal importance (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 13). The inclusion of 
political institutions that exercise control over the government, beyond the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches, is plausible. It is coherent and not characterised by overinflation or redundancy. It is distinguished from 
related concepts and applies to all political systems (see previous section). 
The Horizontal Accountability Index is relatively valid and reliable in the measurement phase as well. In accord-
ance with its conceptualisation, its measurement approach considers the legislature, judiciary, and oversight agen-
cies that constrain the executive branch (Coppedge et al., 2017b, p. 77). With regard to the legislature, the focus 
reflects a definition of accountability: whether the parliament is able to demand information from the government 
or to sanction illegal or unethical behaviour by the government (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 14). The index measures 
the existence of a legislature by the extent to which the parliament is able to exercise control over the government 
by asking questions, and the extent to which the legislature can investigate illegal or unethical government activity 
and decide against the government (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 14). Judiciary oversight of the government is meas-
ured using five indicators: higher and lower court independence from government, government compliance with 
important higher and lower court decisions, and whether the government acts in accordance with the constitution 
(Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 14). The extent to which other state institutions control the government is captured by 
an indicator that measures whether other state institutions are likely to investigate and report potential illegal or 
unethical government behaviour (v2lgotovst) (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 14). The Horizontal Accountability Index 
indicators perform well in relation to content validity. They are valid measures that consider the whole concept. 
The index also provides reliable data. As the previous section explains, the data are derived from expert evaluations 
carried out by native and international experts. Reliability is increased by the reliance on multiple coders. They 
are also comparable across countries and over time. The index relies exclusively on V-Dem data (see Section 
6.2.8).  
The Horizontal Accountability Index is based on a hierarchical Bayesian structural equation model with four com-
ponents: an independent investigative institution, a government that considers the constitution, and independent 
judicial and legislative branches that can act against the wishes of the government (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 61ff.). 
It does not use factor analyses because some accountability measures assume hierarchical relationships between 
the elements of underlying concepts (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 58). The model assumes direct effects on account-
ability of the extent to which an independent investigative body exists, and the extent of a government’s acceptance 
of the constitution (Lührmann et al., 2017 p. 63). It models the extent of legislative accountability as a function of 
the presence or absence of a legislative branch. In this way, it considers the assumption that political systems 
without legislatures should have lower accountability values than systems with legislatures. Finally, it models 
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judicial oversight over the government as a nested latent variable (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 62f.). In sum, Lühr-
mann et al. (2017)’s aggregation level and rule are transparent and in line with their concepts. 
To conclude, the underlying concept of the Horizontal Accountability Index confirms the common understanding 
of accountability. It also shows reliability in the measurement phase. Its indicators are characterised by content 
validity. It considers both rule of law and rules in use. The resulting index is available and comparable for most 
countries since 1900. The aggregation phase is also characterised by validity. 
6.2.11 Political rights 
There are insufficient indicators on political rights for global comparative analyses. The only indicator that focuses 
exclusively on the dimension of political rights is Lührmann et al.’s (2017) V-Dem Diagonal Accountability Index. 
This section discusses its validity and reliability in the three phases of index construction. 
The underlying concept of the Diagonal Accountability Index presents no validity problems in the conceptualisa-
tion phase, as an indicator of political rights. It is distinguished from related concepts. Lührmann et al. (2017, pp. 
4f.) have identified a third dimension of accountability by including diagonal accountability, alongside vertical 
and horizontal accountability. They define diagonal accountability as the ‘extent to which citizens are able to hold 
a government accountable outside of formal political participation’ (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 15). The assumption 
is that governments can be held accountable to citizens outside formal forms of political organisation (elections 
and political parties) by civil-society organisations and the media, via monitoring and influencing government 
behaviour (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 8). This concept explains the horizontal and vertical relationship between the 
components and sub-components. The dimensions of diagonal accountability include freedom of expression, civil 
society, citizen engagement in politics, and media freedom (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 15). The concept of diagonal 
accountability confirms Merkel’s (2016, 2004) conceptualisation of political liberties. While it does not consider 
freedom of association, it includes a similar variable: civil engagement in politics.68 The concept presents no prob-
lems related to redundancy or conflation. It applies to many types of political systems.  
The Diagonal Accountability Index performs well in the measurement phase. It captures the underlying concept 
of diagonal accountability completely and its indicators are characterised by content validity. Media freedom is 
first measured by indicators of the extent to which government actions undermine media freedom. They consider 
the extent of media censorship by the government and censorship on the Internet (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 15). 
This is also captured by the availability of neutral media (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 15). Finally, the index includes 
indicators related to critical reporting on the government, equal reporting on opposition candidates, multiple po-
litical perspectives in the media, and the presence of self-censorship on issues relevant to the government (Lühr-
mann et al., 2017, p. 15). The importance of civil society is measured by indicators that consider popular and 
voluntary participation in civil-society organisations, government control over the entry and exit of civil-society 
organisations in public life, and government oppression of civil-society organisations (Lührmann et al., 2017, pp. 
15f.). Freedom of expression is captured by freedom of expression in private discussion on political matters by 
women and men without government oppression or cultural restrictions, and freedom of academic and cultural 
expression (Lührmannet al., 2017, p. 16). An item that evaluates the inclusion of citizens in public deliberations is 
used as an indicator of citizen engagement in politics (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 16). Finally, the Diagonal Ac-
countability Index offers comparable for my research period and country sample. V-Dem also offers the disaggre-
gated indicators. However, the measure relies only on V-Dem data. 
Lührmann et al. (2017) use hierarchical Bayesian structural equation analysis to aggregate their indicators to their 
summary measures. They do not use factor analysis as they assume hierarchical relationships between the elements 
of their underlying concepts (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 58). Diagonal accountability is regarded as a function of 
media freedom, freedom of expression, civil society and citizen engagement in politics (Lührmann et al., 2017, 
pp. 15, 64). Media freedom, freedom of expression and civil society are modelled as latent variables, measured by 
multiple indicators (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 64). Citizens engagement in politics is measured by only one indi-
cator (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 64). Their aggregation level and rule confirms their concept of diagonal account-
ability. They also explain in detail their aggregation approach (reliability). 
In sum, the diagonal accountability index from Lührmann et al. (2017) performs well in the three phases of index 
construction. While it does not consider freedom of association, it includes an indicator of civil society participa-
tion. 
 
68 V-Dem offers, with the Freedom of Association (thick) index, a summary measure that considers freedom of association. In 
addition to civil-society organisational indicators, it also considers indicators related to the vertical-accountability dimension 
(the right to form and participate in political parties). For this reason, it does not represent an alternative to the diagonal ac-
countability index. 
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6.2.12 Civil rights 
I capture civil rights by the Equality before the law and individual liberty index from Coppedge et al. (2017) and 
Pemstein et al. (2017). The Civil Liberties measure from Freedom House and the World Bank Governance Indi-
cator Rule of Law that have often been applied in earlier studies show validity problems in all three phases of 
index construction (see Chapter A6.6 in the annex).69 Their underlying concepts are too maximalist. Simultane-
ously, the Rule of Law measure omits relevant elements of civil rights. Indicators from both measures have prob-
lems with content validity and are not comparable over time. Their aggregation rule is not explained.  
The following section explains that the V-Dem measure is a valid and reliable indicator of civil rights and offers 
comparable data across countries and over time. Following Merkel (2016, p. 264; Merkel, 2004, pp. 39f.) civil 
rights refer to constitutional rights that protect the individual against the state and other individuals; they include 
equal treatment under the law, equal and fair access to independent courts, and the rule of law. The Equality Before 
the Law and Individual Liberty Index aims to measure ‘[t]o what extent are laws transparent and rigorously en-
forced and public administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property 
rights, freedom from forced labour, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion?’ 
(Coppedge et al., 2017a, p. 60). The concept, therefore, considers all relevant elements of civil rights; it presents 
no problems with regard to concept specification or logic. It also performs well in the measurement phase. It is 
based on 14 V-Dem items, evaluated by multiple experts, including native scholars and professionals. The indica-
tors are characterised by content validity and cover the civil-rights concept. They consider the following: equal 
access to justice and rigorous and impartial public administration; transparent laws with predictable enforcement; 
freedom from forced labour, torture, and political killings; freedom of religion and movement; and property rights. 
This index is available and comparable across the countries in the sample during the research period. However, it 
is based only on expert evaluations and a single data source (V-Dem). All indicators of the V-Dem measure are 
converted to an interval scale by a measurement model. The summary measure results from a Bayesian factor 
analysis model, based on the indicators described above. The aggregation rule confirms the underlying concept. 
The category associational and organisational rights are weighted lower than the other categories, which include 
only three indicators.  
6.3 Control hypotheses and variables 
To ascertain the relative importance of the interrelationship between international integration and domestic poli-
tics, the statistical analyses control additional variables, which have been applied in similar studies. This chapter 
formulates and operationalises control hypotheses. Comparative climate and environmental policy research en-
compasses political (political-institutional and party-difference theory), social (power-resource theory), economic 
(functionalism) and international (globalisation and European integration research) explanatory approaches (e.g., 
Tosun, 2015, pp. 648–655). In addition, scholars have examined the importance of natural determinants (e.g., Jahn, 
2013b; Neumayer, 2002b). Comparative climate and environmental foreign-policy research has considered inter-
national (system), political (state-centric), and social (societal) approaches (Barkdull & Harris, 2002). Alongside 
corruption and international economic integration, economists have examined the influence of economic develop-
ment and demographic variables. In sum, international, political, economic, social, institutional, and natural factors 
that explain cross-national variation in climate commitment and performance can be distinguished. Within the 
present explanatory model (see Chapter 5), these variables are regarded as context factors of government behav-
iour.  
6.3.1 Economic controls 
Economic activities are an important source of CO2 emissions. The theoretical and empirical literature is unclear 
with regard to the direction and function (linear or curvilinear) of the effect of the level of economic development. 
Early economic and political science studies predicted a positive linear effect of economic development (via the 
scale of economic activity) on pollution when there were no changes in technologies or factor-inputs and -outputs 
(the prosperity-pollution hypothesis) (Jahn, 2016a, p. 17f.; Stern, 2004, p. 1421; Tosun, 2015, p. 648). The pros-
perity-cleaning-up hypothesis argues that rich countries are more committed to climate protection and perform 
better in greenhouse gas emissions reductions (Jahn, 2016a, p. 172). They have more resources and a higher reg-
ulatory and technical capacity to implement environmental policies (Wheeler, 2001, p. 234). Income and education 
also enable local communities to address environmental problems (Wheeler, 2001, p. 234). Poor countries use 
their scarce resources for environmental protection only after improvements have been made in other policy areas 
(e.g., public health) (Wheeler, 2001, p. 234). Following the empirical findings of an inverted U-shaped relationship 
 
69 Gallego-Alvarez et al. (2014) apply the Voice and Accountability World Bank indicator to consider civil rights (see Section 
A6.2.8 in the annex). 
134 
 
 
between GDP per capita and environmental degradation, EKC theory assumes that environmental pollution rises 
with per capita income but levels off and declines after a pollutant-dependent threshold has been reached (Stern, 
2004, p. 1419). In the early stages of economic development, the pollution-intensive industry sector becomes more 
important (the composition effect), relative to the less pollution-intensive agricultural sector (Stern, 2004, p. 1421). 
In later stages, the shift from a pollution-intensive industry sector to the service sector contributes to a decline in 
environmental pollution. To explain the inverted U-shaped relationship, scholars have also emphasized the shift 
from pollution-intensive to more environmentally friendly inputs, changes in output structure, international trade, 
the use of more environmentally friendly technologies, and the outsourcing of pollution-intensive production to 
poorer countries, as well as environmental attitudes (Arrow et al., 1995, p. 520; Dauvergne, 2017, p. 398; Li & 
Reuveny, 2006, p. 942; Stern, 2004, p. 1421, 1423; Torras & Boyce, 1998, p. 149f.; Van Alstine & Neumayer, 
2008, p. 50; Wheeler, 2001, p. 234f.), political and civil rights (Li & Reuveny, 2006, p. 942; Torras & Boycle, 
1998), and environmental policy (Dauvergne, 2017, p. 398; Torras & Boyce, 1998, p. 149). 
Most empirical studies have tested the effect of GDP per capita and its squared form on pollution levels (the 
‘reduced form’ of the EKC) (Torras & Boyce, 1998, p. 149; Wheeler, 2001, p. 235). There is no clear support for 
the different theoretical perspectives (see also Jahn, 2016c, p. 682) (e.g., Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; Esty, 2011, p. 
161a; Galeotti et al., 2006; Jensen & Spoon, 2011, p. 110; Li & Reuveny, 2006; Liddle, 2015; Spilker, 2013). 
Empirical research confirms the importance of studying economic development and CO2 emissions separately in 
developed and developing countries. There is some indication that the inverted-U shaped relationship does not 
apply to global pollutants (e.g., CO2 emissions) (Gallagher, 2009, p. 11; see also Arrow et al., 1995, p. 520; Dau-
vergne, 2017, p. 401; Stern, 2004, p. 1423). Governments may be more willing to address local pollution (Arrow 
et al., 1995, p. 520; Torras & Boyce, 1998, p. 148). In addition, differences between developed and developing 
countries can be assumed. Based on the EKC, these are likely to undermine climate performance in poor economies 
(Hcont1a). It is unclear whether economic development has a positive or negative effect on climate performance in 
developed countries (Hcont1b). By contrast, economic development might support a country’s commitment to cli-
mate cooperation in developed countries (Hcont1c). As discussed above, climate concerns are more prevalent among 
residents of high-income countries. Thus, the higher the level of economic development, the higher the level of 
climate commitment. This study measures a country’s level of economic development using the standard indicator 
– GDP per capita – to control population size (Babones, 2007, p. 150). GDP per capita in purchasing-power parity 
(PPP) is better at capturing the standard of living than market prices or official exchange rates (Babones, 2007, p. 
151). To test a curvilinear effect, the natural logarithm of GDP per capita has been mean-centred to avoid problems 
with multicollinearity; its squared term has been added to the regression models. The curvilinear effect is not tested 
in the analysis of climate commitment (Neumayer, 2002a, p. 150, footnote). EKC theory mainly refers to the 
relative size of the agricultural and industry sectors. The empirical models control for economic growth, based on 
annual GDP-growth data in %. Rapid economic growth is harmful for the environment (e.g. Böhmelt et al., 2016). 
In times of low economic growth, state and private investments in environmentally friendly technologies may be 
lower (Dauvergne, 2017, p. 398). Governments are less likely to join especially hard climate treaties in times of 
economic decline. Thus, economic growth is likely to undermine climate commitment and performance (Hcont10). 
Data on GDP per capita (The World Bank Group, 2016b) and GDP growth (The World Bank Group, 2017a) comes 
from the World Bank’s Development Indicators.  
Various empirical studies have considered the size of particular economic sectors (e.g., Garmann, 2014). Industry 
is more pollution-intensive than agriculture or the service sector (Cao & Prakash, 2010, p. 489). Industry-sector 
representatives and workers tend to oppose climate change mitigation efforts (Sprinz & Vaahtoranta, 1994, pp. 
104f.; Ward, 2008, p. 393). Thus, the size of the industry sector undermines a government’s willingness to com-
mit to climate cooperation and undertake climate change mitigation efforts (Hcont2). The present study controls for 
industry-sector size, measured by the percentage of GDP produced by the industry sector (see also Ward, 2008, p. 
393). In accordance with previous research, this study also controls the percentage of fuel exports in merchandise 
exports (e.g., Cao & Prakash, 2010). High levels of fossil fuel exports can make it harder for governments to shift 
to climate-friendly energy resources (Povitkina, 2018, p. 419). Fossil-fuel production contributes directly to emis-
sions and increases reliance on fossil fuels in the domestic economy (Neumayer, 2002c, p. 7). Moreover, repre-
sentatives of the fossil fuel industry generally oppose climate protection (Povitkina, 2018, p. 419) and participation 
in climate treaties (Hcont3). Data on the size of fossil fuel exports and the industry sector come from the World 
Bank (The World Bank Group, 2016c,d). 
6.3.2 Social controls 
Numerous studies have examined the influence of ENGOs on climate commitment and performance. ENGOs 
contribute to climate cooperation, spread norms, provide assistance in the design and implementation of environ-
mental policies, and reduce uncertainty by informing and monitoring state commitment and behaviour (Böhmelt 
et al., 2015, p. 93; Raustiala, 1997, pp. 728f.). They indirectly support climate commitment and performance 
through public mobilisation, boycotts, demonstrations, the circulation of research results, court rules, and support 
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for environmentally friendly political candidates and parties (Binder & Neumayer 2005, p. 529f.; Connelly & 
Smith, 1999, p. 78). The number of members and financial resources of ENGOs (ENGO strength) is decisive 
(Binder & Neumayer, 2005, p. 530). ENGOs may have more impact on government responses to local, rather than 
global, environmental problems because it is easier to mobilise public support for environmental problems with 
direct effects on human health (Binder & Neumayer, 2005, p. 530; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010a, p. 9). Accord-
ingly, the influence of ENGOs is thought to be higher in countries that are more impacted by global warming 
(Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010a, p. 9). Finally, the positive effect is clearer in relation to commitment, rather than 
performance. It is harder to monitor the implementation of climate policies. While case studies confirm that ENGO 
strength contributes to environmental protection, quantitative findings are ambiguous (e.g., Scruggs, 1999, p. 29). 
Thus, this book assumes a positive association with climate commitment and performance (Hcont4). The effect 
should, however, be more prevalent in relation to the ratification of climate treaties. This study controls for the 
annual number of ENGOs present in a country (see also Fredriksson & Ujhelyi, 2006; Fredriksson et al. 2007). 
The higher the number of ENGOs, the higher their influence. However, a smaller number of ENGOs may be better 
organised and more effective (Böhmelt et al., 2015, p. 106; Fredriksson & Ujhelyi, 2006, p. 18, footnote). This 
study applies data derived from Bernauer et al. (2013a) on the number of ENGOs per country, registered with the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). The IUCN is an umbrella organisation that supports con-
servation and biological diversity within countries (Böhmelt et al., 2015, p. 105). This measure does not consider 
all domestic ENGOs, as membership in the IUCN is not obligatory (Bernauer et al., 2013b, p. 105). It may also 
include some international ENGOs (Böhmelt et al., 2015, p. 105, footnote; Bernauer et al., 2013b, p. 98, footnote). 
Bernauer et al. (2013b, p. 98) have stated that other data sources include fewer ENGOs and countries. I have 
logarithmised the number of ENGOs to reduce positive skewness (see also Böhmelt et al., 2015, p. 106, footnote).  
Comparative environmental and climate policy research has examined the importance of corporatism in environ-
mental performance (e.g., Crepaz, 1995; Jahn, 1998; Neumayer, 2003; Scruggs, 1999, 2001, 2003) (Tosun, 2015, 
p. 649). Corporatism describes an interest-group arrangement characterised by centralised societal interest groups 
(capital and labour), interest-group/government cooperation in policymaking, and consensual policy decisions 
(Dolšak, 2001, p. 419; Jahn, 2016a, p. 172; Jahn & Wälti, 2007, p. 3). In pluralist interest-group arrangements, 
interest groups vary over time and have a lower degree of cooperation (Christoff & Eckersley, 2011, p. 440). On 
the one hand, centralised organised interests (Wenzelburger & Neumann, 2015, p. 257), information distribution 
and use, flexibility and learning, the consideration of multiple interests in the policymaking process (Scruggs, 
2003), and long-term interest-group arrangements, together with a focus on consensual decisions, contribute to 
climate protection in corporatist systems (Christoff & Eckersley, 2011, p. 440). Varying interests over time and 
little cooperation among interest groups undermine climate-policy efforts in pluralist systems (Christoff & Eck-
ersley, 2011, p. 440; Poloni-Staudinger, 2008, p. 412; Strøm & Swindle, 1993, p. 7). On the other hand, industry 
and labour representatives have more influence on policymaking than ENGOs in corporatist systems (Dolšak, 
2001, p. 419; Matthews, 2001, p. 408; Poloni-Staudinger, 2008, p. 412; Strøm & Swindle, 1993, p. 7). Previous 
research on climate performance has produced different findings (Neumayer, 2003; Jahn, 2008). I use Siaroff’s 
(1999, p. 184) summary measure of corporatism (see also Jahn, 2008; Neumayer, 2003). Given the available data, 
corporatism is controlled in the analysis of climate performance only in relation to developed countries. Overall, 
the effect of corporatism on climate outcomes in high-income countries is ambiguous (Hcont5). 
6.3.3 Demographic controls 
Most empirical studies of climate performance (e.g., Li & Reuveny, 2006) control for demographic variables. 
First, population growth is presumed to be positively associated with greenhouse gas emissions (Li & Reuveny, 
2006, p. 943) (Hcont6a). It contributes to pollution via consumption (Ward, 2008, p. 393) and is regarded as a 
primary explanatory factor of greenhouse gas emissions (Christoff & Eckersley, 2011, p. 434). It does not neces-
sarily affect climate commitment (Hcont6b). The ecological vulnerability of citizens in densely populated countries 
(population density, i.e. the ratio of population and land area) tends to increase public support for climate protection 
(Jahn, 2016c, p. 684; Scruggs, 2003, p. 73; Ward, 2008, p. 393), thus contributing to climate commitment and 
performance (Hcont7a). Li and Reuveny (2006), however, have found a significant positive effect of population 
density on CO2 emissions. The larger and less densely populated a country, the longer it takes to transport goods 
and services (Jahn, 2016c, p. 684). For this reason, governments in countries with low population density may be 
more reluctant to ratify and implement climate agreements (Hcont7b). Finally, urban regions are associated, via 
consumption, with natural greenhouse emissions and greenhouse emission levels (Arvin & Lew, 2011, p. 1154). 
Yet, public transportation systems, smaller houses, and the use of natural gas can contribute to lowering green-
house gas emissions in urban areas (Makido et al., 2012; Povitikina, 2018; Timmons et al., 2016). Thus, it is an 
empirical question whether urban populations contribute to or undermine climate performance (Hcont8a). Urbani-
sation may contribute to climate commitment. Urban citizens tend to be more aware and concerned about global 
warming (Hcont8b). Statistical analyses therefore test multiple World Bank indicators (The World Bank Group, 
2016e, 2017b, c), including population growth, population density, and urban population. In relation to model 
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complexity, the present study does not consider the three demographic factors using all statistical models. In rela-
tion to model development, the most important demographic variable for the dependent variable is considered. 
Other variables are controlled in the robustness analysis of the final model. 
6.3.4 Natural controls 
Natural explanatory factors include ‘differences in the climatic conditions, the availability of renewable and fossil 
energy resources and the transportation requirements’ (Neumayer, 2002b, p. 7). Empirical research has shown that 
climate conditions and energy resources help to explain CO2 emissions per capita (Neumayer, 2002b; Jahn, 2003). 
Their relative explanatory power is low (Neumayer, 2002b). This study considers country size because it is asso-
ciated with transportation (Neumayer, 2002b, p. 7, see previous section regarding measurement) and is therefore 
likely to undermine climate performance (Hcont9). The robustness analysis of climate performance in developed 
countries controls the index of heating degree months (HDM index), derived from Jahn (2013b, c). The HDM 
index captures the average national heating degree by month using ‘the difference of the base temperature to the 
actual monthly temperature for each region, weighting it by the regional population’ (Jahn, 2013b, p. 101). Below 
the base temperature, heating in buildings is needed (Jahn, 2013b, p. 98). Countries with colder average tempera-
tures are associated with more heating and, therefore, higher emissions (Jahn, 2013b, p. 97; Neumayer, 2002b, p. 
7). Higher average temperatures may also be associated with high emissions because they require more cooling 
(Jahn, 2013b, p. 108; Neumayer, 2002b, p. 7). Jahn (2013b, p. 98) uses 15 Celsius as a base temperature. Since 
cooling is also associated with energy consumption, I have estimated the same models, using the respective Cool-
ing Degree Months (CDM) index (Jahn, 2013c). Thus, higher and lower national average temperatures are likely 
to undermine climate performance (Hcont10). Unfortunately, there are no available data for developing countries. 
Therefore, these variables are only considered in the analysis of climate outcomes in developed countries. 
6.3.5 International controls 
The literature studies the influence of member states on EU environmental policy and the effect of adoption of EU 
environmental policy by member states (Tosun, 2015, p. 652). In contrast to other IGOs, the EU can coerce mem-
ber states to follow its climate policies. The EU has been very active in climate protection. It represents its member 
states in the international climate-treaty negotiations. Moreover, it describes itself as a leader in domestic and 
global environmental protection on the national and international level (Lenschow & Spungk, 2010, p. 134). 
Schreurs and Tiberghien (2007, 2010) have argued that the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol resulted from a 
combination of competitive, mutually reinforcing factors, including the support of the European presidencies, 
Commission, and Parliament, and the adoption of the burden-sharing approach. Jahn (2008) has shown that EU 
member states are associated with lower overall (as well as industry) CO2 emissions. EU membership should 
contribute to climate commitment and climate performance (of developed countries) (Hcont11). In the analysis of 
the Kyoto Protocol, EU members are treated as a single country, as they entered the climate treaty together. 
Dobbin et al. (2007, p. 459) have emphasized the importance of controlling multiple diffusion mechanisms. Inter-
national climate cooperation is only successful if many countries join international agreements. Thus, countries 
are more likely to ratify the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol when other countries have ratified them (Harrison & 
Sundstrom, 2010a, p. 5). This study controls for the likelihood of ratification when countries within the same 
region have signed on to the agreement. Regional climate commitment is captured by the percentage of countries 
that have ratified the UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol within a year. Policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions may 
also diffuse across regions. In the climate performance analysis of developing countries, I consider the average 
climate performance of countries from particular regions, applying the IIASA (2004) classification of regions. The 
analysis of developed countries relies on the family of nations concept (Castles, 1993). Regional commitment and 
performance are likely to contribute to climate commitment and performance (Hcont12). 
6.3.6 Political controls 
Political parties in parliament and government may differ in their climate policies (see Chapter 4). The database 
makes it possible to control left, right, centre, and left-libertarian party strength in parliament when analysing 
climate performance in developed countries (see Section 6.2.6). On the left/right dimension, left-wing-party 
strength in parliament is associated with significantly higher climate commitment and performance levels than 
right-wing party or centre-party strength (Hcont13a). Centre parties should contribute more to the ratification of 
climate treaties and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions than right parties (Hcont13b). On the green/growth 
dimension, green and left-libertarian parliament seats contribute to both dimensions of state participation in climate 
cooperation (Hcont14). 
Numerous studies of cross-national difference in environmental commitment (e.g., Böhmelt et al., 2015) and per-
formance (e.g., Bernauer & Koubi, 2009) have examined the importance of electoral rules. As plurality systems 
are associated with a larger winning coalition than proportional representation (PR) systems (Bueno de Mesquita 
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et al., 2003, p. 54), they tend to provide more environmental public goods to secure voter support (see also Milesi-
Ferreti et al., 2002). On the other hand, many scholars expect PR systems to perform better in relation to climate 
and environmental protection (e.g., Fredriksson & Millimet, 2004; Fredriksson & Wollscheid, 2007, pp. 382f.; 
Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010b, p. 272; Persson et al., 2007; Persson & Tabellini, 1999). First, plurality elections 
imply that politicians focus on the local environmental problems of a few ‘marginal districts’ (Persson & Tabellini, 
1999, p. 703; see also Fredriksson & Millimet, 2004, pp. 237f.; Persson & Tabellini, 1999, pp. 703, 713f.). Political 
candidates and parties in PR systems depend on support from citizens in all districts (Fredriksson & Millimet, 
2004, pp. 237f.). The median voter favours environmental protection (Fredriksson & Millimet, 2004, pp. 237). 
Second, while plurality electoral rules favour large party factions in parliament and single-party governments 
(Persson et al., 2007, pp. 169ff.), PR rules contribute to a better representation of diffuse interests (e.g., climate 
protection), making it more likely that new and small parties will gain seats in parliament (see also Fiorino, 2011, 
p. 378; Harrison and Sundstrom, 2010b, p. 272). Third, coalition governments in PR systems are more likely to 
provide more public goods, given that voters are able to distinguish between the policy preferences of government 
parties (Persson et al., 2007, pp. 164f.). Finally, industry interest groups have more political influence in plurality 
systems (Fredriksson & Millimet, 2004, p. 238). Case studies have shown that democracies with PR electoral rules 
have contributed to Kyoto Protocol ratification and climate change mitigation (e.g., Crowley, 2007, p. 127; Harri-
son & Sundstrom, 2010a; 2007, p. 9). PR systems have enabled green parties to influence climate commitment in 
Australia (Crowley, 2007), Europe, and Japan (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010a, pp. 3f., 10). Thus, PR electoral rules 
are likely to be associated with higher levels of climate commitment and performance, in contrast to plurality 
systems (Hcont14). These electoral regime data are drawn from the World Bank Database of Political Institutions 
2015 (Cruz et al., 2016a). The dichotomous variable ‘Plurality’ classifies a country as plurality system, if ‘legis-
latures are elected using a winner-take-all/first past the post rule’ (Cruz et al., 2016b, no page number). The vari-
able ‘PR’ classifies countries with parliaments based on vote shares as proportional representation (Cruz et al., 
2016b, no page number). Both variables are missing if there is no legislature, the legislature is unelected, there is 
only one candidate, or there is no clear competition in an elected legislature in a single-party system (Cruz et al., 
2016b, no page number). 
The academic literature discusses the vulnerability of countries to climate change as an explanatory factor in 
climate commitment and state efforts to mitigate global warming (e.g., Dolšak, 2009; Tubi et al., 2012). Tubi et 
al. (2012, p. 473) distinguish between two dimensions of country vulnerability: climate change impacts, i.e. eco-
logical and socio-economic consequences; and a country’s technological, institutional, and educational capacity 
to adapt to global environmental change. According to neoliberal institutional (e.g., Roberts et al., 2004) and state-
centric foreign-policy theory (Sprinz & Vaahtoranta, 1994), countries that face considerable impacts of global 
warming and are characterised by a low adaption capacity are likely to support climate cooperation (Sprinz & 
Vaahtoranta, 1994, pp. 79f.; Tubi et al., 2012, p. 475f.). In addition, citizens in such countries may demand climate 
policies from their politicians (Dolšak, 2009, p. 560). Vulnerable countries are likely to prefer climate change 
adaptation policies over climate change mitigation (Tubi et al., 2012, p. 476). At the same time, they can only 
make credible demands on other countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions if they also implement such policies 
(Dolšak, 2009, p. 560). Heggelund et al. (2010, p. 237) have argued, based on the empirical literature, that vulner-
ability cannot explain a country’s performance. National discourses on climate change are often independent of 
climate change vulnerability (Christoff & Eckersley, 2011, p. 445). In sum, there is no clear effect of climate 
vulnerability on climate commitment and performance (Hcont15). This study measures climate change impacts 
using Bättig et al.’s (2007) climate change index in Bättig and Bernauer (2009). This index rates climate variability 
caused by global warming, rather than natural developments, on a scale from 0–1. Higher values indicate higher 
climate variability. With regard to a country’s capacity to adapt to climate change, this study controls for economic 
development, i.e. GDP per capita (see Section 6.3.1). 
In the pooled analysis of UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification, Annex I status is included as an independent 
variable (see Section 6.1). Annex I parties to the climate regime tend to be more reluctant than Non-Annex I parties 
to ratify international climate agreements because they have higher compliance costs, reducing their economic 
competitiveness in comparison to developing countries (Downs et al., 1996; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010a, pp. 5, 
14) (Hcont16). This does not apply to the UNFCCC, which is associated with few costs for Annex I and Non-Annex 
I parties. 
More recently, publications have studied the relationship between types of autocracy and environmental perfor-
mance (e.g., Ward et al., 2014; Wurster, 2013). Based on the assumption that political stability and political com-
petition contribute to the implementation and effectiveness of long-term and sustainable environmental policies 
(e.g., Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Ward et al., 2014, p. 319; Wurster, 2013, p. 79), Wurster (2013, pp. 79ff.) 
argues that civilian autocracies are likely to perform better in climate change mitigation than monarchies and 
military dictatorships. First, they stay in power long than military autocracies (Ward et al., 2014, p. 319; Wurster, 
2013, p. 80). Second, civilian autocracies are characterised by a higher degree of competition (Wurster, 2013, p. 
80) and stability, which make them less likely to become ‘stationary bandits’ (see also McGuire & Olson, 1996, 
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p. 48; Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2006, p. 334). Moreover, monarchies (Wurster, 2013, p. 89) and military regimes 
have smaller winning coalitions. Mattes and Rodríguez (2014, p. 527) have argued that, since the political institu-
tions of personalist and military autocracies contribute to accountability, transparency, and flexibility, they are 
more likely to cooperate at the international level. In sum, differences in climate commitment and performance 
among autocracies constitute an empirical question (Hcont17). While Ward et al. (2014) have found no significant 
differences among autocratic regimes (military, monarchy, personalist, single party) in relation to CO2 emissions, 
Wurster (2013, p. 86) has observed a significant positive effect of monarchies on global air pollution. The present 
study applies data from Cheibub et al. (2010, 2009) to consider differences between civilian, military, and royal 
dictatorships. The annex discusses the validity and reliability of different approaches to measuring autocratic re-
gime types (see Chapter A6.7). 
6.4 Treatment of missing values 
The selection criteria used in the operationalisation of independent and dependent variables were data availability 
and comparability for selected countries during the complete research period. Unfortunately, missing data are still 
present in the data. This chapter explains the treatment of missing values and cases. Macro-comparative research 
uses interpolation and mean values of available cases to deal with missing values (Lauth et al., 2009, p. 92; Roller, 
2005, p. 143). Interpolation may bias parameter estimates in TSCS, as it contributes to linearity in the data (Beck & Katz, 
2015, pp. 65f.; Pennings et al., 2006, p. 66; Wolf, 2015, p. 109, footnote). This study applies cross-sectional OLS regression. 
This study follows the approach of Roller (2005, p. 143f.). Missing values between two country-years have been 
estimated based on a linear regression (1). In the case of missing country-years at the beginning or end of the 
research period (independent variables: 1991–2005, dependent variables: 1992–2006) the missing values have 
been estimated, based on the long-term linear trend (linear regression) (2). With regard to completely missing 
cases, I have used the average of available and estimated values related to the country’s family of nations (Castles, 
1993) (developed Annex I countries) or world region (IIASA, 2004) (all other countries) (3). In the following 
cases, these approaches have not been applied. Completely missing cases have only been with the average values 
of the country family/world region in the case of independent variables. Countries for which climate performance 
is completely missing have been excluded from the analysis. Second, missing values related to veto-point and 
player variables have not been estimated based on linear regression or replaced by average values. The assumption 
of a linear development underlying linear regression is problematic for these variables (Roller, 2005, p. 145). 
Countries missing a maximum of five country-years have only been assessed on these variables. Third, for some 
countries, data on trade relationships (exports and imports in commodities) were not available for all years of the 
research period (1991–2005). In most countries, the most important trading partners were relatively stable over 
time. Therefore, missing values were replaced with trading-partner data from the last available year. When earlier 
data on trade relationships were missing, the missing years were replaced with values from the next available year. 
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7  Climate commitment 
Abstract 
This study contributes to the literature on globalisation and climate commitment by examining the possible mod-
eration effects of domestic political institutions. To this end, it tests the hypotheses of the veto-player, political-
corruption, and regime-type approaches in relation to the joint effect of international integration and domestic 
political institutions. The statistical analysis offers no support for the veto-player approach or the political-corrup-
tion approach. However, the findings indicate that regime-type differences do influence the relationship between 
political globalisation and climate commitment. In contrast to earlier research, this study also shows that treaty 
design matters. International political integration contributes only in autocracies to UNFCCC ratification. Non-
democracies join international organisations, as well as soft international treaties such as the UNFCCC, to enhance 
their international reputations. By contrast, civil rights strengthen the positive effect of international political inte-
gration on Kyoto Protocol ratification. Countries that accept the rule of law at the domestic level also join more 
demanding international agreements. A case study of Bolivia contributes to a better understanding of the causal 
relationships. 
Is globalisation good or bad for climate commitment and does its effect depend on domestic political institutions? 
The first section (7.1) of this chapter explains the application of proportional-hazards models to answer my re-
search questions. The following section (7.2) examines univariate distributions of dependent and independent var-
iables to ensure a better interpretation of the statistical results. To consider differences in treaty design (see Chapter 
2), UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification are studied separately (Sections 7.3 and 7.4). Both sections begin by 
examining the effect of international integration on climate commitment; they then explore the joint effects of 
globalisation and domestic political institutions, based on the explanatory models developed in Chapter 5. Section 
7.5 discusses the statistical results. A short case study involving Bolivia, which complements the statistical analy-
sis, contributes to a better understanding of the causal relationships. The last section summarises the findings and 
conclusions. 
7.1 Analysis method: Survival analysis 
Previous research has used survival analyses,71 logistic analyses, or OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) regression 
analyses to study the ratification of climate treaties (see Chapters 2 & 3). The present study uses a survival analysis. 
First, the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol have nearly universal membership (see Figures 7.2.1 and 7.2.2). Conse-
quently, a logistic regression, i.e. an analysis of ratification or non-ratification of both international treaties, is not 
feasible (Neumayer, 2002, p. 818). The dependent variable in a survival analysis is a combination of the occurrence 
of an event, i.e. a country becoming a ratifier of the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol, and the time it takes for the event 
to take place (Jahn, 2013, p. 401; Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 161). Second, few countries have withdrawn from 
the UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol (e.g., Canada from the Kyoto Protocol). Thus, the logistic-regression assumption 
that the probability of entering a climate agreement is the same before and after ratification does not apply (von 
Stein, 2008, p. 253). A survival analysis drops countries from the analysis when they have ratified the agreement. 
Third, in contrast to a linear regression of the duration of ratification, a survival analysis considers timing (von 
Stein, 2008, p. 254). Chapter 2 argues that ratification delay tells us something about climate commitment (von 
Stein, 2008, p. 254). Finally, a survival analysis can study countries that have not ratified the UNFCCC or the 
Kyoto Protocol (e.g., the United States as a non-ratifier of the Kyoto Protocol) (Jahn, 2013, pp. 401, 403; Strange, 
1994, p. 246; Wenzelburger et al., 2014, pp. 169, 186). Ratification delay can also be caused by other variables, 
such as the number of veto players (Neumayer, 2002, pp. 818f.). This is an additional reason to consider veto 
points when analysing ratification behaviour.  
Survival models vary with regard to the measurement of their dependent variables (Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 
163). As the present study examines the ratification of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, i.e. dichotomous varia-
bles, a survival model based on a discrete dependent variable is applied. In this respect, discrete and continuous 
time models can be distinguished. The former assume that an event can only take place at certain time points, 
while the latter makes no such assumption (Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 163). As ratification is not limited to 
certain time points, a continuous time model is applied. A single-event model is used; it assumes that an event can 
take place once only for each country (Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 164). Country withdrawals from climate 
 
71 Survival analysis is also called event-history analysis (Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 161). 
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agreements rarely occur. This study also adopts the Proportional Hazards model (or Cox model, Wenzelburger et 
al., 2014, p. 185) a semi-parametric single-event model. While it considers the timing of events, it does not specify 
its functional form a priori (Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 164, 183f.). Thus, the time dependence of the dependent 
variable does not have to be specified, in contrast to parametric models (Wenzelburger et al., 2014, pp. 185f.). In 
contrast to non-parametric models, it is able to test the effects of independent variables on the dependent variable 
(Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 209).  
In a survival analysis, censoring refers to the lack of information on the event history of cases (Wenzelburger et 
al., 2014, p. 166). Left-censoring, i.e. missing data at the beginning of an event history (Wenzelburger et al. 2014, 
p. 167) is no problem, as the research period starts with the opening of the ratification process (Fredriksson & 
Gaston, 2000, p. 349). Right-censoring refers to countries that have not ratified the agreement at the end of the 
research period (Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 167). This is another reason to apply a proportional-hazards model 
(Fredriksson & Gaston, 2000, pp. 350, 352). For the parameter estimation, it uses the so-called Partial Likelihood 
(PL) method, which examines the chronological order of events as a dependent variable (Wenzelburger et al., 
2014, p. 187).72 Tied events, i.e. ratifications that occurred at the same time, can be problematic for the Cox model 
(Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 186). To deal with tied events, this study applies the exact-marginal-likelihood73 
method, which offers the most exact results (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 56; Therneau & Grambsch, 
2000, p. 48; Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 189).  
The unit of analysis is country-years, given that data on the independent variables are only available on a yearly 
basis (see also von Stein, 2008). As most independent variables are not constant over time, the dependent variables 
are coded in the following way. A dichotomous variable indicates the ratification status of a country at the time 
when the status quo changed or at the end of the research period. A second variable measures ratification delay, 
counting the days between the opening of the ratification process and the ratification of the UNFCCC or Kyoto 
Protocol. The day of ratification is not counted. The research period starts with the opening of the ratification 
process (UNFCCC in 1992, Kyoto Protocol in 1998). As the EU member states negotiated and entered the Kyoto 
Protocol together, they are not treated as separate countries in the analysis of its ratification. Depending on the 
measurement level of the independent variable, the mean or modus of EU members is examined (see Table 7.2.1–
7.2.3). As Chapter 6 explains, this study studies a country sample of all available countries (global comparative 
analysis) and a country sample of developing Non-Annex I countries. In contrast to the analysis of climate perfor-
mance in developing countries, this sample includes post-communist Non-Annex I developing countries. Devel-
oped countries cannot be studied separately because of the low variance in their ratification behaviour (see Section 
7.2). Analyses of the pooled sample consider Annex I status as a control variable. 
7.2 Univariate analysis 
Before presenting the findings, this section examines the univariate distributions of the explanatory factors as well 
as UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification to contribute to a better understanding of the results. Tables 7.2.1–
7.2.3 summarise the measurement and coding of the independent and dependent variables.
 
72 This approach is less suited to small samples (N<20) (Wenzelburger et al., 2014, p. 186). 
73 This method is also called the averaged-likelihood method (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 56) 
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Table 7.2.1 Measurement of climate commitment and economic and political globalisation 
Variable Measurement Data Sources 
 UNFCCC 
ratifica-
tion 
Year of ratification (dichotomous variable) and ratifica-
tion duration of the UNFCCC in days from June 4th, 
1992 (opening day for signing) until the day of ratifica-
tion. The latter is not counted.  
UNFCCC (no year 
a) 
Kyoto 
Protocol 
ratifica-
tion 
Year of ratification (dichotomous variable) and ratifica-
tion duration of the Kyoto Protocol in days from May 16, 
1998 (opening day for signing) until the day of ratifica-
tion. The latter is not counted. 
UNFCCC (no year 
b)  
Economic 
globalisa-
tion 
a. Trade openness: Logged % of the sum of imports and 
exports of domestic GDP corrected for population 
size.  
b. Capital openness: Logarithmised % of stock of FDI 
inflows of GDP.  
c. Policy diffusion via economic interdependence: Spa-
tial lag variable that measures the ratification behav-
iour (UNFCCC/ Kyoto Protocol) of a country’s five 
most important trading partners regarding the amount 
of exports and imports of commodities (connectivity 
indicator). 
a.  The World Bank 
Group (2016a) 
b. UNCTAT (2015) 
c. UN Comtrade 
(2017) & UN-
FCCC (no year a, 
b) 
Political 
globalisa-
tion 
a. IGO memberships: Annual number of full country 
memberships in IGOs based on data from 
Pevehouse et al. (2010). Missing values and no state 
system member are coded as no membership.  
b. Network centrality in IGO networks: Annual num-
ber of a country’s indirect and direct IGO’s ties to 
other countries in 1.000. 
a. Pevehouse et al. 
(2010) 
b. von Stein (no 
year) 
Notes:  Analysis units = country-years. I added one to variables with an observed minimum of zero before logarithmising 
them. 
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Table 7.2.2 Measurement of veto players, political corruption, and regime type 
Variable Measurement Data Sources 
Govern-
ment ideo-
logy 
Left and right government ideology: 1 – in the case of a pres-
idential system a left-wing/ right-wing chief of executive, in 
the case of a parliamentary system a left-wing/ right-wing 
largest party in parliament or if available largest seat share 
in government cabinet. 0 – in all other cases. Parliamentary 
and presidential systems are identified using information 
from the ‘system’ variable from Cruz et al. (2016). EU: Mo-
dus of each year, if no modus = 1 
Developed coun-
tries: Armingeon et 
al. (2015); Swank 
(2013); developing 
countries: Arm-
ingeon et al. (2015); 
Cruz et al. (2016); 
Swank (2013). 
Ideologi-
cal hetero-
geneity 
among 
veto play-
ers 
1 –At least one right-wing partisan veto player within dome-
stic political institutions with veto player status in internati-
onal treaty ratification. 0 – in all other cases. EU: Modus of 
all member states in each year, if no modus = 1. 
Armingeon et al. 
(2015); Cruz et al. 
(2016), Hathaway 
(2008), Henisz 
(2002), Jahn (2010), 
Swank (2013) 
Veto 
points 
a. Governmental fragmentation: Logarithmised annual num-
ber of governmental parties.  
b. Presidential democracy: 1 – the president has veto player 
status in international treaty ratification. 0– in all other 
cases. EU: Modus of all member states in each year. 
c. Bicameralism: 1 – The second legislative chamber has 
veto player status in international treaty ratification. 0 – In 
all other cases. EU: Modus of all member states in each 
year. 
a. Cruz et al. 
(2016) 
b. Simmons 
(2009b), 
Bookmann 
(no year) 
c. Hathaway 
(2008) 
Forms of 
Political  
Corrup-
tion 
a. Political corruption: Political Corruption Index 
b. Executive corruption: Executive Corruption Index 
c. Legislative corruption: Legislative corrupt activities Pub-
lic sector corruption: Public Sector Coruption Index 
Higher values indicate higher values of political corruption. 
a., b. & d. McMann 
et al. (2016) 
c. Coppedge et al. 
(2017) & Pemstein 
et al. (2017) 
Regime 
type 
a. Electoral democracy: 1 – Electoral democracy, 0 – No 
electoral democracy. 
b. Established democracy: 1 – Established democracy, 0 – 
No established democracy. 
a. Cheibub et al. 
(2010, 2009) 
b. Freedom 
House (2015) 
& Marshall et 
al. (2015) 
De-
mocracy 
qualities 
a. Vertical accountability: Vertical Accountability Index  
b. Horizontal accountability: Horizontal Accountability In-
dex  
c. Political rights: Diagonal Accountability Index 
d. Civil rights: Equality before the law and individual lib-
erty index 
Higher values indicate higher values of democracy quality. 
Coppedge et al. 
(2017); Pemstein et 
al. (2017); Lühr-
mann et al. (2017) 
Notes:  Analysis units = country-years. The variables bicameralism, presidential veto player, right veto player and govern-
ment ideology variables are zero in autocratic years and autocratic years of interruption, transition and interregnum 
and missing in democratic years of interruption, transition and interregnum. I added one to variables with an observed 
minimum of zero before logarithmising them. 
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Table 7.2.3 Measurement of control variables 
Variable Measurement Data Source 
Economic 
Develop-
ment 
Natural logarithm of GDP per capita in constant 2010 US$.  The World Bank 
Group (2016d) 
Economic 
growth 
Annual growth rate of GDP in % at market prices based 
on constant local currency.  
The World Bank 
Group (2017a) 
Industry 
group 
strength 
a. Logarithmised % of the industry sector of GDP.  
b. Logarithmised fuel exports as % of merchandise ex-
ports. 
a. The World 
Bank Group 
(2016b) :  
b. The World 
Bank Group 
(2016c) 
ENGO 
strength 
Logarithmised number of ENGOs in a country registered 
with the IUCN.  
Bernauer et al. 
(2013) 
Popula-
tion  
density 
Logarithmised population size divided by land area in m².  The World Bank 
Group (2017b) 
Climate 
change 
vulnera-
bility 
Climate change index. It indicates climate change risk ex-
posure on a scale from 0 to 1. Higher values indicate higher 
climate change risk exposure.  
Bättig & Bernauer 
(2009). 
Electoral  
system 
a. Plurality electoral system: 1 – plurality electoral sys-
tem, 0 – no plurality electoral system. 
b. Mixed electoral system: 1 – mixed electoral system 
(plurality and PR), 0 – no mixed electoral system. 
Reference category: PR electoral system.  
Cruz et al. (2016) 
Types of 
autocracy 
a. Military dictatorship: 1 – Military dictatorship, 0 – all 
other cases. 
b. Monarchy: 1 – Royal dictatorship, 0 – all other cases. 
Reference category: civil dictatorship 
Cheibub et al. 
(2010, 2009)  
Regional 
climate 
commit-
ment 
Regional mean of UNFCCC/ Kyoto Protocol ratification, 
EU = Mean of European member states.  
IIASA (2004); 
UNFCCC (no 
year a, b) 
Notes:  Analysis units = country-years. Cross-sectional data of the climate change index refer to the period from 1990-2005. 
I added one to variables with an observed minimum of zero before logarithmising them. 
Positively skewed variables have been logarithmised. Univariate statistics of the independent variables in the anal-
yses of UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification are presented in Tables A7.1.1 and A7.1.2 in the annex.
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Figure 7.2.1 Ratification duration of the UNFCCC in selected countries up to 2006 
 
Notes: The darker the colour the longer the duration of the ratification of the UNFCC. Missing countries are grey. 
Figure 7.2.2 Ratification duration of the Kyoto Protocol in selected countries up to 2006 
 
Notes: The darker the colour the longer the duration of the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Missing countries are grey. 
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Figures 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 present the ratification duration of countries that entered the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
up to the end of the research period. Annex I countries ratified the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol faster, on average, 
than Non-Annex I countries (see Table 7.2.4). Yet, there is considerable variation among Non-Annex I countries. 
On the one hand, there are Non-Annex I countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol considerably faster than Annex 
I countries. On the other hand, some countries, especially in North and Sub-Sahara Africa, took a long time to 
enter into both climate treaties. There is little variation among Annex I parties in the ratification of the UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol. As explained above, EU member states entered the Kyoto Protocol together. 
Table 7.2.4 The ratification delay of countries that ratified the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol during the 
research period: 1992 to 2006 
 Mean Std.dev. Minimum Maximum N 
UNFCCC      
Annex I 879 792 210 4282 33 
Non-Annex I 1020 609 92 2912 84 
Kyoto Protocol      
Annex I 1614 276 1099 2720 29a 
Non-Annex I 1843 771 185 3193 76 
Kyoto Protocol       
Annex I 1785 467 1099 2720 9b 
Non-Annex 1844 771 185 3193 76 
Notes:  a EU member states as separate countries, b EU member states as single country. N=117. 12 countries in the dataset 
have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol until 2006. Std.dev. = Standard deviation. 
The main independent variables – globalisation dimensions, veto points, the presence of a right-wing veto player, 
political-corruption dimensions, and democracy-quality dimensions – vary more between countries than over time 
(see Table 7.2.5). Thus, it is relevant to study whether they can help to explain country differences in climate 
commitment. Government ideology also changes considerably over time. Policy diffusion (UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol ratification) differs little between countries but considerably over time. This is because, over time, most 
trading partners ratified the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol.  
Trade and capital openness are not highly correlated. This justifies their separate analysis. Economic openness 
varies considerably among countries (see Figures 7.2.3 & 7.2.4). The figures indicate that international trade and 
investment does not undermine climate commitment. Despite low levels of trade and capital openness, North Af-
rican and Sub-Saharan African countries took a long time to ratify the two climate treaties. The univariate distri-
butions of the policy diffusion variables are skewed. Most countries ratified the UNFCCC fast. 
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Table 7.2.5 Variation of main independent variables between and within countries (1992–2006) 
 Std.dev.  
between 
Std.dev. 
within 
N Countries 
Trade openness (lg) .18 .08 1749 117 
Capital openness (ln) .80 61 1751 117 
Policy diffusion (UNFCCC) .06 .24 1635 117 
Policy diffusion (KP) .05 .35 1635 117 
IGO memberships 20.29 4.90 1635 117 
Network Centrality 1.04 .70 1401 117 
Left government .26 .27 1715 117 
Right government .29 .28 1715 117 
Centre government .17 .19 1715 117 
Right veto player (foreign) .41 .20 1703 117 
Government fragmentation .58 .29 1747 117 
Presidential veto player .27 .12 1734 117 
Bicameralism .35 .09 1734 117 
Executive corruption .29 .06 1748 117 
Legislative corruption 1.22 .26 1752 117 
Public sector corruption .30 .06 1759 117 
Electoral democracy .47 1.7 1752 117 
Established democracy .46 .19 1753 117 
Vertical accountability .78 .24 1748 117 
Horizontal accountability .97 .23 1748 117 
Political rights .89 .18 1748 117 
Civil rights .26 .06 1748 117 
Notes: Analysis units = country-years from 1992-2006. KP = Kyoto Protocol. St.dev. = Standard deviation. 
Figure 7.2.3 Country differences in international economic integration 
Trade openness 
 
Capital openness 
 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. N=117. The darker the colour the higher the level of international 
economic integration. Missing countries are grey.   
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Figure 7.2.3 Country differences in international economic integration  (continuation) 
Policy diffusion (UNFCCC) 
 
Policy diffusion (Kyoto Protocol) 
 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. N=117. The darker the colour the higher the level of international 
economic integration. Missing countries are grey. 
Figure 7.2.4 Variation in international economic integration 
 
 Mean Median Stdev. Minimum Maximum 
Trade openness -.01 -.01 .18 -.40 .65 
Capital openness 2.70 2.69 .80 .67 4.78 
Policy diffusion 
(UNFCCC) 
.88 .90 .06 .63 .96 
Policy diffusion 
(Kyoto Protocol) 
.39 .39 .08 .23 .63 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. The boxplots display z-scores. N=117. 
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Figure 7.2.5 Country differences in international political integration 
IGO memberships 
 
State centrality in IGO networks 
 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. N=117. The darker the colour the higher the level of international 
political integration. Missing countries are grey.  
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Figure 7.2.5 Country differences in international political integration (continuation) 
 
 Mean Median Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
IGO memberships 64.92 63.43 20.29 28.93 124.43 
Network centrality 5.32 5.38 1.04 2.51 7.27 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. The boxplots display z-scores. N=117. Std.dev. = Standard devi-
ation. 
Figure 7.2.6 Government fragmentation 
  
 Mean Median Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
Government fragmentation .53 .25 .58 .00 2.12 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. Government fragmentation is logarithmised. The boxplot displays 
z-scores. N=117. Std.dev. = Standard deviation. 
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Countries also differ with regard to their international political integration, as captured by their IGO memberships 
and centrality in IGO networks (Figure 7.2.5). The two indicators are highly but not perfectly correlated. Both are 
tested in the empirical analysis. Visual inspection suggests that political globalisation contributes to UNFCCC and 
Kyoto Protocol ratification. Countries that were highly politically integrated ratified both climate treaties quickly 
(e.g., in Europe and Latin America). By contrast, Sub-Saharan African countries, which entered the UNFCCC and 
Kyoto Protocol relatively late, shared low levels of involvement in IGOs.  
There is a lack of variation, related to indicators of government ideology, specific veto points, and the presence of 
a right-wing veto player, in the global comparative sample. This reflects the limited availability of data on the 
government ideology of partisan veto players. Data restrictions limit the explanatory power of these variables. 
They also cause high correlations among indicators in the veto-player approach (developing-country sample, 
1992–2006: government fragmentation and bicameralism, bicameralism, and right-wing veto player, pooled sam-
ple, 1998–2006: right-wing government ideology and right-wing veto player, government fragmentation and right-
wing veto player). In addition, government fragmentation is skewed. About 25% of all countries are characterised 
by a relatively high number of government parties (see Figure 7.2.6).  
Developing countries exhibit higher values on executive and legislative corruption than developed countries (see 
Figure 7.2.7). In particular, governments and parliaments in Africa are highly corrupt. The two corruption dimen-
sions are positively correlated. The box plots reveal that executive and legislative corruption varies considerably 
across countries. Moreover, high levels of government corruption do not necessarily imply high levels of corrup-
tion in parliament and vice versa. Latin America has severe problems with legislative corruption; it performs better 
with regard to executive corruption. By contrast, developed countries differ more in relation to legislative corrup-
tion, rather than executive corruption. For instance, Italy has severe problems with legislative corruption. 
Figure 7.2.7 Country differences in executive and legislative corruption 
Executive corruption 
 
Legislative corruption 
 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. N=117. The darker the colour the higher political corruption. 
Missing countries are grey. 
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Figure 7.2.7 Country differences in executive and legislative corruption (continuation) 
 
 Mean Median Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
Executive corruption .50 .57 .29 .01 .97 
Legislative corruption .32 .13 1.57 -3.42 2.89 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. The boxplots display z-scores. N=117. Std.dev. = Standard devi-
ation. 
The global comparative sample consisted of 53 established and 64 non-established democracies (see Figure 7.2.8). 
Of these, 61 countries were classified as electoral democracies and 56 as non-electoral democracies. In the devel-
oping-country sample, the two regime indicators were not perfectly correlated. The democracy-quality dimensions 
were highly correlated with each other. This was particularly true of vertical accountability and political rights, 
vertical accountability and civil rights, and political and civil rights. They also correlate highly with regime-type 
dummies. The world maps show little variation in democratic qualities among developed countries. For his reason, 
this study has concentrated on analysing the joint effects of globalisation and democratic qualities in developing 
countries. There are considerable country differences in democratic qualities among poor countries (see Figures 
7.2.9 & 7.2.10). Moreover, democratic qualities also vary within countries. Countries that perform well on one 
democracy-quality dimension do not necessarily perform well on another. It is well known that nearly all Latin 
American countries could be classified as electoral democracies during the research period. They share high levels 
of vertical accountability, in comparison to their performance on political and civil rights. This justifies the ap-
proach chosen here – to study democratic qualities separately. The plots indicate that most observations exhibit 
relatively high values of vertical accountability as well as political and civil rights. By contrast, only half of coun-
tries worldwide can be found on the upper part of the empirical distribution of horizontal accountability. 
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Figure 7.2.8 Democracies and autocracies 
Electoral democracies and non-electoral democracies 
 
Established democracies and non-established democracies 
 
Notes: Green = electoral/ established democracies most years from 1992-2006, violet = non-electoral/ non-established de-
mocracies most years from 1992-2006. N=117. Missing countries are grey. 
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Figure 7.2.9 Country differences in democratic qualities 
Vertical accountability 
 
Horizontal accountability 
 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. N=117. The darker the colour the higher democracy quality. 
Missing countries are grey.   
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Figure 7.2.9 Country differences in democratic qualities (continuation) 
Political rights 
 
Civil rights 
 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. N=117. The darker the colour the higher democracy quality. 
Missing countries are grey.  
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Figure 7.2.10 Worldwide variation in democratic qualities 
 
 Mean Median Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
Vertical accountability .61 .63 .78 -3.42 2.89 
Horizontal accountability .42 .38 .97 -1.76 2.25 
Political rights .68 .73 .89 -1.50 2.11 
Civil rights .67 .68 .26 .08 .99 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. The boxplots display z-scores. N=117. Std.dev. = Standard devi-
ation. 
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7.3 Ratification of the UNFCCC 
This section examines the relationship between international integration, domestic political institutions, and UN-
FCCC ratification. Section 7.3.1 begins by analysing additive effects of globalisation. The following section (7.3.2) 
tests joint effects with domestic political institutions. To this end, marginal-effects plots are examined. To avoid 
problems with multicollinearity, highly correlated independent variables (>.7) are not included in the same model. 
These include: state memberships in IGOs and state centrality in IGO networks (developing-country sample, 
1992–2006), policy diffusion and mean regional commitment, the presence of a right-wing veto player and right-
wing government ideology, electoral and established democracy, established democracy and the presence of a 
right-wing veto player, government fragmentation and the presence of a right-wing veto player, as well as political 
and civil rights. Moreover, vertical accountability is highly correlated with horizontal, political, and civil rights 
(>.7). There are no problematic correlations between executive and legislative corruption. Correlations are pre-
sented in Chapter A7.2 in the annex. 
7.3.1 International integration and UNFCCC ratification 
To consider model complexity, the first models included only indicators of globalisation and control variables. All 
of the models controlled ENGO strength, industry-sector size, fuel exports, GDP per capita, population density, 
climate change vulnerability, and Annex I status (pooled analysis only). Next, in separate models, political insti-
tutional indicators of the three explanatory models – veto player, regime, type and political-corruption approach – 
were added.74 Third, globalisation and control variables, as well as significant institutional variables, were exam-
ined simultaneously. The final step also considered additional controls, such as regional commitment. Only the 
models used in this final step are presented in Tables 7.3.1 and 7.3.2. The tables present beta coefficients. They 
describe the effect of an independent variable on the occurrence of the ratification of the UNFCCC (Jahn, 2013, 
p. 402). Positive or negative signs indicate whether the independent variable increases or decreases the hazard rate, 
i.e. the probability that ratification occurred in a certain time period (Fredriksson & Gaston, 2000, p. 352; Wen-
zelburger et al., 2014, pp. 166, 170, 190). Among various controls, ENGO strength contributes as expected to 
UNFCCC ratification (Hcont4) The positive effect of the number of ENGOs is not significant in all models in the 
analysis of developing countries. In contrast to theoretical expectations, climate change vulnerability undermines 
quick ratification (Hcont15); Non-Annex I parties ratified the treaty faster than Annex I parties to the agreement 
(Hcont16).  
No stable relationship has been shown between economic openness and UNFCCC ratification. The negative effect 
of trade openness becomes insignificant when regional commitment is controlled. Policy diffusion among trading 
partners contributes to UNFCCC ratification. Regional commitment has a significant positive effect on UNFCCC 
ratification as well (Hcont8).75 While the effect of regional commitment remains stable in a separate analysis of 
developing countries, the effect of policy diffusion becomes insignificant. In sum, as expected, economic globali-
sation does not matter to UNFCCC ratification. In accordance with the theoretical expectations, international po-
litical integration, captured by IGO memberships or state centrality in IGO networks, contributes to a faster ratifi-
cation of the UNFCCC in all models (HInt4.1). In the separate analysis of developing countries, the positive effect 
of international political integration stays significant. 
There is no support for the hypothesis that institutional constraints or institutional quality matter to UNFCCC 
ratification. As expected, the policy preferences of veto players (presence of a right-wing veto player, government 
ideology) as well as veto points make no difference. The effect of a right-wing veto player is negative but insig-
nificant. Positive effects of bicameralism and presidential veto-player status become insignificant when regional 
commitment is controlled. The separate analysis of developing countries indicates also no significant effects of 
policy preferences of veto players and specific veto points. Executive and legislative corruption contribute to UN-
FCCC ratification in the global comparative analysis when regional commitment is controlled. Both effects are 
insignificant in the analysis of developing countries (HCorr2.1.2 & HCorr2.2.2). There are no significant differences 
in UNFCCC ratification between democracies and autocracies. Among democracy-quality dimensions, the find-
ings of pooled analysis indicate that political and civil rights in separate models contribute to the ratification of the 
Convention when regional commitment is controlled. Yet, in the separate analysis of developing countries there 
is neither a significant effect of regime type nor of specific democracy-quality dimensions (HDem5.1.2 & 
HDem5.2.2).
 
74 The results of the first two steps are presented in Tables A7.3.1–A7.3.9 in chapter A7.3 in the annex. 
75 Both variables cannot be tested simultaneously because of their high bivariate correlation. 
163 
 
 
Table 7.3.1 International integration, domestic political institutions, and UNFCCC ratification (Global com-
parative analysis) 
 Global comparative analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Economic develop-
ment (ln) 
-.075 .928 -.095 .910 -.072 .931 -.100 .904 
(.133) (.133) (.136) (.136) 
Industry sector size 
(ln) 
-.225 .799 -.181 .834 -.175 .840 -.143 .867 
(.376) (.385) (.389) (.399) 
Fuel exports (ln) 
 
-.045 .956 -.046 .955 .014 1.015 .009 1.009 
(.097) (.097) (.098) (.098) 
ENGO strength (ln) 
 
.361** 1.435 .372*** 1.450 .211 1.235 .244* 1.277 
(.146) (.140) (.148) (.142) 
Population density 
(ln) 
-.047 .954 -.051 .950 -.063 .939 -.070 .932 
(.091) (.090) (.089) (.088) 
Climate change vul-
nerability 
-4.351*** .013 -4.283*** .014 -4.868*** .008 -4.793*** .008 
(1.113) (1.125) (1.080) (1.095) 
Annex I 
 
-.863** .422 -.815** .443 -1.268*** .281 -1.187*** .305 
(.387) (.380) (.408) (.400) 
Regional climate 
commitment 
  3.749*** 42.50 3.727*** 41.54 
  (.662) (.661) 
Executive corrup-
tion 
-.649 .522 -.552 .576 -.884 .413 -.791 .453 
(.607) (.626) (.603) (.629) 
Political rights 
 
.126 1.135  .213 1.238  
(.165)  (.162)  
Civil rights 
 
 .535 1.707  .664 .1.943 
 (.557)  (.571) 
Trade openness (lg) 
 
-1.181* .307 -1.296* .274 -.965 .381 -1.054 .348 
(.676) (.698) (.701) (.718) 
Capital openness 
(ln) 
.151 1.163 .159 1.172 .10 1.106 .106 1.112 
(.134) (.135) (.133) (.134) 
Policy diffusion 
(UNFCCC) 
1.154* 3.172 1.213** 3.363   
(.596) (.593)   
IGO memberships .016** 1.016 .015** 1.02 .013** 1.101 .014** 1.014 
 (.007) (.007) (.006) (.006) 
N 412 412 412 412 
LR chi square 55.8 56.21 79.45 79.03 
Countries 117 
Notes: The table presents beta coefficients, hazard ratios (in italics), and standard errors (in parentheses), * p < .1, ** p < .05, 
*** p < .01. 
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Table 7.3.2 International integration, domestic political institutions, and UNFCCC ratification (Analysis of 
developing countries) 
 Developing countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Economic develop-
ment (ln) 
-.000 1.00 .033 1.034 .008 1.008 .022 1.023 
(.190) (.194) (.194) (.197) 
Industry sector size 
(ln) 
-.370 .691 -.493 .611 -.340 .712 -.453 .636 
(.461) (.471) (.473) (.486) 
Fuel exports (ln) 
 
-.227* .797 -.232* .793 -.182 .833 -.183 .832 
(.120) (.119) (.115) (.116) 
ENGO strength (ln) .277 1.319 .279 1.322 .108 1.114 .156 1.169 
 (.188) (.181) (.198) (.189) 
Population density 
(ln) 
-.054 .947 -.053 .949 -.115 .891 -.103 .902 
(.125) (.124) (.125) (.125) 
Climate change vul-
nerability 
-4.309*** .013 -4.450*** .012 -4.874*** .008 -4.849*** .008 
(1.195) (1.198) (1.210) (1.209) 
Regional climate 
commitment 
  3.633*** 37.82 3.395*** 29.82 
  (1.152) (1.149) 
Executive corrup-
tion 
-.678 .508 -.940 .391 -1.128 .324 -1.285 .277 
(.776) (.824) (.759) (.812) 
Political rights -.063 .939  .085 1.089  
 (.181)  (.186)  
Civil rights  -.681 .506  -.290 .748 
  (.655)  (.683) 
Trade openness (lg) 
 
.170 1.858 .384 1.468 -.022 .978 .231 1.260 
(.837) (.851) (.892) (.905) 
Capital openness 
(ln) 
.035 1.036 .026 1.026 .105 1.110 .085 1.089 
(.166) (.164) (.168) (.166) 
Policy diffusion 
(UNFCCC) 
1.049 2.855 .999 2.716   
(.871) (.866)   
IGO memberships 
 
.031*** 1.032 .034*** 1.034 .024*** 1.025 .027*** 1.027 
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.010) 
N 277 277 277 277 
LR chi square 32.80 33.77 40.59 40.56 
Countries 76 
Notes: The table presents beta coefficients, hazard ratios (in italics), and standard errors (in parentheses), * p < .1, ** p < .05, 
*** p < .01. 
In sum, in accordance with the theoretical expectations, there is no support for the hypothesis that economic open-
ness or policy diffusion via trading partners matters for UNFCCC ratification (Htreatydesign2). International political 
integration, however, contributes to faster ratification of the UNFCCC (HInt4.1.2). In accordance with conclusions 
drawn from the literature on treaty design and international cooperation, there is no support for the hypothesis that 
domestic institutional explanatory factors matter to UNFCCC ratification (Htreatydesign3). However, the explanatory 
power of indicators drawn from the veto-player approach must be considered (see previous section). 
7.3.2 Joint influence of international integration and domestic political institutions 
Does the effect of globalisation on UNFCCC ratification depend on domestic political institutions? This study has 
not only tested hypotheses involving interactions discussed in Chapter 5. It has also analysed the potential two-
way interaction effects of all international integration dimensions with all variables in the three explanatory ap-
proaches (veto-player approach, political-corruption approach and regime-type approach). Most developed coun-
tries ratified the UNFCCC fast (see also Gupta, 2010, p. 639). This chapter starts with the analysis of developing 
countries and then tests the stability of the result in the global analysis. The reason for this is that all interactions 
that were significant in the global comparative analysis have become insignificant in the separate analysis of de-
veloping countries. Therefore, a final model has been developed, based on the sample of developing countries and 
tested for the global comparative sample. Following Brambor et al. (2006) marginal-effects plots have been used 
to interpret interaction effects and evaluate their significance.76 The constituent terms of interaction effects are 
mean-centred to avoid problems with non-essential multicollinearity. All models have controlled for GDP per 
capita, industry-sector size, fuel exports, ENGO strength, population density, climate change vulnerability, and 
Annex I status. As the previous section has shown that regional commitment affects UNFCCC ratification, this 
 
76 A statistically significant interaction term does not necessarily mean that the interaction effect is significant and an insignif-
icant interaction effect does not mean the effect of international integration is insignificant at all values of the moderator vari-
able (Brambor et al., 2006; Esarey & Summer, 2017, p. 1145). 
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variable has been included in place of policy diffusion. Exceptions include the models that examine interactions 
between policy diffusion and domestic political institutions. 
To consider model complexity, this study has first tested interaction effects in separate models. A survival analysis 
has no comparable R square statistic. Therefore, in a second step, significant interactions of the same globalisation 
indicator and explanatory approach have been tested simultaneously. Third, significant interaction effects with 
different globalisation indicators of the same explanatory approach have been examined in the same model. Fi-
nally, stable significant interaction effects of all three explanatory models have been tested together. The following 
section present the results from the second and third steps only. 
With regard to the veto-player approach, there is a positive effect of IGO memberships and centrality in IGO 
networks in democracies without a left- or right-wing government ideology or veto points (bicameralism, presi-
dential veto point, government fragmentation, becoming stronger with number of government parties). In addition, 
policy diffusion contributes to UNFCCC ratification in democratic countries with a left-wing government ideol-
ogy, as well as in democracies with a presidential veto player. Because of the low variation in the veto player 
variables, these results suggest that political globalisation contributes to climate commitment in non-democracies. 
There is no interaction between economic openness and political-corruption dimensions (executive and legislative 
corruption). This study also finds no support for the claim that executive or legislative corruption moderate the 
effect of policy diffusion. The positive effect of international political integration captured by IGO memberships 
or network centrality on UNFCCC ratification becomes stronger with executive corruption and weaker with leg-
islative corruption. These effects are significant only at average levels of corruption.  
With regard to regime type, there is a positive effect of capital openness in electoral and established democracies. 
Policy diffusion contributes to UNFCCC ratification in electoral democracies. IGO memberships and network 
centrality have a positive effect in non-electoral democracies and non-established democracies. Moreover, the 
positive effect of IGO memberships on UNFCCC ratification becomes stronger with vertical accountability and 
political and civil rights. It is also significant for average and high values of political rights. In contrast to the other 
democratic qualities, the positive effect of IGO memberships reduces with horizontal accountability. By contrast, 
the positive effect of network centrality increases with checks and balances. In a simultaneous analysis (political 
rights and IGO memberships, horizontal accountability and IGO memberships, electoral democracy and IGO 
memberships, electoral democracy and capital openness, electoral democracy and policy diffusion), all interaction 
effects remain stable. The results remain the same when network centrality is used in place of IGO memberships. 
The interaction of IGO memberships with political rights is included in place of vertical accountability or civil 
rights, as it is the clearest effect in the marginal-effects plot. The interactions with electoral democracy, as opposed 
to established democracy, have been tested, since policy diffusion interacts only with electoral democracy (see 
above).  
The final section of this chapter examines the significant interaction effects of the three explanatory models sim-
ultaneously. This model includes the interactions of policy diffusion with left-wing government ideology, policy 
diffusion and presidential veto player, interactions of IGO memberships with veto points (presidential veto player, 
government fragmentation, bicameralism) and left-wing and right-wing government ideology, interactions of IGO 
memberships with executive and legislative corruption, interactions of IGO memberships with electoral democ-
racy, political rights and horizontal accountability, capital openness and electoral democracy and policy diffusion 
and electoral democracy. All effects remain significant. To test model complexity, this study has also estimated 
the model without the interactions of IGO memberships with veto points and government ideology, as these imply 
that IGO memberships have a positive effect on climate commitment in non-democracies. All effects remain sig-
nificant. Yet, in the jack-knife analysis based on world regions (IIASA, 2004), only the interaction effects of IGO 
with political rights, as well as electoral democracy, are significant. 
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Figure 7.3.1 International political integration, political rights, electoral democracy, and UNFCCC ratifica-
tion (Developing countries) 
90% c.i. 
 
95% c.i. 
 
Notes: Marginal effect plot. Analysis units = country-years from 1992-2006. N=76. International political integration meas-
ured by IGO memberships. Control of trade and capital openness, regional commitment, economic development, 
ENGO strength, industry size, fuel exports, population density, climate change vulnerability. Simultaneous analysis 
of the interaction effects of IGO memberships and political rights and IGO memberships and electoral democracy. 
c.i. = confidence interval. 
Figure 7.3.1 presents the results of this final model. The positive effect of IGO memberships becomes weaker with 
political rights in developing countries without North African countries (jack-knife analysis) (see Figure 7.3.2). 
This effect is only significant for countries with average values of political rights. In the analysis of the pooled 
sample (see Figure 7.3.3) the interaction between political globalisation and political rights is significant only for 
average values of political rights. In this analysis, the positive effect of IGO memberships does not become weaker 
with political rights. The results remain the same when network centrality is applied as an indicator of international 
political integration. 
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Figure 7.3.2 International political integration, political rights, and UNFCCC ratification (Developing coun-
tries) 
 
Notes: Marginal effect plot, 95% confidence interval. Analysis units = country-years from 1992-2006. Analysis without 
North African countries. Control of trade and capital openness, regional commitment, economic development, ENGO 
strength, industry size, fuel exports, population density, climate change vulnerability. Simultaneous analysis of the 
interaction effects of IGO memberships and political rights and IGO memberships and electoral democracy. 
These results remains stable when democratic and autocratic sub-types are controlled, as well as when regional 
commitment, EU membership, electoral size urban-population size, country size, and economic growth is con-
trolled (see Section A7.6 in the annex). This also applies to the analysis of additional controls in separate regression 
models. The model has a good model fit (see A7.5.1 in the annex). There are no violations of the model assump-
tions (see A7.5.2 in the annex). Regarding control variables, as expected, regional commitment contributes to 
UNFCCC ratification (Hcont12) (see Tables 7.3.3 & 7.3.4). Hcont15 indicated no clear relationship between climate 
change vulnerability and climate commitment. By contrast, the statistical analysis shows that more vulnerable 
states ratified the UNFCCC later. The analysis of developing countries suggests that monarchies are less likely 
than military autocracies (reference category) to ratify the UNFCCC. 
To conclude, in accordance with hypothesis Hxdemocracy1a, international political integration only contributes to 
UNFCCC ratification in non-democracies. In accordance, in developing countries, the positive effect of political 
globalisation becomes weaker with political rights. IGO involvement contributes to climate commitment in coun-
tries with average levels of political rights. The policy preferences of veto players, veto points, and political cor-
ruption do not influence the effects of globalisation on climate commitment. Before discussing these results in 
Section 7.5, the next section examines Kyoto Protocol ratification. 
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Figure 7.3.3 International political integration, political rights, electoral democracy, and UNFCCC ratifica-
tion (Global comparative analysis) 
90% c.i. 
 
95% c.i. 
 
Notes: Marginal effect plot. Analysis units = country years from 1992-2006. N=117. International political inte-
gration measured by IGO memberships. Control of trade and capital openness, regional commitment, eco-
nomic development, ENGO strength, industry size, fuel exports, population density, climate change vul-
nerability and Annex I status. Separate analysis of interactions of IGO memberships with political rights 
and electoral democracy to avoid problems with multicollinearity. c.i. = confidence interval.  
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Table 7.3.3 International political integration, political rights, electoral democracy, and UNFCCC ratifica-
tion (Global comparative analysis) 
 Global comparative analysis 
 (1) (2) 
Economic development (ln) .014 1.014 .078 1.082 
 (.139) (.137) 
Industry sector size (ln) -.401 .670 -.629 .533 
 (.410) (.412) 
Fuel exports (ln) .018 1.018 -.024 .976 
 (.103) (.105) 
ENGO strength (ln) .289* 1.334* .431*** 1.538*** 
 (.157) (.152) 
Population density (ln) -.042 .959 -.051 .950 
 (.088) (.088) 
Climate change  
vulnerability 
-4.779*** .008*** -4.893*** .007*** 
(1.073) (1.088) 
Regional commitment 3.651*** 38.503*** 3.436*** 31.069*** 
 (.676) (.669) 
Annex I -1.155*** .315*** -1.013*** .363*** 
 (.393) (.388) 
Civilian dictatorship -.263 .769 -.099 .906 
 (.291) (.358) 
Monarchy -.219 .803 -.447 .640 
 (.461) (.494) 
Political rights .248 1.281  
 (.193)  
Electoral democracy  -.005 .995 
  (.392) 
Trade openness -.899 .407 -.825 .438 
 (.755) (.761) 
Capital openness .144 1.154 .174 1.190 
 (.130) (.135) 
IGO memberships .012* 1.012* .024** 1.024** 
 (.007) (.009) 
IGO memberships x Politi-
cal rights 
-.000 1.000  
(.006)  
IGO memberships x Elec-
toral democracy 
 -.019 .982 
(.012) 
N 412 412 
LR chi square 78.23 78.85 
Countries 117 
Notes: The table presents beta coefficients, hazard ratios (in italics), and standard errors (in parentheses), * p < .1, ** p < .05, 
*** p < .01.
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Table 7.3.4 International political integration, political rights, and electoral democracy (Analysis of devel-
oping countries)  
Developing countries 
 (1) (2) 
Economic development (ln) .049 1.050 .117 1.124 
 (.198) (.200) 
Industry sector size (ln) -.553 .575 -.526 .591 
 (.513) (.504) 
Fuel exports (ln) -.186 .830 -.279** .756** 
 (.118) (.133) 
ENGO strength (ln) .237 1.267 .379* 1.461* 
 (.206) (.225) 
Population density (ln) -.111 .895 -.093 .912 
 (.131) (.129) 
Climate change vulnerability -4.486*** .011*** -4.897*** .007*** 
 (1.172) (1.198) 
Regional commitment 3.623*** 37.432*** 3.402*** 30.028*** 
 (1.185) (1.190) 
Civil dictatorship  -.060 .942 
  (.447) 
Monarchy  -1.206* .299* 
  (.672) 
Political rights .170 1.186 .021 1.021 
 (.240) (.273) 
Electoral democracy .019 1.020 -.186 .830 
 (.397) (.533) 
Trade openness -.262 .769 .000 1.000 
 (.906) (.989) 
Capital openness .136 1.145 .169 1.184 
 (.172) (.177) 
IGO memberships .032*** 1.032*** .039*** 1.021*** 
 (.012) (.013) 
IGO memberships x Electoral 
democracy 
-.020 .980 -.027 .973 
(.022) (.022) 
   
IGO memberships x Political 
rights 
.017 1.017 .017 .017 
(.012) (.012) 
N 277 277 
LR chi square 40.31 44.11 
Countries  76  
Notes: The table presents beta coefficients, hazard ratios (in italics), and standard errors (in parentheses), * p < .1, ** p < .05, 
*** p < .01.  
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7.4 Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
This chapter presents the results of the analysis of Kyoto Protocol ratification. As discussed above, the first section 
examines additive effects of domestic political institutions and international integration. The subsequent section 
tests joint effects of domestic political institutions and international integration. The analysis of Kyoto Protocol 
ratification examines the pooled sample from 1998 to 2006. To provide a robustness analysis, the developing-
country sample is examined. As explained, EU member states are treated as a single case. To avoid problems with 
multicollinearity, due to high bivariate correlations (>.7), the following variables have not been tested simultane-
ously: democracy-quality dimensions, IGO memberships and state centrality in IGO networks, electoral/estab-
lished democracy and vertical accountability, electoral accountability and political rights, electoral/established 
democracy and government fragmentation, established democracy and right-wing veto player, policy diffusion via 
trading partners and regional commitment (see Chapter A7.2). 
7.4.1 International integration and Kyoto Protocol ratification 
As in the analysis of UNFCCC ratification, the first models only included indicators of globalisation and control 
variables. Models of the additive analysis controlled ENGO strength, industry-sector size, fuel exports, economic 
development, population density, climate change vulnerability and Annex I status (see Tables 7.4.1 & 7.4.2). Sec-
ond, political institutional indicators of the three explanatory models – veto player, regime type, and political-
corruption approach – were added to separate models.77 Third, globalisation and control variables, as well as sig-
nificant institutional variables, have been examined simultaneously. In this final step, additional controls such as 
regional commitment, have also been considered. Only models of this final step are presented below. Among the 
controls, countries with high levels of population density ratified the Kyoto Protocol more quickly. This supports 
Hcont16a. Models that also consider regional commitment indicate that Annex I countries are less likely to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol quickly. There is no support for the hypothesis that economic globalisation matters for Kyoto 
Protocol ratification. The negative effect of trade openness is significant in some models only. In addition, policy 
diffusion via trading partners does not influence climate commitment. Ratification by countries in the same region 
significantly hastens Kyoto Protocol ratification. There is no stable support for the claim that IGO memberships 
or network centrality contribute to Kyoto Protocol ratification. These findings remain stable in the separate anal-
ysis of developing countries. 
There is no support for the hypothesis that the presence of a right-wing veto player or democratic veto points –
government fragmentation, presidential veto power, or the veto power of the upper legislative chamber – affect 
Kyoto Protocol ratification. This applies to the analysis of the pooled and developing-country samples. A signifi-
cant positive effect of right-wing government ideology on Kyoto Protocol ratification in the separate analysis of 
developing countries becomes insignificant in the final model. The data does not confirm that the presence of a 
right veto player or government fragmentation delay the ratification of hard climate treaties (HVeto1.21, HVeto1.2.2, 
HVeto2.2.1, & HVeto2.2.2).These findings indicate that neither executive nor legislative corruption matter to Kyoto 
Protocol ratification (HCorr1.2.1, HCorr1.2.2, HCorr2.2.1, & HCorr2.2.2). The statistical findings also indicate that re-
gime type and democracy-quality dimensions do not affect climate commitment. There is no support that political 
rights contribute to Kyoto Protocol ratification (HDem4.2.1 & H4.2.2). The positive effects of vertical accounta-
bility and electoral democracies become insignificant when regional commitment is controlled. The results suggest 
that established democracies did ratify the Kyoto Protocol more quickly. However, this result is insignificant in 
the analysis of developing countries. Regarding the control hypotheses, the data support that densely populated 
countries are more committed (Hcont7a) and that regional commitment contributes to Kyoto Protocol ratification 
(Hcont12). In contrast to Hcont16, Annex I parties are more likely to ratify the Kyoto Protocol quickly than Non-
Annex I parties.  
 
77 The results of the first two steps are presented in Tables A7.4.1–A7.4.10 in chapter A7.4 in the annex. 
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Table 7.4.1 International integration, domestic political institutions, and Kyoto Protocol ratification (Global 
comparative analysis) 
 Global comparative analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Economic develop-
ment (ln) 
-.168 .846 -.173 .841 -.134 .874 
(.175) (.177) (.178) 
Industry sector size 
(ln) 
.768* 2.154 .577 1.780 .873* 2.395 
(.423) (.450) (.465) 
Fuel exports (ln) -.002 .998 .040 1.040 .021 1.021 
 (.109) (.114) (.115) 
ENGO strength (ln) -.092 .912 -.099 .906 -.156 .855 
 (.172) (.177) (.174) 
Population density 
(ln) 
.311*** 1.364 .289** 1.335 .293*** 1.340 
(.112) (.114) (.112) 
Climate change vul-
nerability 
.307 1.359 .676 1.965 -.572 .564 
(1.299) (1.316) (1.242) 
Regional commitment   4.146*** 63.18 
   (.877) 
Annex I -1.098** .334 -1.299** .273 -1.450*** .235 
 (.515) (.549) (.495) 
Right government 
ideology 
 .173 1.189  
 (.399)  
Political corruption -.177 .838 -.232 .793 -.559 .572 
 (.778) (.815) (.801) 
Established 
Democracy 
1.059*** 2.883 1.149*** 3.154 .643** 1.903 
(.302) (.344) (.316) 
Trade openness (lg) -1.353 .259 -1.408 .245 -1.602* .202 
 (.877) (.917) (.871) 
Capital openness (ln) .154 1.166 .133 1.143 .094 1.099 
 (.157) (.171) (.155) 
Policy diffusion .553 1.738 .209 1.233  
 (.932) (.966)  
IGO memberships .015 1.015 .015 1.015 .015* 1.015 
 (.009) (.010) (.009) 
N 573 560 573 
LR chi square 35.33 37.95 60.12 
Countries 96 
Notes: The table presents beta coefficients, hazard ratios (in italics), and standard errors (in parentheses), * p < .1, ** p < .05, 
*** p < .01.  
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Table 7.4.2 International integration, domestic political institutions, and Kyoto Protocol ratification (Analy-
sis of developing countries) 
 Developing countries 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Economic develop-
ment (ln) 
.060 1.062 .117 1.124 -.061 .941 
(.217) (.234) (.225) 
Industry sector size 
(ln) 
.424 1.529 .371 1.450 .407 1.502 
(.534) (.554) (.539) 
Fuel exports (ln) -.004 .996 -.009 .991 .053 1.055 
 (.124) (.128) (.125) 
ENGO strength (ln) -.009 .991 -.030 .970 -.090 .914 
(.192) (.196) (.196) 
Population density 
(ln) 
.578*** 1.782 .538*** 1.713 .494*** 1.639 
(.158) (.159) (.151) 
Climate change vul-
nerability 
1.021 2.775 .923 2.516 .252 1.287 
(1.369) (1.348) (1.356) 
Regional commit-
ment 
  3.797*** 44.59 
  (1.185) 
Right government 
ideology 
 .699 2.011  
 (.519)  
Political corruption -.976 .377 -.523 .592 -1.005 .366 
(.863) (.911) (.908) 
Established democ-
racy 
.767** 2.154 .674 1.961 .416 1.516 
(.344) (.414) (.367) 
Trade openness (lg) -1.233 .292 -1.624 .197 -.867 .420 
(.988) (1.057) (.941) 
Capital openness 
(ln) 
.268 1.307 .304 1.355 .192 1.212 
(.182) (.197) (.185) 
Policy diffusion .524 1.689 .032 1.032  
 (1.028) (1.081)  
IGO memberships .014 1.014 .010 1.010 .016 1.016 
 (.010) (.011) (.010) 
N 442 431 442 
LR chi square 39.12 40.68 49.81 
Countries 76 
Notes: The table presents beta coefficients, hazard ratios (in italics), and standard errors (in parentheses), * p < .1, ** p < .05, 
*** p < .01. 
In sum, there is no effect of economic or political-globalisation dimensions on Kyoto Protocol ratification. In 
accordance with Htreatydesign2 international economic integration neither affects UNFCCC nor Kyoto Protocol rati-
fication. In contrast to Htreatydesign3, which claimed that domestic political institutions mattered to Kyoto Protocol 
ratification, the present study finds that the political institutional variables considered in the analysis have no stable 
significant effects. 
7.4.2 The joint effects of international integration and domestic political institutions 
The following section tests the hypotheses of the three explanatory models on the joint influence of international 
integration and domestic political institutions. To develop a final model, the first step involved adding interaction 
terms to separate regression models to consider model complexity. In a second step, significant interactions of the 
same globalisation indicator and explanatory approach were tested simultaneously. Third, significant interaction 
effects of the variables associated with each explanatory approach were examined simultaneously with different 
globalisation indicators from the same explanatory approach. In the final step, significant interaction effects of the 
different explanatory models were tested simultaneously. In comparison to the analysis of UNFCCC ratification, 
this section examines the global comparative sample and tests the robustness of the final model with the develop-
ing-country sample. All models control ENGO strength, industry sector size, fuel exports, economic development, 
population density, climate change vulnerability and Annex I status. Models that do not test interactions with 
policy diffusion via trading partners control for regional commitment. The following section reports the results of 
the third step, i.e. the significant interactions of each explanatory approach, before examining the results of the 
final step. 
In simultaneous analysis of the significant interactions of the explanatory variables in the veto-player approach 
with the globalisation dimensions, there is a stable significant negative effect of trade openness in countries with 
left-wing governments or presidential veto players, as well as a positive effect of capital openness in bicameral 
democracies and countries with left-wing governments. There are no stable significant interactions between veto-
player-approach variables and international political integration (IGO memberships or state centrality in IGO net-
works) or policy diffusion. With regard to the political-corruption approach, trade openness is known to have 
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delayed Kyoto Protocol ratification in countries with below-average levels of executive/legislative corruption, 
while policy diffusion contributes to Kyoto Protocol ratification in countries with below-average levels of legisla-
tive corruption and IGO memberships (or state centrality in IGO networks) contribute in countries with below-
average levels of executive/legislative corruption. The analysis of the regime-type approach suggests that trade 
openness delays Kyoto Protocol ratification in non-established democracies as well as in countries with average 
civil rights. In addition, international political integration, captured by IGO memberships or network centrality, 
contributes to Kyoto Protocol ratification in countries with above-average civil rights. 
Figure 7.4.1 International political integration, civil rights, and Kyoto Protocol ratification (Global compara-
tive analysis) 
IGO memberships, 95% c.i. 
 
State centrality in IGO networks, 95% c.i. 
 
Notes: Marginal effect plot. Analysis units = country-years from 1992-2006. N=96. The multivariate models in-
cludes trade openness, capital openness, policy diffusion, IGO memberships/ network centrality, civil 
rights, political corruption, ENGO strength, industry sector size, fuel exports, economic development, pop-
ulation density, climate change vulnerability, Annex I status, and the interaction of IGO memberships/ 
network centrality with civil rights. c.i. = confidence interval. 
In the simultaneous analysis of significant interactions of the three explanatory models, the positive effect of IGO 
memberships in countries with above-average civil rights, the positive effect of policy diffusion in countries with 
legislative corruption, the interaction between trade openness and legislative corruption and the positive effect of 
capital openness in countries with left-wing governments all remain stable. Jack-knife analysis based on world 
regions (IIASA, 2004) indicates that only the joint effect of IGO memberships and civil rights is significant. The 
result is the same when state centrality in IGO networks is used as an indicator of political globalisation. This final 
model is displayed in Figure 7.4.1. These findings remain stable when democratic and autocratic sub-types are 
controlled, as well as when regional commitment, electoral size, urban population size, country size, and economic 
growth are considered (see Section A7.6 in the annex). The results remain the same when the additional controls 
are added in separate regression models. The final model has a good model fit and no violations of the model 
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assumptions (see Chapters A7.5.1 & A7.5.2 in the annex). The result remains the same when only developing 
countries are examined. 
While the economic-openness indicators are significant in the simultaneous analysis with interaction effect in 
Table 7.4.3, these effects are not stable in the robustness analysis (jack-knife analysis). The hazard ratio supports 
the finding that the joint effect of network centrality and civil rights has a substantial effect on climate commitment. 
As expected, regional commitment contributes to Kyoto Protocol ratification. In accordance with hypothesis 
Hcont7a, densely populated countries are more likely to ratify the Kyoto Protocol fast.  
To conclude, as expected, economic openness/interdependence has no effect on Kyoto Protocol ratification. There 
are no joint effects of economic globalisation influence and veto players or political-corruption dimensions. In 
accordance with theoretical expectations, political corruption and the policy preferences of veto players cannot 
explain the relationship between globalisation and Kyoto Protocol ratification. Specific veto points do not moder-
ate positive incentives derived from political globalisation. The statistical analysis supports hypothesis Hxdemoc-
racy2b. There is a positive effect of international political integration, captured by IGO memberships or state cen-
trality in IGO networks, on Kyoto Protocol ratification in countries with above-average levels of civil rights. 
Table 7.4.3 International political integration, civil rights, and Kyoto Protocol ratification 
 Global comparative 
analysis 
Developing countries 
Economic develop-
ment (ln) 
-.187 .829 .036 1.037 
(.235) (.274) 
Industry sector size 
(ln) 
1.427** 4.165** 1.128 3.089 
(.700) (.810) 
Fuels exports (ln) -.167 .846 -.166 .847 
 (.145) (.155) 
ENGO strength (ln) .033 1.033 .089 1.093 
 (.222) (.235) 
Population density 
(ln) 
.374** 1.453** .583*** 1.792 *** 
(.148) (.189) 
Climate change 
vulnerability 
-.165 .847 -.227 .797 
(1.486) (1.576) 
Regional commit-
ment 
4.630*** 102.564*** 4.085*** 59.415*** 
(1.081) (1.370) 
Annex I -.947 .388  
 (.630)  
Political corruption 1.534 4.635 1.146 3.145 
 (1.079) (1.197) 
Civil rights 1.909** 6.748** 1.509 4.521 
 (.936) (.943) 
Trade openness -2.367** .094 -1.912 .148 
 (1.131) (1.208) 
Capital openness .532** 1.703** .609** 1.838** 
 (.232) (.275) 
Network centrality .238 1.269 .265 1.303 
 (.203) (.217) 
Network centrality 
x Civil rights 
1.481** 4.396 1.626** 5.083** 
(.679) (.778) 
N 491 382 
Countries 96 76 
LR Chi2 60.30 49.70 
Notes: The table presents beta coefficients, hazard ratios (in italics), and standard errors (in parentheses), * p < .1, ** p < .05, 
*** p < .01. 
7.5 Discussion of the results 
This chapter discusses the results of this study. Table 7.5.1 summarises the statistical findings on additive effects 
of globalisation on climate commitment. As expected, international economic integration does not matter to cli-
mate commitment. While policy diffusion via trading partners contributes to UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratifi-
cation, tests of regional ratification behaviour lead to the same result. The lack of any independent effect of eco-
nomic globalisation may reflect the fact that countries often ratify climate treaties without intending to implement 
them. Moreover, as Chapter 3 has discussed, international economic integration has both positive and negative 
effects on climate commitment, ultimately producing no clear effect. While IGO involvement (in line with theo-
retical expectations) does contribute to UNFCCC ratification, political globalisation has no stable additive effect 
on Kyoto Protocol ratification. 
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Table 7.5.1 Summary of results: Globalisation and climate commitment 
Independent vari-
able 
UNFCCC 
 
Kyoto Protocol 
 
Pooled 
Developing 
Pooled 
Developing 
Trade openness 
HInt1.1.1 / HInt1.2.1 / 
HInt1.1.2 / HInt1.2.2 / 
Capital openness 
HInt2.1.1 / HInt2.2.1 / 
HInt2.1.2 / HInt2.2.2 / 
Economic  
interdependence 
HInt3.1.1 + (/) HInt3.2.1 + (/) 
HInt3.1.2 + (/) HInt3.2.2 + (/) 
Political  
globalisation 
HInt4.1.1 + HInt4.2.1 / (+) 
HInt4.1.2 + HInt4.2.2 / (+) 
Notes: + positive effect, / no effect, - negative effect, +/- direction unclear. Green – empirical observed effect, red – theoret-
ical expected effect that has not been supported by the empirical analysis. 
With regard to explanatory approaches involving state responses to globalisation, there is no support for the hy-
pothesis that the policy preferences of veto players or veto points influence the effect of international integration 
on climate commitment. Thus, in accordance with the theoretical expectations, there is no support for the hypoth-
esis that government ideology or the presence of a right-wing veto-player moderates the effect of international 
integration on climate commitment. In contrast to the hypotheses, specific veto points do not influence the effect 
of international political integration on UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol ratification (Hxveto1–6). However, the low 
explanatory power of these measures must be taken into account. There is likewise no support for the hypothesis 
that political corruption moderates the effect of international economic or political integration on climate commit-
ment, captured by UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol ratification (Hxcorr1a,b, Hxcorr3). Corrupt and non-corrupt govern-
ments react in similar ways to incentives derived from globalisation, when it comes to their ratification behaviour.  
These results support hypotheses derived from the regime-type approach. Additionally, the findings contribute to 
the literature on treaty design and international cooperation. The statistical analysis of climate commitment sup-
ports Htreatydesign2, confirming that there is no effect of international economic integration. There is likewise no 
support for the hypothesis that political globalisation matters more for soft treaties (UNFCCC) than for hard trea-
ties (Kyoto Protocol) (Htreatydesign1). The results suggest, however, that it is important to consider treaty design 
when analysing the interaction effects between international political integration and regime type. IGO involve-
ment contributes to UNFCCC ratification in autocracies only (Hxdemocracy1b). There are no general differences with 
regard to political globalisation and Kyoto Protocol ratification between democracies and autocracies. However, 
civil rights moderate the effect of international political integration on Kyoto Protocol ratification (Hxdemocracy2b). 
The following two sections discuss these interaction effects in more detail. 
7.5.1 UNFCCC ratification 
Political globalisation incentivises countries to join international climate cooperation. Following neoliberal insti-
tutionalist theory, it reduces transaction costs and uncertainty, contributes to issue linkages, and raises reputation 
costs. Following constructivist theory, world society theory, and social network theory, it distributes international 
environmental norms, raises legitimacy and reputational pressures, and promotes the influence of foreign govern-
ments and non-state actors at the international level. Chapter 5 argues that regime type moderates the positive 
effect of international political integration on UNFCCC ratification. In contrast to the theoretical expectation that 
democracies are more open to incentives related to political globalisation (Hxdemocracy1a), IGO involvement has 
been shown to contribute only in autocracies (non-electoral democracies) to UNFCCC ratification (Hxdemocracy1b). 
Accordingly, the positive effect of political globalisation is reduced in relation to political rights in poor countries.  
Figure 7.5.1 below shows that most electoral democracies, regardless of the number of IGO memberships they 
had, ratified the UNFCCC quickly, in comparison to the average ratification delay for all countries. There were 
some exceptions, however. Several electoral democracies with below-average numbers of IGO memberships took 
a long time to ratify the UNFCCC. These included the Dominican Republic, Israel, and Ukraine. In addition, 
several electoral democracies with an above-average number of IGO memberships took a long time to ratify the 
UNFCCC. Turkey was a bivariate outlier. Overall, the scatter plot supports the result of the multivariate analysis: 
there is no clear relationship between IGO memberships and UNFCCC ratification in electoral democracies. By 
contrast, political globalisation contributed to UNFCCC ratification in autocracies. Most non-democracies with an 
above-average number of IGO memberships ratified the UNFCCC fast. A few exceptions (Gabon, Morocco, Togo) 
took longer than the average ratification duration for all countries. Most autocracies involved with a below-average 
number of IGOs took more than the average ratification duration to enter the UNFCC. Ratification delay varied 
more among autocracies with a below-average number of IGO memberships.
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Figure 7.5.1 International political integration and UNFCCC ratification delay in electoral democracies and 
autocracies (Global comparative analysis) 
Electoral Democracies 
 
Autocracies 
 
Notes: UNFCCC ratification duration = in days, IGO memberships = country average 1992-2006. Bivariate linear regression 
of the relationship in blue, 95% confidence interval in grey, vertical line = average number of IGO memberships, 
horizontal line = average UNFCCC ratification duration. Countries that are most years from 1992-2006 electoral 
democracies are classified as electoral democracies and all others as autocracies. 
These results support the hypothesis that autocracies involved in IGOs ratify the UNFCCC to enhance their inter-
national reputations and legitimacy. The more autocracies are integrated in the international political system, the 
more they care about how they are perceived at the international level. They also join IGOs to show that they can 
cooperate with other states. The finding that international political integration contributes to UNFCCC ratification 
in autocracies is in line with the literature on non-democracies and the ratification of human rights treaties. Em-
pirical research has shown that ‘states with strong domestic institutions and poor human rights records are less 
likely to join human rights treaties than states with weaker domestic institutions that have similar rights records’ 
(Hathaway, 2007, p. 613). Autocracies ratify human-rights agreements because they strive for international repu-
tational status vis-a-vis foreign governments, IGOs, and NGOs (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005; Hathaway, 2002; 
Simmons, 2009a, pp. 77f.; von Stein, 2013, p. 2). Hafner-Burton and Tusutsui (2005) have argued, in accordance 
with world society theory, that the more deeply autocracies are embedded in the international political system, the 
more they ratify human-rights treaties to gain international legitimacy (see Chapter 5). Thus, autocracies ratified 
the UNFCCC quickly to enhance their international reputations. Non-democracies, such as the Sudan, with above-
average IGO membership values, ratified the UNFCCC as fast as established democracies. The reputation of the 
Sudan at the international level was low during the research period (BTI, 2018). While its government has entered 
into numerous international environmental treaties, it has made little effort to protect the environment (BTI, 2018, 
no page number; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, no year, p. 3).  
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The statistical analysis finds no analogous finding for Kyoto Protocol ratification. This literature on autocracies 
and the ratification of human rights agreements explains also why this finding does not apply to Kyoto Protocol 
ratification. Autocracies only ratify human rights treaties with universal membership as long as they have no com-
pliance measures, making it possible for governments to avoid implementing them at the domestic level (Hatha-
way, 2007; von Stein, 2013, p. 1). This applies to the UNFCCC. By contrast, the Kyoto Protocol stipulated that 
Non-Annex I countries would profit from climate change mitigation measures implemented by developed coun-
tries in the developing world. Thus, regime type cannot explain the relationship between international political 
integration and Kyoto Protocol ratification. 
An alternative explanation, related to this finding, could be that a higher number of veto players delays the ratifi-
cation process in democracies. This is in line with the finding that there is a significant effect of IGO involvement 
in countries with no specific veto points. However, the interaction between international political integration and 
horizontal accountability is not stable. The low variance of the veto-point indicators must also be considered. 
Figure 7.5.2 International political integration and UNFCCC ratification delay in countries with above- and 
below-average levels of political rights (Global comparative analysis) 
Above and average political rights 
 
Below average levels of political rights 
 
Notes: UNFCCC ratification duration = in days, IGO memberships = country average 1992-2006, bivariate linear regression 
of the relationship in blue, 95% confidence interval in grey, vertical line = average number of IGO memberships, 
horizontal line = average UNFCCC ratification duration.
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As explained above, international political integration contributes to UNFCCC ratification in countries with above-
average and average levels of political rights. Figure 7.5.2 presents this relationship. Most countries with above-
average and average political rights ratified the UNFCCC quickly if they were involved in many IGOs. Accord-
ingly, most countries with below-average political rights and few IGO memberships took longer than the average 
to ratify the UNFCC. The ratification behaviour of countries with below-average IGO memberships and political 
rights varies considerably. These results suggest that countries with average levels of political rights ratify the 
UNFCCC in response to domestic demands but have little intention to implement it to enhance their reputations at 
the international level. Moreover, in accordance with the finding that IGO involvement contributes to UNFCCC 
ratification in autocracies, the positive effect of political rights on climate commitment becomes weaker in relation 
to political rights. In a simultaneous analysis, the interaction between IGO memberships with political rights as 
well as electoral democracy remained significant. It must be considered that electoral democracy correlates highly 
with political rights. 
7.5.2 Kyoto Protocol ratification 
As expected, international political integration does not affect Kyoto Protocol ratification democracies and autoc-
racies in different ways. There is no support for the hypothesis that political rights moderate the effect of interna-
tional political integration (Hxdemocracy2a). In accordance with Hxdemocracy2b, civil rights matter for the influence of 
international political integration. IGO involvement contributes to Kyoto Protocol ratification in countries with 
above-average civil rights. In countries with below-average civil-rights values, international political integration 
can even delay Kyoto Protocol ratification.  
Thus, the results support the theoretical expectation that governments that respect civil rights, including the rule 
of law, at the domestic level are more open to the positive influence of centrality in IGO networks on Kyoto 
Protocol ratification. First, acceptance of the rule of law at the domestic level makes it more likely that govern-
ments will join international agreements. Second, governments in countries with high civil-rights values are more 
likely to take environmental protection concerns into account (Leroy & van Tatenhove, 2000; Zahran et al., 2007, 
p. 41).
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Figure 7.5.3 International political integration and Kyoto Protocol ratification in developing countries with 
above- and below-average civil rights 
Above and average civil rights 
 
Below average civil rights 
 
Notes: Kyoto Protocol ratification duration = in days, IGO memberships = country average 1992-2006, bivariate linear re-
gression of the relationship in blue, 95% confidence interval in grey, vertical line = average number of IGO member-
ships, horizontal line = average Kyoto Protocol ratification duration.
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The higher positive effect of international political integration on Kyoto Protocol ratification in countries with 
high civil-rights values can be explained using the example of Bolivia. Bolivia is vulnerable to climate change 
(Hicks & Fabricant, 2016, p. 92). During the research period, it was characterised by above-average civil-rights 
values and centrality in IGO networks and it ratified the Kyoto Protocol relatively fast (see Figure 7.5.3). Demo-
cratic qualities, including civil rights, had improved considerably since the middle of the 1980s and they remained 
stable, at a relatively high level, during the research period. Moreover, V-Dem data indicate that Bolivia performed 
better on civil rights in 1992–2006 than on political rights or electoral and horizontal accountability. Since the 
middle of the 1980s, Bolivia’s government had worked to enhance the country’s reputation at the international 
level; for this reason, it participated actively in international cooperation (BTI, 2003). In the 1990s, Bolivia has 
continued to participate actively, at the international level, in environmental initiatives (Bojanic, 2001, p. 18). It 
ratified both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol quickly (see also Bojanic, 2001, p. 17). These developments 
are not independent of each other. They reflect the country’s development strategy at the end of the last century. 
During the 1990s, the Bolivian government reduced government spending and inflation to tackle its economic 
crisis, in accordance with IMF loan conditions (Hicks & Fabricant, 2016). Bolivia privatised important economic 
sectors of its economy and implemented economic, social, and political reforms (Hicks & Fabricant, 2016, p. 89). 
It also improved civil rights, including property rights, to make its economy more attractive to international trade 
and investment. This approach reflects Bolivia’s acceptance of the importance of civil rights for its development. 
Accordingly, Bolivia has also participated actively in international cooperation to enhance its international repu-
tation. It is important to note that Bolivia joined international cooperative efforts that were associated with costs 
(BTI, 2003). With regard to the Kyoto Protocol in particular, it accepted market solutions to address global warm-
ing in the international climate change regime. Bolivia supported a mechanism in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations 
that aimed to use forests as emission sinks for developed countries. According to Bojanic (2001), Bolivia ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol because it regarded it as an opportunity to increase trade with developed countries and to 
receive financial aid and technology from developed countries. Thus, Bolivia accepted the rule of law, on the 
domestic and international level, to promote its own economic development.  
The example of Bolivia, therefore, shows how acceptance of civil rights and international cooperation (as condi-
tions for economic development) contributed to the relatively fast adoption of the Kyoto Protocol by the Bolivian 
government. This argument also applies to the more recent behaviour of the United States within the international 
climate change regime. The US not only questions climate cooperation but also the rule of the law on the domestic 
and international level. 
By contrast, it cannot be argued that, during the research period, Bolivia ratified the Kyoto Protocol because of its 
acceptance of human rights. The implications of climate change affect human rights as well as other individual 
rights (Rajamani, 2010, pp. 293, 393). As Chapter 5 explains, the acceptance of human rights may contribute to a 
country’s support of international cooperation to tackle climate change. The link between human rights and climate 
change was first identified, at the international level, only in 2005. In 2005, the Inuit argued before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights that global warming caused by US emissions was undermining their 
human rights (Rajamani, 2010, p. 389). Rajamani (2010, p. 389) has described this as the beginning of climate 
change and human rights. However, human rights have influenced the further behaviour of Bolivia in the interna-
tional climate change regime. Economic reforms during the 1990s led to the emergence of an environmental move-
ment (Hicks & Fabricant, 2016, p. 89; Perreault, 2005). This movement criticised aspects of environmental gov-
ernance, such as water privatisation, for lacking democratic accountability (Hicks & Fabricant, 2016, p. 89f.). For 
instance, water was framed by social movements as a human right (Hicks & Fabricant, 2016, p. 90). Simultane-
ously, social movements demanded nationalisation and indigenous rights (Hicks & Fabricant, 2016, p. 90). Aca-
demics and NGOs have adopted a human-rights perspective on global warming (Rajamani, 2010, p. 394). Indige-
nous groups have also argued within the UNFCCC that their vulnerability to global warming should be considered 
(Rajamani, 2010, p. 399). In 2007, Small-Island states emphasised the relationship between global warming and 
climate change (Rajamani, 2010, p. 399). In the UN climate negotiations, many developing countries adopted a 
human-rights perspective; these included Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Thailand (Rajamani, 2010, pp. 395f, 400). 
They emphasised that their countries must be economically able to mitigate climate change to ensure the survival 
and wealth of their citizens (Rajamani, 2010, pp. 395f.). In 2008, the General Assembly of the Organisation of 
American States accepted a resolution proposed by Argentina on the link between climate change and human 
rights (Rajamani, 2010, p. 400). Rajamani (2010, p. 400) has described how, during the climate change negotia-
tions of 2008–2010, negotiators from Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile promoted a human-rights approach to global 
warming. In 2009, several Latin American countries, including Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, 
supported the link between climate protection and human rights (Rajamani, 2010, p. 402). Thus, the acceptance of 
human rights at the domestic level has contributed to Bolivia’s support of climate protection at the international 
level. However, Bolivia only expressed support for the link between human rights and climate protection after 
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. At the start of international negotiations on climate change, representatives of devel-
oping countries focused their right to pursue economic development (Rajamani, 2010, p. 394). 
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7.6 Conclusions 
Is globalisation good or bad for climate commitment? This study set out to contribute to the academic literature 
by examining possible interaction-moderation effects of domestic political institutions. It applied a statistical anal-
ysis to test the hypotheses of three explanatory approaches to the joint effect of globalisation and domestic political 
institutions: the veto-player, political-corruption, and regime-type approaches. International economic integration 
has been shown to have no effect on UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol ratification. However, international political 
integration does support UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification. In contrast to previous research, this chapter 
has shown that the effect is moderated by aspects of regime type. The data offer no support for the veto-player or 
political-corruption approaches. However, it does support the regime-type approach. Treaty design matters. The 
regime type moderates the effect of political globalisation on the UNFCCC, a soft international climate treaty. 
International political integration has been shown to have a positive effect on UNFCCC ratification in autocracies. 
There is no difference in the relationship between international political integration and Kyoto Protocol ratification 
between democracies and autocracies. However, civil rights are decisive for the relationship between international 
political integration and Kyoto Protocol ratification. Civil rights strengthen the positive effect of international 
political integration on Kyoto Protocol ratification. Countries that accept the rule of law at the domestic level 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol faster. Bolivia also persuaded other countries, including Mexico, Costa Rica, Colombia, 
and Uruguay, to support emission-reduction markets selling clean-development mechanisms (Bojanic, 2001, p. 
21). Among various controls, regional commitment is important for UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification. 
The statistical analysis also suggests that countries that were more vulnerable to climate change ratified the former 
agreement later, and that monarchies entered into it later than military autocracies. Population density also con-
tributes to Kyoto Protocol ratification. 
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8  Climate performance 
Abstract 
Is the globalisation good or bad for climate performance? This chapter contributes to the literature by examining 
whether the effects of different globalisation dimensions on climate performance depend on domestic political 
institutions. It applies a statistical analysis to test the hypotheses of three explanatory approaches to the joint in-
fluence of globalisation and domestic political institutions – the veto-player approach, the political-corruption 
approach, and in the analysis of developing countries, the regime-type approach. The results suggest that climate 
performance in the developed world depends on the climate outcomes of important trading partners. As expected, 
this effect is independent of domestic political institutions. No confirmation has been found that either the veto-
player approach or the political-corruption approach can explain the relationship between policy diffusion via 
trading partners and climate performance. Among globalisation dimensions only trade and capital openness are 
associated with climate performance in developing countries. The statistical analysis of developing countries sup-
ports the political-corruption and regime-type approaches. Political corruption worsens the negative effect of in-
ternational trade. The present study adds to previous research in showing that civil rights weaken the negative 
effect of international trade. Finally, capital openness contributes to climate performance in countries with below-
average civil-rights values, but contributes to CO2 emissions in countries with above-average civil-rights values. 
This supports the hypothesis presented in this study that civil rights undermine the scale effects of international 
trade climate protection, via attractiveness to foreign investment. 
This chapter contributes to the globalisation/environment literature by examining the extent to which the effect of 
different globalisation dimensions on climate performance depend on domestic political institutions. Most quanti-
tative studies of climate performance have applied TSCS (see Chapter 2). The term refers to the application of a 
regression analysis of repeated measures of spatial units (e.g., countries).78 As TSCS simultaneously considers 
country differences and changes over time, it enables researchers to test the effects of variables that are assumed 
to be equal among countries and over time (Jahn, 2013, p. 398; Kittel & Winner, 2005, p. 289; Kittel, 2005, p. 
100; Wolf, 2015, p. 109). In contrast to cross-sectional regression analyses, the analysis of repeated observations 
of countries is less affected by the problem of too many variables and too few cases (Jahn, 2013, p. 398; Lijphart, 
1971, p. 685; Podestà, 2002, pp. 6f.). Chapter A8.1 in the annex examines the model assumptions of TSCS for the 
developed and developing-country sample in this study. Both datasets violate the assumptions of no autocorrela-
tion, stationarity, and homogeneity of units. The application of methods to deal with these violations in a pooled 
time-series analysis would make it impossible to analyse country differences in climate performance. For this 
reason, a cross-sectional OLS regression is applied instead. Cross-country variations are of primary interest in this 
study. The OLS regression estimates the effect of levels of independent variables on levels of dependent variables.  
The following sections estimate OLS regression models, based on research-period averages of independent and 
dependent variables, to address long-term relationships between independent and dependent variables (e.g., 
Babones, 2014, pp. 180f.). The use of long-term-period averages of independent and dependent variables also 
increases the reliability of the indicators (You & Khagram, 2005, p. 141). Any cross-sectional regression analysis 
is vulnerable to omitted-variable bias (Plümper et al., 2005, p. 334). The following sections consider relevant 
control variables. As explained in Chapter 2, country differences in climate performance among developed coun-
tries and developing countries are examined separately (8.1 & 8.2). Section 8.3 discusses the statistical findings. 
The final section (8.4) summarises the results.  
8.1 Developed countries  
This chapter examines the research question in relation to developed countries. The first section explains the cod-
ing of the independent and dependent variables in the analysis of country averages and examines univariate distri-
butions of the main independent and dependent variables (9.2.1). Second, the research question is analysed using 
an OLS regression of country averages from 1992 to 2006. This chapter investigates the additive effects of inter-
national integration, relative to domestic political institutions and control variables (9.2.2), as well as possible 
moderation effects (9.2.3). 
 
78 In contrast to panel analyses in survey research that studies many cases (N>1,000) at a few time points (t<5), TSCS refers to 
analyses of few cases (N = 15 to 30) (Podestà, 2002, p. 6; Wolf, 2015, pp. 109f.) over a long period of time (t > 10) (Beck, 
2001, p. 274; Bohlken, 2011, p. 5; Wolf, 2015, p. 110 Footnote). 
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8.1.1 Univariate analysis 
Before presenting the results, this section examines the univariate distributions of independent and dependent 
variables. As the previous section explains, this study has investigated long-term country differences, using coun-
try averages from 1992 to 2006. Tables 8.1.1–8.1.3 summarise the coding of variables in the analysis of climate 
performance in developed countries. Presidential veto power is not considered, as there is a lack of variance among 
developed countries (see Chapter 6).79  
Table 8.1.1  Measurement of the dependent variable 
Variable Measurement Data Sources 
Climate per-
formance 
CO2 emissions metric tons per capita levels divi-
ded by GDP per capita, PPP in constant 2011 US 
Dollars and standardised with the best-practice ap-
proach for developed Annex I countries. Higher 
values indicate a better climate performance. 
World Bank 
(2016a) 
Notes: Analysis units = country-averages from 1992-2006. 
 
79 Only Portugal and the United States had a president with veto power during the complete research period; France had one in 
1996 and between 2003 and 2006. Finland had one until 2000. 
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Table 8.1.2  Measurement of the main independent variables 
Variable Measurement Data Sources 
Economic 
globalisation 
a. Trade openness: Logged % of the sum of imports and 
exports of domestic GDP corrected for population 
size.  
b. Capital openness: % of stock of (FDI) inflows of 
GDP. 
c. Policy diffusion via economic interdependence: Spa-
tial lag variable that measures the climate performance 
of a country’s five most important trading partners ba-
sed on the amount of exports and imports of commo-
dities. Higher values indicate a better climate perfor-
mance of a country’s most important trading partners. 
a. World Bank 
(2016b) 
b. UNCTAT 
(2015) 
c. UN COMT-
RADE (2017) 
Political glob-
alisation 
a. IGO Memberships: Annual number of full country 
memberships in IGOs. Missing values and no state 
system members are coded as no membership. 
b. Centrality in IGO networks: Annual number of a 
country’s indirect and direct IGO’s ties to other count-
ries in 1.000. 
a. Pevehouse et al. 
(2010)  
b. von Stein (no 
year) 
Government 
ideology 
% of left, right, and logarithmised centre party seats in 
government cabinets.  
Swank (2013) 
Ideological 
heterogeneity 
among veto 
players 
Left – right polarisation among partisan veto player 
within political institutions with veto player status in do-
mestic policy. 0 – no left – right polarisation, 1 – left – 
right polarisation 
Armingeon et al. 
(2015) in Teorell 
et al. (2016); 
Cruz et al. 
(2016), Henisz 
(2002), Jahn 
(2010) 
Veto points 
a. Government fragmentation: Logarithmised annual 
number of governmental parties. 
b. Bicameralism (domestic policy): Veto player status of 
the upper house of the legislative in domestic policy. 
0 – no bicameralism, 1 bicameralism.  
a. Cruz et al. 
(2016) 
b. Jahn (2010) 
Forms of Poli-
tical Corrup-
tion 
a. Political corruption: Logarithmised Political Corrup-
tion Index 
b. Executive corruption: Logarithmised Executive Cor-
ruption Index 
c. Legislative corruption: Legislative corrupt activities 
d. Public sector corruption: Logarithmised Public Sector 
Corruption Index 
Higher values indicate higher values of political corrup-
tion. 
a., b. & d. 
McMann et al. 
(2016) 
c. Coppedge et 
al. (2017) & 
Pemstein et al. 
(2017) 
Notes: Analysis units = country-averages from 1992-2006. Exceptions: country averages of policy diffusion and IGO mem-
berships from 1992-2005 and network centrality from 1992-2003. Ideological heterogeneity is measured by the sum 
of years of left – right polarisation from 1992-2006. Countries that have been more than half of the research period 
(seven years) a bicameral system are coded with 1 and if not with 0.80  
  
 
80 Countries with upper status of the second chamber of the legislative: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, United Status. Countries without upper status of the second chamber of the legislative: Aus-
tria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom. In fact, only 
the veto power of the Belgium upper house of the legislative has changed over time. Belgium is coded as having two legislative 
veto players by Jahn (2010) until 1993. I code Belgium as not having veto player status of the second chamber of the legislative. 
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Table 8.1.3 Measurement of the control variables 
Variable Measurement Data Sources 
Economic 
Development 
Natural logarithm of GDP per capita in constant 2010 
US$. 
World Bank 
(2016e) 
Economic 
growth 
Logarithmised annual % growth rate of GDP at mar-
ket prices based on constant local currency.  
World Bank 
(2017a) 
Industry 
group strength 
a. % of the industry sector of GDP. 
b. Logarithmised fuel exports as % of merchandise 
exports.  
 
a. World 
Bank 
(2016c) 
b. World 
Bank 
(2016d) 
Corporatism Corporatism index from Siaroff (1999) Siaroff (1999) 
ENGO 
strength 
Logarithmised annual number of ENGOs in a country 
registered with the IUCN. 
Bernauer et 
al. (2013) 
Population 
density 
Logarithmised population size divided by land area in 
m². 
World Bank 
(2017b) 
Population 
growth 
Population growth. Higher values indicate higher pop-
ulation growth rates.  
World Bank 
(2017c) 
Urban popula-
tion 
Urban population as % of total population.  World Bank 
(2016f) 
Climate 
change 
vulnerability 
Climate change index: It indicates climate change risk 
exposure on a scale from 0 to 1. Higher values indicate 
greater climate change risk exposure. 
Bättig & 
Bernauer 
(2009) 
Electoral sys-
tem 
a. Plurality electoral system: 1 – plurality electoral 
system, 0 – no plurality electoral system.  
b. Mixed electoral system: 1 – mixed electoral sys-
tem (plurality and PR), 0 – no mixed electoral sys-
tem. 
Reference category: PR electoral system. 
Cruz et al. 
(2016) 
EU integra-
tion 
EU country membership – 1, No EU country member-
ship – 0 
Own coding 
Political par-
ties in parlia-
ment 
% of left, right, logarithmised centre, and left liberta-
rian party seats in the lower chamber of the legislative 
Swank 
(2013)  
Notes: Analysis units = country-averages from 1992-2006. Exceptions: EU membership = I code countries with EU mem-
bership most of the years from 1992 to 2006 as EU members (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), and other countries as non-
EU members. Austria, Finland and Sweden have entered the EU in 1995 and are, therefore, treated as EU members. 
Climate change vulnerability = The Climate change index offers refers to the period from 1990-2005. 
Climate-performance levels vary considerably among developed countries (see Table 8.1.4). Switzerland and two 
Scandinavian countries (Norway and Sweden) perform best, while the Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, 
and the United States) share the lowest performance among developed countries. The first two are even univariate 
outliers (see Figure 8.1.1). The bad performance of these three countries is well known in comparative climate 
policy research (e.g., Christoff & Eckersely, 2011, p. 438; Hanusch, 2018, p. 75).  
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Table 8.1.4 Climate performance of developed countries 
Switzerland 97.09 
Norway 91.45 
Sweden 86.58 
France 82.71 
Austria 76.57 
Italy 76.22 
Portugal 75.31 
Spain 73.87 
Denmark 68.88 
Netherlands 66.02 
New Zealand 63.01 
Germany 62.99 
Japan 62.07 
United Kingdom 61.52 
Ireland 60.98 
Belgium 57.94 
Greece 56.18 
Finland 50.63 
United States 30.66 
Canada 26.59 
Australia 16.65 
Mean  
All countries (N=21) 64.00 
Nordic countries 74.38 
Central European countries (incl. CHE)  74.22 
Anglo-Saxon countries (incl. JPN)  45.93 
Southern European countries  68.45 
Median 63.01 
Standard deviation across countries  20.39 
Standard deviation over time 6.44 
Notes:  Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. 
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Figure 8.1.1 Variation in climate performance in developed countries 
 
Notes:  Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. The boxplot displays z-scores. N=21. 
Several countries have improved their climate performance over time (see Figure 8.1.2). In Germany, emissions 
reductions stem from reunification; in the United Kingdom, they reflect the restructuring of the national economy. 
Overall, CO2 emissions vary more between countries (standard deviation=20.39) than over time (1992–2006) 
(standard deviation=6.44). Accordingly, Christoff and Eckersley (2011, p. 431) have concluded that ‘there has 
been no concerted or effective collective state response to the threat of global warming.’ The question is therefore: 
What causes these persistent country differences? As Chapter 7 has described, the main independent variables also 
vary more across countries than over time. 
Figure 8.1.2 Development of climate performance in developed countries, 1992–2006 
  
Notes:  Analysis units = country-years from 1992-2006. 
Table A8.2.1 in the annex presents univariate statistics of independent and control variables. As in Chapter 7, 
positively skewed variables have been logarithmised.81 The annex (A8.2.4) tests whether there are problems with 
non-normally distributed residuals in the final regression model. 
Compared to the other dimensions of economic globalisation, developed countries vary less in trade openness (see 
Figure 8.1.3). Moreover, a considerable part of the variance in international trade stems from outliers. Small EU 
member states – namely, Belgium and the Netherlands – are highly integrated in the international economy. Japan 
and the US share comparatively low levels of exports and imports as percentage of GDP. Capital openness and 
policy diffusion via trading partners vary more among developed countries. In relation to foreign direct investment, 
Ireland is a univariate outlier. Most countries share major trading partners with an average climate performance 
 
81 This includes trade openness, political corruption and executive corruption, ENGO strength, GDP per capita, GDP growth, 
centre-party seats as a percentage of total cabinet seats, centre-party seats in parliament, and fuel exports as a percentage of 
GDP per capita. Capital openness is not logarithmised, as it contributes only to negative skewness. 
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on the upper half of the scale. The boxplot shows that the univariate outliers Australia, Japan, and New Zealand 
mainly trade with states with relatively high CO2 emissions. It is relevant to study whether this also explains their 
below-average climate performance. 
Figure 8.1.3 Variation in international economic integration among developed countries 
 
 Mean Median Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
Trade openness -.02 -.04 .17  -.38 .27 
Capital openness 27.12 25.12 18.73 1.19 89.32 
Policy diffusion 57.64 61.75 12.36 23.58 73.08 
Notes:  Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. The boxplots display z-scores. N=21. Std.dev. = Standard devi-
ation. 
Countries with above-average levels of policy diffusion perform above the average in climate protection as well 
(see Table 8.1.5). This is in line with the hypothesis that climate performance in developed countries depends on 
the climate outcomes of important trading partners.  
Developed countries also differ with regard to their international political integration – measured by state mem-
berships in IGOs and state centrality in the IGO network (see Figure 8.1.4). More than 50% of the country sample 
share above-average levels of IGO involvement. New Zealand has relatively little involvement with IGOs. 
Table 8.1.5 Mean comparison of the climate performance of developed countries 
 Mean Climate 
performance 
N 
Above average trade openness 66.51 10 
Above average capital openness 64.04 7 
Above average policy diffusion 72.95 15 
Above average IGO memberships 70.80 11 
Above average network centrality 68.24 12 
Bicameralism 59.49 10 
Government fragmentation 71.58 11 
Left party strength in government 69.25 12 
Right party strength in government 61.88 10 
Centre party strength in government 65.86 12 
Left/right polarisation above average sum of years 66.60 11 
Above average left party strength in parliament 66.64 13 
Above average right party strength in parliament 59.47 11 
Above average centre party strength in parliament (ln) 65.57 13 
Above average left libertarian party strength in parliament 72.12 10 
Above average public sector corruption 63.55 11 
Above average legislative corruption 67.12 10 
Above average executive corruption 64.74 9 
Notes:  Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=21. 
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Figure 8.1.4 Variation in international political integration among developed countries 
 
 Mean Median Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
IGO memberships 94.35 97.86 14.20 60.71 124.42 
Network centrality 6.57 6.64 .43 5.37 7.27 
Notes:  Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. The boxplots display z-scores. N=21. Std.dev. = Standard devi-
ation. 
In accordance with the hypotheses in this study, there is little variation in CO2 emissions among countries with 
above-average left, centre, and right-wing party strength in government or parliament, as well as left/right polari-
sation. Countries with an above-average number of government parties, PR electoral rules, or left-libertarian party 
strength in parliament perform well in climate protection. Figure 8.1.5 shows that government fragmentation varies 
considerably among developed countries.  
There is little variation among developed countries with regard to public sector corruption (Figure 8.1.6). Most 
countries share low levels of executive and public sector corruption. However, there are several univariate outliers. 
Greece has the highest levels of executive and public sector corruption. Austria, Italy, and Portugal are also outliers 
with regard to corrupt bureaucrats. By contrast, legislative corruption varies considerably among developed coun-
tries. 
Figure 8.1.5 Variation in government fragmentation among developed countries 
 
 Mean Median Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
Government frag-
mentation 
.73 .79 .47 .00 1.58 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=21. The boxplots displays z-scores. Std.dev. = Standard de-
viation.  
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Figure 8.1.6 Variation in political corruption among developed countries 
 
 Mean Median Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
Executive corrup-
tion 
.07 .04 .08 .01 .34 
Legislative corrup-
tion 
-1.63 -1.57 .99 -3.42 .39 
Public sector corrup-
tion 
.08 .04 .12 .01 .52 
Notes:  Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=21. The boxplots display z-scores. Std.dev. = Standard devi-
ation. 
8.1.2 International integration and climate performance 
This section examines the additive effects of international integration on climate performance. The sample size 
(n=21) poses three challenges, given fewer degrees of freedom. First, few independent variables can be included 
simultaneously in the same regression model. Second, parameters and significance values become more vulnerable 
to the influence of outliers, i.e. cases that are not explained by the regression model (Urban & Mayerl, 2011, pp. 
185f., 191f.). Third, a small number of degrees of freedom, in combination with multicollinearity, i.e. linear rela-
tionships between independent variables within a regression model (Urban & Mayerl, 2011, pp. 225ff.), can con-
tribute to unstable regression results (Hildebrandt, 2015, p. 90). Here, this has three implications for the cross-
sectional regression models. First, a step-wise regression is used to consider sample size. This makes it possible 
to take into account the complexity of models during the interpretation (Hildebrandt, 2015, p. 90). There is no 
agreement in the literature on the number of variables that can be included in a regression model, based on the 
number of cases (Jahn, 2013, p. 378). Roller (2005) includes in her analysis of established Western democracies 
only two independent variables in one model. Following Jahn (2013, p. 378), the number of independent variables 
should not be higher than 1/3N-1 (constant) (N= number of countries). In accordance with a stricter rule, the 
present study tests the effect of globalisation dimensions in pairwise control with other variables. Pairwise control 
of interaction effects implies that these models include main terms, the interaction term, and one control variable 
consisting of four independent variables. Following Jahn’s (2013) recommendation, there need to be at least 15 
cases. The models in this study are also estimated without outliers. The first step in the stepwise regression analysis 
is to estimate bivariate correlations (Babones, 2014, p. 130; Hildebrandt, 2015). Next, the stability of the effects 
are examined, in pairwise comparison to another independent variable. The third step tests interactions between 
domestic political institutions and international integration in separate models. Finally, the stability of interaction 
effects (in pairwise comparison to one other independent variable) is examined. 
Bivariate and multivariate regression models are analysed with and without multivariate outliers (Urban & Mayerl, 
2011, p. 191f.). Outliers, i.e. countries characterised by an absolute distance of more than two standard deviations 
between their observed values and their predicted values (based on the regression model) are excluded (Urban & 
Mayerl, 2011, p. 185). Next, influential observations based on additional statistics (Cook’s D, Standardised 
DfBeta’s, and Leverage) are dropped from the analysis. Because of the small sample size, countries with a Lever-
age value of 3k/N or higher are excluded (Urban & Mayerl, 2011, p. 188). The letter k refers to the number of 
independent variables included in the regression model. N refers to the number of cases. Observations with an 
absolute value of DFBETA and/ or Cook’s D equal to or higher than 1 are dropped from the analysis (Urban & 
Mayerl, 2011, p. 189). If additional observations are identified as outliers (2 standard deviations) after the 
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exclusion of outliers and influential cases during the first two steps, they are also excluded from the analysis. The 
last model is reported. 
Correlations among independent variables are then examined to check for possible problems with multicollinearity 
(see Chapter A8.2.2 in the annex). Several correlations are higher than .8 or even .9 and cannot be tested simulta-
neously. This includes left/right/centre strength in government with left/right/centre strength in parliament, exec-
utive and legislative corruption and IGO memberships and state centrality in IGO networks. 
Tables 8.1.6–8.1.8 present bivariate correlations among the independent and dependent variables. Regarding con-
trols, economic development is positively associated with climate performance when outliers are excluded from 
the analysis. Hcont1b has argued that there is no clear relationship between economic development and climate 
performance in high-income countries. The negative effect of industry-sector size (Hcont2) becomes significant 
when several outliers are excluded from the analysis. In accordance with hypothesis Hcont3, fuel exports contribute 
to CO2 emissions when bivariate outliers – Norway, Ireland, and the United States – are excluded from the analysis. 
Table 8.1.6  Bivariate correlations between economic and political globalisation and climate performance in 
developed countries 
Independent variable N=21 With-
out out-
liers 
Outliers 
Economic globalisation    
Trade openness (lg) .265 .316 AUS, CAN, USA, 
BEL, IRL 
Capital openness -.061 -.082 AUS, CAN, USA, 
CHE, IRL 
Policy diffusion .506** .635*** JPN 
Political globalisation    
IGO memberships .347 .355 FRA, NZL 
State centrality in IGO networks .341 .433* NZL 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. The table displays Pearson’s r. 
Table 8.1.7 Bivariate correlations between domestic political institutions and climate performance in devel-
oped countries 
Independent variable N=21 With-
out out-
liers 
Outliers 
Veto players    
Left party strength in government  .426* .460* AUS, CHE, SWE 
Right party strength in government  -.275 -.216 CAN, AUS, USA, 
CHE, JPN, IRL 
Centre party strength in government (ln) -.050 -.250 AUS 
Left party strength in parliament  .416* .182 AUS, CHE, USA, 
CAN 
Right party strength in parliament  -.189 -.067 AUS, CAN, USA, 
CHE, PRT, IRL 
Centre party strength in parliament (ln)  -.023 -.406* AUS, GRC 
Left libertarian party strength in parlia-
ment  
.453** .301 AUS, NOR 
Ideological heterogeneity among veto 
players  
.141 .360 AUS 
Bicameralism  -.216 .248 AUS, CAN, USA 
Government fragmentation (ln)  .409* .419* AUS 
Political corruption    
Executive corruption (ln) -.070 -.041 AUS, CAN, USA, 
GRC 
Legislative corruption  .192 .327 AUS, CAN, USA, 
ITA, CHE 
Public sector corruption .058 .788*** AUS, CAN, USA, 
GRC, CHE, NOR, 
SWE, FRA, FIN 
Political corruption (ln) -.103 -.268 AUS, CAN, USA, 
ITA 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. The table displays Pearson’s r. 
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Table 8.1.8 Bivariate correlations between control variables and climate performance in developed countries 
Independent variable N=21 Without  
outliers 
Outliers 
Control variables    
Economic development (ln) .200 .422* AUS, CAN, USA, 
NOR 
Economic growth (ln) -.350 -.139 AUS, CAN, USA, IRL 
Industry sector size .244 -.463* AUS, CAN, USA, 
CHE, GRC, NOR, 
SWE 
Fuel exports (ln) -.228 -.676*** NOR, IRL, USA 
Corporatism .496** .399 AUS, NOR 
ENGO strength (ln) -.395* -.070 IRL, USA, AUS, CAN 
Population density (ln) .491** .191 NOR, SWE, AUS, 
CAN, USA, CHE 
Population growth -.463** -.369 IRL, NZL, AUS 
Urban population  -.310 .034 AUS, CAN, USA, 
CHE, PRT, BEL 
Climate change vulnerability .103 .091 AUS, CAN, USA, 
CHE, NOR 
EU membership  .307 .691*** CHE, NOR 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. The table displays Pearson’s r. 
There is no significant relationship between economic growth and global air-pollution levels. There is no stable 
effect of ENGO strength or demographic factors (population growth, population density, and urban population) or 
climate vulnerability on climate performance. The positive effect of corporatism becomes insignificant when Aus-
tralia and Norway are excluded from the analysis. EU members show a higher climate performance (Hcont11). The 
relationship becomes stronger and statistically significant when outliers – Norway, Portugal, and Switzerland – 
are excluded from the analysis. As expected, (Hcont14), plurality electoral systems perform less well than PR sys-
tems in climate performance (see Table A8.2.2 in the annex). 
As expected (HInt1.3.1 & HInt2.3.1), there is no support for the hypothesis that economic openness, measured by 
trade or capital openness, influences climate performance in developed countries. The visual inspection of the 
scatter plots underlines these findings (see Figure 8.1.7). These results remain stable in pairwise comparison to 
other variables (see Tables A8.2.3–A8.2.6 in the annex). Trade openness contributes significantly to climate per-
formance only when economic growth is controlled with and without outliers. By contrast, there is, as expected 
(HInt3.3.1), a strong significant effect of policy diffusion on climate performance. Among various explanatory 
factors, it has the strongest effect on the dependent variable. Countries that trade with countries with low CO2 
emissions also perform well. Australia, Canada, and the United States have high global air-pollution levels and 
share important trading partners with low levels of climate performance (see Figure 8.1.7). By contrast, the trading 
partners of Norway and Sweden also perform well. The relationship becomes stronger when the bivariate outlier 
– Japan – is excluded from the analysis. This finding remains the same in pairwise comparison to control variables 
with and without outliers/influential cases (see Tables A8.2.7–A8.2.8).  
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Figure 8.1.7 International economic integration and climate performance in developed countries 
 
 
 
Notes:  Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=21. Vertical and horizontal lines = average values of interna-
tional economic integration and climate performance. 
The effect of policy diffusion became insignificant when I controlled outliers. It turned significant again when 
outliers—Canada, Japan and Switzerland—were removed from the analysis (see Table A8.2.14 in the annex). In 
the bivariate analysis, there is no significant effect of IGO memberships or network centrality on climate perfor-
mance (HInt4.3). In pairwise comparison to other independent variables, the effect stays positive and becomes 
significant in some models (see Figure 8.1.8 & Table A8.2.9–A8.2.11 in the annex). The positive effect of state 
centrality in IGO networks becomes significant if New Zealand (bivariate outlier) is excluded from the analysis. 
It is insignificant in pairwise comparison to most other independent variables with and without outliers/influential 
cases. 
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Figure 8.1.8 International political integration and climate performance in  developed countries 
 
 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=21. Vertical and horizontal lines = average values of interna-
tional political integration and climate performance. 
With regard to the policy preferences of veto players, the ideological heterogeneity of veto players in the left/right 
dimensions does not help to explain climate performance (HVeto1.3.1, HVeto2.3.1, HVeto3.3.1, & HVeto4.3.1).82 In 
contrast to the hypotheses, government ideology affects climate outcomes. With regard to governmental ideology, 
the bivariate analysis indicates that left-wing parties in government contribute to climate performance. There is no 
significant effect of right-wing party strength. While centre government ideology does not matter to CO2 emis-
sions, centre-party strength in parliament undermines climate performance when Australia and Greece are ex-
cluded from the analysis. There are no significant effects of left-wing or right-wing party strength in parliament 
with or without outliers/influential cases. A significant positive effect of left-libertarian parties in parliament be-
comes insignificant when outliers are considered. Government fragmentation contributes to climate performance. 
There is no significant relationship between bicameralism and CO2 emissions levels. There is no support for the 
hypothesis that political corruption or its dimensions matter to climate outcomes. Significant public sector corrup-
tion only contributes to climate performance when nine outliers are excluded from the analysis. 
To conclude, among globalisation dimensions, only policy diffusion via trading partners influences climate per-
formance in the developed world (HInt3.3.1). Government fragmentation and left-wing government ideology are 
associated with better climate performance. Political-corruption dimensions have no independent effect on CO2 
emissions in rich countries. Policy diffusion via trading partners is just as important for climate performance as 
EU membership and fuel exports. 
8.1.3  Joint influence of international integration and domestic political institutions 
This section examines the joint influence of globalisation and domestic political institutions on climate perfor-
mance in developed countries. As in the analysis of climate commitment, marginal-effects plots are examined. 
Constituent terms of interaction effects are mean-centred. All models are estimated with and without outliers/in-
fluential cases and with and without pairwise control of other independent variables. 
 
82 The same result is obtained when I use the logarithmised jahn2 index from Jahn (2010): r=.170, without outliers (AUS, CAN, 
CHE, GBR, GRC, USA): r=-.169. 
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The previous section has shown that there is no independent effect of trade and capital openness on climate 
performance. There is likewise no support for the hypothesis that their effect depends on government ideology or 
on the ideological heterogeneity of veto players. When outliers and influential cases are excluded, there is a sig-
nificant positive effect of trade openness, which becomes higher in relation to right-wing-party strength in gov-
ernment. This joint relationship, however, becomes insignificant in several models that include pairwise independ-
ent variables. There is no support for the hypothesis that specific veto points – government fragmentation or bi-
cameralism – moderate the effect of trade or capital openness. A significant interaction between the number of 
government parties and trade openness (in the analysis without outliers/influential cases) is not stable when con-
trols are considered. Executive, legislative, and public sector corruption do not moderate the effect of trade or 
capital openness.  
The previous section has shown that a country’s CO2 emissions depend on the climate performance of its main 
trading partners. In accordance with theoretical expectations, there is no support for the hypothesis that left/right 
polarisation of veto players or government ideology in the left/right dimension moderates the effect of policy 
diffusion. When urban population is controlled for, with and without outliers, the effect of policy diffusion be-
comes stronger when the share of left-wing party seats in government increases. This interaction effect is not 
significant in all jack-knife analysis models, when countries are removed from the analysis in separate models. 
This also applies to jack-knife analyses that control for urban-population size. The marginal-effects plot indicates 
that the positive effect of policy diffusion becomes weaker in relation to right-wing-party strength in government. 
This interaction effect becomes insignificant when population density is controlled. Moreover, the direction is 
unstable when outliers and influential cases are excluded.  
The statistical results indicate that there is a significant effect of policy diffusion only in bicameral systems. This 
finding becomes insignificant in the model without outliers and influential cases, which controls for left-wing-
party strength in parliament. The statistical data suggest that the lower the government fragmentation, the stronger 
the positive effect of policy diffusion. The more below-average the number of government parties, the stronger 
the positive effect of policy diffusion. This effect is not significant at high values of government fragmentation. 
The effect is stable and significant in jack-knife analyses when one country is removed from the analysis. It is not 
stable in models that consider controls. In some models (compared to controls and with or without outliers and 
influential cases), it is only significant at average values of government fragmentation. In the analysis that controls 
for left-wing-party strength in parliament and the exclusion of outliers, the effect is only significant when the 
number of government parties is a higher value.  
There is no support for the claim that executive, legislative, or public sector corruption moderate the effect of 
policy diffusion in developed countries. The effect of policy diffusion becomes stronger with public sector cor-
ruption. However, this interaction effect becomes insignificant in pairwise comparison to some controls. The lower 
the level of executive corruption, the stronger the positive effect of policy diffusion. The direction of this effect is 
not stable when independent variables are controlled or outliers are excluded. In some models, the positive effect 
of policy diffusion becomes stronger with executive corruption. In a jack-knife analysis the direction turns again. 
The same results are obtained when legislative corruption is used in place of executive corruption. 
There is no significant interaction between international political integration, measured by IGO memberships 
or centrality in IGO networks, and executive corruption. In the analysis without outliers, lower the level of exec-
utive corruption, the stronger the significant positive effect of IGO memberships. This result becomes insignificant 
in pairwise comparison to controls. The joint effect of executive corruption and network centrality is insignificant 
in most models that control for other independent variables/and or remove outliers and influential cases. There are 
no stable significant interactions between IGO membership or network centrality and public sector corruption. 
When outliers and influential cases are excluded, there is a significant positive effect of IGO memberships in 
countries with below-average values of public sector corruption, which grows stronger as public sector corruption 
is reduced. It becomes insignificant in pairwise comparison to several controls. The data analysis shows no joint 
effect of IGO memberships and legislative corruption. A significant interaction with network centrality becomes 
insignificant in pairwise comparison to some independent variables, but significant when outliers and influential 
cases are removed from the analysis. Finally, it becomes insignificant in the analysis without Australia. 
As expected, the ideological heterogeneity of veto players in the left/right dimension does not moderate the effect 
of IGO involvement. A significant interaction between network centrality and left/right polarisation in pairwise 
control of independent variables becomes insignificant in several models without outliers. There is no support for 
the hypothesis that left-wing or right-wing government ideology influences the relationship between state IGO 
memberships or network centrality and climate performance in developed countries. An joint effect between right-
wing government ideology and network centrality is significant in comparison to a few other independent variables 
when outliers and influential cases are controlled.  
The statistical analysis initially supports the finding that international political integration, captured by IGO mem-
bership or state centrality in IGO networks, contributes to climate performance when government fragmentation 
is below average. The lower the number of government parties, the stronger the positive effect of international 
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political integration. Most countries with a higher number of government parties have higher levels of political 
integration and climate performance. Australia, Canada, and the US have below-average levels of government 
fragmentation and a low-level climate performance. However, this moderation effect becomes insignificant when 
country size is controlled.  
There is a positive effect of IGO membership in countries with bicameralism. It becomes insignificant in pairwise 
comparison to some independent variables. In the analysis without outliers, it is insignificant in the model that 
includes EU membership. By contrast, the positive effect of state centrality in countries with bicameralism remains 
stable in comparison to other independent variables and/or when outliers and influential cases are excluded from 
the analysis (see Figure 8.1.9). It remains significant and stable in jack-knife analyses. There is no significant 
effect of state centrality in countries without bicameralism. It is only significant in the model with left/right polar-
isation. The inclusion of the interaction term in the multivariate model with network centrality and bicameralism 
improves the explanatory model significantly. R² increases from .193 (R² adjusted = .104) to .437 (R² adjusted 
.337) (F-test on change in R² = **). 
Figure 8.1.9 State centrality in IGO networks, bicameralism and climate performance in developed countries 
 
Notes:  Marginal effect plot, 95% confidence interval. Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=21. 
This study has tested the assumptions of no multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, and normal distribution of resid-
uals of OLS regression of the regression model with the interaction effect between network centrality and bicam-
eralism (see Chapter A8.2.4 in the annex). The regression model does not violate the assumptions related to ho-
moscedasticity of errors or multicollinearity. Residuals are normally distributed when the two outliers (Switzer-
land, New Zealand) are excluded from the analysis. The results remain stable. As previously explained, the positive 
effect of network centrality in bicameral systems remains significant in jack-knife analyses (see Figure A8.2.6). It 
becomes insignificant when country size is controlled. It turns significant again when outliers are removed (see 
Figure A8.2.7 in the annex). The results remain stable when climate conditions are considered (see Chapter A8.2.5 
in the annex). Network centrality also contributes to climate performance in bicameral developed countries in the 
analysis of country averages during the two sub-periods (1992–1999 and 2000–2006).  
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Table 8.1.9 International political integration, bicameralism, and climate performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Network 
centrality 
-7.990  
-.169 
(12.39) 
-1.755 
-.037 
(11.85) 
-4.659 
-.098 
(12.61) 
-3.971 
-.084 
(11.61) 
-2.694 
-.057 
(11.552) 
-5.237 
-.111 
(12.97) 
-5.965 
-.126 
(12.89) 
        
Bicameral-
ism 
-7.366 
-.185 
(8.159) 
-11.67 
-.293 
(7.967) 
-13.04 
-.327 
(7.686) 
-6.337 
-.159 
(9.043) 
-7.976 
-.200 
(8.581) 
-9.454 
-.237 
(8.488) 
-9.426 
-.237 
(8.163) 
        
Network 
centrality x 
Bicameral-
ism 
44.70** 
.607** 
(17.67) 
47.58** 
.646** 
(18.61) 
50.78** 
.689** 
(18.57) 
45.66** 
.620** 
(17.80) 
44.830** 
.608** 
(18.144) 
49.80** 
.676** 
(18.27) 
52.25** 
.709** 
(18.77) 
        
Policy diffu-
sion 
.478 
.290 
(.387) 
           
        
Trade open-
ness (lg) 
  3.180 
.026 
(25.25) 
         
        
Capital 
Openness 
    -.143 
-.131 
(.226) 
       
        
Left govern-
ment ideol-
ogy 
      .231 
.244 
(.216) 
     
        
Left party 
strength in 
parliament 
    .259 
.201 
(.281) 
  
        
Right gov-
ernment ide-
ology 
         -.131 
-.144 
(.207) 
  
        
Right party 
strength in 
parliament 
           -.213 
-.168 
(.278) 
        
Constant 38.35 
(24.49) 
67.93*** 
(5.240) 
72.26*** 
(8.502) 
56.90*** 
(11.55) 
56.386 
(13.576) 
71.69*** 
(7.790) 
75.21*** 
(10.70) 
R2 .486 .437 .450 .474 .465 .450 .457 
Adjusted R² .357 .296 .313 .342 .331 .313 .321 
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. The table displays unstandardised and standardised regression 
coefficients (in italics), and standard errors (in parentheses), * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.  
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Table 8.1.9 International political integration, bicameralism, and climate performance (continuation) 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Network 
centrality 
-4.015 
-.085 
(12.50) 
-3.418 
-.072 
(12.36) 
-.210 
-.004 
(10.68) 
-4.453 
-.094 
(11.93) 
-4.437 
-.094 
(11.30) 
-1.089 
-.023 
(12.28) 
       
Bicameral-
ism 
-12.74 
-.320 
(7.655) 
-12.37 
-.310 
(7.592) 
-6.099 
-.153 
(7.522) 
-14.52* 
-.364* 
(7.925) 
-10.56 
-.265 
(7.233) 
-8.259 
-.207 
(9.948) 
       
Network 
centrality x 
Bicameral-
ism 
51.66** 
.701** 
(19.31) 
50.58** 
.686** 
(18.99) 
43.57** 
.591** 
(16.67) 
48.96** 
.665** 
(17.86) 
45.84** 
.622** 
(17.31) 
46.77** 
.635** 
(17.85) 
       
Centre gov-
ernment ide-
ology (ln) 
1.510 
.111 
(2.784) 
          
       
Centre par-
liamentary 
strength 
  1.507 
.091 
(3.287) 
        
       
Left liber-
tarian par-
liamentary 
strength 
    2.210
* 
.356* 
(1.162) 
      
       
Left right 
polarisation 
      .635 
.188 
(.703) 
    
       
Government 
fragmenta-
tion (ln) 
        11.30 
.263 
(8.023) 
  
       
Plurality 
electoral 
system 
          -15.00 
-.296  
(11.79) 
       
Mixed elec-
toral system 
          -1.345 
-.033 
(10.85) 
       
Constant 65.37*** 
(7.067) 
64.88*** 
(8.536) 
57.68*** 
(7.184) 
64.38*** 
(6.469) 
59.12*** 
(7.993) 
69.63*** 
(5.608) 
R2 .447 .444 .540 .464 .499 .509 
R² Adjusted .308 .305 .426 .330 .373 .345 
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. The table displays unstandardised and standardised regression 
coefficients (in italics), and standard errors (in parentheses), * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.  
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Table 8.1.9 International political integration, bicameralism, and climate performance (continuation) 
 (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Network 
centrality 
.422 
.009 
(11.74) 
1.675 
.035 
(11.58) 
-4.951 
-.105 
(9.925) 
-1.082 
-.023 
(11.85) 
8.363 
.177 
(13.47) 
-1.878 
-.040 
(9.223) 
-14.041 
-.245 
13.374 
        
Bicameral-
ism 
-12.86 
-.323 
(7.483) 
-3.184 
-.080 
(10.18) 
-5.882 
-.148 
(6.747) 
-11.26 
-.283 
(7.848) 
-19.42** 
-.487** 
(9.119) 
3.722 
.093 
(7.715) 
-7.894 
-.203 
(7.512) 
        
Network 
centrality x 
Bicameral-
ism 
44.07** 
.598** 
(18.40) 
41.36** 
.561** 
(18.29) 
49.15*** 
.667*** 
(15.26) 
49.52** 
.672* 
(18.72) 
56.42*** 
.766*** 
(18.45) 
13.25 
.180 
(17.98) 
43.443** 
.631** 
(19.661) 
        
Fuel exports 
(ln) 
-2.984 
-.168 
(3.383) 
           
        
ENGO 
strength (ln) 
  -7.576 
-.319 
(6.149) 
         
        
Corporatism     6.783
** 
.442** 
(2.570) 
       
        
Climate 
change vul-
nerability 
      -21.80 
-.074 
(63.17) 
     
        
EU mem-
bership 
        -16.92 
-.401 
(12.71) 
   
        
Country size           -.000
*** 
-.740*** 
(.000) 
.000* 
-.473* 
(.000) 
        
Constant 72.19*** 
(6.984) 
81.60*** 
(12.13) 
47.82*** 
(8.796) 
76.62*** 
(25.57) 
82.50*** 
(11.98) 
68.89*** 
(4.094) 
69.763 
(3.589) 
R2 .463 .485 .607 .441 .493 .655 .757 
R² Adjusted .328 .357 .509 .301 .366 .569 .687 
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 19 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. The table displays unstandardised and standardised regression 
coefficients (in italics), and standard errors (in parentheses), * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Model 7 without multi-
variate outliers (New Zealand and Switzerland). 
A comparison of the standardised regression coefficients in Table 8.1.9 reveals that the interaction between net-
work centrality and bicameralism in a pairwise comparison is more important for climate performance than the 
other independent variables. This also applies to the analysis without outliers. The effect of policy diffusion via 
trading partners becomes significant again when the outliers (Japan, New Zealand, and Switzerland) are removed 
from the analysis. In contrast to the bivariate analysis, there is no support for the hypothesis that government 
fragmentation, left-wing ideology, or centre-party strength in parliament are associated with climate performance 
with and without outliers. With regard to control variables, as in a bivariate analysis, economic development con-
tributes to climate performance. In addition, economic growth undermines climate performance in the analysis 
without outliers (the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland). The expected negative effect of fuel 
exports is stable in the analysis without outliers (New Zealand and Switzerland) in pairwise comparison to the 
interaction effect. The positive relationship between corporatism and climate outcomes (insignificant in the anal-
ysis with outliers) is significant in the simultaneous analysis of the interaction between network centrality and 
bicameralism without outliers (New Zealand and Switzerland). This finding supports previous findings, suggesting 
that corporatism contributes to climate performance. The simultaneous analysis supports the finding that countries 
that are less densely populated are associated with better climate performance (Hcont7b). Population density con-
tributes to climate performance when the joint effect of international political integration and bicameralism is 
considered and outliers are excluded (Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland). Country size undermines 
climate performance (Hcont9). In this model, the interaction between network centrality and bicameralism becomes 
insignificant. It is, however, significant in the analysis without outliers. Moreover, in the model without outliers, 
its effect is again more important for climate performance. In contrast to the bivariate results, there is no support 
for the hypotheses that industry-sector size (Hcont2), EU membership (Hcont11), and electoral rules (Hcont14) matter 
to climate performance in a simultaneous analysis with the interaction effect of network centrality and bicameral-
ism, with and without outliers.  
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Thus, international political integration captured by network centrality contributes to climate performance in bi-
cameral developed countries. This effect is, in pairwise comparisons, the most important driver of climate out-
comes. In addition to state centrality in IGO networks, globalisation affects climate performance in developed 
countries via policy diffusion. The simultaneous analysis supports the theoretical expectations that economic de-
velopment, corporatism, and population density contribute to climate performance, while economic growth, fuel 
exports and country size undermine it. 
To conclude, among the dimensions of international economic integration, policy diffusion is associated with cli-
mate performance among developed countries. This is in line with hypothesis HInt3.3.1. The effect of policy dif-
fusion is independent of veto points, policy preferences of veto players on the left-wing right dimension and po-
litical corruption. As expected, (HInt1.3.2 & H2.3.2), there is no support for the hypothesis that trade or capital 
openness matters for CO2 emissions (HInt1.3.1 & HInt2.3.1). International political integration measured by state 
centrality in IGO networks has a positive effect on climate performance in bicameral systems (Hxveto5). There are 
no stable interaction effects of economic or political globalisation with political corruption. 
8.2 Developing countries 
This chapter analyses the joint influence of globalisation and domestic political institutions on climate performance 
in developing countries. Section 8.2.1 summarises the coding of the independent and dependent variables and 
examines the univariate distributions of the variables. The following section analyses additive effects of interna-
tional integration and domestic political institutions on climate performance (8.2.2). Sections 8.2.3 to 8.2.5 inves-
tigates separately whether veto players and points, dimensions of political corruption and regime type moderate 
the effects of globalisation dimensions. Finally, Section 8.2.6 tests significant interaction effects of the three ex-
planatory models simultaneously. 
8.2.1 Univariate analysis 
The independent and dependent variables are measured in country averages from 1992–2006. Tables 8.2.1–8.2.3 
summarises their coding. 
Table 8.2.1 Measurement of climate performance and economic and political globalisation 
Variable Measurement Data Source 
Climate per-
formance 
CO2 emissions metric tons per capita levels divided by 
GDP per capita, PPP in constant 2011 US Dollars and 
standardised with the best-practice approach for develo-
ping Non-Annex I countries. Higher values indicate a 
better climate change mitigation performance. 
World Bank 
(2016) 
Economic 
globalisa-
tion 
a. Trade openness: Logged % of the sum of imports and 
exports of domestic GDP corrected for population 
size. 
b. Capital openness: Logarithmised % of stock of for-
eign direct investment (FDI) inflows of GDP. 
c. Economic interdependence: Spatial lag variable that 
measures climate performance (see above) of a 
country’s five most important trading partners based 
on the amount of exports and imports of commodities. 
Higher values indicate a better climate performance of 
a country’s most important trading partners. 
a. World Bank 
(2016 
b. UNCTAT 
(2015) 
c. UN COMT-
RADE 
(2017) 
Political 
globalisa-
tion 
a. IGO memberships: Annual number of full country 
memberships in IGOs. Missing values and no state 
system member are coded as no membership. 
b. Centrality in IGO networks: Annual number of a 
country’s indirect and direct IGO’s ties to other 
countries via in 1.000. 
a. Pevehouse et 
al. (2010) 
b. von Stein (no 
year) 
Notes:  Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. N=64. I added one to variables with an observed min-
imum of zero before logarithmising them. 
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Table 8.2.2 Measurement of veto players, political corruption, and regime type 
Variable Measurement Data Source 
Govern-
ment ideo-
logy 
a. Left, centre, and right government ideology: 1 – in the case of 
a presidential system a left-wing/ centre/ right-wing chief of 
executive, in the case of a parliamentary system a left-wing/ 
centre/ right-wing largest party in parliament. 0 – in all other 
cases. Parliamentary and presidential systems are identified 
using information from the ‘system’ variable from Cruz et al. 
(2016). 
Cruz et al. 
(2015)  
Ideologi-
cal hetero-
geneity 
among 
veto play-
ers  
Left/right polarisation among partisan veto player within po-
litical institutions with veto player status in domestic policy. 0 
– no left – right polarisation, 1 – left – right polarisation 
Cruz et al. 
(2016), Hatha-
way (2008), 
Henisz (2002), 
Jahn (2010) 
 Veto 
points 
a. Government fragmentation: Logarithmised annual num-
ber of governmental parties.  
b. Presidentialism: 1 –the president has veto player status in 
domestic policy. 0– in all other cases. 
c. Bicameralism: 1 – The second legislative chamber has 
veto player status in domestic policy. 0 – In all other cases. 
a. Cruz et al. 
(2016) 
b. Cruz et al. 
(2016)/ 
Cheibub et 
al. (2010) 
c. Hathaway 
(2008) 
Political 
Corrup-
tion 
a. Political corruption: Political Corruption Index  
b. Executive corruption: Executive Corruption Index  
c. Legislative corruption: Legislative corrupt activities 
d. Public sector corruption: Public Sector Corruption Index 
Higher values indicate higher values of political corruption. 
a., b. & d. 
McMann et al. 
(2016) 
c. Coppedge et 
al. (2017) & 
Pemstein et al. 
(2017) 
Regime 
type 
a. Electoral democracy: 1 – Electoral democracy, 0 – No 
electoral democracy. 
b. Established democracy: 1 – Established democracy, 0 – 
No established democracy. 
a. Cheibub et al. 
(2010) 
b. Freedom 
House (2015), 
Marshall et 
al. (2015) 
De-
mocracy 
qualities 
a. Vertical accountability: Vertical Accountability Index 
b. Horizontal accountability: Horizontal Accountability In-
dex  
c. Political rights: Diagonal Accountability Index  
d. Civil rights: Equality before the law and individual lib-
erty index  
Higher values indicate higher values of democracy quality. 
Coppedge et al. 
(2017); 
Pemstein et al. 
(2017); Lühr-
mann et al. 
(2017) 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. N=64. I added one to variables with an observed minimum of 
zero before logarithmising them. The time-series cross-sectional variables government fragmentation, bicameralism, 
government ideology, left/right polarisation and presidential veto player are zero in autocratic years and missing in 
democratic years of transition, interruption and interregnum. IGO membership and policy diffusion refer to country-
averages from 1992-2005, network centrality from 1992-2003. Government ideology, left/right polarisation, bicame-
ralism and presidential veto player, regime type variables receive 1 when it applies to at least half of the research 
period (i.e. 7 years). 
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Table 8.2.3 Measurement of control variables 
Variable Measurement Data Source 
Economic 
Development 
Natural logarithm of GDP per capita in constant 
2010 US$. 
World Bank 
(2016c) 
Economic 
growth 
Annual % growth rate of GDP at market prices ba-
sed on constant local currency.  
World Bank 
(2016a) 
Industry group 
strength 
a. Logarithmised % of the industry sector of GDP. 
b. Logarithmised fuel exports as % of merchandise 
exports.  
a. World Bank 
(2016e) 
b. The World 
Bank Group 
(2016d) 
ENGO strength 
Logarithmised number of ENGOs in a country 
registered with the IUCN.  
Bernauer et al. 
(2013) 
Population  
density 
Logarithmised population size divided by land 
area in m².  
World Bank 
(2016b) 
Population 
growth 
Population growth. World Bank 
(2016f) 
Urban popula-
tion 
Urban population as % of total population. World Bank 
(2016g) 
Electoral sys-
tem 
a. Plurality electoral system: 1 – plurality electoral 
system, 0 – no plurality electoral system 
b. Mixed electoral system: 1 – mixed electoral sys-
tem (plurality and PR), 0 – no mixed electoral 
system.  
Reference category: PR system. 
Cruz et al. 
(2016) 
Climate change 
Vulnerability 
Climate change index, indicates climate change risk 
exposure on a scale from 0 to 1. Higher values indi-
cate greater climate change risk exposure. 
Bättig & Ber-
nauer (2009). 
Types of autoc-
racy 
a. Military dictatorship: 1 – Military dictatorship, 0 
– all other cases 
b. Royal dictatorship: 1 – Royal dictatorship, 0 – all 
other cases 
Reference category: civil dictatorship  
Cheibub et al. 
(2010, 2009) 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. N=64. I added one to variables with an observed minimum of 
zero before logarithmising them. Climate change vulnerability = the Climate change index refers to the period from 
1990-2005. Types of autocracies = dichotomous variables that indicate whether the political system has been classi-
fied as military, royal or civil dictatorship in most years of the research period (>7) from 1992-2006. The electoral 
system refers to the electoral rules of most years of the research period. 
Climate performance varies among regions and within regions (see Figure 8.2.1). Some of this variance can be 
explained by economic development. Countries of Sub-Sahara Africa show in regional comparison the highest 
mean performance among developing countries. These results from their low levels of economic development (see 
Figures 8.2.2 & 8.2.3). East Asian and Pacific as well as North African countries with relatively high GDP per 
capita levels share relatively high CO2 emissions. However, several West African countries with higher GDP per 
capita values perform well. Latin American countries have despite relatively high economic development levels 
comparatively low levels of global air pollution. Thus, it is of interest what explains cross-national variation in 
climate outcomes besides economic development. Climate performance is negatively skewed in the developing 
world. This results mainly from two outliers: China and South Africa. If I include them in the analysis they are 
identified as multiple outliers. In addition, the normality distribution of residuals assumption of OLS regression is 
violated when both countries are included in the analysis of the final model (see Figure A8.3.7). Therefore, the 
following sections exclude them from the analysis. 
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Figure 8.2.1 Country differences in climate performance in developing countries 
 
 Mean Me-
dian 
Std. 
dev. 
Skew-
ness 
Kurto
sis 
Mini-
mum 
Maxi-
mum 
N 
All countries 83.43 87.35 12.86 -2.36 7.55 28.87 99.16 66 
Without China and 
South Africa 
85.10 87.63 8.80 -.89 .42 60.24 99.16 64 
East Asia and the 
Pacific 
60.84 74.48 27.79     3 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
84.17 85.39 4.57     13 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
75.32 78.44 6.76     10 
South Asia 85.36 91.37 13.97     4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 87.09 90.42 12.27     36 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. The darker the colour the higher a country’s climate perfor-
mance. Missing countries are grey. Std.dev. = Standard deviation. 
Figure 8.2.2 Country differences in economic development in developing countries 
 
Notes:  Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=66. The darker the colour the higher a country’s climate per-
formance. Missing countries are grey. 
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Figure 8.2.3 Economic development and climate performance in developing countries 
 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=64. Vertical and horizontal lines = average values of economic 
development and climate performance. 
Table A8.3.1 in the annex summarises univariate statistics of my independent variables. Chapter A8.3.2 in the 
annex presents bivariate correlations among independent variables. Economic openness varies considerably 
among developing countries (see Figures 8.2.4 & 8.2.5). Comparing the world maps of trade openness and climate 
performance suggests that countries that are open to trade have relatively high CO2 emissions. Developing coun-
tries also differ in capital openness. Bivariate correlations and the world maps illustrate that trade and capital 
openness do not correlate high with each other. It is therefore adequate to study them separately. Developing 
countries vary considerably with regard to policy diffusion among trading partners. 
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Figure 8.2.4 Country differences in international economic integration in  developing countries 
Trade openness 
 
Capital openness 
 
Policy diffusion 
 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=66. The darker the colour the higher a country’s climate per-
formance. Missing countries are grey. 
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Figure 8.2.5 Variation in international economic integration in developing countries 
 
 Mean Median Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
Trade openness -.04 -.03 .18 -.39 .49 
Capital openness 2.67 2.74 .88 .15 4.58 
Policy diffusion 60.53 61.33 9.32 37.58 80.58 
Notes:  Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. The boxplots display z-scores. N=21. Std.dev. = Standard devia-
tion. 
Poor countries differ considerably with regard to political globalisation (see Figures 8.2.6 & 8.2.7). It makes little 
difference whether it is captured by state memberships in IGOs or network centrality. Therefore, there is no dif-
ference in their relationship with climate outcomes. The visual inspection suggests no positive relationship with 
climate performance. Sub-Saharan African countries with low memberships in IGOs and IGO network emit low 
levels of CO2. 
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Figure 8.2.6 Country differences in international political integration in  developing countries 
IGO memberships 
 
Centrality in IGO networks 
 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=66. The darker the colour the higher a country’s climate per-
formance. Missing countries are grey. 
Figure 8.2.7 Variation in international political integration in developing countries 
 
 
 Mean Median Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
IGO memberships 62.47 61.33 14.45 28.92 80.58 
Network centrality 5.32 5.38 .82 2.51 6.80 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=64. The boxplots display z-scores. Std.dev= Standard devia-
tion. 
Most electoral democracies in my sample have been more than the half of the research period presidential democ-
racies (16). Seven electoral democracies are parliamentary democracies and two semi-presidential democracies 
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for at least seven years. Presidential democracies exhibit a relatively high mean climate performance (see Table 
8.2.4). Yet, it is similar to the mean performance of electoral democracies in general. Only nine countries have at 
least half of the research period a second chamber of the legislature with veto power. They perform, on average, 
worse than electoral democracies in general. Government fragmentation is skewed (see Figure 8.2.8). Most coun-
tries are characterised by no or very few government parties. Unfortunately, because of data availability, there is 
little variation on government ideology indicators and the measure of ideological heterogeneity among veto play-
ers. Based on the univariate analysis, there is little support for the claim that the policy preferences of veto players 
and veto points should explain variation in climate performance in the developing world. 
Figure 8.2.8 Variation in government fragmentation among developing countries 
 
 Mean Median Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
Government frag-
mentaion 
.33 .00 .53 .00 2.41 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. The boxplot displays z-scores. N=64. Government fragmentation 
is logarithmised. Std.dev. = Standard deviation. 
Executive and public sector corruption are highly correlated (.792***). Nonetheless, there are country differences 
with regard to the presence of executive, legislative, and public sector corruption (Figure 8.2.9). Nearly half of the 
sample exhibit high values of executive, public sector and legislative corruption (Figure 8.2.10). There is little 
variation in mean climate performance of countries with above-average executive, legislative or public sector cor-
ruption (Table 8.2.4). African countries share high values of political corruption. Many African countries with 
high levels of executive and public sector corruption are characterised by low levels of trade and capital openness 
and high values of climate performance (see Figures 8.2.2 & 8.2.9). This supports the hypothesis that political 
corruption hinders international trade and investment and thus lowers negative scale and composition effects of 
economic growth on climate performance. These countries also show low levels of economic development (see 
Figure 8.2.2).
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Figure 8.2.9 Country differences in political corruption among developing countries 
Executive corruption 
 
Legislative corruption 
 
Public sector corruption 
 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=66. The darker the colour the higher a country’s climate per-
formance. Missing countries are grey. 
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Figure 8.2.10 Variation in political corruption in developing countries 
 
 Mean Median Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
Executive corrup-
tion 
.63 .64 .19 .12 .97 
Legislative corrup-
tion 
.62 .73 .77 -1.28 2.26 
Public sector corrup-
tion 
.64 .65 .21 .12 .96 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. The boxplots display z-scores. N=64. Std.dev. = Standard devi-
ation. 
Given the available data, there are more autocracies than democracies in my developing-country sample. My sam-
ple consists of 25 countries that have been at least seven years electoral democracies. 16 countries are classified 
as established democracies for at least seven years. With the exception of South Africa, there are no established 
democracies in Sub-Sahara Africa and few countries are classified as electoral democracies. Electoral democracies 
perform better than established democracies. Yet, this may result from their lower levels of economic development. 
There are 45 countries that are classified as autocracies for at least seven years. Autocracies consist mainly of 
civilian dictatorships (23). There are 18 military dictatorships and four monarchies. Among types of autocracy, 
military dictatorships perform better. Overall, the visual inspection suggests that there are no systemic differences 
in climate performance between democracies and autocracies. 
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Table 8.2.4 Mean comparison of climate performance of developing    countries 
 Mean N 
Presidential democracies (Cheibub) 85.96 16 
Presidential democracies (DPI) 79.89 13 
Bicameralism 74.25 9 
Above average levels of government fragmentation 82.19 23 
Left government ideology 66.06 4 
Right government ideology 86.30 6 
Left right polarisation among veto players 74.25 9 
Above average public sector corruption 84.66 38 
Above average legislative corruption 84.28 35 
Above average executive corruption 86.17 36 
Above average political corruption 85.56 32 
Electoral democracies 84.88 25 
Established democracies 79.32 16 
Royal dictatorships 79.34 4 
Civilian dictatorships 79.70 23 
Military dictatorships 86.57 18 
Above average vertical accountability 83.25 28 
Above average horizontal accountability 82.83 37 
Above average political rights 85.11 38 
Above average civil rights 81.33 16 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=64. 
Political rights are highly correlated with civil rights (.787***) and vertical accountability (.821***). There is a 
strong positive relationship between civil rights and vertical accountability (.816***).83 Nonetheless, developing 
countries perform in different ways on the democracy-quality dimensions. Levels of political rights, civil rights, 
horizontal and vertical accountability vary considerably among them (see Figures 8.2.11 & 8.2.12). This applies 
to democracies and autocracies. For instance, while most African countries are classified as non-democracies, 
there is considerable variation with regard to democratic qualities among them. Latin American countries share 
very high levels of electoral accountability but differ with regard to checks and balances, political and civil rights. 
Outside Latin America, developing countries exhibit higher values of horizontal than vertical accountability. Few 
states perform very well on democratic qualities (see Figure 8.2.12). About half of all considered countries can be 
found on the lower half of the scales on vertical and horizontal accountability as well as political and civil rights. 
Developing countries vary in particular regarding political rights. Few outliers perform very bad regarding vertical 
accountability. This is in line with the observation that elections of political authorities occur in most countries. 
 
83 The other correlations among regime type and democracy quality indicators are lower .7. 
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Figure 8.2.11 Country differences in democratic qualities among developing countries 
Vertical accountability 
 
Horizontal accountability 
 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=66. The darker the colour the higher a country’s climate perfor-
mance. Missing countries are grey.  
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Figure 8.2.11 Country differences in democratic qualities among developing countries (continuation) 
Political rights 
 
Civil rights 
 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=66. The darker the colour the higher a country’s climate perfor-
mance. Missing countries are grey. 
Figure 8.2.12 Variation in democratic qualities in developing countries 
 
 Mean Median Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
Vertical accountabi-
lity 
.33 .28 .64 -1.44 1.62 
Horizontal accoun-
tability 
.06 .10 .69 -1.25 1.64 
Political rights .38 .52 .75 -1.50 1.99 
Civil rights .56 .59 .22 .08 .98 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. The boxplots display z-scores. N=64. Std.dev. = Standard devi-
ation. 
To conclude, the univariate analysis suggests that regime type alone cannot explain differences in climate perfor-
mance. It is an empirical question whether democratic qualities help to explain country differences in climate 
performance. Countries with above-average values related to political rights perform better than countries with 
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above-average values on other democracy dimensions. This is also the dimension in which the largest number of 
countries has above-average values. 
8.2.2 International integration and climate performance 
Before testing the interaction effects between international integration and domestic political institutions, this sec-
tion examines their additive effects on CO2 emissions. To consider the claim that model complexity may affect 
regression results84, regression models with control variables only (ENGO strength, industry-sector size, fuel ex-
ports, GDP per capita, economic growth, climate change vulnerability, urban population size) and globalisation 
indicators are initially estimated. In additional models, this study also controls electoral rules and autocratic regime 
types (see Section A8.3.8). Second, in separate regression models, indicators of ideological heterogeneity among 
veto players, veto points, regime type, and political corruption are added to the regression model (see Chapter 
A8.3.3). Several variable pairs are not included simultaneously to avoid problems with multicollinearity.85 Finally, 
a model is estimated that includes significant independent variables from step two, as well as controls and global-
isation indicators. This model is presented below in Figures 8.2.11 and 8.2.12. Its results remain stable when 
regional performance is included in place of policy diffusion (see Figures A8.3.6 & A8.3.7 in the annex), and also 
when additional controls, such as autocratic regime types, are controlled (see chapter A8.3.5 in the annex). 
The multivariate analysis supports the theoretical expectation that trade openness undermines climate performance 
in developing countries (HInt1.3.2). This result is stable across all models. Many countries with below-average 
levels of trade openness perform at above-average levels when it comes to climate performance. By contrast, most 
countries with above-average levels of trade openness share relatively high CO2 emission levels. Nonetheless, a 
considerable number of countries deviates from this pattern. In contrast to HInt2.3.2, capital openness has a signif-
icant positive effect in the final model. This effect is not stable in all models. The scatter plot (Figure 8.2.13) 
indicates no clear positive bivariate effect. The question is whether systemic country differences cause deviations 
from the linear relationship of trade and capital openness with climate performance. As expected (HInt3.3.2), there 
is no support for the hypothesis that policy diffusion influences global air pollution.  
International political integration, measured by state involvement in IGOs or state centrality in IGO networks, has 
no effect on climate performance (see also Figure 8.2.14). This is in line with the expectation that political glob-
alisation has more influence on climate commitment than performance (see Chapter 3).  
 
84 Following Jahn (2013, p. 378), the number of independent variables should not be higher than 1/3N-1 (constant) (see also 
Chapter 8.1). This means with N=64 a maximum of 20 variables. 
85 Executive and public sector corruption (r=.792***), political and civil rights (.789***), political rights and vertical account-
ability, and civil rights and vertical accountability (r= .821***, r= .816***) are highly correlated (see Chapter A3.8.2). Veto-
player and point indicators also correlate highly with each other as they consider democracy (presidential veto player (DPI) 
and left/right polarisation (r=.750***), bicameralism and the number of government parties (r=.724***). 
218 
 
 
Figure 8.2.13 International economic integration and climate performance in developing countries 
 
 
 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=64. The vertical and horizontal lines represent average values 
of international economic integration and climate performance. 
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Figure 8.2.14 International political integration and climate performance in  developing countries 
 
 
Notes:  Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=64. The vertical and horizontal lines represent average values 
of international political integration and climate performance.  
There is no support for the hypothesis that veto points and ideological heterogeneity among veto players influence 
climate performance. Only some models indicate that presidential democracies captured by the DPI or Cheibub et 
al. (2010) data perform better than other countries. The significant effect of political corruption on global air pol-
lution in the model presented below is not stable across models. There is likewise no support for the hypothesis 
that specific political-corruption dimensions matter (HCorr1.3.2, HCorr2.3.3, & HCorr3.2). Among democratic quali-
ties and regime-type variables, only political rights contribute to climate performance when political corruption is 
controlled. While the bivariate analysis indicates a negative effect of economic development, its effect is positive 
and insignificant in the multivariate analysis (see Figures 8.2.15 & 8.2.16). It must be considered that the dependent 
variable already takes economic development into account. The present study also estimates the same model, using 
the squared term of the mean-centred GDP per capita to test the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis. As 
there is no significant curvilinear effect of economic development on climate performance in the developing world, 
only the linear term of GDP per capita is included in the model below. In contrast to the theoretical expectations 
(Hcont4), the number of ENGOs are associated with higher emission levels. Urban population contributes to global 
air pollution (Hcont8a). Regional performance is associated with lower CO2 emission levels (Hcont12) (see Figures 
A8.3.6 & A8.3.7 in the annex). However, this effect remains insignificant in the analysis of interaction effects in 
the next section. As expected, countries with plurality and mixed electoral rules are associated with higher levels 
of CO2 emissions than other countries (Hcont14). Figures 8.3.15 and 8.3.16 present the results of the simultaneous 
analysis (see Table A8.3.9 in the annex) of significant political institutional variables.  
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Figure 8.2.15 Explanatory factors of climate performance in developing countries (Multivariate regression): 
Unstandardised regression coefficients 
 
Notes:  Unstandardised Regression Coefficients with 90% Confidence Intervals, R²=.593, R² Adjusted==.454, Analysis units 
= country averages from 1992-2006, N=64. To compare effects of independent variables see Figure 8.2.16 
Figure 8.2.16 Explanatory factors of climate performance in developing countries (Multivariate regression): 
Standardised regression coefficients 
 
Notes: Standardised Regression Coefficients with 90% Confidence Intervals, R²=.593, R² Adjusted=.454, Analysis units = 
country averages from 1992-2006, N=64, 90% confidence interval, significant 99%: ENGO strength, 95%: trade 
openness, capital openness, 90%: political rights, political corruption, urban population. 
To conclude, as expected, trade openness is associated with lower climate performance in developing countries 
(H1.1.2). This effect is substantial: the strongest effect on climate performance, relative to the other independent 
variables included in the model (see Figure 8.3.16). In contrast to H2.12., the results indicate no stable effect of 
capital openness. The scatter plot suggests that a third variable may moderate this effect. In comparison to H4.3.2, 
international political integration has no effect on climate performance. This is in line with the expectation that 
IGO involvement has more influence on climate commitment than performance (see Chapter 3). In contrast to the 
theoretical expectations, countries with higher levels of political rights perform better. 
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8.2.3 Joint influence of international integration and domestic political institutions 
Is the effect of globalisation on climate performance in developing countries moderated by domestic political 
institutions? This chapter examines hypotheses derived from the three explanatory approaches: the veto-player, 
political-corruption, and regime-type approaches (see Chapter 5). To consider model complexity, I begin by ex-
amining the three explanatory approaches separately. Several political institutional variables in each explanatory 
approach correlate highly with each other. To avoid problems with multicollinearity, the respective hypotheses 
have been tested in separate regression models. Second, I examine significant interaction effects with the highest 
explanatory power of each explanatory approach simultaneously. To develop a final model, I re-examine this 
model by testing whether specific variables in each explanatory approach are decisive. All models control for 
ENGO strength, industry size, fuel exports, climate change vulnerability, urban population, GDP per capita and 
economic growth. A robustness analysis is used to consider additional variables. Additionally, jack-knife analyses 
based on world regions (IIASA, 2004) are used. As in Chapter 6 and the analysis of developed countries, marginal-
effects plots are interpreted and constituent variables are mean-centred to avoid problems with non-essential mul-
ticollinearity. 
There is no support, either for an independent effect of international political integration – captured by IGO mem-
berships or state centrality in IGO networks – or for an interaction with veto players. Thus, neither ideological 
heterogeneity among veto players or government ideology, nor specific veto points moderate the effect of interna-
tional political integration. These results also indicate no joint effect with regime type – electoral/established de-
mocracy or specific democracy-quality dimensions. Finally, there is no joint effect of forms of political corruption 
and international political integration. The previous section has shown that there is no linear effect of policy dif-
fusion on climate performance in developing countries. The statistical analysis also indicates no joint effect with 
domestic political institutions, based on the three explanatory approaches. By contrast, the effects of trade and 
capital openness are moderated by domestic political institutions and institutional quality. The following section 
will describe these results in more detail. 
Veto-player approach 
Trade openness undermines climate performance in countries without democratic veto points, democratic left/right 
polarisation, or democratic left- or right-wing government ideology. These interactions remain stable when they 
are tested simultaneously.86,87 The model with left/right polarisation has the highest explanatory power among 
veto-player models. When it comes to veto points, the model in which trade interacts with a presidential veto 
player explains the largest proportion of the variation in climate performance. Capital openness contributes to 
climate performance in democracies with left-wing government ideology and has a negative effect in democracies 
with right-wing government ideology. However, the low variance of the government ideology variables must be 
considered. When political corruption and political rights are controlled, there is a significant positive effect of 
capital openness in countries with below-average government fragmentation. Capital openness supports climate 
protection in non-presidential democracies (indicator from Cheibub et al., 2010).88 This model has the highest 
explanatory power. 
In sum, the results of the separate analysis of the veto-player approach suggest that there is a negative effect of 
trade openness in countries without democratic veto points and ideological heterogeneity among veto players. 
Capital openness has a positive effect in countries with below-average government fragmentation and non-presi-
dential democracies. 
Political-corruption approach 
There is a significant negative effect of trade openness only in countries with average values for executive, legis-
lative, and public sector corruption. The model involving executive corruption has the highest explanatory power. 
While there are no interactions of capital openness with executive or legislative corruption, capital openness con-
tributes to climate performance in countries with below-average or very low public sector corruption values.89  
Regime-type approach 
Trade openness is negatively associated with climate performance in established and electoral democracies. There 
is also a significant but weaker negative effect of trade openness on non-established democracies. Accordingly, 
trade openness has a negative effect in countries with above-average values of vertical and horizontal accounta-
bility and political and civil rights. These effects of international trade are insignificant in countries with high 
 
86 The interactions of trade openness with bicameralism and government fragmentation cannot be tested in the same model 
because they are highly correlated. Likewise, the interactions of right-wing government ideology and left/right-polarisation 
with trade openness have not been included in the same model. 
87 The results are stable when political corruption and political rights are controlled. 
88 A significant interaction between bicameralism and capital openness becomes insignificant when political rights and political 
corruption are controlled. 
89 The results remain stable if political rights and presidential democracy are controlled. 
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levels of these democratic qualities. There is a clear negative effect of trade openness in countries with above-
average values of political rights. Capital openness has a significant positive effect in electoral democracies, but 
not in established democracies. It also has a significant positive effect in countries with below-average vertical 
accountability and political and civil rights.90 The models in which trade and capital openness interact with politi-
cal rights have the highest explanatory power. 
Simultaneous analysis of the hypotheses of the three explanatory approaches 
The separate analysis of the explanatory models above suggests that the effects of trade and capital openness are 
moderated by veto players, aspects of regime type, and forms of political corruption. To develop a final model, 
the present study has tested significant interactions with the highest explanatory power simultaneously: trade open-
ness and presidential democracy, capital openness and presidential democracy, trade openness and political rights, 
capital openness and political rights, trade openness and public sector corruption, capital openness and public 
sector corruption (see Figure 8.2.17). This makes it possible to consider model complexity and problems with 
multicollinearity. With regard to the interaction between international integration and veto players and points, the 
interaction between a veto-point measure and international integration (with the highest explanatory model) has 
been applied, due to the low variance of government ideology and left/right polarisation variables. The model tests 
the interaction effects of trade and capital openness with public sector corruption, given that capital openness has 
shown a significant interaction with public sector corruption only. The interaction between capital openness and 
political rights remains unstable in robustness analyses (jack-knife analyses based on world regions, IIASA, 2004). 
The second step estimates the simultaneous model, using the interactions of trade and capital openness with civil 
rights (see Figure 8.2.18). In a separate analysis, the models with an interaction between capital openness and civil 
rights have also shown a high explanatory power. Robustness analyses have been applied to this model. Its findings 
remain the same if regional performance is controlled, instead of policy diffusion via trading partners. The results 
remain the same when electoral rules or country size, climate commitment, autocratic-regime types, parliamentary 
and semi-parliamentary democracy or electoral rules are considered. The model also shows no problem with mul-
ticollinearity and remains stable with robust standard errors (robust regression). 
Is the effect of trade and capital openness moderated by veto points? The results above suggest that there is a 
negative effect of trade openness in countries without democratic veto players and a positive effect of capital 
openness in non-presidential democracies and countries with low levels of government fragmentation. The simul-
taneous analysis (Figure 8.2.17 and 8.2.18) suggests a significant negative effect of trade openness in non-presi-
dential democracies.91,92 In the simultaneous analysis, the interactions of trade and capital openness with govern-
ment fragmentation (in place of presidential democracy) have been tested. The other institutional variables in the 
veto-player approach show little variance among developing countries. The negative effect of trade openness be-
comes stronger with government fragmentation. This effect is significant for countries with an average or below-
average number of government parties. The positive effect of capital openness becomes stronger with government 
fragmentation. So far, the analysis suggests that the interactions between veto points and economic openness re-
main stable. Trade openness has a negative effect in countries without veto points; the effect of capital openness 
is moderated by presidential democracy and government fragmentation. However, when the interactions of trade 
and capital openness with electoral democracy are tested simultaneously (see below), the joint effects of economic 
openness and presidential democracy become insignificant. 
  
 
90 The results remain the same when political corruption and presidential democracy are controlled. 
91 The positive effect of capital openness in non-presidential democracies becomes negative when South African countries are 
removed from the analysis. 
92 These results remain the same when the reference category is parliamentary democracy, i.e. when the model controls for 
semi-parliamentary and autocracy types. They are also stable when additional controls are added (climate commitment, country 
size). 
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Figure 8.2.17 Simultaneous analysis of the interaction effects of trade and capital openness with public sector 
corruption, political rights, and presidential democracy 
Trade openness by  
public sector corruption, 95% c.i. 
Capital openness by  
public sector corruption, 95% c.i. 
  
Trade openness by  
political rightsa, 95% c.i. 
Capital openness by  
political rights, 95% c.i. 
 
 
Trade openness by  
presidential democracy, 95% c.i. 
Capital openness by  
presidential democracy, 95% c.i. 
 
 
Notes:  The interaction effects shown are tested simultaneously. The multivariate model controls ENGO strength, industry 
size, fossil fuel exports, economic development, economic growth, climate change vulnerability, policy diffusion and 
IGO memberships. Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=64, R² = .665, Adjusted R² = .509. a This 
figure is based on the analysis of the sample without Pacific Asian countries. c.i. = confidence interval. 
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Figure 8.2.18 Simultaneous analysis of the interaction effects of trade and capital openness with public sector 
corruption, civil rights, and presidential democracy 
Trade openess by  
public sector corruption, 95% c.i. 
 
Capital openness by  
public sector corruption, 95% c.i. 
 
Trade openness by  
civil rights, 95% c.i. 
 
Capital openness by  
civil rights, 95% c.i. 
 
Trade openness by  
presidential democracy, 95% c.i. 
 
Capital openness by  
presidential democracy, 95% c.i. 
 
Notes:  The interaction effects shown are tested simultaneously. The multivariate model controls ENGO strength, industry 
size, fossil fuel exports, economic development, economic growth, climate change vulnerability, policy diffusion, 
IGO memberships. Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=64, R² = .722, Adjusted R² = .593. c.i.= 
confidence interval. 
The interaction between capital openness and government fragmentation also becomes insignificant and the inter-
action between trade openness and government fragmentation is unstable in the robustness analysis (jack-knife 
analysis based on world regions). Thus, the interaction effects between economic openness and veto points result 
from the association of democratic veto points with democracy. To conclude, veto points do not moderate the 
effects of trade and capital openness on climate performance in developing countries. 
Is the effect of trade and capital openness moderated by political corruption? Trade openness has a significant 
negative effect on climate performance in countries with average levels of executive, legislative, and public sector 
corruption (see Figure 8.2.19). Its effects become stronger with legislative corruption, but weaker with executive 
and public sector corruption. When Latin American countries are removed from the analysis (see Figure 8.2.19), 
the negative effect of trade becomes also stronger with public sector corruption, as well as executive corruption. 
This implies that international trade undermines climate protection in countries with average levels of executive, 
legislative, and public sector corruption. The joint effect between trade openness and public sector corruption has 
been included in the final model and in further robustness analyses. The models with public sector corruption 
remain stable when additional controls are considered. The plot suggests a positive effect of capital openness in 
countries with very low levels of public sector corruption. This effect becomes insignificant in the jack-knife 
analysis. In sum, trade openness has a negative effect in countries with average levels of executive, legislative, 
and public sector corruption. The general political corruption index also considers judicial corruption. This study 
has focused on executive, legislative, and public sector corruption. However, the findings of the final model stay 
the same when it includes the joint effect of trade openness and judicial corruption or trade openness and political 
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corruption. There is no stable interaction between public sector corruption and capital openness. A separate anal-
ysis has already shown that the effect of capital openness is not conditional on executive or legislative corruption. 
The separate analysis of the regime-type approach has shown significant interaction effects of trade as well as 
capital openness with multiple democratic qualities and regime-type indicators. Are specific democratic qualities 
or regime type in general decisive for the effect of trade and capital openness? In contrast to the interaction between 
trade openness and established democracy, in simultaneous analysis the interaction between trade openness and 
electoral democracy stays significant in jack-knife analysis. There is a negative effect of trade openness on climate 
performance in non-electoral democracies (see Figures 8.2.20). By contrast, the analysis of democratic qualities 
shows that trade openness has a negative effect only in countries with average levels of vertical accountability/hor-
izontal accountability/political and civil rights. These models have a higher explanatory power than the model with 
the interactions of trade and capital openness with electoral democracy (R²=.6128, Adjusted R²=.4025). The neg-
ative effect of trade openness becomes weaker with vertical accountability, horizontal accountability, and civil 
rights. When Pacific Asia or Sub-Saharan African countries are excluded from the analysis, it also becomes weaker 
with political rights. The interactions of trade openness with political and civil rights are stable in jack-knife anal-
ysis.93 In addition, the explanatory power of the model with civil rights (R² = .7219, Adjusted. R² = .5926) is higher 
than the model with vertical accountability (R² = .6289, Adjusted R² = 4563), the model with horizontal account-
ability (R² = .6967, Adjusted R² = .4091), and the model with political rights (R² = .6650, Adjusted R² = .5092). 
As electoral democracy correlates highly with the democracy-quality dimensions, the results suggest that trade 
openness has a negative effect in countries with average levels of civil rights. 
The plot suggests that the positive effect of capital openness becomes weaker with political rights. It is insignificant 
in countries with low levels of political rights. Interactions with vertical and horizontal accountability as well as 
political rights, however, become insignificant in the jack-knife analysis (based on world regions). There is a 
significant joint effect of capital openness with civil rights only. The positive effect of foreign direct investment 
becomes weaker with civil rights. It is negative with high civil-rights values. This interaction effect is significant 
at below-average and very extensive civil rights. 
The joint effects of trade openness and civil rights, trade openness and public sector corruption, and capital open-
ness and civil rights remain stable in the separate analysis of two subperiods (1992–1999 and 2000–2006) (see 
Chapter A8.3.5 in the annex). Chapter A8.3.4 in the annex tests the model assumptions. The results remain the 
same when democratic and autocratic sub-types are controlled, as well as when country-size, electoral types, cli-
mate commitment, and regional commitment are considered (see Figures A8.3.9 & A8.3.10). This also applies to 
the separate addition of controls to the regression models.
 
93 When North African or Sub-Saharan African countries are excluded, the interaction between trade openness and vertical 
accountability has a negative effect for countries with slightly above-average values of vertical accountability. The interaction 
between checks and balances and trade openness in several jack-knife models is only significant for average or above-average 
values of horizontal accountability. 
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Figure 8.2.19 Comparison of political-corruption dimensions 
Trade openness by 
executive corruptiona, 95% c.i.
 
Capital openness by 
 executive corruption, 95% c.i. 
 
Trade openness by  
legislative corruption, 95% c.i. 
 
Capital openness by  
legislative corruption, 95% c.i. 
 
Trade openess by  
public sector corruptiona, 95% c.i. 
 
Capital openness by  
public sector corruption, 95% c.i. 
 
Notes:  The interaction effects shown are based on simultaneous analysis of trade and capital openness with civil rights, 
presidential democracy and the respective political corruption dimension. The multivariate model controls ENGO 
strength, industry size, fossil fuel exports, economic development, economic growth, climate change vulnerability, 
policy diffusion, IGO memberships. a Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=64. This figure is based 
on the analysis of the sample without Pacific Asian countries. c.i. = confidence interval. 
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Figure 8.2.20 Comparison of democracy-quality dimensions 
Trade openness by  
vertical accountability, 95% c.i. 
 
Capital openness by  
vertical accountability, 95% c.i. 
 
Trade openness by horizontal  
accountabilitya, 95% c.i. 
 
Capital openness by  
horizontal accountability, 90% c.i. 
 
Trade openness by  
civil rights, 95% c.i.
 
Capital openness by  
civil rights, 95% c.i. 
 
Notes:  The interaction effects shown are based on simultaneous analysis of trade and capital openness with public sector 
corruption, presidential democracy and the respective democracy-quality dimension/ regime type indicator. The mul-
tivariate model controls ENGO strength, industry size, fossil fuel exports, economic development, economic growth, 
climate change vulnerability, policy diffusion, IGO memberships. a Analysis units = country averages from 1992-
2006, N=64. This figure is based on the analysis of the sample without Pacific Asian countries.  
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Figure 8.2.20 Comparison of democracy-quality dimensions (continuation) 
Trade openness by 
political rights, 95% c.i. b 
 
Capital openness by 
political rights, 95% c.i. 
 
Trade openness by  
electoral democracy, 90% c.i. 
 
Capital openenss by  
electoral democracy, 90% c.i.
 
Notes: The interaction effects shown are based on simultaneous analysis of trade and capital openness with public sector 
corruption, presidential democracy and the respective democracy quality-dimension/ regime type indicator. The mul-
tivariate model controls ENGO strength, industry size, fossil fuel exports, economic development, economic growth, 
climate change vulnerability, policy diffusion, IGO memberships. b Analysis units = country averages from 1992-
2006, N=64. This figure is based on the analysis of the model without the interactions of trade and capital openness 
with presidential democracy of the sample without Pacific Asian countries. c.i. = confidence interval. 
Table 8.2.5 presents the results of the final model with additional controls that have been found to be significant 
in the additive analysis in the previous section. The inclusion of the interactions of trade and capital openness with 
civil rights improves the explanatory power of the model significantly (F-test in change in R² = **). This does not 
apply to the joint effect of trade openness and public sector corruption. Among independent variables, trade open-
ness is still the most important driver of climate performance (see standardised regression coefficients). It also has 
a substantial effect on the dependent variable, which varies (without China and South Africa) between about 60 
and 100. Nonetheless, the joint effects of trade and capital openness with civil rights are also of relative importance 
for climate outcomes. The conclusions with regard to the controls remain the same: ENGO strength and urban 
population undermine climate performance. Plurality and mixed electoral rules are associated with higher-than-
average emissions levels. In addition, the model with interaction effects also suggests that presidential democracies 
perform better than other democracies. This is also the case when semi-presidential democracies are controlled. 
The model assumptions have been tested for Model 4 in Table 8.2.5. There are no violations of normal distributions 
of residuals, homoscedasticity, no multicollinearity, and linearity. As previously explained, China and South Af-
rica have been removed from the analysis of climate performance in developing countries. Using robust regres-
sions, the joint effects of trade openness and civil rights, capital openness and civil rights, and trade openness and 
public sector corruption remain stable and significant when China and South Africa are included. 
To conclude, globalisation affects climate performance in developing countries via economic openness. In accord-
ance with Hypothesis Hint1.3.2, trade openness has a negative effect on climate performance. This negative effect 
becomes stronger with political corruption (Hxcorr2a). This interaction is significant for average levels of political 
corruption. It is independent of the form of political corruption. At the same time, trade openness has a significant 
negative effect on climate performance in countries with average levels of political and civil rights and vertical 
and horizontal accountability. Democratic qualities weaken the negative effect of trade openness. In accordance 
with the theoretical expectations (Hxdemocracy3a & Hxdemocracy4a), the models with political and civil rights are stable. 
The model with civil rights can explain more cross-national variation than the other democratic-qualities models 
(Hxdemocracy4b). In contrast to hypothesis HInt2.3.2, the additive models support no negative impact of capital open-
ness. However, civil rights moderate the effect of capital openness on climate performance (Hxdemoracy4b). Foreign 
investment undermines climate performance in countries with extensive civil rights; it is associated with low levels 
of CO2 emissions in countries with few civil rights. 
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Table 8.2.5 International integration, domestic political institutions, and climate performance in developing 
countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Economic devel-
opment (ln) 
1.871 .211 
(2.018) 
1.996 .225 
(2.038) 
2.391 .269 
(2.006) 
1.882 .212 
(1.971) 
Economic growth .695 .168 
(.484) 
.686 .166 
(.487) 
.683 .165 
(.476) 
.372 .090 
(.493) 
Industry sector 
size (ln) 
-4.659 -.204 
(4.170) 
-4.603 -.201 
(4.195) 
-5.575 -.244 
(4.139) 
-4.105 -.179 
(4.104) 
Fuel exports (ln) -.624 -.107 
(.792) 
-.544 -.093 
(.805) 
-.652 -.112 
(.790) 
-.493 -.085 
(.773) 
ENGO strength 
(ln) 
-3.231** -.303** 
(1.287) 
-3.167** -.297** 
(1.298) 
-3.898*** -.366*** 
(1.336) 
-3.768*** -.354*** 
(1.302) 
Urban population -.174** -.404** 
(.082) 
-.186** -.432** 
(.084) 
-.187** -.435** 
(.082) 
-.164** -.381** 
(.082) 
Climate change 
vulnerability 
7.961 .101 
(9.526) 
8.234 .104 
(9.591) 
9.957 .126 
(9.429) 
9.904 .125 
(9.176) 
Mixed electoral 
system 
-6.422** -.319** 
(2.442) 
-6.549** -.325** 
(2.464) 
-6.787*** -.337*** 
(2.413) 
-5.990** -.297** 
(2.387) 
Plurality electoral 
system 
-4.468* -.251* 
(2.545) 
-4.934* -.278* 
(2.651) 
-4.717* -.265* 
(2.595) 
-3.128 -.176 
(2.666) 
Presidential de-
mocracy 
4.476* .222* 
(2.647) 
4.222 .209 
(2.689) 
4.715* .234* 
(2.644) 
5.357** .266** 
(2.596) 
Semi-presidential 
democracy 
1.170 .023 
(5.225) 
.512 .010 
(5.345) 
-.638 .010 
(5.267) 
-2.266 -.045 
(5.199) 
Public sector cor-
ruption 
10.33* .247* 
(5.853) 
11.01* .263* 
(5.972) 
10.54* .252* 
(5.845) 
7.646 .183 
(5.897) 
Civil rights 7.354 .182 
(6.453) 
8.205 .203 
(6.612) 
7.105 .176 
(6.495) 
6.347 .157 
(6.333) 
Trade openness 
(lg) 
-18.35** -.379** 
(7.154) 
-18.59** -.384** 
(7.205) 
-19.35*** -.399*** 
(7.058) 
-20.62*** -.426*** 
(6.902) 
Capital openness 2.186* .218* 
(1.245) 
2.220* .221* 
(1.253) 
1.910 .190 
(1.238) 
1.776 .177 
(1.207) 
Policy diffusion .095 .100 
(.124) 
.109 .115 
(.127) 
.107 .113 
(.124) 
.125 .133 
(.121) 
IGO member-
ships 
-.072 -.119 
(.090) 
-.073 -.120 
(.091) 
-.049 -.081 
(.090) 
-.069 -.114 
(.088) 
Trade openness x 
Public sector corruption 
  -18.88 -.072 
(27.85) 
-51.63 -.198 
(33.03) 
-52.31 -.200 
(32.14) 
Trade openness x 
Civil rights 
    -52.26
* -.225 
(29.83) 
-36.26 -.156 
(30.27) 
Capital openness 
x Civil rights 
      -11.62 -.225 
(6.241) 
Constant 91.63*** (16.16) 90.16*** (16.40) 89.09*** (16.05) 87.10*** (15.65) 
R2 .592 .596 .622 .651 
R² Adjusted .441 .435 .460 .488 
Notes:  The table displays unstandardised, standardised regression coefficients (in italics), and standard errors (in paratheses), 
*** p <.01, ** p <.05, N=64. Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006. 
8.3 Discussion of the results 
This section discusses the statistical results in relation to the research question and hypotheses. Overall, the analysis 
supports the finding that globalisation affects climate performance differently in developed and developing coun-
tries. This chapter will therefore separate developed and developing countries. Table 8.3.1 summarises the results, 
in relation to the additive effects of globalisation dimensions on climate commitment and performance. 
  
230 
 
 
Table 8.3.1 Summary: The effect of globalisation on climate commitment and performance 
 
UNFCCC 
 
Kyoto Protocol 
 
Climate  
Performance 
 
Pooled 
Developing 
Pooled 
Developing 
Developed  
Developing 
Trade openness 
HInt1.1.1 / HInt1.2.1 / HInt1.3.1 / 
HInt1.1.2 / HInt1.2.2 / HInt1.3.2 - 
Capital openness 
HInt2.1.1 / HInt2.2.1 / HInt2.3.1 / 
HInt2.1.2 / HInt2.2.2 / HInt2.3.2 / (-) 
Economic interde-
pendence 
HInt3.1.1 + (/)/ HInt3.2.1 + (/) HInt3.3.1 +/- 
HInt3.1.2 + (/) HInt3.2.2 + (/) HInt3.3.2 / 
Political  
Globalisation 
HInt4.1.1 + HInt4.2.1 / (+) HInt4.3.1 / (+) 
HInt4.1.2 + HInt4.2.2 / (+) HInt4.3.2 / (+) 
Notes: + positive effect, / no effect, - negative effect, +/- direction unclear. Green – empirical observed effect, red – theoret-
ical expected effect that has not been supported by the empirical analysis. 
8.3.1 Developed countries 
As expected, economic globalisation affects climate performance via policy diffusion in developed countries 
(HInt3.3.1). There is no effect of trade or capital openness on CO2 emissions (HInt1.3.1, HInt2.3.1). In accordance 
with the theoretical expectations, the effect of policy diffusion is independent of domestic political institutions. 
Thus, the results support neither the veto-player nor the political-corruption approach. Moreover, economic inter-
dependence is an important explanatory factor related to cross-national variation in climate performance among 
developed countries.  
In contrast to the theoretical expectations, there is no additive positive effect of international political integration 
on climate performance (HInt4.3.1). Network centrality, however, contributes to climate protection in bicameral 
systems (Hxveto6). Countries with bicameralism have below-average climate performance and network centrality or 
above-average climate performance and network centrality (see Figure 8.3.1). France, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Spain are bicameral systems with above-average climate-protection values. Germany and Switzerland, also bi-
cameral systems, barely deviate from this pattern. Among federal states, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the US 
perform badly in climate performance and share below-average network-centrality values. In countries with bi-
cameralism, network centrality has a positive effect on climate performance.  
Figure 8.3.1 International political integration, bicameralism, and climate performance in developed coun-
tries  
 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=21. Countries with bicameralism are blue. All others are 
red. The vertical and horizontal lines = average values of international political integration and climate perfor-
mance. 
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The statistical analysis suggests that international political integration contributes to climate performance only in 
bicameral systems. Desai (2002, p. 376) deduces from case studies that international pressures, such as European 
integration, have been very important to environmental policy in general. Countries with above-average network 
centrality and climate performance are bicameral systems, and EU members (Spain, Netherlands, Italy, and 
France) (see Figure 8.3.1). Countries with below-average network centrality and climate performance, as well as 
bicameralism, are not EU-members (Australia, Canada, and the United States). Australia, Canada, and the US are, 
in general, less politically integrated (Brown, 2012, p. 325). Several of these countries are also federal systems 
(e.g., Australia, Canada, Germany, and the United States). It could, therefore, be an interaction between political 
globalisation and EU integration and bicameralism. However, no support for this relationship can be found in the 
data.  
One explanation for this finding is that bicameralism and federalism imply that there are more actors involved in 
the domestic political decision-making process who are influenced by incentives derived from political globalisa-
tion than would be the case in unicameral states. Comparative climate policy research on differences in climate 
performance between EU countries and the US supports this conclusion. State participation in IGOs implies co-
operation between sub-national policymakers as well as public officials (Schreurs et al., 2009, p. 181). Local and 
regional political authorities and public officials from the US and Europe can, therefore, exchange their experience, 
knowledge, and policy preferences in meetings within the UN system and other IGOs (Selin & VanDeveer, 2012, 
p. 360). For instance, Schreurs et al. (2009, p. 177) have argued that, despite the lack of US government climate 
change mitigation policies, federal states and cities have introduced climate policies influenced by European cli-
mate change policies. Selin and VanDeveer (2012, p. 360) have observed that networks of political decision-
makers at different political levels in Europe and the US have contributed to the adoption of climate policies in 
US federal states and cities; these resemble European responses to climate change. European climate policies are 
affected by climate-policy ideas discussed by the US Congress (Selin & VanDeveer, 2012, p. 360). Brown (2012, 
p. 330) has argued that ‘competitive federalism is not enough, but it is also better than nothing.’ Federal systems 
in the EU enable cooperation among environmental supporters from local, regional, national, and EU levels 
(Brown, 2012, p. 329). 
However, the result is driven by a small number of countries. Differences between Australia, Canada, the US, and 
other developed countries must be considered. In addition to bicameralism, the former three countries share fed-
eralism and low levels of international political integration; in comparison to European countries, they have cheap 
gasoline prices, energy dependence on oil and coal, and low levels of population density (Brown, 2012, p. 325; 
Christoff & Eckersley, 2011, p. 438). Moreover, Australia and Canada are the most important exporters of natural 
resources among the developed countries (Brown, 2012, p. 325; Christoff & Eckersley, 2011, p. 438). Case studies 
suggest that the effect of federalism depends on other factors, such as responsibility for natural-resource extraction, 
whether states or provinces support environmental protection (Desai, 2002, p. 373). Desai (2002, p. 374) assumes 
that conflicts between the federal and state governments in federal systems with weak federal government and 
plurality electoral rule, tend to focus on economic growth and are dependent on states with natural-resource ex-
traction. States and provinces that depend on natural-resource extraction have little interest in climate change mit-
igation. Regional governments in Australia support natural-resource extraction because they depend on it finan-
cially (Desai, 2002; Walker, 2002). In Australia and Canada, states and provinces control natural-resource extrac-
tion. There are conflicts related to environmental protection between regional governments and federal govern-
ments in Canada and Australia (Toner, 2002; Walker, 2002). Australian states are unwilling to act against the 
policy preferences of important economic actors, even if they are responsible for environmental policy (Desai, 
2002; Walker, 2002). The multivariate analysis shows that the interaction effect remains stable when we control 
for country size and fossil-fuel exports and consider population density. 
8.3.2 Developing countries 
In accordance with the hypotheses, economic globalisation affects the climate performance of developing coun-
tries via economic openness. In accordance with HInt3.3.2, there is no significant effect of policy diffusion on 
developing countries. As expected, trade openness is associated with low levels of climate performance (HInt1.3.2). 
In contrast to hypothesis HInt2.3.2, capital openness has an effect on climate performance only when its interrela-
tionship with civil rights is taken into account (see below).  
The empirical analysis offers little support for the veto-player approach. The findings confirm hypotheses associ-
ated with the political-corruption approach. The effect of international trade is significant only in countries with 
average levels of political corruption (analysis without Latin American countries). The analysis suggests that the 
negative effect of international trade becomes stronger with political corruption. The effect is independent of the 
form of political corruption (executive, legislative, and public sector corruption). This supports the hypothesis that 
corruption worsens the negative effect of economic openness in developing countries (Hxcorr4b). The corruption of 
political decision-makers and public officials makes politicians unlikely to address global warming and enables 
firms and citizens to avoid environmental regulations. However, the statistical results indicate that trade openness 
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has no significant effect in countries with very high levels of political corruption. This is in line with hypothesis 
Hcorr4a. It confirms the observation that political corruption hinders economic growth and contributes to lower 
scale effects of international trade. However, it is important to note that the joint effect of trade openness and 
aspects of political corruption contribute little to explaining differences in climate performance among developing 
economies. 
 
Figure 8.3.2 Trade openness, democracy qualities, and climate performance in developing countries 
Vertical accountability 
 
Horizontal accountability 
 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=64. The 50% of countries that are in the middle of the distri-
bution of political and civil rights, vertical and horizontal accountability are blue. All others are red. The vertical and 
horizontal lines = average values of international economic integration and climate performance. 
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Figure 8.3.2 Trade openness, democracy qualities and climate performance in developing countries (conti-
nuation) 
Political rights 
 
Civil rights 
 
Notes: Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=64. The 50% of countries that are in the middle of the distri-
bution of political and civil rights, vertical and horizontal accountability are blue. All others are red. The vertical and horizontal 
lines = average values of international economic integration and climate performance. 
 
Democratic qualities affect the relationship between economic openness and climate performance. The results of 
this study suggest that political and civil rights and vertical and horizontal accountability weaken the negative 
effect of international trade on climate performance. The latter two interactions, however, are unstable. The results 
indicate that civil rights are decisive for the relationship between trade openness and climate performance. Based 
on a visual inspection of bivariate scatter plots (Figure 8.3.2) and explanatory power, the interaction effect is 
clearest in relation to civil rights. In accordance with the theoretical expectations of this study, it is not regime type 
in general, but specific democratic qualities that lessen the negative effect of international trade on CO2 emissions. 
This may explain why Spilker (2013) finds no interaction between the regime type captured by summary measures 
of democracy quality and trade openness in relation to CO2 emissions. In her analysis of the joint effect of trade 
openness and regime type on SO2 and CO2 emissions in developing countries, Spilker (2013) finds support for this 
hypothesis for SO2 but not CO2 emissions. 
Figure 8.3.2 shows that the interaction between civil rights and trade openness applies only to countries with 
average civil-rights values. The 50% of countries in the middle of the civil-rights distribution exhibit a clear neg-
ative effect of trade openness in comparison to other countries (Figure 8.3.3). Above-average civil-rights values 
are not associated with a negative effect of trade openness. For instance, Ecuador, Bolivia and India are 
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characterised by below-average values of trade openness and above-average civil-rights values, but they do not 
perform well in climate protection. A similar pattern can be present for vertical and horizontal accountability, as 
well as political rights. However, the latter cannot describe the relationship between trade openness and climate 
performance as well as civil rights. This applies especially to the model with horizontal accountability. 
 
Figure 8.3.3 Trade openness, civil rights, and climate performance in developing countries 
Countries with middle values of civil rights 
 
Countries with below or above middle values of civil rights 
 
Notes:  Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=64. Blue lines = bivariate linear regression of the relationship 
between trade openness and climate performance. Grey area = 95% confidence interval. The vertical and horizontal 
lines = average values of international economic integration and climate performance. 
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Figure 8.3.3 Trade openness, civil rights, and climate performance in developing countries (continuation) 
Countries with below middle levels of civil rights 
 
Countries with above middle levels of civil rights 
 
Notes:  Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=64. Blue lines = bivariate linear regression of the relationship 
between trade openness and climate performance. Grey area = 95% confidence interval. The vertical and horizontal lines = 
average values of international economic integration and climate performance. 
 
The present results suggest that aspects of regime type also moderate the effect of trade openness on CO2 emis-
sions. However, civil rights are more important for the moderation effect of democracy.94 The analysis suggests 
that trade openness has a negative effect in countries with average levels of civil rights, while its effect becomes 
weaker with civil rights. This is in line with the literature, which shows that democracy has positive effects on the 
environment only when there are stable political institutions and a developed civil society and (e.g., Fredriksson 
& Neumayer, 2016; Gallagher & Thacker, 2008; see Chapter 4). Accordingly, Keefer (2007) has shown that pub-
lic-goods provision is lower in young democracies because of ‘the inability of political competitors in young de-
mocracies to make credible, pre-electoral promises to voters’ (Keefer, 2007, p. 804). 
While there has been no stable effect of capital openness on the additive analysis of climate performance, its effect 
on CO2 emissions varies with civil rights. In accordance with hypothesis Hxdemocracy4b, there is a negative effect of 
capital openness in countries with extensive civil rights. By contrast, foreign investment contributes to climate 
performance in countries with few civil rights. Figure 8.3.4 shows that most countries with above-average civil-
rights values have either below-average values of capital openness and above-average values of climate 
 
94 Differences in research design must be considered. The present analysis has focused on cross-national variation. Spilker 
(2013) pooled countries over time. 
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performance or above-average values of capital openness and below-average values of climate performance. This 
finding confirms the democracy-FDI literature, which suggests that civil rights make countries more attractive for 
foreign investment. Civil rights, including the rule of law, enable large-scale investments. They thus contribute to 
global air pollution via the scale of economic activity. 
 
Figure 8.3.4 Capital openness, civil rights, and climate performance in developing countries 
Countries with above average civil rights 
 
Countries with below average civil rights 
 
Notes:  Analysis units = country averages from 1992-2006, N=64. Blue lines = bivariate linear regression of the relationship 
between capital openness and climate performance. Grey area = 95% confidence interval Vertical and horizontal 
lines = average values of international economic integration and climate performance. 
This result differs from the argument made by similar studies (e.g., Spilker, 2013). Accordingly, the previous 
section discussed Bolivia in detail to examine the causal relationship between civil rights, capital openness, and 
climate performance. The scatter plot shows that Bolivia is characterised by above-average levels of civil rights 
and foreign investment, as well as below-average climate performance. Bolivia became a democracy in the 1980s. 
There have been further improvements in democracy quality, including the rule of law during the 1990s (BTI, 
2003, p. 2). Bolivia has performed well in civil rights, including the rule of law, since the 1990s (BTI, 2003, p. 6). 
State-led companies were privatised from the middle of the 1980s until 2001 (BTI, 2006, p. 17). Privatisations 
also took place in the energy sector (BTI, 2006, p. 4). The privatisation of state-led companies in the 1990s led to 
an increase in FDI inflows to Bolivia (Flexner, 2000). In 1998, Bolivia became the largest receiver of FDI, as a 
percentage of GDP, in Latin America (Flexner, 2000). FDI flows in Latin America play a considerable part in the 
pollution-intensive economic sector (Blanco et al., 2013, p. 106). In Bolivia, FDI inflows in the 1990s went mainly 
to the business and hydrocarbon sectors, i.e. oil and gas exploration (Flexner, 2000). Blanco et al. (2013) have 
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shown that FDI in pollution-intensive sectors contributes more to CO2 emissions in Latin America than FDI flows 
to other economic sectors. Following the foreign investment, there has been a considerable increase in exports 
during the research period and beyond. It is plausible to expect that this has contributed to an increase in CO2 
emissions in Bolivia. In sum, the case of Bolivia shows that civil rights attract FDI, which contributes via scale 
effects to global air pollution. 
8.4 Conclusions 
This chapter contributes to the literature on globalisation and climate performance by showing how the effect of 
various globalisation dimensions depends on domestic political institutions. To this end, it has used a statistical 
analysis to test the hypotheses of three explanatory approaches to the joint influence of globalisation dimensions 
and domestic political institutions: the veto-player approach, the political-corruption approach, and (in the analysis 
of developing countries) the regime-type approach. The findings suggest that climate performance in developed 
countries depends on the climate performance of important trading partners. This effect is independent of domestic 
political institutions. There is no support for the hypothesis that the veto-player or political-corruption approaches 
can explain the relationship between policy diffusion and climate performance. An analysis of developed countries, 
however, suggests that there is a positive effect of state centrality in IGO networks on climate performance in 
bicameral systems. This effect is, in a pairwise comparison, the most important driver of climate outcomes. In 
addition to these relationships, the statistical analysis supports non-political drivers of climate performance in 
high-income countries. As expected, economic development, corporatism, and population density contribute to 
climate performance, while economic growth, fuel exports, and country size undermine it. 
In accordance with the hypotheses, international integration affects climate outcomes in developing economies in 
different ways. Among various globalisation dimensions, only economic openness is associated with climate per-
formance in developing countries. In accordance with the political-corruption approach, political corruption wors-
ens the negative effect of international trade. This interaction effect is independent of the form of political corrup-
tion. However, it contributes little to explaining differences in climate outcomes among developing countries. It 
adds to previous research, which has found that civil rights, in particular, weaken the negative effect of interna-
tional trade in countries with average levels of this democracy quality. Capital openness contributes to climate 
performance in countries with below-average civil-rights values, but undermines climate performance in countries 
with above-average civil-rights values. These democratic freedoms increase the scale effects of international trade 
on CO2 emissions by attracting foreign investment. This relationship is exemplified by Bolivia. Among various 
controls, ENGO strength and urban population undermine climate performance. In the developing world, political 
institutions have additional additive effects on climate outcomes. Plurality and mixed electoral rules are associated 
with higher-than-average emissions levels. Presidential democracies perform better than other democracies. 
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9 Conclusion 
Abstract 
This book adds to the academic literature that domestic political institutions moderate, apart from the relationship 
between economic interdependence and climate performance (in developed countries), the effects of economic 
and political globalisation on climate commitment and performance. This chapter concludes the present study. It 
compares the findings described in previous chapters on the joint effect of globalisation and domestic political 
institutions on climate commitment and performance. It then evaluates the implications and limitations of these 
results for future research. This work concludes by reflecting upon possible policy implications. 
The climate change crisis is one of the greatest challenges of our time. To tackle global warming, it is important 
to understand country differences in state participation in international climate cooperation. Climate cooperation 
implies that states commit to common goals and principles (climate commitment) and implement policy measures 
to realise these goals (climate performance). A central question in comparative and global-environmental politics 
is whether globalisation is good or bad for climate commitment and performance. From a policy perspective, it is 
of particular importance to establish the extent to which domestic political factors moderate the globalisation/cli-
mate change relationship. For instance, with regard to economic globalisation, policymakers and interest groups 
frequently use competition concerns to impede the ratification of climate agreements and the adoption of policies 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In contrast to the broader literature on the consequences of globalisation, 
there has been little research on whether effects of globalisation on climate commitment and performance depend 
on domestic politics. To fill this research gap, the present study has examined whether domestic political institu-
tions moderate the effects of international economic and political integration. To this end, it has applied three 
theoretical approaches to the joint effect of international integration and domestic political institutions in the 
broader globalisation literature: the veto-player, political-corruption and the regime-type approaches. The veto-
player approach assumes that the policy preferences of veto players and veto points moderate state responses to 
globalisation. The other two approaches identify aspects of institutional quality (political corruption and democ-
racy) as crucial. 
Previous quantitative studies have not systematically examined the possible moderation effects of domestic polit-
ical institutions, based on the assumption that competitive pressures caused by economic globalisation affect gov-
ernment behaviour in climate policy, independent of domestic politics. From a theoretical perspective, multiple 
moderation effects of institutional variables on climate commitment and performance can be assumed. Domestic 
political institutional variables not only moderate government responses to international incentives and pressures, 
they also affect the impact of exposure to international influences on climate commitment and performance. Do-
mestic political institutions involved in implementing climate policies moderate the effect of globalisation on cli-
mate performance. Finally, domestic political institutions moderate (as context conditions of international trade 
and investment) the effect of economic openness on climate outcomes via economic growth.  
The present study of data on climate commitment and climate performance from 1992-2006 has shown that polit-
ical globalisation contributes to the ratification of soft and hard international climate treaties. In the developed 
world, economic globalisation influences climate performance via policy diffusion among trading partners. In 
developing countries, economic openness is crucial. Trade and capital openness undermine climate outcomes in 
poor countries. This analysis adds to the academic literature that domestic political institutions moderate, apart 
from the relationship between economic interdependence and climate performance (in developed countries), the 
effects of economic and political globalisation on climate commitment and performance. While competition pres-
sures caused by economic globalisation affect climate performance in developed countries, independent of domes-
tic variables, institutional constraints and institutional quality still moderate the effect of incentives derived from 
involvement in IGOs on climate commitment and performance, as well as context conditions of international trade 
and capital scale effects of economic openness on climate outcomes. Left- and right-wing veto players care about 
economic competitiveness. The same applies to corrupt and incorrupt political decision-makers. The policy pref-
erences of veto players in the left/right dimension do also not affect the effects of the other globalisation dimen-
sions on climate commitment and performance. However, institutional constraints and institutional quality make 
a difference in the relationship between political globalisation and climate commitment and performance. Aspects 
of institutional quality – political corruption and democracy quality – influence climate policy consequences of 
economic openness in the developing world. Overall, the results show that institutional constraints and institutional 
quality can strengthen positive and weaken negative effects of globalisation on climate commitment and 
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performance. The results support hypotheses based on political-corruption and regime-type approaches. By con-
trast, there is little support for the veto-player approach. 
The first section (9.1) of this final chapter compares the findings related to climate commitment and performance 
The following section (9.2) discusses the contributions that this study makes to the literature, as well as possible 
future research questions. Section 9.3 explains the limitations of this study. The final section focuses on policy 
implications. 
9.1  Comparison of climate commitment and performance 
Chapter 2 specifies the dependent variables as commitment to the central goals and principles of the international 
UN climate change regime (climate commitment) and the implementation of measures that contribute to its central 
goal: the stabilisation of greenhouse gas emissions (climate performance). Together, both dependent variables 
constitute state participation in climate cooperation within the UN framework. This study measures climate com-
mitment by the delay in ratifying the two climate treaties that fall within the research period (1992–2006) – UN-
FCCC and Kyoto Protocol. Climate performance is captured by data on CO2 emissions. Previous studies of the 
joint effect of globalisation and domestic political institutions have focused on climate performance. To date, there 
has been no similar publication on climate commitment. However, climate cooperation requires states to agree on 
common goals and principles and implement policy measures to implement them. It is therefore important to study 
the way in which globalisation affects climate commitment.  
The comparison of the two dimensions is also relevant. The moderation effects of domestic political institutions 
may be more prevalent for climate commitment and performance. From a theoretical perspective, it is easier for 
countries to act in accordance with positive incentives derived from political globalisation and to ratify climate 
treaties than it is for them to mitigate climate change. The ratification of international climate agreements is asso-
ciated with lower costs than climate protection. Moreover, the issue visibility of ratification behaviour is higher. 
It is harder for citizens and ENGOs to monitor the consequences of globalisation on climate policy outcomes than 
on climate commitment. For the same reason, it might be easier for governments to not reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in accordance with pressures from economic globalisation. It is therefore crucial to study whether do-
mestic political institutional factors influence effects on climate commitment and performance. 
This study began by showing that globalisation matters for both dimensions of state participation in climate coop-
eration. Table 9.1 summarises the main findings. However, the comparison of climate commitment and perfor-
mance reveals important differences. When we focus on the relative importance of the dimensions of globalisation, 
the statistical findings support the globalisation/environment literature by indicating that international integration 
affects climate commitment and performance in different ways. Political globalisation implies positive incentives 
for states to enter into climate treaties and to mitigate climate change. The results support the claim that IGO 
involvement contributes to the ratification of climate treaties. However, it only matters for climate performance in 
bicameral developed countries. It is easier for governments to act in accordance with incentives derived from IGOs 
in their participation in climate treaties. Climate commitment does not necessarily imply that countries actually 
implement policy measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  
Policymakers use economic competition concerns to question participation in climate treaties and the adoption of 
climate policies. However, international economic integration contributes only to explaining country differences 
in climate performance. Economic globalisation influences climate policy outcomes via competitive pressures 
caused by economic openness and interdependence (policy diffusion), as well as via the scale and composition 
effects of economic openness. In line with expectations, the statistical findings show that economic interdepend-
ence is crucial for climate performance in developed countries, and that economic openness undermines climate 
performance in poor countries. Case studies have shown that economic interdependence influenced the Kyoto 
Protocol ratification of some countries. However, there is no general association between economic globalisation 
and climate commitment across countries. To conclude, the importance of economic and political globalisation 
varies for climate commitment and performance. While political globalisation contributes to climate commitment, 
it supports climate performance only in bicameral developed countries. By contrast, economic globalisation affects 
only climate performance. 
The results of this study also suggest that globalisation effects on the ratification of climate treaties and on climate 
performance are, with one exception,96 moderated by domestic political institutions. Aspects of institutional qual-
ity are crucial. Only policy diffusion among trading partners affects climate outcomes in developed countries, 
independent of domestic political institutions. The analysis of climate commitment and performance reveals that 
the policy preferences of veto players – captured by government ideology and ideological heterogeneity on the 
left-dimension – do not moderate the influence of international integration. Thus, left- and right-wing veto players 
 
96 The relationship between economic interdependence and climate performance is independent of the institutional variables 
considered in this study. 
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respond in similar ways to incentives and pressures caused by globalisation during the ratification of climate trea-
ties and in relation to climate protection. 
The theoretical discussion suggests that domestic political institutions have more influence on the globalisation/cli-
mate commitment relationship than international-integration consequences for climate performance. This is be-
cause the issue visibility of ratification behaviour is higher than that of climate-policy implementation. Accord-
ingly, the statistical findings show that the effect of policy diffusion among trading partners on climate perfor-
mance in the developed world does not vary in accordance with institutional variables. The present findings, how-
ever, indicate that institutional variables matter to the effects of other globalisation dimensions on climate com-
mitment and performance. 
While domestic political institutions moderate the influence of globalisation on climate commitment and perfor-
mance, moderation effects vary between the two dimensions. On the one hand, different institutional variables 
matter to some extent. First, in accordance with previous research, political corruption strengthens the negative 
effects of trade openness on CO2 emissions in developing countries. However, it makes no difference to the rela-
tionship between political globalisation and climate commitment. IGO involvement contributes to the ratification 
of climate treaties, irrespective of corrupt governments and parliaments. Second, only the analysis of climate out-
comes finds support for the veto-player approach, with the joint effect of political globalisation and bicameralism. 
The policy preferences of veto players and veto points do not moderate the effects of globalisation on climate 
commitment. On the other hand, among institutional drivers, democracy quality matters for both aspects of climate 
cooperation. There is no evidence, however, that it only leads to climate-friendly consequences of international 
integration. Civil rights strengthen the positive effects of IGO involvement on Kyoto Protocol ratification and 
lessen the negative effects of trade openness. Simultaneously, in contrast to their democratic counterparts, only 
autocratic governments ratify soft climate treaties in accordance with incentives derived from political globalisa-
tion. Capital openness undermines climate performance in developing economies with above-average levels of 
civil rights. Overall, institutional quality moderates the effects of IGO involvement and economic openness on 
climate commitment and performance. Specific moderation effects vary between climate commitment and perfor-
mance, as well as between developed and developing countries and with treaty design. 
To conclude, globalisation matters for climate commitment and performance. Political globalisation contributes to 
the ratification of climate treaties and climate performance in developed countries only. Economic globalisation 
is important for climate outcomes only. Institutional variables moderate the effects of international integration on 
ratification behaviour and climate outcomes. Only the relationship between economic interdependence and climate 
performance in developed countries is independent of institutional constraints and institutional quality. For both 
dimensions of state participation in climate cooperation, aspects of institutional quality and, in particular, democ-
racy quality are decisive for globalisation influences. By contrast, the policy preferences of veto players in the 
left/right dimension do not influence state responses to globalisation in relation to climate commitment and per-
formance.  
Table 9.1 Main findings  
 Climate Commitment Climate Performance 
 UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol  
 All countries All countries 
Developed 
Developing 
Trade 
openness 
/ / 
/ 
- in countries with average levels of po-
litical corruption and average levels of 
civil rights 
Capital 
openness 
/ / 
/ 
- in countries with above average levels 
of civil rights 
Policy dif-
fusion 
/ / 
+/- 
/ 
Interna-
tional polit-
ical integra-
tion 
/ / + in bicameral systems 
+ in non-electoral 
democracies 
+ in countries 
with above aver-
age levels of civil 
rights  
/ 
Notes:  + positive effect, / no effect, - negative effect, +/- unclear direction. 
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9.2 Contributions to the literature 
This section discusses the contributions made by this study and its findings to the literature, and their implications 
for future research. The two sections focus on contributions to comparative climate policy research and to general 
globalisation and policy-diffusion research. 
9.2.1 Comparative climate policy research  
Comparative climate policy research investigates domestic and international factors that explain climate policy 
output and outcomes, including climate commitment and performance. In contrast to the broader literature on the 
consequences of globalisation, there has been no systematic research on moderation effects of domestic political 
institutions in comparative climate policy research. To fill this research gap, the present study has applied three 
perspectives on the joint effect of globalisation and domestic political institutions on climate commitment and 
performance: the veto-player approach, the political-corruption approach, and the regime-type approach. Previous 
research has not compared multiple explanatory approaches. The veto-player approach is the most elaborate theo-
retical approach to study the joint effect of international and domestic explanatory factors. The analysis shows that 
the veto-player approach cannot explain the relationship between globalisation and climate commitment and per-
formance. It finds support for the political-corruption and regime-type approaches. The comparison of the three 
explanatory approaches suggests that the policy preferences of veto players and institutional constraints on the 
government (the policy preferences of veto players and veto points) do not explain state responses to globalisation. 
The policy preferences of the government in the left/right dimension make no difference at all to the effect of 
globalisation on climate commitment and performance. The regime type and a country’s acceptance of the rule of 
law (civil rights) affect a country’s exposure to the positive incentives of international political integration. More-
over, civil rights and political corruption undermine climate performance via scale effects of international trade 
and investment. Thus, aspects of institutional quality matter for the influence of globalisation. Future research 
could investigate the importance of additional aspects of institutional quality, such as government effectiveness. 
Overall, it is important to consider multiple explanatory approaches when analysing the joint effects of globalisa-
tion and domestic political institutions. The following section discusses the results for each explanatory approach 
in detail. 
Among the three explanatory approaches, the findings offer little support for the veto-player approach. This applies 
to the analysis of climate commitment and performance. This is in line with the argument in Chapter 5 that left- 
and right-wing parties react in similar ways to international pressures in relation to climate policy. In this respect, 
the research period from 1992–2006 must be considered. More recently, in the developed and developing world, 
there has been a polarisation of positions on global warming in the left/right dimension. It applies especially to 
Europe and the United States but also to developing countries. Right-wing populists and right-wing populist par-
ties, in contrast to mainstream right- and left-wing parties, uniformly reject climate cooperation and climate change 
mitigation (Lockwood, 2018, p. 712). Moreover, they question global warming (Lockwood, 2018, p. 712). Exam-
ples include the Trump administration in the United States, the Brazilian government of Jair Bolsonaro, and right-
wing populist parties in Europe (e.g., AfD in Germany and the Front National in France). Right-wing populist 
governments have also eliminated some climate-protection policies in Hungary, Poland, and the United States, 
among other countries (Lockwood, 2018, p. 712). These findings are therefore restricted to the research period. 
Future research could analyse whether the left/right dimension has become more important for government re-
sponses to globalisation, with regard to climate policy. In addition, the green/growth dimension has been not ex-
amined here, due to a lack of available data. It is reasonable to expect it to influence globalisation effects on climate 
commitment and performance. This issue should be considered in future research. 
The findings offer support for the political-corruption approach. In accordance with previous research, political 
corruption contributes to the negative effects of trade openness on climate performance in the developing world. 
As expected, it is not important for climate outcomes in developed countries. Developing countries share higher 
levels of political corruption. These results also support the implicit assumption of previous research that political 
corruption in general is decisive, as opposed to specific political-corruption dimensions. This study has added to 
the existing research in finding no similar interaction with capital openness. The political-corruption approach 
does not apply either to incentives and pressures caused by policy diffusion or to those caused by IGO involvement. 
Corrupt and non-corrupt governments react in similar ways to policy diffusion and political globalisation. There 
is likewise no support for the hypothesis that political corruption moderates the effect of globalisation on climate 
commitment.  
Finally, the results confirm hypotheses of the regime-type approach in the pooled analysis of climate commitment, 
as well as the analysis of the climate performance of developing countries. In contrast to earlier research, which 
focused on regime type, this study has shown that a separate analysis of democracy-quality dimensions can con-
tribute to a better understanding of the relationship between globalisation and climate commitment and 
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performance. In this respect, there are differences between climate commitment and performance. Regime-type 
and democratic qualities moderate the effect of international political integration on climate commitment, while 
democratic qualities moderate the effect of economic openness on climate performance in developing countries. 
This confirms hypotheses and statistical results showing that political globalisation contributes to climate commit-
ment and economic openness undermines climate performance in developing countries only. With regard to cli-
mate commitment, the moderation effects vary between UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol ratification. While there 
are differences between democracies and autocracies with regard to the effect of international political integration 
on UNFCCC ratification, only civil rights strengthen the positive effect of IGO involvement on Kyoto Protocol 
ratification. In developing countries, there is a negative effect of trade openness on climate performance in coun-
tries with average civil rights. Moreover, capital openness has a negative effect on climate performance in countries 
with above-average civil rights. In sum, it is important to consider regime type and specific democratic qualities 
to understand the environmental consequences of globalisation. Further studies could study the moderation effects 
of democratic qualities on climate performance in developed countries and consider other democracy-quality di-
mensions, such as equal access to political power among social groups and democracy quality at the local and 
regional level. 
The findings on the joint effect of regime type and international political integration on climate commitment also 
add to the literature on treaty design and state participation in international treaties. This literature assumes that 
treaty design matters to state participation in international treaties. Previous empirical research has supported this 
theoretical expectation. The current results shows that interaction effects also vary in accordance with treaty de-
sign. This contributes to the literature on treaty design and international cooperation. Further research should ask 
whether domestic and international factors, which explain ratification behaviour, and their interaction effects vary 
in accordance with treaty design. The finding that IGO involvement contributes to UNFCCC ratification in autoc-
racies supports the literature on human-rights treaties. 
There are several pathways for future research. As Chapter 2 explains, moderation effects between globalisation 
and domestic political institutions vary between domestic and global environmental problems. Political decision-
makers may have more incentives to reduce the negative consequences of globalisation on the local environment. 
It is therefore relevant to compare the effect of interactions between globalisation and domestic political institu-
tions on different environmental policies. Spilker (2013) has found that the positive effect of trade openness on 
SO2 emissions in developing countries is weaker in countries that are more democratic. She has found no similar 
effect on CO2 emissions. The present results have shown that civil rights, not democracy quality in general, weaken 
the negative effects of trade openness on climate performance. Future research should examine whether this is a 
general difference between domestic and global pollution. Cao and Prakash (2012) have shown that veto players 
moderate the effect of international economic interdependence on domestic air and water pollution. My own anal-
ysis of climate commitment and performance finds no support for the veto-player approach. With regard to eco-
nomic interdependence, this confirms the argument that left- and right-wing veto players react in similar ways to 
international economic pressures, particularly in the case of global air pollution. CO2 emissions result from eco-
nomic processes and have no immediate local consequences. Therefore, the veto-player approach may apply to 
local pollutants but not to global pollutants. It is important to study these differences in more detail. Future research 
should analyse the joint effect of capital openness and civil rights. The example of Bolivia shown that civil rights 
can make FDI in natural-resource extraction more attractive, thus contributing to higher emission levels. For in-
stance, it is relevant to study potential differences among types of foreign direct investment.  
Finally, this study has focused on domestic political institutions, reflecting the available data. While it has consid-
ered both institutional constraints and institutional quality, it is also important to consider the policy preferences 
of political actors. Within the veto-player approach, the policy preferences of political actors have to some extent 
been taken into account. 
9.2.2 Globalisation and policy-diffusion literature  
This study makes two contributions to the broader literature on the joint effects of globalisation and domestic 
political institutions on the environment. First, it underlines the importance of examining multiple globalisation 
dimensions when analysing the moderation effects of domestic political institutions. Previous research has focused 
on domestic pollution. Such studies have argued that, in relation to climate policy, governments react in similar 
ways to international pressures to stay internationally competitive, since global warming has no immediate effect 
on citizens. In contrast to these studies, the present analysis considers multiple dimensions of globalisation: eco-
nomic openness, interdependence, and international political embeddedness. The main argument is that, while 
countries respond in similar ways to international economic pressures to stay economically competitive, domestic 
political institutions can moderate the effects of economic openness via economic growth and incentives derived 
from international political integration. This study has added to the literature by showing that, while domestic 
political institutions do not influence policy diffusion via trading partners, they moderate the effect of international 
political integration, as well as trade and capital openness. The findings suggest that the effect of international 
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economic interdependence, which is decisive for country differences in climate performance in developed coun-
tries, is independent of veto players and political corruption. By contrast, regime type moderates the effect of 
international political integration on climate commitment. Moreover, regime type and political corruption improve 
our understanding of the effect of economic openness on climate performance in developing countries. In this 
respect, the case study of Bolivia shows that the same mechanism can contribute to the positive effects of interna-
tional political integration on climate commitment, strengthening the negative effects of economic openness on 
climate performance. The present findings, therefore, underline the importance of considering multiple globalisa-
tions when researching the joint effect of domestic and international factors that may explain other policy outputs 
and outcomes. 
Second, this study has shown that a disaggregated analysis of domestic political institutions contributes to a better 
understanding of the effects of globalisation. Using as explanatory models the veto-player, political-corruption, 
and regime-type approaches, I argue that there are multiple possible moderation effects of domestic political insti-
tutions on the influence of globalisation. Second, forms of political corruption and democracy-quality dimensions 
vary in their moderation effects. With regard to the veto-player approach, it has shown that, among veto points, 
only bicameralism is important for the relationship between globalisation and climate performance in developed 
countries. With regard to the political-corruption approach, corrupt and incorrupt governments react in similar 
ways to political globalisation. However, political corruption worsens the negative effects of trade and capital 
openness. In contrast to earlier research findings, this effect is independent of the form of political corruption. The 
present findings also add to the literature on the regime-type approach. For the Kyoto Protocol, in contrast to the 
UNFCCC, there is no difference in international political effects on the ratification behaviour of democracies and 
autocracies. Yet, civil rights strengthen positive incentives derived from international political integration. In ac-
cordance with the findings of Spilker (2013), economic openness does not have a different effect on climate per-
formance in developing democracies and autocracies. However, this study has shown that specific democratic 
qualities moderate the effect of trade and capital openness on CO2 emissions. The disaggregated analysis of the 
moderation effects of domestic political institutions can, therefore, help us to better understand the climate-policy 
consequences of globalisation. This confirms the finding that the disaggregated analysis of regime type helps to 
explain the consequences of democracy in relation to climate commitment and performance (Escher & Walter-
Rogg, 2018). The disaggregated approach can also help us better understand the joint effect of domestic political 
institutions and globalisation on other environmental, social, and economic policy outputs and outcomes. For in-
stance, previous research has shown that democracy moderates the effect of economic globalisation on social 
policy outputs and outcome. It may be fruitful to examine which democratic qualities are decisive. 
9.3 Limitations of this study 
This chapter discusses the limitations of this study and their implications for future research. The results depend 
on research design and model specification. In this respect, they are restricted to specific country samples and one 
research period (1992–2006). Future research should study these relationships in more recent years. As the previ-
ous section explains, with regard to the veto-player approach, the importance of veto players and their policy 
preferences may have become more important during the last decade, in relation to the influence of globalisation 
on climate commitment and performance. Many comparative climate-policy studies are limited to a specific re-
search period. It is, therefore, important to improve the data available for further studies. My developed-country 
sample is nearly complete, based on the selection criteria. However, data availability issues have made it necessary 
to drop some countries from the developing and pooled country sample. As explained in chapter 6, I have not 
examined climate performance in post-communist countries. This partly reflects the lack of data on the policy 
preferences of veto players outside the developed world. To improve our knowledge, there is a need for better 
data.  
My findings refer to the conceptualisation and measurement of the dependent variables. This implies that these 
conclusions on climate commitment refer to the ratification duration of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. Chapter 
2 explains that ratification behaviour only reflects the acceptance of an international consensus. Moreover, my 
findings suggest that states ratify international climate agreements to enhance their reputations at the international 
level. Thus, ratification behaviour tells us little about a country’s actual willingness to contribute to climate change 
mitigation. It is therefore necessary for future research to develop new measures for the analysis of climate com-
mitment via large N-studies. There is a particular need for data based on expert evaluations, which can address the 
complexity of commitment to climate cooperation. 
With regard to climate performance, this study has examined CO2 emissions levels. These results do not neces-
sarily apply to other greenhouse gases. Moreover, as Chapter 2 explains, I have focused on between-variation 
country averages over the research period. Thus, the findings of this study do not refer to the development of CO2 
emissions within countries. For both theoretical and empirical reasons, it is important to examine between- and 
within-variation data separately (see also Hanusch, 2018, p. 251). I have focused on between-variation data, as 
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political institutions vary little over time. Future research should analyse the relationship between globalisation, 
domestic political institutions, and changes in CO2 emissions. It should also be noted that the dependent variable 
focuses on emissions derived from production within countries. This is in line with previous research. Yet, as 
Chapter 2 argues, developed countries may perform better because they shift pollution-intensive production pro-
cesses to the developing world. Likewise, global air pollution in the developing world derives from the production 
of goods that are exported to industrialised countries. 
In addition, this study of climate commitment and performance focuses on national climate policy (see also Han-
usch, 2018, p. 252). There is a need to study transnational, regional, and domestic climate commitment and per-
formance as well. Climate policy takes place at all levels of the political system (see also Selin & VanDeveer, 
2012, p. 342; Winslow, 2005, p. 771). Cities and regions undertake international coordination efforts and are active 
in climate change mitigation. Therefore, the effect of globalisation and its interplay with domestic political insti-
tutions might vary among cities and regions. 
The results show that conceptualisation matters for the effect of international economic integration on climate 
commitment and performance. The moderation effects of domestic political institutions vary between trade and 
capital openness, as well as policy diffusion via trading partners. This confirms the argument in policy-diffusion 
research that it is important to consider multiple conceptualisations of policy diffusion. In this regard, the findings 
also suggest that, in relation to climate commitment, policy diffusion within regions, rather than via trading part-
ners, is decisive. The statistical analysis of interaction effects between domestic and international variables has 
focused on policy diffusion via important trading partners. Consequently, future research should consider alterna-
tive approaches to measuring this policy-diffusion mechanism (for instance, the measurement approach proposed 
by Cao & Prakash, 2010), as well as other policy-diffusion mechanisms. 
With regard to political globalisation, this study has focused on state involvement in IGOs. In particular, the con-
structivist approach also considers other dimensions of political globalisation, such as INGOs. It is necessary to 
supplement the present findings with an analysis of additional dimensions of political globalisation. Finally, this 
study has followed previous research in focusing on economic and political globalisation. It may be fruitful to 
study interactions between other dimensions of globalisation and domestic factors as well – for instance, whether 
the effects on the global environment of aspects of social globalisation, such as tourism, vary in accordance with 
domestic political institutions. 
As Section 9.1 explains, the findings suggest that the veto-player approach cannot explain climate-policy responses 
to international economic and political integration. Given the available data, there has been little variance among 
indicators of the ideological heterogeneity of veto players and specific veto points in the developing-country and 
pooled-country samples. Thus, the statistical power of these variables is low. The separate analysis of climate 
performance in developed countries came to the same conclusion: that the policy preferences of veto players and 
veto points do not help us understand the effects of globalisation. The results remained stable using the ideological 
heterogeneity measure developed by Jahn (2010), which is based on actual policy preferences. Nonetheless, there 
is a need for valid and reliable data on the policy preferences of veto players in developing countries. 
The explanatory models specified in Chapter 5 show that there are multiple relevant moderation effects of domestic 
political institutions on the influence of domestic political institutions. In accordance with previous research on 
globalisation and climate commitment and performance, this study has applied a quantitative research design. With 
better data, it may be possible in future to consider multiple interrelationships with structural equation modelling 
in large-N analyses as well. The short case studies complement the quantitative analyses, helping to explain the 
causal mechanisms underpinning these findings. To improve our knowledge on the causal relationships between 
international and domestic explanatory factors of climate cooperation, it would be helpful to shift use process 
tracing.   
9.4 Policy implications of the research findings 
There has been a considerable increase in in globalisation for the last decades (Gale, 2019, p. 517). Simultaneously, 
high levels of deforestation, biodiversity loss, ocean pollution and (global) air pollution can be observed (Gale, 
2019, p. 517). An important question, in global environmental politics, is, therefore, whether globalisation is good 
or bad for our (global) environment. According to Frankel and Rose (2005, p. 85), when international trade con-
tributes to environmental degradation, independent of other factors, there is little public demand to reduce global-
isation to protect the environment. This study has shown that domestic political institutions moderate, apart from 
the relationship between economic interdependence and climate performance, effects of globalisation on climate 
commitment and performance. This implies that domestic politics is able to strengthen positive effects and weaken 
negative effects of globalisation on climate cooperation. In this respect, the results offer multiple political and 
practical implications.  
According to Barrett (2003, see also Bang et al., 2016), the effectiveness of climate treaties depends on three 
conditions: broad participation, acceptance of ambitious greenhouse gas emission reductions by its member states, 
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and that members states reduce their emissions in accordance with these emission targets. With regard to climate 
commitment, supports of climate cooperation should consider the interplay between political globalisation and 
regime type aspects. The effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol has been undermined by the non-participation of 
important greenhouse gas emitters (Canada, USA). The results confirm the conclusion from previous research that 
it is important to support involvement in IGOs as it contributes to climate treaty ratification. This study shows that 
regime type aspects strengthen this relationship. In this respect it is important to distinguish between soft and hard 
climate treaties. Scholars and policymakers discuss the design of international climate treaties to increase state 
participation in climate cooperation. The results of this study suggest that treaty design influences the joint effect 
of international political integration and regime type aspects on climate commitment. International political inte-
gration contributes to the participation of autocracies in soft climate treaties. Thus, when the aim is broad country 
participation among non-democratic countries, soft climate treaties are preferable. By contrast, state involvement 
in IGOs or IGO networks is associated only with the ratification of harder climate treaties (Kyoto Protocol) in 
countries with above-average civil rights. Thus, acceptance of the rule of law at the domestic and international 
level contributes to the ratification of more ambitious climate agreements. To increase state participation in such 
climate treaties, it is important to support the rule of law and international cooperation in developed and developing 
countries. In accordance with this finding, it can be observed that opponents of climate change mitigation (e.g., 
the Trump administration) reject multilateral cooperation in general and simultaneously undermine the rule of law 
at the domestic level. The current Paris Agreement is a relative ambitious climate treaty (Bang et al., 2016, p. 212). 
However, it does not include legally binding greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. Nonetheless, the rejection 
of international cooperation and the rule of law by the US administration has led to its withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement. 
As described above, the effectiveness of climate agreements depends on their compliance with international cli-
mate targets. With regard to climate performance in developed countries, the findings imply that a country’s cli-
mate performance depends on the climate performance of its main trading partners. This relationship is independ-
ent of institutional constraints, the policy preferences of veto players, and political corruption. When a country’s 
trading partners share low levels of CO2 emissions, this country is likely to achieve high levels of climate perfor-
mance. This finding underlines the importance of coordinating greenhouse gas emissions reductions among de-
veloped countries. To improve climate protection in countries that perform badly, governments should undertake 
more efforts to coordinate their climate policies with the respective policies of their trading partners. More recently, 
major developed countries have stopped supporting climate Therefore (i.e., the US). This may undermine climate 
policies in connected countries. Moreover supporters of climate protection, should take the lead in climate change 
mitigation. For instance, the trade relationship between China and the EU has contributed to stricter environmental 
regulations in China. 
The finding, that trade and investment are negatively associated with climate performance in countries with aver-
age or above-average levels of civil rights, suggests that international economic integration has not contributed to 
sustainable development in the developing world. This underlies the importance of supporting green growth strat-
egies in developing countries. However, the analysis suggests that trade and capital openness are not necessarily 
associated with lower climate performance in developing countries. The analysis of developing countries indicates 
that civil rights lessen the negative effects of trade openness on climate performance in developing countries. This 
implies that policy-makers should support the rule of law to contribute to climate protection. This is in accordance 
with the argument that improvements in institutional quality are necessary to reduce negative effects of globalisa-
tion (Fukumi & Nishijima, 2010, p. 1873). Simultaneously, these liberties undermine climate performance via 
scale effects of increased foreign investment. Thus, it is important that policy-makers support green-growth strat-
egies in foreign investment. To solve the climate crisis, it is also important to consider further the environmental 
consequences of free-trade agreements. These findings help to illuminate the fear that the EU trade agreement with 
MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) may cause environmental 
degradation in these democracies via economics of scale and deforestation (e.g., Greenpeace European Unit, 
2019). In fact, even political decision-makers in EU member states have questioned the trade agreement, given 
Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro’s inaction during the devastating wildfires in Latin America in 2019 (Borger et 
al., 2019; Sengupta, 2019). The Amazonian fires are a man-made disaster (Watts, 2019). Farmers and smallholders 
burn forest land for agriculture. In addition, land-grabbers burn trees. The deforestation in 2019 was far worse than 
in previous years. While there are multiple explanations for this development, the right-populist Bolsonaro gov-
ernment has reduced environmental regulations, cut the financial resources and staff of important environmental 
agencies, and questioned deforestation and climate change (Watts, 2019). Likewise, other right-populist political 
decision-makers and parties, including the Trump administration, have focused on economic growth and actively 
reduced and undermined state efforts to protect the environment. Second, based on the finding that civil rights 
lessen the negative effects of trade openness on climate performance, a decline in the rule of law is likely to 
contribute to global air pollution. It is therefore important to support both environmental protection and civil rights. 
Right-wing governments, like those in Brazil and the United States, undermine civil rights and environmental 
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protection. President Joel Bolsonaro cuts public support for indigenous groups and accepts land grabbing, which, 
together with deforestation, destroys their way of life. Accordingly, he does not accept the rule of law at the inter-
national level or environmental cooperation. The Brazilian government rejected the support of EU member states 
to tackle the wildfires. However, this book has also shown that foreign direct investment contributes via economic 
growth to global air pollution. A decline in the rule of law in countries such as Brazil may therefore have a positive 
effect for our atmosphere by reducing the economic activities of multinational corporations. To conclude, political 
decision-makers should address the environmental consequences of international trade and investment to tackle 
climate change. 
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